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1Introduction: Spectres of Mauss
if the people of Dogville have a problem with acceptance, what they really 
need is something for them to accept. something tangible, like a gift.
lars von trier’s Dogville (2003) opens with the self-appointed philos-
opher-in-residence of a tiny mountain hamlet speculating over a solu-
tion to the moral shortcomings of his neighbours. thomas edison, Jr 
(Paul Bettany) hazards that what is needed to awaken the townsfolk of 
Dogville from their dogmatic slumbers is something new, something 
different, something suggestive of a future. ‘something tangible, like 
a gift.’ the gift duly arrives in the form of a beautiful young runaway 
(Nicole Kidman), who stumbles accidentally upon the town after taking 
flight from an unspecified figure of authority. Appropriately, she is 
called Grace – a name connoting God’s gift of unmerited and sponta-
neous, unconditional salvation. As the film’s narrator observes, Grace 
‘hadn’t chosen Dogville from a map, or sought out the town for a visit. 
she had elected to give herself up to him at random, as – yes – a gift. 
Generous, very generous, thought tom.’
After a difficult start, the people of Dogville warm to Grace, who, 
under tom’s guiding influence, distinguishes herself by giving them pre-
cisely what they do not need, doing the jobs that no one knew needed 
doing prior to her arrival. this early phase of warmth does not last, 
however. the more Grace gives, the more the recipients of her gifts 
become resentful of her; the more the gift is perceived as a burden that 
threatens to undermine the integrity, the identity of its recipients; the 
more Grace is seen to be taking hold, or possession, of the town. in a 
reversal of roles, Grace herself becomes the obliging host to whom the 
rest feel indebted. We soon see an attempt to reinstate the previous hier-
archy. emphasising the risks they run in harbouring a wanted fugitive, 
the people of Dogville assert their right to a greater countergift in return 
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for their own gift of hospitality. Grace alone is no longer enough. 
Before long, her alleged debt to them is so great that she is reduced to 
a slave, performing all manner of menial duties for the women and all 
manner of sexual favours for the men and children. in the last instance, 
Grace is reduced to an object that stands outside the symbolic order 
of the community. her status as an irredeemable outsider is confirmed 
when she is presented as a sacrificial offering to the forces of the law 
from which she fled.
the sacrifice fails, revealing in so doing the complicity between the 
gift and the law, the nomos, that stands as its inverse face. the dreaded 
force of law turns out to be a gangster, Grace’s father, who merely 
sought to incorporate her into the family business. having been rescued 
from captivity, Grace returns to the town and, in the film’s final scene, 
proceeds to rain down death on every last one of Dogville’s (human) 
inhabitants. No longer recognisable as such, the gift is released from 
the fatal economy that negated it. No longer ‘tangible’, or recognisable 
as a gift, it finally achieves what it always threatened to achieve with 
the unbearable intensity of its imperative: not just the undermining, but 
also the destruction, of the identity of its recipients in the very moment 
of its receipt.
in the second instalment of von trier’s anticipated America trilogy, 
Manderlay (2005), we see Grace stumble across an Alabaman slave 
plantation and, with all the generosity her name suggests, respond once 
again to the call to bestow her gift on a people apparently grateful to 
receive it. Wresting power from its white colonial mistress, Grace (this 
time played by Bryce Dallas howard) turns Manderlay into a demo-
cratic cooperative, presenting each of its black workers with a ‘deed 
of gift’ that entitles them to communal ownership and a share in the 
profits of cotton production. Not everyone is happy, however, and 
when the collapse of the traditional order leads to the late sowing of 
crops and an ensuing shortage of food, the fears of one older ex-slave, 
Wilhelm (Danny Glover), prove justified. the emancipated slaves are 
simply not ready for freedom and the ungrounding collapse of identity 
it brings with it. they cannot bear the greatest weight of the gift they 
have received. As in Dogville, we are presented with a politics that, 
though beginning with hospitality and an openness toward the gift, 
veers toward its sacrifice and suppression. Dogville concludes with the 
traumatic discovery that the gift is not just Grace – not just unqualified 
redemption – but also poison. Manderlay ends with a similar inversion 
of hospitality, a similarly futile attempt to confine the gift. the freed 
slaves ochlocratically vote to imprison Grace, to force her to fill the role 
of the old colonial mistress and administer a return to the ‘old ways’ 
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of slavery. her gift of freedom is once again met with a countergift 
that negates it, even if the negation is once again destined to fall short 
of what it takes to contain her. As the credits roll for the second time, 
Grace breaks free and takes flight, repeating the inappropriability, the 
ability to exceed containment and confinement to the present that char-
acterised her escape from Dogville.
G i fts  AND leGAcies
there is a temptation to interpret both films, Dogville and Manderlay, 
as illustrations of what the anthropologist Marcel Mauss called the 
economy of the gift, the threefold obligation to give, to receive and 
to reciprocate. Mauss famously argues that this threefold obligation 
constitutes the élan vital of archaic society, the force of life that binds 
communities together through a network of gift exchange designed 
to prevent the accretion of destabilising concentrations of power and 
wealth. At the very least, one could see Dogville as an attempt to trace 
the life of the gift under conditions of capitalism, after the breakdown 
of the archaic gift economy, coinciding with the birth of homo eco-
nomicus, the atomised individual for whom obligation without con-
tract no longer represents a profitable investment and an efficient use 
of scarce resources. to do so, however, would be to risk missing an 
entire history of post-Maussian thought contained within the films, a 
history in which the logic of the gift is pushed to the extreme, leaving 
it unrecognisable. Dogville may begin with a Maussian notion of gifts 
inscribed within an economy, but it soon becomes an affirmation of 
the claim made by Derrida and supported by Bataille, Klossowski, 
lacan, Deleuze and Nancy: namely, that there is a gift that exceeds any 
economy, and which is accordingly impossible, except where it occurs 
in the absence, or in excess, of subjectivity. the sequel illustrates all the 
more starkly how this gift relates to politics; how the impossibility of 
receiving the gift corresponds to what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘the 
fundamental problem of political philosophy’ (AŒ, 31/36), why we 
desire our own repression, or – to recast it – why it is easier to refuse a 
gift than to accept it.
over the course of this book, it will hopefully become apparent that 
the impossible gift is not the sacrificial offering as such, but that which 
returns to haunt in the failure of its offering, a moment of excess that 
escapes any and every confinement, which moreover transforms or even 
obliterates that which attempts to receive it. the people of Dogville 
and Manderlay are haunted by the spectre of Grace, by the figure of 
a gift that, surviving its own sacrifice, returns, takes flight and refuses 
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to die. in the same way, might we say that twentieth-century thought 
in general is haunted by the spectre of The Gift, the spectre, or rather 
spectres of Marcel Mauss’s Essai sur le don?
this somewhat tentative claim is borne out in the legacy of Mauss’s 
masterwork, the essay that first identified the economy of the gift as ‘one 
of the rocks on which our societies are built’ (G, 4/148 [tM]). Mauss’s 
revolutionary argument consists in contesting the idea that, prior to the 
advent of capitalism and advanced monetary systems, the germ of the 
market economy is recognisable in a system of barter where the market 
place serves as the site of rational, utilitarian exchange. Analysing 
fieldwork undertaken amongst the indigenous tribes of Melanesia, the 
south Pacific and the American Northwest, Mauss argues that these 
societies exhibit ‘nothing that might resemble what is called a “natural” 
economy’ (G, 5/150 [tM]). in place of the methodological individual-
ism of later economists (hayek 1944: 44; hayek 1949: 6–11; Joseph 
1975: 37), he elaborates a theory of group behaviour and the ‘total 
social fact’ first developed by his uncle, Émile Durkheim. he thus rejects 
the idea that society is an aggregate of self-seeking, utility-maximising 
individuals, organised around distinct public and private spheres, the 
market (agora) and the home (oikos). Underlying this rejection is the 
claim that economic man is a relatively recent phenomenon. it makes 
its debut, Mauss suggests, in the early eighteenth century, at around the 
time of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (G, 76/271). Mandeville’s poem 
(1714) and subsequent commentaries thereon (1732) portray man as a 
bee whose selfish and calculating behaviour works to the overall benefit 
of the hive (Mandeville 1997: 27). But the account, Mauss suggests, is a 
product of its age, the early european enlightenment: an abstract theo-
retical, which is to say metaphysical, construct, rather than an anthro-
pological given. Mandeville and those who follow him fail to account 
for the complex social bonds that must be seen to determine the scope 
of individual agency. in neglecting the question of social conditioning, 
they also neglect the historicity of the subject, of what foucault would 
later call the ‘recent invention’ of man, whose existence is nothing 
more than ‘a new fold in our knowledge, and [who] will disappear 
again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form’ (ot, 
xxiii/15).
Mauss anticipates this so-called death of man and the anthropolo-
gist will ironically be decisive in awakening philosophy from what 
foucault diagnoses as its ‘anthropological slumbers’ (ot, 340/351). 
As it is outlined in The Order of Things, foucault uses this sommeil 
anthropologique to characterise the increasingly lazy, dogmatic stance 
of philosophy with regard to the conceptualisation of man, who by the 
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end of the nineteenth century was taken for granted as an analytic point 
of departure from which to understand the world, a rational-transcen-
dental given awkwardly imposed on experience. Philosophy, in other 
words, had lapsed into a kind of anthropocentrism, or ‘Anthropology’: 
‘And so we find philosophy falling asleep in the hollow of this fold 
[in our knowledge]; this time not the sleep of Dogmatism, but that of 
Anthropology,’ understood as ‘the pre-critical analysis of what man 
is in his essence’ (ot, 341/353). calling into question the analytic 
credentials of the rational, calculating and sovereign ‘i think’, Mauss 
writes:
Homo œconomicus is not behind us, but lies ahead, as does the man of 
morality and duty, the man of science and reason. for a very long time man 
was something different, and he has not been a machine for very long, made 
complicated by a calculating machine. (G, 76/272)
in place of the pre-social, metaphysically individuated essence, or resid-
ual soul, of the modern subject, Mauss’s study of gift exchange suggests 
the very opposite: a complex network of obligations, commitments and 
blurred identities from which there no more emerges a concept of the 
individual than there does an isolable market place.
in the gift economies of archaic societies, operations of exchange 
are not confined to transactions between individuals, nor are they pri-
marily economic in nature. on the contrary, Mauss writes: ‘first, it is 
not individuals but collectivities that impose obligations of exchange 
and contract upon each other’ (G, 5/150). the exchange of gifts is 
not limited to the distribution of scarce resources, but occurs at every 
level of society, as a ‘system of total services [système des prestations 
totales]’ (G, 5/151), a total social fact able to account for the whole of 
society: a military structure; a structure of politics and intertribal diplo-
macy; a legal technique for the dissemination of law (encoded in myths 
and songs that assert the necessity of giving), in addition to the more 
obvious religious (sacrificial) and ceremonial connotations. Mauss 
describes a scenario in which the giving of gifts cannot be reduced to 
any logic of individualistic, utilitarian rationality. Gifts given are not in 
themselves economically desirable or necessary, but rather tend toward 
the materially useless, the purely symbolic. the motive for exchange 
is not internal to the objects exchanged, but a product of the social 
imposition of obligation, according to which it is not enough just to 
reciprocate gifts given:
the institution of total services doesn’t merely carry with it the obligation to 
reciprocate presents received. it also supposes two other obligations just as 
important: the obligation on one hand, to give presents, and on the other, to 
receive them. (G, 13/161)
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the threefold obligation to give, to receive and to reciprocate locks 
participants into an interminable series of obligations by demanding 
that gifts ‘follow around this circle a regular movement in space and 
time’ (G, 22/176 [tM]). the public sphere is thus all-encompassing, 
structured by laws and myths endowed with the task of reiterating the 
notion that adhesion to the rules of gift exchange is ‘in the final analy-
sis [. . .] strictly compulsory, on pain of private or public warfare’ (G, 
5/151). Underlying this logic is the fundamental claim that to receive a 
gift is to become indebted to its giver. Mauss draws on Germanic ety-
mology to show that the gift, inseparable from the debt it engenders, 
is poison (Mauss 1997: 28–32/243–7), to be cured or expiated only by 
ensuring its constant circulation. every gift given compels a countergift 
of equal or greater value, in order to prevent the accumulations of 
power that would threaten communal stability by introducing inequal-
ity back into the structure of society. in the extreme example of the 
Amerindian potlatch, this is taken to the point of competing to establish 
who is ‘the most madly extravagant’ (G, 37/200), ritually destroying 
vast quantities of possessions prior to the requirement to give them 
away. in exchange for the material wealth that could see them acquire 
power over others, tribal members receive dignity and prestige as a 
reward for embracing poverty.
in a study that situates Mauss in a long line of social contract theo-
rists from Grotius and hobbes to Rousseau, the economic historian 
Marshall sahlins famously describes the Essai as Mauss’s ‘own gift 
to the ages’, ‘a source of unending ponderation for the anthropologist 
du métier’, whose work ‘in fact only renders the due of the original’ 
(sahlins 1972: 149). for sahlins, then, it is as if one could look to 
Mauss’s text, above all to his claim that it is the very nature of the gift 
to compel reciprocation, to explain the extent of subsequent engage-
ments with his work. An apparently similar claim is made by Jacques 
Derrida, who repeats sahlins’s point, yet subtly radicalises it, posing 
the question of whether ‘the gift is not first of all the essay titled The 
Gift, precisely insofar as it finds it impossible to speak of the gift that 
is its theme?’ (Gt, 57/79 [tM]). the gift of Mauss’s Essai, in other 
words, would not lie in its recognisability, in the generation of a sense 
of recognition that one would feel impelled, obliged, to reciprocate, but 
rather in its very refusal of recognition, in the difficulty of identifying it 
explicitly with any gift. to respond to Mauss out of obligation would 
in fact be to negate the gift, to subsume it under a law of exchange, 
an economy in which it would become both conditional and predeter-
mined.
Derrida’s argument lies in extending the Maussian logic of the gift 
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beyond the conclusions at which Mauss himself arrives. By empha-
sising the anthropologically irreducible relationship between the gift 
and poison, the gift and obligation, Mauss endeavours to expose the 
occidentalism of a (christian) concept of giving that valorises the gift 
as inherently virtuous, given unconditionally, without expectation 
of return. But his critique of homo economicus ultimately falls short 
because it remains rooted in anthropology. By asserting the impurity 
of the gift to be constitutive, a by-product of its inseparability from the 
contaminated relations of human exchange, Mauss sacrifices uncon-
ditional generosity to a modern logic of the subject. in a much earlier 
essay, to which we shall return presently, Derrida writes of claude 
lévi-strauss that, ‘whether he wants to or not’, the ethnologist ‘accepts 
into his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment 
when he denounces them’ (WD, 356/414). the claim is equally appli-
cable to Mauss, who anthropocentrically defines the gift in relation 
to the subject, and not vice versa. for Derrida, it is not the gift that is 
contaminated, but the economic logic of subjectivity. We see this in the 
way that, rather than sacrifice the purity of the concept, Derrida insists 
on an irreducible discrepancy between the promise of the gift and the 
possibility of fulfilling that promise. Mauss’s economy of the gift testi-
fies to the excess of our concept of giving over any instantiable instance 
of giving. But it does not in and of itself suffice to preclude the possibil-
ity that there could still be an unconditional gift, a gift that would fulfil 
the promise implied by its concept. the crux of Derrida’s argument is 
that the gift cannot exist where its giving is merely conditional; where, 
that is to say, it risks generating a sense of debt, a perceived obligation 
to reciprocate, on the part of the recipient. Nor can it exist even if it is 
given unbeknown to the recipient, so long as there is a giver who would 
stand to experience some kind of pleasure or jouissant return on his or 
her (or its) investment:
for there to be a gift, it is necessary that the donee not give back, amortize, 
reimburse, acquit himself, enter into contract, and that he never contracted 
a debt. [. . .] it is thus necessary, at the limit, that he not recognize the gift as 
gift. if he recognizes it as gift, if the gift appears to him as such, if the present 
is present to him as present, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. 
Why? Because it gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a sym-
bolic equivalent. [. . .] if the other perceives or receives it, if he or she keeps 
it as a gift, the gift is annulled [Si l’autre le perçoit, s’il le garde comme don, 
le don s’annule]. But the one who gives it must not see it or know it either, 
otherwise he begins at the threshold, as soon as he intends to give, to pay 
himself with a symbolic recognition, to praise himself, to approve of himself, 
to gratify himself to congratulate himself, to give back to himself symboli-
cally the value of what he thinks he has given. (Gt, 13–4/26–7)
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irrespective of whether it is given in the explicit context of an (archaic) 
gift economy, the gift, Derrida argues, is inherently economic – so long 
as it is identifiable as a gift. the mere intention to give or recognition 
of a gift serves to inscribe the gift within an economy that annuls its 
supposed unconditionality. for there to be a gift, it would by definition 
have to break with the economy in which it finds itself inscribed in the 
very act of being given. it would have to take place in the absence of the 
subject, in the absence of any supposedly self-identical giver or receiver 
who might recognise obligation or benefit in the giving or receipt of a 
gift. it is accordingly impossible:
if the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain 
aneconomic. Not that it remains foreign to the circle, but it must keep a 
relation of foreignness to the circle, a relation without relation of familiar 
foreignness. it is perhaps in this sense that the gift is the impossible.
 Not impossible, but the impossible [Non pas impossible mais l’impos-
sible]. (Gt, 7/19)
Not just impossible but the impossible, the gift would be the very defini-
tion of impossibility simply because it could never admit of subjective 
experience. Derrida repeatedly insists on the qualification, ‘s’il y en a’, 
‘if there is any’ (Gt, 7/18), in order to emphasise that in speaking of 
a pure gift we depart from the realms of the experientiable and enter 
into the domain of an event that can be neither verified subjectively nor 
communicated in language (Derrida, Nouss and soussana 2001: 89).
the counterintuitiveness of the gift’s impossibility is one of several 
objections raised against Derrida’s argument. the most prominent 
and sustained version of the criticism comes from the phenomenolo-
gist Jean-luc Marion, who remains sympathetic to the deconstructive 
position, but criticises Derrida for failing to see that the gift does admit 
of conscious, phenomenal experience – even if it remains subjectively 
ungraspable. in Being Given (1997), Marion argues that Derrida’s 
analysis of the gift does not go far enough, because Derrida fails to see 
that the conditions of the gift’s impossibility serve as the very condi-
tions of its possibility, by preventing its recuperation within any kind of 
economy. the gift, according to Marion:
would be accomplished not despite the threefold objection made by Derrida, 
but indeed thanks to it [grâce à elle]. in effect, the so-called ‘conditions of 
the impossibility of the gift’ (no givee, no giver, no object given) would 
become precisely the conditions for the possibility of its reduction to and for 
a pure givenness. (Marion 2002: 84/122)
this defence of the experientiability of the gift revolves around the 
notion that it can exist, albeit not as the object of an identifiable 
exchange. Rather than defy experience outright, Marion suggests that 
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the gift yields itself to experience of a kind that defies conceptualisa-
tion, refusing any appropriative synthesis or assimilation by what he, 
following Kant, calls transcendental subjectivity. the gift, in other 
words, would give itself in an experience that does not require, and 
would moreover be incompatible with, an active, preconditioning sub-
jectivity. Not only does pure donation not need a subject to recognise 
its existence, but it is also of such intensity that recognition is rendered 
impossible, because it pacifies the conceptual mechanisms of its would-
be recipient. far from it withdrawing from or not yielding to experi-
ence, as if somehow deficient, Marion describes the gift as a ‘saturated 
phenomenon’, a phenomenon whose intuition exceeds the ability of 
any concept to grasp it, and which occasions a beatific encounter that 
cannot be traced to any cause, or identifiable giver (2002: 214/299). 
for the openly christian Marion, who sets out to redeem a negative 
theology he detects at work in Derrida, phenomenology thus opens on 
to a ‘mystical theology’ that leaves open a space for (divine) revelation 
(Derrida and Marion 1999: 40). Responding to this in a dialogue with 
Marion, Derrida expresses doubt that such an asubjective experience is 
conceivable within the horizons of phenomenology. he suggests that 
Marion ‘wants to free the gift and givenness from being’ (1999: 59). 
Derrida is, for all that, clear that our inability to experience the gift as 
such does not amount to saying that it could never exist in excess of 
the horizons of subjectivity, yielding itself to the desubjectified (1999: 
57–8).
one might hazard that the difference between the two philosophers 
ultimately comes down to the relation of the aneconomic gift to the eco-
nomic structure of consciousness. in seeking to articulate the experience 
of the gift as one of the sublime pacification of subjectivity, Marion 
seems less interested than Derrida in the gift’s violent, poisonous dime-
sion. for Derrida, this violence is what necessitates the gift’s rupture 
with both consciousness and phenomenology. Where Marion’s subject 
is left pacified but essentially intact by an encounter with the gift, we 
shall see that Derrida’s emphasis on the gift’s ability to unground, or 
break down, subjectivity becomes crucial to an understanding of its 
politics.
By claiming to draw out and extend the implicit christianity of the 
Derridean account, Marion renders it more susceptible to another 
series of criticisms, this time hailing from the opposite end of the 
spectrum. for the philosopher and anthropologist Marcel hénaff, the 
decoupling of the gift from the social dimension of recognition reveals 
the Derridean treatment of giving to be formed by a restrictive Judeo-
christian perspective that is simply incommensurable with the logic 
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of gift-giving in archaic society. Preferring a vocabulary of ‘ceremo-
nial giving’ to the language of ‘archaic’ gift ‘economics’ employed by 
Mauss, hénaff denies that the giving of gifts entails the kind of crea-
tion of obligation that would generate an economy of debt. Defining 
economics more narrowly than either Mauss or lévi-strauss, as ‘a 
relation between men through the intermediary of things’ (2002: 204), 
he argues that the ceremonial giving analysed by anthropologists is not 
economic but symbolic, a gesture intended less to subordinate than 
simply to present a ‘mark of respect, as the expression of a desire to 
know the other in his existence, in his status and finally as evidence of 
an alliance’ (2002: 204). the gift is thus above all political, pertaining 
to ‘the originating gesture of reciprocal recognition between humans, a 
gesture found in no other living beings in that it is mediated by a thing’ 
(hénaff 2009: 230). it is in this affirmation of an intentional poli-
tics of recognition that hénaff’s reading becomes critical of Derrida, 
whom he accuses of reading the gift not just overly economically and 
insufficiently politically, but as too exclusively moral (2002: 188). his 
principal concern is that Derrida’s construal of the anthropological 
gift retroactively projects capitalist notions of exchange and debt back 
on to non-capitalist societies. Derrida’s second mistake, according to 
hénaff, is to make the gift contingent upon its unconditionality, upon 
the absence of any attenuating recognition. in so doing, Derrida under-
mines his own claim to have established the non-self-identity of the gift 
by rendering the deconstruction of its essence dependent upon ‘the only 
voice recognizable and recognized by our entire religious and moral 
tradition: purely generous gift-giving’ (2009: 218). this alone is what 
accounts for and sustains the ‘impossibility’ of the gift being given in 
and to experience.
Where Marion is ultimately in broad agreement with Derrida, the 
weight of hénaff’s charges is potentially devastating and he is not the 
only one to make them. We shall see in chapter 2 that Jean-françois 
lyotard proffers a similarly occidentalist critique, suggesting that ‘the 
whole problematic of the gift, such as [we] receive it from Mauss [. . .] 
belongs in its entirety to Western imperialism and racism,’ as a fantasy 
produced by capitalism, which leads us to idealise anything that might 
escape the totalising logic of exchange-value (lyotard 1993a: 106/130). 
hénaff and lyotard can none the less be shown to labour under 
a number of misapprehensions about what is at stake in Derrida’s 
engagement with the gift, all of which are linked to the assumption that 
it abstracts itself from politics in favour of a naïvely idealistic ethics. it 
might be argued in response that Derrida’s engagement implies a deeper 
appreciation of politics than hénaff’s conception of the intentional 
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creation of alliances allows, and moreover explains how and why we 
might arrive at the overly simplistic formulation of politics as symbolic 
recognition. the question of an unmediated giving is not one of moral 
generosity so much as of generosity as an expression of the spontane-
ous and unmediated, of that which precedes and thereby establishes 
the conditions of mediation and exchange. in other words, Derrida 
wants to know what it is that precedes the giving of any recognisable 
gift, what it is that elicits the initial act of giving. the same question is 
posed by hénaff in response to what he perceives as a lacuna in Mauss: 
namely, the question of what occasions the giving of a gift prior to any 
form of obligation to reciprocate. his solution again rests on the idea 
of recognition, above all on the idea that recognising others through the 
giving of gifts finds its origin in some kind of human nature. ‘the cer-
emonial prestation of gifts puts on display a fundamental structure of 
reciprocity as a condition of all social life in the human species’ (hénaff 
2002: 181). however interesting, the hypothesis is one that Derrida – 
along with the majority of thinkers to be discussed over the course of 
the next four chapters – would regard with considerable suspicion of 
essentialism.
in the Derridean account of giving, the (human) subject is not the 
privileged site of aneconomy, of a spontaneity and generosity unme-
diated by the calculation of interest, but the very opposite. As will 
perhaps become clearer through readings of Derrida’s contemporaries, 
aneconomy is reserved for the giving of existence, which is to say for 
the event of a giving that precedes the subject, and in relation to which 
subjectivity is moreover habitually and even constitutively in a relation 
of tension, economically seeking to preserve itself against a giving that 
is also poisonous to its subjective integrity or identity. the economic 
should not, in the first instance, be conflated with the more conspicu-
ous and conscious calculations of the materially self-interested homo 
economicus, which would only be an extreme version, a recently emer-
gent caricature, of a more basic economy of subjectivity. Nor should it 
be deemed independent of, or incommensurable with, the aneconomic, 
since the two exist in a relation of interdependent tension. An instance 
of deconstruction’s conceptual minimalism, which rids language of 
its metaphysical baggage, Derrida’s concept of economy should be 
read as a literal interpretation of the Greek oikonomia: the manage-
ment, or rather the law (nomos) of the oikos, meaning household or 
hearth, a place of identity (Gt, 6/18; Pc, 299–300/320–1; Johnson 
1993: 57–64). economy thus refers to the law of identity, to that which 
returns or attempts to return to its perceived point of origin, its oikos.
Despite the connotation of being prior or external to the sphere 
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of politics, in a familial chez soi distinct from the public space of the 
polis, this identification of economics with the law of the oikos does 
not quite entail that it is pre-political or uncontaminated by politics. 
exemplified by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s entry on ‘Œconomie’ in the 
1755 edition of the Encyclopédie, the modern, enlightenment thinking 
of economics moves away from its supposedly pre-political origin in 
housekeeping by distinguishing itself as political economy, the study of 
‘the great family that is the state’ and, increasingly, of a market place 
whose brutality contrasts with the sanctuary of a private-sphere oikos 
thought beyond the reach of politics (Rousseau 1986: 16). the modern 
tradition culminates, in the mid-nineteenth century, with Karl Marx, 
for whom the horizons of politics are framed and moreover caused by 
the economic ‘superstructure’, with political struggles determined by 
the relations between economic classes and the ownership of the means 
of production (Marx 2000: 425/8). As is illustrated by the feminist 
movement’s demands to repoliticise the oikos, the advent of postmo-
dernity brings with it the reversal of the modern situation of economics 
prior to politics. to paraphrase the prominent slogan of the feminist 
writer carol hanisch (1969), Derrida argues that the personal is always 
already political. the site of a purportedly inviolable, domestic seat of 
identity is constitutively violated, shot through with an (aneconomic) 
alterity that the economic logic of identity retroactively seeks to keep 
at bay: there is economics because there is politics. A major influence 
on Derrida, emmanuel levinas sets out the logic of this position in 
Totality and Infinity (1961), where he argues that ‘economic existence 
remains within the same. [. . .] its movement is centripetal,’ because it 
constructs a dwelling place for identity through the exclusion of any-
thing construed as threatening (ti, 175/191). Derrida elaborates on this 
in a late essay on hospitality, arguing that the subject comes into being 
as the site of a permeable oikos (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 
29/37). the economic return-to-self is occasioned by the ungrounding 
of economy by aneconomy, and consists in the reassertion of identity 
against the incursions of difference from which it cannot and should 
not secure itself definitively. Understood as the law of identity and its 
continual reinscription, economy also thus functions as a working defi-
nition of the subject. construed by modernity as a self-identical ground 
of privileged, transcendental consciousness, subjective self-identity 
is now recognised as being preceded and made possible by alterity, 
constructed through the management of anything that undermines the 
nomos of its oikos.
in shifting the site of giving away from the economics of the subject 
and on to an unrecognisable, aneconomic event, Derrida’s critique is 
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less of Mauss and more of the modern philosophical tradition, of which 
Mauss remains a part in spite of The Gift. Phenomenology in particular 
has conceived the gift as an indubitable, isolable locus of sense-certainty 
and presence on which to ground the subject. somewhat ironically, 
given Mauss’s critique of modern (cartesian) subjectivity, his illustrious 
contemporary, the German phenomenologist, edmund husserl, uses 
the idea of gift as sense datum to reground a cartesian philosophy of 
consciousness and privileged, transcendental structures of subjectivity. 
in the Cartesian Meditations (1931), husserl writes of a ‘principle of 
pure “intuition” or evidence’ pertaining to ‘what we find actually given 
(and, at first, quite immediately) in the field of the ego cogito’ (husserl 
1960: 24/64). this thesis on the ‘givenness’ of the world in conscious-
ness is later reworked by heidegger, who, initiating the interrogation 
of giving subsequently assumed by Derrida, criticises the residual 
‘anthropologism’, the residual privileging of consciousness in husserl. 
heidegger differentiates ontologically between that which is recognised 
as given and that which gives it, positing the necessity of an impersonal 
event of giving that cannot be grasped simply in terms of what es gibt 
(tB, 21–2/22). for Derrida, however, heidegger – like Mauss – is still 
too committed to representation, still too wedded, in spite of himself, to 
the idea of a gift that can be conceived and identified independently of 
those who would receive it. through its residual commitment to think-
ing the gift in terms of an essentialised presence-to-self, phenomenol-
ogy continues to endorse the idea of an authentic, legitimate recipient. 
this is particularly problematic when it comes to heidegger’s politics, 
where his conviction that Germany stands in a philosophically privi-
leged relationship to Ancient Greece, as the proper heir, the recipient 
of Greek Heimischwerden, gets caught in a drift toward Nazism (see, 
for example, iM 40, 213/208 [152]). contemporary phenomenology 
moves away from this, notably in the case of Jean-luc Marion, who 
concurs with Derrida that the gift cannot be received, in the sense of 
being recognised as such (even if it can be experienced). But one might 
wonder in passing whether there is not still a problem of politics in 
Marion; whether, like heidegger, Marion does not see the wholly 
benign, unpoisonous gift as short-circuiting politics, giving itself to 
philosophical or phenomenological analysis in a way that sublates any 
politics of gift and receipt.
Marcel Mauss was deeply suspicious of heidegger, dismissing him, 
in a letter to Roger caillois, as ‘a Bergsonian held back by hitlerism, 
legitimating a hitlerism infatuated with irrationalism’ (fournier 
2006: 327/710; fournier 1990: 87). An unswerving proponent of the 
modern ideals of rationality, humanism and positivism, he was equally 
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 suspicious of the anti-enlightenment counterculture, ‘this sort of abso-
lute irrationalism’ that a number of his more experimental students, 
most notably caillois and Michel leiris, under the influence of Georges 
Bataille, took to be the natural progression of his work (2006: 327/710; 
1990: 87). for Derrida, however, the point is that in seeking to separate 
out his own legacy from that of heidegger, Mauss is ultimately com-
plicit in the same kind of essentialist, politically dubious thinking of the 
gift in terms of self-presence, the inheritance of which would amount to 
a mimetic repetition of the same. We see this, on one hand, in terms of 
Mauss’s nostalgic claim that ‘we can and must return to archaic society 
and to elements in it [on peut et on doit revenir à de l’archaïque <sic.>]’ 
(G, 69/263); on the other, in his reliance on a concept of homecoming 
not dissimilar to that of heidegger. to the disappointment of many 
of his legatees, including lévi-strauss (iMM, 47–8/xxxvii), the Maori 
ethnographer, firth (1959: 419), and the anti-lévi-straussian political 
philosopher, claude lefort, who describes the move as ‘incomprehen-
sible’ (1978: 30), Mauss’s rationalism appears to desert him once he 
draws on the Maori myth of the hau, ‘the spirit of the thing [l’esprit des 
choses]’, to explain the intrinsic power of the gift to compel response. 
‘Ultimately, it is the hau that wishes to return to its birthplace, to the 
sanctuary of the forest and the clan, and to the owner’ (G, 12/160). 
An early essay by René Major (reprinted in Major 2001) attempts a 
Derridean reading of this myth, anticipating Derrida’s retention of the 
Maussian language of the ghost. Derrida, however, rejects the central 
tenet of the hau, the idea of centripetal homecoming (Gt, 40–3/58–60). 
Read through Derrida, the spectres of Mauss are defined not by home-
coming and rhythm but by rupture and the refusal of economy, the 
gift’s escape from the law of the place of identity. the gift does not 
return economically to itself, but refuses conflation with presence by 
always returning to and from the future. its legacy is not programmed 
in advance, predetermined in its destiny by the intrinsic qualities of the 
bequest, but rather defined by the absence and moreover the impossibil-
ity of teleology.
What compels us to respond to Mauss’s offering is not the self-iden-
tity of the work, not the ease with which, as sahlins implies, we are able 
to recognise it as a gift, but the aporia of the gift, the impossibility of 
recognising it as such, the impossibility of disentangling its essence from 
a whole host of other legacies and spectres. Rather than a straightfor-
ward affirmation of the Essai’s self-evidence, the question of Mauss’s 
legacy becomes caught up in a problematic of inheritance that serves 
to undermine it, refusing it conceptualisation in terms of the gift and 
receipt of a self-identical, essentially recognisable object. the gift and 
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the spectre alike come to exist amidst the instability, the groundlessness 
of a bequest that is constituted discontinuously, in the act of a repeti-
tion that breaks with the original. in an interview conducted to coin-
cide with the publication of Spectres de Marx (1993), Derrida remarks 
that: ‘to inherit is not essentially to receive something, a given that one 
could then have. to inherit is to select, to sort, to highlight, to reacti-
vate’ (Derrida 2002: 110–11; see also Pc, 299/320, on ‘the legacy of 
freud’). Governed by the aporia, by the impossibility of receiving, that 
is, of identifying the gift we supposedly receive, to inherit is rather to 
respond to and reanimate a life in excess of any phenomenal object, to 
participate in a repetition of difference that exceeds mimesis. through 
the continual renegotiation of what it is of the gift that lives on, we 
unleash a life that resists confinement to finitude, to a finite proper 
name, such as Mauss. in attempting to name the gift, in attempting to 
select, to decide, what of Mauss’s gift survives, however, we are also 
called upon to give death, to sacrifice one (reading of) Mauss in order 
that another might live on beyond and as a result of this sacrifice.
life – being-alive – is perhaps ultimately defined by this tension internal to a 
heritage, by this reinterpretation of what is given in the gift, and even what 
is given in filiation. this reaffirmation, which both resembles and inter-
rupts, resembles (at least) an election, a selection, a decision. (Derrida and 
Roudinesco 2004: 4–5/16 [tM])
it is through the decision that life is conferred and restored that the 
proper name of the author gives way to a multiplicity of spectral incar-
nations. the citation describes deconstruction as a strategy that, rather 
than ‘kill off’ its chosen texts and authors, seeks to reanimate them, to 
disclose how they live on, suspended between life and death by a sacri-
fice that can never be definitive.
in emphasising the necessity of decision, the citation also serves to 
disclose the political dimension that deconstruction, despite Derrida’s 
assertions to the contrary (R, 39/64), has so often been accused of 
eliding. in place of inheritance as a private matter, a concern for the 
familial oikos, it becomes a question of political, aneconomic exchange. 
there is a politics of inheritance in which giver, receiver and gift cannot 
be rigidly delimited but rather contaminate one another, rendering lines 
of filiation indistinct, overflowing any notion of an oikos that would 
precede the public sphere of the political. in place of the ‘economic’, 
‘marketised’ model of politics as a form of exchange or ‘competitive 
struggle’ between pre-given individuals (Mouffe 2005: 13; schumpeter 
1976: 269), we encounter politics in an event that – like the gift – 
eludes identification, moreover as the response to this elusiveness: the 
tension between a gift that continually takes flight and the decision 
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that attempts to name it, to delimit the sacred site of that which refuses 
recognition. to speak of a politics of the gift is therefore to speak of 
a politics of decision, a decision about what it is that withdraws from 
experience. At least one critic has queried the extent to which this can 
really be considered political, whether ‘a description of deconstruction 
as a viable analysis of the political’ would not rely upon ‘deconstruc-
tion taking up a definable position within political discourse’ (Williams 
2001: 132): in other words, consenting to work within a field whose 
terms are already defined, contributing to existing debates within politi-
cal philosophy, rather than seeking to redefine the relation between 
philosophy and politics through a questioning of what politics is.
the present work is an attempt to reject this concern, by beginning 
the (impossible) task of naming in what politics would consist once, fol-
lowing Derrida following Mauss, we refuse to reduce it to a description 
of economic relations and seek instead to discern the relationalities, 
the aneconomic exchanges by virtue of which the political comes into 
existence.
to  RetURN (eteRNAllY)  to  the  G ift
in The Delirium of Praise, her formidable study on the intellectual 
relationships of Bataille, Klossowski and Deleuze, amongst others, 
eleanor Kaufman writes of ‘the peculiarities of a twentieth-century 
french context’ that gives rise to a philosophical moment, an ‘atopic 
space’ of aneconomic exchange that ‘certain historicizing impulses not 
only would not do justice to, but might not even notice as existing at 
all’ (Kaufman 2001: 6). Kaufman argues that the contingent, historical 
relationships between various figures in and around poststructural-
ism contribute to a fundamental change in the way we think about 
the nature of intellectual exchange. this account of an idea that par-
ticipates in, yet is irreducible to, the history from which it develops is 
strongly prefigured by Deleuze, who, in What Is Philosophy? (1991), 
differentiates between scientific descriptions of actual ‘states of affairs 
[états de choses]’ and the philosophical project of extracting from the 
sciences in order to create concepts that stand in for the impossibility 
of experience (WiP, 21–2/26–7). this creation presupposes scientific 
changes, but crucially also goes beyond science. to create a concept is 
to repeat the event by creating a language adequate to the expression 
of that which refuses representation, a language that gives consistency 
to experience beyond the point at which subjectivity begins to unravel.
one can discern in the philosophical legacy of Mauss the repetition 
of a concept of the gift that derives from and yet cannot be reduced 
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to either anthropological or phenomenological accounts. following 
Kaufman, the aim of the present work is not to give a history of ideas, 
however, even if such a history is on occasion inevitably offered. Nor 
is it to produce lacanian, Deleuzian or Nancian readings of (what 
Mauss calls) the gift economy, though these too may creep in on occa-
sion. Rather, reading the gift through Derrida as that which refuses 
experience, the project is to extract a concept of the gift as event, as a 
Deleuzian ‘line of flight’ or becoming, freed from both its anthropologi-
cal confinement to a particular moment in space and time, and from 
the constraints of subjective representation, and to ascertain how the 
deployment of this concept generates a new paradigm of postmod-
ern, poststructuralist political economy. the tracing of this concept 
is organised around a series of repetitions, which, while in a sense 
beginning with Mauss and Maussian problematics, move increasingly 
further away from the conclusions of The Gift, notably from the rela-
tively conventional political morality Mauss espouses. Mauss believed 
the potential of his analyses lay in their contribution to a reassessment 
of the welfare state (G, 67–70/261–4), in a promotion of the social 
values of obligation and reciprocation. his derivation of moral conclu-
sions about the denigration of reciprocity in twentieth-century Western 
society has received considerable criticism, though. As Mary Douglas 
observes, in the foreword to The Gift’s english translation:
his own attempt to use the theory of the gift to underpin social democracy is 
very weak. social security and health insurance are an expression of solidar-
ity, to be sure, but so are lots of other things, and there the likeness ends. 
(G, xv)
the difficulties of transposition have not deterred hénaff, who traces 
the politics of symbolic recognition in ceremonial giving through 
modern institutions of law and government embodying a ‘public pro-
cedure of reciprocal recognition between human groups’ (2009: 227). 
Read through Derrida and other poststructuralists, however, Mauss’s 
legacy is marked by a far broader interrogation of these very institu-
tions and of the liberal democratic politics of modernity as a whole.
Despite the claims of Jürgen habermas, amongst others, this invoca-
tion of poststructuralism should emphatically not be taken to connote 
an irresponsible politics of relativism guided by ‘normative intuitions’ 
rather than philosophical rigour. Nor should it be thought to descend 
from a critique of reason that shows ‘reckless disregard for its own 
foundations’ (habermas 1987: 337/391). As James Williams has 
recently argued, poststructuralism is not inherently ‘against’ anything – 
except perhaps the naïve claims to certainty that would lead us to take 
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something for granted, its self-evidence immunising it from critique 
(Williams 2005: 6). By challenging the rigour of ontology and the sup-
posed self-evidence of modern ideals, so-called poststructuralists have 
not sought to collapse the tradition that bequeathed them, but rather 
to create the conditions for its reaffirmation through an interrogation 
of its limits. Poststructuralism implies a ‘politics of the left’, Williams 
argues, only in so far as it demands that ideas be subject to scrutiny, 
re-evaluated, exposed to the new (2005: 4–6). one might say, only in 
so far as it subjects thought to trial by an eternal return of the new and 
different.
the choice of a language of eternal return is not incidental, here. 
central to the question of the poststructuralist politics of reaffirmation 
is the french legacy of friedrich Nietzsche, whose scathing critique of 
the abstract, idealised thought of modernity broadly lent itself to – and 
for one commentator even ‘anticipated’ – the (admittedly theoretical) 
empiricism of Maussian anthropology (schrift 1995: 87). Jacques le 
Rider has noted how, between the 1920s and 1960s, the reception of 
Nietzsche in france is marked by ‘a reversal of political perspectives’, 
the increasingly radical deployment of Nietzsche, reappropriated from 
the ideologues of Nazism by, amongst others, Georges Bataille and 
Pierre Klossowski – who were also amongst the first readers of Mauss 
(le Rider 1999: 181). the alignment of Nietzsche with the gift would 
be a central theme of this radicalisation. the philosopher and intel-
lectual historian, Alan D. schrift, has observed how for Bataille, in 
particular, Nietzsche’s critique of debt, in the Genealogy of Morality, 
and valorisation of the ‘gift-giving virtue [schenkende Tugend] in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra ‘place him firmly on the side of those who give’ (Z, 
100–2/93; schrift 1995, citing hes, 370/404). le Rider also points 
to an exegetical shift of emphasis towards Nietzsche’s idea of eternal 
return which, decoupled from a more problematic concept of the will 
to power and reaffirmed as a will to chance, lent itself to a renewed 
thinking of politics in terms of time. Reworked by poststructuralist phi-
losophers as an ontology of the non-linear temporality of the event, the 
thought of eternal return provides an alternative to the then dominant 
anthropocentrism of thinking time as the linear progression of human 
history (1999: 172–4). the argument is put most succinctly by Michel 
foucault, who posits Nietzsche’s eternal return as another name for 
the death of man, hence the basis for the new epistémè– the ‘fold in 
our knowledge’ – that would supersede the framing of philosophy by 
‘Anthropology’ and ‘mark the threshold beyond which contemporary 
philosophy can begin to think again. [. . .] if the discovery of Return is 
indeed the end of philosophy, then the end of man is the return to the 
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beginning of philosophy’ (ot, 342/353). the eternal return becomes 
synonymous with the gift both as a name for the intensity that breaks 
down the accepted identity of the human, and as the promise of some-
thing (a future, the übermensch  ) in excess of the homo economicus. 
through its implication in a selective process of interrogation and 
affirmation, the politics of the gift is inextricable from poststructuralist 
readings of Nietzsche’s eternal return, the thought experiment in which 
identity is continually ungrounded through the challenge to affirm 
repetition. seeking to confront the nihilism of living in anticipation of 
an afterlife, Nietzsche defies us to contemplate life as an interminable 
repetition of the same:
this life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once 
more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but 
every pain and every joy and every sigh and everything unutterably small or 
great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and 
sequence. (Gs, 273/250, [§341])
for Nietzsche, those unable to bear the prospect of finitude without 
redemption simply collapse under ‘das grösste schwergewicht’, the 
utmost weight of the thought experiment, thus filtering out the weak 
from the strong. for his héritiers, as we shall see, this process of selec-
tion becomes the mark of the repetition of difference, of a singularity 
that cannot be absorbed without remainder into the economic struc-
tures of consciousness (Klossowski 1963: 206–8). the recognition of 
the limits of consciousness gives rise to the idea of a life of the gift 
beyond man, beyond the limit of corporeality. the gift exists as an irre-
ducible, spectral remainder that exceeds any attempt to delimit it as a 
phenomenologically appropriable object. More than just an affirmation 
of the past, the inheritance of The Gift becomes an affirmation of the 
future, of the inexperientiable, unpredictable life of a gift whose legacy 
consists in its undecidability, multiplicity and spectrality.
in excess of any ‘legitimate’, or what Johnson has called ‘paradig-
matic’ reading of Mauss (Johnson 1996: 314), there is a life of the gift 
that survives the eternal return, lives on because it escapes determina-
tion by the proper name, Mauss. if every attempt to engage with Mauss 
is a repetition of Mauss’s initial engagement, the repetition is not one 
of sameness, but of a minimal difference that simultaneously preserves 
and transforms its meaning. Mauss’s work is no longer a gift because it 
conforms to his own description thereof, but precisely because it gen-
erates a concept of the gift that resists such a description. it succeeds 
because it fails. As Derrida writes in his own study of Mauss, Given 
Time (1991): ‘one could go so far as to say that a work as  monumental 
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as Marcel Mauss’s The Gift speaks of everything but the gift’ (Gt, 
24/39). the tone of the statement reverberates across the eighty years 
that have passed since the Essai’s 1923–4 publication.
the anthropologist, Maurice Godelier, has already written exten-
sively on ‘the legacy of Mauss’, tracing the history of the development 
of Maussian ideas from the Essai to the present, through a broad dis-
cussion of recent work in sociology and anthropology (Godelier 1999: 
10/17). Yet, like sahlins, Godelier continues to work from within a 
traditional concept of inheritance. this exclusive emphasis on anthro-
pology prevents him from extending the legacy to account for Mauss’s 
bastard progeny, to emphasise his influence on other disciplines, not 
least philosophy, which he helped to liberate from the strictures of 
‘Anthropology’. According to schrift, writing in his collection, The 
Logic of the Gift (1997), in addition to Mauss’s incalculable, even 
founding, contribution to the fledgling disciplines of ethnology and 
anthropology, ‘the theme of the gift [. . .] can be located at the centre 
of current discussions of deconstruction, gender, ethics, philosophy 
[. . .] and economics.’ it is, furthermore, ‘one of the primary focal 
points at which contemporary disciplinary and interdisciplinary dis-
courses connect’ (schrift 1997: 3). While acknowledging more distant 
origins in Nietzsche and phenomenology, schrift initially suggests the 
cause of the recent upsurge in interest to reside in a combination of 
Derrida’s engagement and the growth of feminist discourses within the 
social sciences (1997: 1–3). Particularly significant in this respect are 
the Algerian writer and philosopher, hélène cixous, and the Belgian 
psychoanalyst, luce irigaray, whose work sets out to rethink society 
around a feminine economy, in contrast to the phallocentrism of tradi-
tional political economy. A point of departure for both is the positive 
revalorisation of a long-standing identification, observed ethnographi-
cally by claude lévi-strauss of woman as gift, an object of exchange 
who does not herself participate in exchange (lévi-strauss 1969: 
65/76). cixous differentiates between a ‘masculine’ economy of posses-
sion, of the return of the ‘selfsame [Propre]’, and a ‘feminine’ economy 
of giving, which consists in the return of difference. in a passage recall-
ing the ethos of withstanding eternal return, she writes: ‘it all happens 
as if man were more directly threatened in his being by the nonselfsame 
[non-propre] than woman’ (cixous 1996: 87/117). Where man behaves 
in line with Mauss, treating giving as a kind of investment, a ‘gift-that-
takes’ and brings in a ‘return [revenu]’, linked to the imposition of obli-
gation, the accretion of status and profit, woman, by contrast, ‘gives 
for [donne pour]’, without trying to ‘ “recover her expenses [rentrer 
dans ses frais]”. she is not able to return to herself, never settling down, 
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pouring out, going everywhere to the other’ (1996: 87/117–18). the 
distinction is repeated by irigaray, who appeals to woman not to let 
herself be reduced to the commodity, to a work of man’s labour, whose 
circulation furnishes the basis of society. she argues that in excess of 
‘the reduction of her sensory, corporeal and material qualities to an 
abstract exchange-value, moreover the reduction of the whole sensory 
world to the concrete practical activity of men’ (irigaray 1985: 184/180 
[tM]), there is a feminine nature that cannot be appropriated, and 
whose potential threat man attempts to control by mediating woman’s 
access to herself. she identifies this nature with a utopia, ‘where nature 
could expend itself without exhaustion; could be exchanged without 
labour; could give itself – beyond the reach of masculine transactions 
– for nothing; free pleasures, well-being without pain, enjoyment [jouis-
sance] without possession’ (1985: 197/193 [tM]).
this notion of containing the gift’s subversive potential also comes 
into play in the reception of Mauss. Drawing on schrift’s more recent 
work on the organisational set-up of post-war french academia, one 
might point to institutional and broader social factors to understand 
how Mauss’s Essai has become a philosophical point de repère, a gift 
to which, at some point, almost every major french philosopher and 
theorist would want to be seen to respond. Derrida’s claim regarding 
the essential undecidability of the gift is illustrated by this reception 
among philosophers, who were undoubtedly threatened, but also freed, 
by Mauss’s assault on the cartesian tradition: more specifically by what 
his intervention spelled for the security of philosophy atop the hierar-
chy of academia. the discipline had long occupied a position of senior-
ity, even superiority, in the institutions of french academia (see, for 
example, fournier 2006: 113–14/240–1), but, by the end of the third 
Republic, this position was being assailed by a combination of political, 
epistemological and institutional factors (2006: 260–2/559–61; schrift 
2006: 40–3). foucault’s analysis of the rise of the human sciences offers 
a useful broader backdrop for what schrift will portray as a ‘crisis’ in 
twentieth-century french philosophy. The Order of Things paints an 
image of philosophy as having arrived, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, at the limit point of the then dominant paradigm, or epistémè, 
of Anthropology. Philosophy-as-Anthropology, which is to say, phi-
losophy construed, increasingly pejoratively, as an abstract ‘analytic of 
man’, would be challenged by a combination of Nietzsche and the posi-
tivism of the human sciences, which called into question the apriority 
of the transcendental subject. the growth of new disciplines, including 
ethnology and psychoanalysis, generated the crystallisation of a new 
epistémè around the ‘death of man’, which would liberate philosophers 
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to fill ‘the void left by man’s disappearance’ through a reworking of 
eternal return as an ontological description of the event of existence 
giving itself (ot, 342/353). But this process was not without complica-
tions. Under threat of being eclipsed by the new disciplines, philosophy 
emerged battered and bruised from wars that it had not only failed 
to prevent, but in which, through such politically dubious figures 
as misappropriated Nietzsche and the Nazi-sympathising schmitt 
and heidegger, it had also, moreover, arguably been complicit. 
Philosophers could thus hardly ignore the challenge that Mauss posed, 
both in his own right and as the figurehead, post-Durkheim, of la 
sociologie française, but nor were they willing to accept him without a 
fight, without reasserting the (ontological) priority of philosophy over 
anthropology. the evidence of this is borne out in a series of broadly 
philosophical attempts to renegotiate the gift, to incorporate it within 
philosophical and psychoanalytic traditions of thinking about giving 
that both echo and supersede the findings of Mauss. it has been sug-
gested by Gasché that Mauss, too, was ill-prepared for the impact of 
his work. on the verge of a thinking through which ‘Western thought 
would be thrown back, for once at least, onto itself and would remain 
alone with its wretchedness’, it is as if he pulled back from the onto-
logical implications of his discoveries, fearful of what they would entail 
for the project of modernity he was not yet ready to abandon (Gasché 
1997: 102–3/73).
An anthropologist running up against the limits of ‘Anthropology’, 
Mauss thus occupies a liminal position, the site of an undecidable line 
separating the apogee from the zenith of the modern project. if con-
temporary french philosophy is defined by the critique of the subject, 
then Mauss not only anticipates but is exemplary of its subsequent 
trajectory. the essay on The Gift becomes a battlefield for the future 
of the subject of philosophy – in both senses of the term: the site of 
an encounter between the insurgent anti-humanism of lévi-strauss 
and the last stand of the existentialist-humanists, sartre and lefort; 
between the scientific sociology and psychoanalysis of the structural-
ists and the more avowedly experimental sociologie sacrée of Bataille 
and Klossowski; between the Deleuzian gift of eternal return and the 
Badiousian politics of grace; between the ethical gift of levinas and 
Nancy’s unrepentant ontology of an offering that abandons us to being 
political.1 in sociology, Jean Baudrillard’s critique of the meaningless 
1. see, in the order in which they are referred to above, lévi-strauss’s Savage Mind 
(1966: 245–58/292–305); sartre’s posthumously published Notebooks for an Ethics 
(1992: 373–8/387–91); lefort’s Les Formes de l’histoire (1978: 21–4); Merleau-
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hyper-reality of symbolic exchange develops out of an early reading 
of gift-economics in which he asserts the need to ‘play Mauss against 
Mauss’ (1993: 1/8), while Pierre Klossowski’s description of the exiled 
Walter Benjamin as an ‘assiduous auditor’ of the collège de sociologie 
(cited in hollier 1988: 389/586) means that further links present them-
selves between Mauss and the frankfurt school, though the potential 
influence has downplayed by one commentator with expertise in both 
areas (Jarvis 1998: 86; see also Jarvis 1999).
the effect of Mauss’s influence and the growing interest in gift theory 
is also tangible in the english-speaking world, where lewis hyde’s 
Mauss-inspired bestseller, The Gift, has left a lasting and public con-
tribution to the history of art, despite frequent criticisms of its overly 
romantic theorisation of giving (hyde 1983: xii-iii; osteen 2002: 28). 
elsewhere, in the wake of the aforementioned cixous and irigaray, 
an extensive literature has developed around the exploration of the 
relationship between giving and corporeality. What Judith still has 
called ‘feminine economies’ and Rosalyn Diprose ‘corporeal generosity’ 
merits a more sustained discussion than can be offered here; as does 
lisa Guenther’s The Gift of the Other (see, in particular, still 1997: 
13–24; Diprose 2002; Guenther 2006: 53–4). their emphasis on the 
body as the site of giving – and Diprose’s suggestion that there is a 
politics of non-linear, non-volitional, corporeal exchange, in particular 
(2002: 48) – presents the prospect of a dialogue with Jean-luc Nancy, 
whose reworking of giving in terms of the passive exposure of finite 
bodies is discussed in chapter 3.
the proliferation of different and even incommensurable concerns 
is also reflected in a number of recent edited collections, notably the 
aforementioned Logic of the Gift (schrift 1997) and Mark osteen’s 
The Question of the Gift (osteen 2002). Both volumes capture the 
explosion of interest generated by the intersection of anthropology 
with contemporary philosophical and theoretical approaches. schrift’s 
brings together, from the most substantial interventions in philoso-
phy, sociology and anthropology, material suggestive of a coalescence 
of modern and postmodern thought around the gift. he stops short, 
Ponty’s essay on Mauss in Signes (1964: 114–16/143–6); and lacan’s comments 
on Mauss in the écrits (e, 223/269). the more experimental, Bataillean and 
Klossowskian, notions of ‘sacred sociology’ and giving are outlined in hollier (1986: 
11/34) and Klossowski’s novelistic trilogy, Les Lois de l’hospitalité (1997: 55–8). 
for Deleuze and Badiou, respectively, see the former’s (DR, 1/7; ls, 328/334; AŒ, 
207/224) and the latter’s comments on grace (2000, 97/142–3; 2003, 65/69); for 
levinas, see 1991 (168–77/182–92); and for Nancy, ef (73/99) and ft (237–8/185–
6).
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though, of suggesting any convergence around a unified theory of 
giving. osteen’s collection is deliberately more varied and interdiscipli-
nary, insisting on the prematurity of any attempt to reconcile empiri-
cal practice with what the editor (not always accurately) perceives as 
the lacunae of french theory. According to osteen, if gift theory is to 
avoid the ‘trite polarities’ of idealised generosity and the utilitarian 
logic of self-interest, ‘the scylla of sentimentality and the charybdis of 
economism’ respectively (2002: 35), then it must, for the time being 
at least, renounce its Mausso-lévi-straussian pretensions to offer a 
totalising theory of social relations. the spirit of the gift, of Mauss’s 
legacy, should be identified less with a romanticised notion of receipt 
than with an acceptance of the ‘risk and danger’ that the gift’s poison-
ousness poses to established disciplinary boundaries (2002: 35). this 
view contrasts with that of those identifying themselves more explicitly 
as Mauss’s héritiers, Jacques Godbout and Alain caillé, associated 
with the revue du MAUSS (‘Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste en sciences 
sociales), who sound a note of caution against the current vogue for 
‘epistemological’ (theoretical) sociology and argue that Mauss’s great-
est contribution continues to be his ‘renewal of economic sociology’ 
and empirical social science (Godbout and caillé 1998: viii-x). the 
caution hints at the complexity, even the opacity, of Mauss’s philo-
sophical heritage.
RePet it ioNs  of  D iffeReNce
the legacy and spectres of Mauss are intertwined with those of hegel, 
Nietzsche, freud and phenomenology, amongst others, but it is pos-
sible to trace the process of this contamination, the unfurling of the 
gift as concept through both its anthropological and phenomeno-
logical lineages, and its culmination in a new understanding of politics. 
Propaedeutically, a distinction needs to be made between those, in 
the first instance, who take their lead directly from Mauss and those 
who, though working primarily from within phenomenology, find 
themselves framed or implicitly informed by the crisis in philosophy 
to which Mauss both contributed and responded. this book is accord-
ingly split roughly into two halves, the second of which looks at the 
defence of philosophy against the perceived threat of anthropology: 
in particular at how philosophers – Martin heidegger and Jean-luc 
Nancy – attempt to overturn the framing of philosophy by anthropol-
ogy through a purely philosophical conceptualisation of politics. the 
first half, by contrast, traces the more explicit legacy of Mauss through 
his ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ heirs, the structural anthropologist, 
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claude lévi-strauss, and the writer of heterology, Georges Bataille. 
Both men stood outside the established institutions of french phi-
losophy and, despite their differences, contributed substantially to the 
intellectual development of the psychoanalyst Jacques lacan. lacan’s 
influence in turn paved the way for Deleuze and the latter’s radical 
reconceptualisation of the relationship between philosophy and the 
human sciences. Between them, these three would give rise to a legacy 
that incorporates at least three major philosophical events, each one of 
which directly draws on The Gift to renegotiate the relation between 
philosophy and its other.
in terms of its recognisability and broader intellectual impact, the 
first major event in the post-Maussian history of Mauss arrives with 
the structuralism of claude lévi-strauss. Driven by the desire for a 
‘progressive mathematisation’ of the social sciences (iMM, 43/xxxvi), 
lévi-strauss shared Mauss’s commitment to the project of trans-
forming philosophy into a more rigorous anthropology, and receives 
the latter’s blessing as ‘the hope of french Americanism’, one who 
would ‘professionalize’ the Durkheimian tradition as an American-
style empirical social science (Mauss, in fournier 2006: 300/648). 
lévi-strauss’s fundamental move was to raise Mauss’s ‘total social 
fact’, the all-encompassing culture of gift exchange, to the level of an a 
priori synthesis of society in which the gift is a mere subjective misper-
ception of an unconscious process of structurally guaranteed symbolic 
exchange. Mauss’s counter-legacy, by contrast, is defined by the refusal 
to identify the gift with exchange, an insistence on the gift’s singular-
ity, inexchangeability. At the other pole from lévi-strauss’s extreme 
modernity, we find Georges Bataille and his avowedly secretive forum 
for sacrifice, Acéphale, and the loosely associated collège de sociologie, 
convened between 1936 and 1939, and attended, amongst others, by 
Alexandre Kojève, the Russian émigré famous for introducing hegel 
to france through an ‘anthropologisation’ of The Phenomenology of 
Spirit (iRh, 6–8/12–14). Both within the collège and in his later, sole-
authored writings, Bataille invokes themes from Nietzsche and freud in 
a critique of the hegelianism of Kojève and, subsequently, structural-
ism. Above all, he rejects the hegelo-Kojevian diagnosis that we have 
reached the end of history, ‘the end of human time or history [la fin 
du Temps humain ou de l’Histoire]’ (iRh, 159n/435n). the modern 
hegelian tradition, with its affirmation of nation-state theodicy, com-
pletely overlooks a field of politics and experience that cannot be con-
ceived within the terms of the phenomenological self-presence yielded 
by dialectics. Bataille articulates this excluded horizon of experience 
in terms of a ‘general economy’ of the exuberant giving of life, which 
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cannot be reduced to the ‘restricted economy’ of (capitalist) exchange 
between sovereign institutions and individuals. he defines the latter’s 
exclusion of the former as the characteristic trait of modern politics 
(hes, 34/41). Bataille thus opens the way for a third event in Mauss’s 
differantial legacy. Poststructuralism ceases to depend upon a direct 
engagement with Mauss but can broadly be seen as the site of a series of 
encounters between the exchangist, structuralist Mauss of lévi-strauss 
and the Nietzschean, aneconomic Mauss of Bataille. in spite of slavoj 
Žižek’s (primarily political, oppositional) insistence that the ‘rational-
ist’, ‘modern’ Jacques lacan should not be thought poststructuralist 
(Žižek 1989: 7), the focus of chapter 1, lacanian psychoanalysis, 
is arguably the most explicit example of this, counting amongst its 
multiple influences close personal engagements with lévi-strauss and 
Bataille. the effects of this are borne out in lacan’s theorisation of 
multiple strata of giving, corresponding to the imaginary, symbolic and 
real registers of his pre-ontology of the unconscious.
the equation of gift and event is central to Derrida’s reading of the 
gift. in one of his earliest conference papers, now recognised as one 
of the first important critiques of structuralism, ‘structure, sign and 
Play in the Discourse of the human sciences’, Derrida returns to lévi-
strauss’s hugely influential introduction to Mauss and, in the presence 
of lacan, takes lévi-strauss to task for neglecting ‘the structurality of 
structure’. he pays particular attention to the idea of something that 
‘while governing the structure, escapes structurality’ (WD, 352–3/410–
11). this raises the question of how the structures that oversee symbolic 
exchange could be independent from the effects of exchange in a way 
that would guarantee their supposedly transcendental status. in place of 
a self-contained, logical totality, traceable to a central origin, or archè, 
Derrida evokes the figures of freud, heidegger and Nietzsche, neglected 
by lévi-strauss, to assert the existence of an ‘event of rupture’ in excess 
of structure. he argues that Mauss’s concept of the hau, the ‘spirit of 
things given’ supposed to ensure the gift’s homecoming, must be sus-
ceptible and indeed made possible by a type of repetition that could 
not be confined to a transcendentally determined path of movement. 
in other words, it presupposes an aneconomic repetition of difference 
prior to any economic repetition of identity. for the gift to be recipro-
cated, returned to its sender, there would have to be the possibility of 
its not being reciprocated, a flaw in the structure that would function as 
its condition of (im)possibility. in reducing gift exchange to a synthetic 
a priori structure, in other words, lévi-strauss fails to think the uncon-
ditionality and spontaneity that would form a constitutive part of any 
gift. When Given Time is reread in light of Derrida’s earlier essay, its 
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claim that Mauss ‘speaks of everything but the gift’ (Gt, 24/39) means 
that, anticipating lévi-strauss, Mauss speaks of a structural totality, le 
tout, the total social fact, but neglects the aneconomic ‘event of rupture’ 
through which the gift escapes the economic law of identity. in both 
earlier and later engagements, Derrida concludes in favour of philoso-
phy, against the anthropological attempt to supersede it, by arguing 
that the structuralist ‘step “outside philosophy” ’ continues to be gov-
erned by philosophical presuppositions regarding the nature of man in 
general, and language in particular (WD, 359/416; Gt, 62–70/86–94).
As we shall see in chapter 2, a similarly, though more sustainedly 
Nietzschean critique of lévi-strauss is staged by Deleuze and Guattari, 
who argue in Anti-Oedipus that ‘the great book of modern ethnology 
is not so much Mauss’s The Gift as Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy 
of Morality. At least, it should be’ (AŒ, 207/224). in deploying 
Nietzsche’s conjectural history of exchange to cast doubt on the sup-
posed apriority of social structures, Deleuze and Guattari set about 
organising a far-reaching rehabilitation of philosophy, reconceptu-
alising it in a way that prevents its usurpation and supersession by 
anthropology. their analysis of the archaic gift economy as an attempt 
to stave off the eternal return of the gift generates an understanding of 
politics as that which emerges in response to the excessive giving of the 
event. By emphasising the inappropriability of this giving, Deleuze and 
Guattari also reject the possibility of successful (Marxist) revolution, 
the revolutionary reappropriation of a metaphysical foundation, which 
would allow the grounding of political institutions in philosophy. this 
has seen them accused, notably by Alain Badiou and slavoj Žižek 
(Badiou 2000: 12/22; Žižek 2004: 20), of elucidating a philosophically 
overdetermined account of the political that reinforces the political 
structures they set out to criticise. the problem is not merely incidental, 
but, from Bataille and heidegger onward, has plagued almost every 
attempt to politicise the gift, to think politics philosophically, in rela-
tion to the event.
With this in mind, chapters 3 and 4 depart from the explicit legacy 
of Mauss in order to return, via heidegger, to the problematic ontology 
of the political: namely, the question of whether politics admits of onto-
logical description. chapter 3 begins with an analysis of heidegger’s 
understanding of the relationship between the gift of the event and poli-
tics, which he deems coextensive with anthropology as a technique for 
the suppression of being in excess of the human. heidegger’s attempt 
to bypass politics through ontology, to supersede politics through 
philosophical as opposed to political revolution, famously gets entan-
gled in Nazism, on account of his belief that the institutional politics 
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of democracy is inadequate to a thinking of the giving of being beyond 
the horizons of subjectivity. the recent and relatively unexplored 
work of Philippe lacoue-labarthe and Jean-luc Nancy examines the 
charge that heidegger’s elision of politics is a necessary by-product of 
a philosophy of the gift. like heidegger, lacoue-labarthe and Nancy 
do not engage explicitly with Mauss at any point, but they can be seen 
to respond to a problematic he triggers: namely, the question of the 
relationship between politics, philosophy and anthropology. Motivated 
by a commitment to the legitimacy of the ontological analysis of the 
political, and an insistence similar to that of Deleuze and Guattari on 
the priority of politics to subjectivity, the irreducibility of politics to a 
form of exchange between subjects, the explicit task of their project is 
to reassert a non-anthropological philosophy of the political without 
repeating heidegger’s dismissal of politics, without treating politics as a 
symptom of the anthropology that takes place in the absence, or forget-
ting, of a philosophy of the event. Both Deleuze and Nancy specifically 
differentiate a politics of the event from the calculable transactions 
of traditional political economy, regarding the latter as an attempt to 
conceal the absent ground by which politics is made possible. they fur-
thermore show how a politics of the gift, through its trenchant critique 
of the politics of homecoming and identity, overthrows rather than 
legitimates totalitarianism.
it has none the less been argued by Alain Badiou, Peter hallward 
and simon critchley, amongst others, that Deleuze and Nancy go 
too far in this respect, treating all institutional, organised politics as 
inherently contaminated by totalitarianism, collapsing the distinction 
between democracy and totalitarianism in a way that idealises their 
own, non-institutional concepts of the political. We see this in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s apparent disdain for democracy, which they regard as 
constitutively opposed to the singularity of the event (WiP, 108/104), 
and moreover in their affirmation of eternal return as a philosophical 
supplement to the insufficiency of institutional politics (WiP, 99/95). 
for Alain Badiou, this amounts to a ‘profoundly aristocratic’ arroga-
tion of politics by philosophy (Badiou 2000: 12/22), the assertion of 
philosophy as the solution to politics, which thus implicitly reaffirms 
the prospect of theodicy criticised by Bataille. By effectively believing 
that ‘ “All” is grace [“Tout” est grâce]’, Badiou argues, Deleuze, too, 
naïvely sublates political struggles in the redemptions of thought (2000: 
97/142–3). staying on the theme of how we receive, or respond to, the 
offering of the event without thereby sacrificing its singularity, chapter 
4 discusses whether Nancy is similarly hasty in relying on philosophy, 
rather than politics, for redemption, on account of a critique of sacri-
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fice that forecloses the prospect of meaningful political action. Nancy’s 
work on the political is shot through with a rejection of sacrifice, which, 
in contradistinction to Bataille, he thinks is inherently predisposed to a 
totalitarian subordination of difference and inescapably bound to the 
attempt to appropriate an ontological ground. But his later work on 
democracy has brought him closer to Derrida, for whom there is no 
alternative to sacrifice, no possibility of not sacrificing the event to rep-
resentation. Derrida argues that politics is this impossibility of escaping 
the contamination of difference by a logic of identity, the reinscription 
of the aneconomic gift within a restricted economy of the subject. this 
is also why politics is irreducibly marked by sacrifice, which seeks 
to separate out the sacred from the profane, while also affirming the 
impossibility of theodicy. sacrifice consists in the making of decisions, 
in the selection of what can and cannot be named, counted as existing, 
in a world of compromise that precludes the theodical giving of every-
thing. it is sacrifice that preserves the possibility of democracy – and the 
gift. By recognising the impossibility of the capture of the gift in actual-
ity, sacrifice is what enables the gift to live on beyond any identifiable 
instantiation thereof; what enables the eternal return of its promise.
*  *  *
this tension between the gift and its sacrifice becomes the decisive 
moment in the politics of the gift. As another name for politics, sacrifice 
becomes the means through which we respond to the offering of the 
event. But it is destined to fall short of the inappropriable gift it recip-
rocates, condemning politics to return, eternally.
is this not the message of von trier’s America trilogy, laid bare in the 
transition between its first two instalments? We see this already at the 
end of Dogville, where becoming-gift is perhaps never as straightfor-
ward as was earlier implied. As Dany Nobus has also observed (2007: 
25), from the moment of Grace’s arrival, the politics of Dogville plays 
itself out in reaction to the gift, as a question of how best to receive it; 
whether to try to absorb and integrate it into the community, or rather 
keep it at a safe distance – maybe even refuse it altogether. Rather than 
being welcomed as a gift, Grace, an unknown, unidentifiable quantity, 
is treated progressively worse as an object, a commodity to be circu-
lated through the town, exploited and enjoyed as the townsfolk see fit. 
the further she descends into the life of the commodity, the more her 
subjective integrity, her identity and even her humanity are eroded; the 
closer we come to an unleashing of the intensities that exist in excess of 
the individuations of subjects; the closer we come to the arrival of a gift 
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so different, so unanticipated, so violent that its recipients are destroyed 
in the moment of receiving it.
Yet having ceased to be a subject, having been raped, dehumanised, 
offered up for sacrifice, Grace is reterritorialised as a moralising angel 
of death in the very moment she could become gift. Moments prior 
to embarking on a slaughter of the townsfolk, she gives a speech that 
signals an appropriation of her name, a willingness to bestow herself 
as poison, to recognise herself as gift. ‘if there’s any town this world 
would be better without, this is it,’ because the people of Dogville fall 
short of the gift’s purity, have failed to become worthy of its receipt. 
this totalitarian arrogation of sovereignty, this essentialisation of the 
gift as something for which one should willingly die, is carried over 
into the sequel, where it masquerades under the name of democracy. 
throughout Manderlay, in place of the ingénue at the start of the pre-
vious film, Grace now seems only too aware of the promise her name 
bestows. the subtitle of the film, A Case of Mistaken Identity, forewarns 
us of the perils of imaginary misrecognition, of both attempting to 
name the gift, identifying oneself with the site of the event, and of seeing 
tyranny where there is the promise of democracy and democracy where 
there is only a hypostatised fantasy thereof. With hindsight, perhaps, 
we can say again that Grace ceases to be the gift in the very moment of 
recognising herself as such, in believing herself the designated recipient 
of the slaves’ call for redemption. the slaves she emancipates come to 
resent the groundless anomie of the democracy she bestows on them, 
unaccustomed to the responsibility it demands in their exercise of sov-
ereignty. When, at the end of the film, they force her to oversee a return 
to the ‘old ways’ of slavery, it is revealed that these old ways, too, were 
designed with the complicity of the slaves themselves, fearful of ‘the 
greatest weight’ of the freedom they would otherwise be forced to bear. 
Yet if the people of Manderlay thus show themselves to be unworthy of 
the event, so too does Grace. her eventual sacrifice is tragic, in the sense 
of being programmed from the instant she assumes the role of messiah. 
equally, however, it embodies the way sacrifice resacralizes, preserves 
the integrity of the promise. At the heart of her tragedy is a conflation 
of the gift with what Grace takes to be democracy, a fixed and inflexible 
ochlocracy that, with its aestheticised ideals of absolute equality and 
corporate sovereignty, reveals itself simply inappropriate to the life of 
the polis it represents.
the problem is precisely the belief in the possibility of definitively 
identifying a spectre of democracy, a gift that, like Grace, ultimately 
evades capture. Grace is governed by a residual faith in the human, a 
fantastical concept of a humanity that exists to be emancipated, to be 
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sublimated by a gift for which people will henceforth radiate gratitude. 
in place of an essential humanity whose emancipation would entail 
the sublation of political struggle, however, there are only the multiple 
becomings of a gift that, like Grace, repeatedly takes flight. this flight 
demands that the gift be repeatedly renegotiated, subjected to the deci-
sions – the sacrifices – entailed by the attempt to name it in an affir-
mation of eternal return. the findings of von trier thus repeat those 
offered by the pursuit of Mauss’s spectres, revealing a politics of the 
gift, of the impossibility of recognition, which gives rise to the repeated 
attempt to name, to identify, the excessive offering that eludes us, an 
event that compels and yet refuses our hospitality, by which the gift is 
destroyed or deferred in the very attempt to receive it.
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1. Speech, Sacrifice and Shit: 
Three Orders of Giving in the 
Thought of Jacques Lacan
Between the publication of the Essai sur le don in 1923–4 and its 
author’s death in 1950, Georges Bataille and claude lévi-strauss did 
more than most to reciprocate the gift of Mauss’s legacy. this recip-
rocation takes place through an extension of the Maussian critique 
of homo economicus; lévi-strauss and Bataille alike reject the notion 
of an ontologically grounded, transcendentally individuated human 
subjectivity. simultaneously following and radicalising Mauss, both 
men regard this subject as nothing more than the product of exchange, 
but also criticise Mauss for an insufficiently ‘general’ understanding 
of exchange as a ‘total social fact’. Yet to some extent, their respec-
tive treatments could hardly have been more different, signalling what 
one commentator has called ‘a major split in the interpretation of the 
Maussian gift’ (Pefanis 1991: 22). the split, as Pefanis (somewhat 
reductively) notes, originates in the shifting emphasis between two 
different instances of the gift, between the kula, on one hand, and the 
potlatch, on the other, the circulation and exchange of gifts versus the 
competition between rivals in which, on occasion, ‘one must expend all 
that one has and keep nothing back’ (G, 37/200 [tM]). lévi-strauss 
concentrates on the former to articulate a distinctly ‘symbolic’ social 
reality, in which subjectivity is determined extrinsically, intersubjec-
tively, by unconscious structures of language and linguistic exchange 
that lie outside and in excess of the subject. Bataille broadly corrobo-
rates this account of subjectivity, but praises the destructive ritual of the 
potlatch precisely for its intimation of a heterogeneous ‘intimacy of the 
divine world’ in excess of the symbolic order (tR, 44/308). he traces 
the gift not to culture – language – but to an understanding of nature as 
‘le don d’une énergie exubérante’, ‘the gift of an exuberant energy’, an 
‘effervescence of life’ that cannot be conceptualised within a capitalistic 
understanding of economic utility (hes, 41/34). Beyond the ‘restricted 
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economy’ of homo economicus, life itself functions in accordance 
with a more general, less anthropocentric, economy, an aneconomy 
of excess and ‘unproductive expenditure [dépense improductive]’ that 
‘brings into contradiction [. . .] the entirety of the existence of man’ (As, 
73/75). this idea serves as the backdrop for Bataille’s fascination with 
sacrifice, a practice in which he sees the potential to overturn man’s 
bondage to commodified, material things and accede to a hitherto 
inaccessible position of sovereignty. through sacrificial giving without 
return, he argues, it becomes possible to attain a paradoxically impos-
sible, and hence ‘sacred’, unconscious experience of the effervescence of 
life that exceeds the subject.
Both lévi-strauss and Bataille thus initiate a shift away from thinking 
the gift as a question of simple empiricity and toward an understanding 
of the gift as an unconscious, transcendental ‘event’. there none the less 
remain profound differences in the nature of this event, not least with 
regard to whether the gift is symbolic or heterogeneous to the symbolic 
order, cultural or natural, economic or aneconomic, which is to say 
constitutively antagonistic to any overarching law of identity.
A friend and colleague of both men, Jacques lacan was uniquely 
positioned to take advantage of and thrive on the tensions between 
the two. he did not do so uniformly, however. Although a confidant 
of Bataille from the early 1930s, the trace of the latter’s influence does 
not become apparent until the seminar of 1959–60, on The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis – in other words, not until after the engagement with 
lévi-strauss, whom lacan knew only later. As a consequence, though 
the occasional commentator has recognised the ‘constant though 
implicit presence of Bataille in lacan’s evolving work’ (Roudinesco 
1997: 136/188), there has until recently been a tendency to privilege 
the influence of lévi-strauss, reading lacan primarily as a structuralist, 
a thinker of the gift in terms of the economics of symbolic exchange, 
to the exclusion of the transgressive, aneconomic gift of Bataille (see, 
for example, Kurzweil 1996: 146; Pefanis 1991). the oversight is no 
doubt partly attributable to the almost total absence of Bataille’s name 
in lacan’s published work, the extent of which is atypical even by the 
standards of a man for whom, on account of there being no such thing 
as ‘symbolic ownership’, ‘plagiarism does not exist’ (siii, 80/93).
even less has been said about lacan’s own thinkings on the gift 
and its relation to the unconscious, which arise as a result of sustained 
negotiations between Bataille and lévi-strauss, not to mention other, 
most notably hegelian influences. the aim of this first chapter is to 
redress this imbalance. As indicated by the use of the plural – think-
ings – lacan’s engagement with the gift is often fragmentary and rarely 
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sustained; it also evolves over time, including a decisive epistemologi-
cal break that coincides with a turn toward Bataille in the late 1950s. 
More importantly, however, the plural points to there being three dif-
ferent, albeit overlapping and often blurred, conceptions of the gift, 
pertaining to each of the three registers of lacan’s ‘pre-ontology’ of the 
unconscious (sXi, 29/38): the symbolic order of speech and language; 
the imaginary site of an ego in search of an ontological ground; and the 
ungrounding real of the libidinal drive.
expressed simply, the argument to be pursued can be summarised as 
follows: lacan borrows from lévi-strauss a theory of the gift as sym-
bolic exchange, while the idea of the gift as a gift of shit, experienced 
in the failure of symbolic exchange, emerges from the work of Bataille. 
these also correspond to two different conceptions of the unconscious, 
first as symbolic, regulative social reality, then as unpredictable excess 
of the real. A third tier of imaginary giving emerges from a combination 
of freud and lévi-strauss’s criticisms of Mauss, but is developed in a 
way that might also serve as a critique of Bataille. the symbolic ‘gift 
of speech (le don de la parole)’ describes how the subject comes to be 
through the exchange of recognition. the imaginary gift – also referred 
to as ‘the gift of love’, ‘the gift of what one doesn’t have (le don de ce 
qu’on n’a pas)’ (e, 580/691; sViii, 419) – reflects the fact that speech is 
never enough to satisfy what lacan, following Alexandre Kojève, calls 
the ‘desire to have his desire recognised’ (e, 285/343). this imaginary 
gift of what one does not have encompasses the offerings, the sacrifices 
one makes in a bid to supplement and guarantee this recognition, which 
is exposed as illusory by the gift of the real. the gift of the real pertains 
to an experience of the impossible – namely, the impossibility of satis-
fying the desire for recognition; it is also the impossibility of achieving 
an experience of intimacy in which sovereignty is regrounded in being. 
Arguably contra Bataille, lacan invents the concept of ‘extimacy’ to 
explain how that which is most intimate to the subject also lies irreduc-
ibly beyond its grasp (sVii, 139/167). in a move that recalls Bataille’s 
vividly literary disquisitions on the ‘horror of excreta’ (hes, 53/44), 
he elaborates on this as a ‘gift of shit (un cadeau d’une merde)’ (sXi, 
268/299), an excremental remainder that lives on after the subject’s 
fantasy of a metaphysically grounded existence has dissolved.
taken together, this triplicate understanding of giving radicalises 
the critique of homo economicus initiated by Mauss and continued by 
lévi-strauss and Bataille. initially seen as an expression of the agency of 
the subject, the gift becomes an expression of desire’s impotence, of its 
bondage to an extimate, excremental object. it ceases to be identifiable 
as a benign offering and becomes redemptive only in so far as recog-
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nised as poison – as that which falls outside and moreover prevents the 
completion of symbolic exchange. lacan thus traces the gift’s passage 
from tangible offering to a transcendental structure of intersubjectivity, 
to an intangible event – a name for life as such – that we recognise only 
in the ungrounding of privileged subjectivity.
the  cUltURe  of  eXchANGe
A combination of ethnographic fieldwork and an enforced wartime 
exile in New York meant that the Belgian lévi-strauss did not meet 
lacan until 1949. By this time, with the recent publication of The 
Elementary Structures of Kinship, also in 1949, he had already set 
out on the project of ‘structural anthropology’, a project of returning 
via Mauss and the linguistics of saussure and Jakobson, to study the 
excessive, inexperientiable form of social reality. lacan’s involvement 
with Bataille had begun much earlier, by at least 1933, when the latter 
published an article on the potlatch, ‘the Notion of expenditure’. 
lacan would also play a supporting role in the projects the essay 
anticipates, notably the collège de sociologie, the institution of ‘sacred 
sociology’ that embarked on a programme of excess, sacrifice and the 
recovery of the sacred. inspired in part by Bataille’s encounter with 
Mauss, the collège was co-founded with leiris and caillois in 1937, 
and functioned as a more open intellectual forum than the associated 
but secretive sacrificial cult of Acéphale lurking in its shadows. the 
collège and its associated activities proved central to Bataille’s work 
throughout this period, which sought to affirm the ‘transgressive’, 
disruptive ‘aneconomy’ of a gift so excessive that it could not be com-
prehended within a capitalistic, utilitarian conception of exchange. like 
his fellow ‘rationalist’, Mauss, who remained suspicious of the collège 
throughout its brief existence, lacan was not himself an active partici-
pant, though he was present at its inception (hollier 1986: 4/22) and 
‘Bataille can be assumed to have kept him scrupulously informed about 
[the] activities’ of Acéphale (surya 2002: 252/306). By the time lacan 
met lévi-strauss, he was also engaged to Bataille’s soon-to-be ex-wife, 
sylvia, and effectively sharing his children. he and Bataille also shared 
a maître à penser in the form of the Russian philosopher, Alexandre 
Kojève, whose legendary seminar on hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
they attended together as self-confessed ‘disciples’ (sXVii, 169/197; 
stoekl 1995: 89n). Yet despite – or, perhaps, because of – the proxim-
ity of this rapport, lacan rarely shows any sign of Bataille’s influence. 
even noting his tendency not to acknowledge his intellectual sources, 
relative to the influences not just of lévi-strauss, but also those of 
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saussure, heidegger and Kojève, Bataille seems to have made little 
impression on his earlier work. Roudinesco posits rivalry over sylvia 
as the predominant factor in this, with lacan’s refusal to acknowledge 
intellectual debts indicative of a desire to establish an existence inde-
pendent of Bataille (Roudinesco 1997: 136–7/188).
By contrast, when in 1950 lévi-strauss’s ‘introduction à l’œuvre 
de Marcel Mauss’ appeared at the opening of Mauss’s Sociologie et 
anthropologie, its impact on lacan was both decisive and immediate. 
the essay, hailed as ‘the foundational act of structural analysis’ (Major 
2001: 170), outlined a theory of the symbolic that would serve as the 
point of departure for lacan’s own reading of Mauss. it would also set 
the tone for a structuralist reworking of psychoanalysis in which, as 
one commentator puts it, ‘Mauss and Boas must be accorded virtually 
the same status as freud’ (Macey 1988: 155). the resulting output, 
most notably the so-called ‘Rome Discourse’ of 1953 – ‘for all practical 
purposes the manifesto of the structuralist reinterpretation of freud’ 
(schrift 2006: 149) – is largely responsible for creating the impression 
of lacan as a lévi-straussian who thinks the gift only at the level of 
symbolic exchange.
clAUDe  lÉV i - stRAUss
Mauss set out what has been the programme of modern ethnology [. . .]; 
at the same time, he perceived the most significant consequence of this new 
orientation of research, which is the bringing together of ethnology and 
psychoanalysis.
(claude lévi-strauss)1
Given both the undoubted influence of Mauss on Bataille and the likely 
influence of Bataille on lacan during the 1930s, it would seem probable 
that lacan read Mauss’s essay on the gift first-hand. Macey has sug-
gested the presence of Mauss in one of lacan’s earliest works, Family 
Complexes (Les Complexes familiaux dans la formation de l’individu), 
published in 1938, though the fleeting mention is not followed through 
in a subsequent, more detailed discussion of the text (Macey 1988: 33, 
215–16). Family Complexes contains a tangible but unreferenced strand 
of sociological and anthropological thinking that could have come 
from any one of Durkheim, fraser, Malinowski and Mauss (lacan 
1984: 15–16, 66). Based on the ambiguity of this evidence, it would 
seem safer to say that lacan’s encounter with Mauss’s The Gift is less 
independent than mediated by the structuralist anthropology of claude 
1. iMM, 4–5/xi.
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lévi-strauss. When he engages and refers most repeatedly to the anthro-
pology of gift economics in ‘function and field of speech and language 
in Psychoanalysis’, the so-called ‘Rome Discourse’ of 1953, it is lévi-
strauss and lévi-strauss’s work on Mauss that receive the attention; 
Mauss himself is not even named. even the explicit references offer little 
to suggest a first-hand reading – let alone a Bataillean one. Unconcerned 
by any potential difference between Mauss and lévi-strauss, a slightly 
earlier conference paper on ‘the functions of Psychoanalysis in 
criminology’ (1950) has lacan affirm ‘Marcel Mauss’s clear formula-
tions, which his recent death has once again brought to our attention: 
the structures of society are symbolic’ (e, 108/132).
scarcely thematised by Mauss, this emphasis on symbolic structure 
is the central theme of lévi-strauss’s ‘introduction to the Work of 
Marcel Mauss’. As Georges Gurvitch’s prefatory note to Sociologie et 
anthropologie implies, the essay that opens Mauss’s selected writings is 
less a proleptic reprise de textes than a ‘highly personal interpretation’ 
(sA, viii), less an introduction than a conclusion. christopher Johnson 
suggests that it is an introduction, if anything, not to Mauss but to 
lévi-strauss’s own work, from which ‘structuralism seems to emerge as 
the only logical point of conclusion of Mauss’s work’ (Johnson 2003: 
70). lévi-strauss sets out from the assumption that Mauss’s œuvre is 
incomplete. on the verge of uncovering objective laws that would faci-
litate the ‘progressive mathematisation’ of the social sciences, ‘enabling 
the use of deductive reasoning in a domain which seemed subject to 
the most total arbitrariness’ (iMM, 43/xxxvi), Mauss ‘halt[ed] at the 
edge of those immense possibilities’, ultimately collapsing back from 
‘science’ into anecdotal empiricism (iMM, 45/xxxvii).
the possibility of understanding archaic society through the universal 
matrix of the total social fact was nevertheless a decisive breakthrough. 
lévi-strauss argues that Mauss’s identification of the threefold obliga-
tion to give, to receive and to reciprocate represents a starting point for 
deciphering the otherness that separates tribal from Western culture, 
a mechanism for identifying objective social structures that underlie 
both. he moreover credits Mauss with insights that directly facilitate 
the discovery of a radical new theory of the unconscious, one that links 
psychoanalysis to social organisation. through Mauss, he continues:
i arrived at the hypothesis that the psychical and the social are complemen-
tary. that complementarity is not static [. . .]; it is dynamic and it arises 
from the fact that the psychical is both at once a simple element of significa-
tion for a symbolic system which transcends it, and the only means of verifi-
cation of a reality whose manifold aspects can only be grasped as a synthesis 
from without. (iMM, 28/xxvi–xxvii [tM])
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in an essay on ‘symbolic efficiency’, published roughly simultaneously 
with the introduction to Mauss, lévi-strauss asserts that the uncon-
scious exists not simply within and as the property of individual sub-
jects, as ‘the ultimate haven of individual peculiarities – the repository 
of a unique history’ theorised by freud (lévi-strauss 1963: 202–3/232). 
treating the unconscious as a privatised faculty of the individual mind 
has the effect of propagating the modern subject whose ontological 
privileging freud set out to decentre, because it neglects the way in 
which subjectivity is situated within culture. for lévi-strauss, and 
lacan after him, the existence of the unconscious is rather extrinsic, to 
be located in the symbolic community that intersubjectively creates its 
members through systems of reciprocal exchange.
the earliest form of this argument is developed in the monolithic 
study of exogamy undertaken in The Elementary Structures of Kinship, 
where lévi-strauss arrives at his hypothesis of the social reality of 
exchange through a study of the exchange of women – ‘the supreme 
gift’ (lévi-strauss 1969: 65/76) – in relation to incest taboos. Previous 
work had sought to show these taboos as the decisive factor in dis-
tinguishing between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, with exogamy serving to 
prevent incest. lévi-strauss instigates an inversion, suggesting that 
the prohibition of incest actually originates as a strategy to ensure 
exogamy: in other words, to justify the continuity of exchange (1969: 
62/72–3). it is this emphasis on exchange and reciprocity as forms of 
communication with the other that explains lévi-strauss’s claim to 
have drawn ‘inspiration’ from the structural linguistics of saussure 
and Roman Jakobson (1969: xxvi/xiv). Although neither language nor 
the unconscious receives explicit treatment in this earlier work, both 
concepts subsequently become decisive in the elaboration of a symbolic 
order that stands in contrast to pre-linguistic ‘nature’. this is perhaps 
seen most clearly in the way lévi-strauss asserts the allocations of posi-
tions within the symbolic order – for example, the socially significant 
roles of brother-in-law, and also mother and sister – to be the outcome 
of the giving away of women for marriage.
from the introduction to Mauss onward, lévi-strauss becomes more 
explicit in attributing the exchange constitutive of culture to extrinsic 
structures of language existing in excess of individual subjects, as a 
distinctly collective social reality: ‘like language, the social is an auto-
nomous reality the same one, morever; symbols are more real than 
what they symbolise, the signifier precedes and determines the signifier’ 
(iMM, 37/xxxii). he elaborates on this point through a reworking of 
the relation between signifier and signified (signifiant and signifié), the 
binary distinction between the ‘sound pattern’ (‘image acoustique’) 
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and the meaning attached to it that operates at the heart of the struc-
turalist linguistics of ferdinand de saussure (saussure 1983: 12/28). 
the point he wishes to emphasise is that what produces meaning – the 
signifier – is prior to and in excess of the meanings, or signifieds, that it 
produces; these meanings, consequently, can never fully express what 
it is that expresses them, nor refer exhaustively to underlying social 
reality. similarly, the notion of an individual psyche is not a base unit 
of social reality, but merely an attempt to give expression to a reality 
that escapes it.
the gist of this is that the unconscious is a network of significations 
whose origin, lévi-strauss suggests, coincides precisely and abruptly 
with that of society and exceeds the comprehension of those it serves 
to organise (iMM, 59–60/xlvii). society is structured by symbols and 
a symbolic order that cannot be understood solely at the level of the 
culture in which they participate. the unconscious is located in the gap 
between the language that the subject assumes as its own and the struc-
tures of language that are irreducibly beyond subjective manipulation. 
its presence, or rather absence, becomes tangible in the form of ‘dis-
continuities’ within everyday experience (connaissance) (iMM, 59–60/
xlvii). Myths arise to fill the deficit of comprehension, collectively 
fulfilling the functions freud once ascribed to the dreams of the indi-
vidual. they generate meanings that cover over the void of experience 
and justify the symbolic practices that societies employ but yet cannot 
otherwise explain. for lévi-strauss, through an analysis of myth it thus 
becomes possible to glean insights into the unconscious structures that 
govern social reality.
lévi-strauss is able to credit Mauss with the discovery, or rather 
near-discovery, of these unconscious structures because he identifies 
the symbolic with the law of exchange. irrespective of this praise, he is 
quick to pick up on the ontological ambiguity that pervades Mauss’s 
account of the gift. for all the Essai’s emphasis on the total social fact, 
and for all Mauss’s coruscating indictment of the artificial narrative of 
homo economicus, who ‘is not behind us, but lies ahead’ (G, 76/272), 
at times he still seems uncertain as to whether gift-exchange is ontologi-
cally prior or posterior to the subjects it organises. in other words, it is 
unclear whether the subjectivity of tribal members is a product of and 
preconditioned by gift exchange, or whether gifts circulate between 
subjects that are already ontologically individuated, superimposing 
upon them a ‘collective spirit’ that would not otherwise exist. Despite 
Mauss’s quite explicit rejection of the subject in other works, notably in 
‘the Notion of Person, the Notion of “self” ’ (see, in particular, Mauss 
1979: 87; sA, 359), it is unclear whether he discovers structures that 
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expose the modern subject as a myth, or whether he merely reads into 
gift-exchange the prospect of diminishing the more deleterious aspects 
of homo economicus from a subject that, stripped of its rampant indi-
vidualism, is none the less essentially (metaphysically) preserved.
the ambiguity takes us to the heart of Mauss’s residual thinking of 
the subject; it is precisely this residue of which lévi-strauss seeks to rid 
him. Repeating the argument that led him earlier to reject the privileg-
ing of incest as the cause of exogamy, he argues that Mauss is guilty 
of succumbing to ‘a mystification, an effect quite often produced in 
the minds of ethnographers by indigenous people’ (iMM, 47/xxxvii), 
regarding native myths of mana, the supposed substance of magic, and 
hau, the ‘spirit of things given’ that compels the circulation of objects 
through the gift-economy. focusing too specifically on the minutiae 
of fragmented experiences and anecdotal accounts of the necessity of 
giving across different cultures, he failed to see beyond the ‘subjective’ 
beliefs through which ‘objective’ unconscious structures of society are 
rendered amenable to understanding (iMM, 48–9/xxxix).
it has to be admitted that, like hau, mana is no more than the subjective 
reflection of the need to supply an unperceived totality. exchange is not a 
complex edifice built on the obligations of giving, receiving and returning, 
with the help of some emotional-mystical cement. it is a synthesis imme-
diately given to, and given by, symbolic thought, which in exchange as in 
any other form of communication, surmounts the contradiction inherent 
in it; that is the contradiction of perceiving things as elements of dialogue, 
in respect of self and others simultaneously, and destined by nature to pass 
from one to the other. (iMM, 58–9/xlvi)
the passage makes clear the priority accorded to the structures whose 
objectivity is seen as a condition of subjectivity. the gift is not consti-
tuted as such in its passage between giver and receiver, but as a form of 
communication gives expression to a structure that is rather prior, and 
moreover constitutive of, these subjective positions.
the criticism that Mauss fails to appreciate the totality of the struc-
tures underlying the hau is extended to apply to the most basic princi-
ples of gift-exchange. lévi-strauss argues that Mauss’s holistic account 
of the irreducibly political, religious, economic and legal institution of 
giving is undermined by the division of the gift-economy into three dis-
tinct obligations to give, to receive and to reciprocate. the distinction 
is, again, ‘subjective’ in its failure to grasp the totality of exchange as 
an event, or total social fact, irreducible to separable actions. taken at 
this level, exchange ceases to be a mere empirical practice and becomes 
instead something akin to a (Kantian) transcendental synthesis: ‘the 
concept of reciprocity, providing immediate resolution of the opposi-
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tion between the self and the other; and the synthetic nature of the gift’ 
(lévi-strauss 1963: 22/36). like the prohibition of incest, the hau is not 
what causes the gift to circulate, but a fragmented, partial expression 
of this synthesis, a myth that is generated to fill the empty site of the 
unconscious signifiers that organise exchange. As Maurice Merleau-
Ponty eloquently puts it, in an essay titled ‘from Mauss to lévi-strauss’ 
that signals the increasing importance of structuralism to his primarily 
phenomenological concerns: ‘exchange is not an effect of society, but 
society itself in act’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 116/146 [tM]).
Where Mauss erroneously accords agency to the hau, or even, ulti-
mately, to subjects endowed with the capacity to give or not to give 
(hence the need for an obligation), lévi-strauss ascribes it to signifiers 
whose operations exceed the subject, famously rejecting the prevailing 
(sartrean) humanism of the era (lévi-strauss 1966: 245–58; lévi-
strauss 1966: 245–58/292–305). At the heart of the functioning of 
this network of signifiers, in the place where Mauss sought to locate 
the hau, he posits a point of ‘inadequation’ between the signifier and 
signified, hence a surplus of signification that cannot readily be assigned 
to a referent. Adopting ‘Jakobson’s definition of the zero-phoneme 
term for term’ (Dosse 1997: 30/51; see Jakobson 1971: 218–19), lévi-
strauss articulates the existence of a ‘symbol in its pure state [à l’état 
pur]’, ‘a zero symbolic value, that is, a sign marking the necessity of a 
supplementary symbolic content over and above that which the signi-
fied already contains’ (iMM, 64/l). the surplus of signification is ‘the 
very condition of the exercise of symbolic thinking’, the moment of 
instability whose inability to be adequately captured in language makes 
possible the circulation and exchange of other signifiers; a surplus, 
moreover, whose existence ultimately gives expression to, and is, ‘the 
disability of all finite thought’ (iMM, 63/xlix).
for a time, up until his engagement with Bataille, lacan repeats 
lévi-strauss’s claims about the intersubjective, symbolic nature of the 
unconscious, writing soon after his meeting with the anthropologist 
that: ‘the unconscious is the part of discourse qua transindividual that 
is not at the subject’s disposal in re-establishing the continuity of its 
conscious discourse’ (e, 214/258 [tM]). he also famously maintains 
that: ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’ (sXi, 149/167; e, 
223/269) and affirms the idea of the unconscious agency of the signi-
fier. in the lacanian repetition of lévi-strauss, however, the degree 
zero of signification is no longer the site of a simple indeterminacy, but 
of the phallus – a term denoting not the biological organ but, more 
generally, the complexity of translating human sexuality into the sym-
bolic order of language. castrated, or incomplete, the subject lacks the 
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 satisfaction of desire that would obviate the need for social existence; 
the fate of desire plays out through the symbolic exchange of language. 
the phallus stands at the centre of a chain of signifiers, which circulate 
around it without being able fully to grasp its excess. like lévi-strauss, 
lacan argues that incest is not an innate aversion, which is to say, prior 
to the symbolic, but retroactively introduced as a fantasy that seeks to 
explain castration. the circulation of signification around the phallus is 
compelled by the lack that generates this fantasy. As will become appar-
ent over the course of the following sections, one sense of the gift in 
lacan is as an imaginary offering that attempts to fill in for the absent 
phallus. this is not the same as the lévi-strauss-inspired ‘gift of speech’ 
by which lacan enjoins us to come to terms with lacan’s influences. 
lévi-strauss’s (Kantian) emphasis on the transcendental synthesis of 
symbolic exchange also passes through a distinctly hegelian moment, 
re-emerging in lacan as an ethics of recognition and a politics of its 
tragic failure.
heGel ,  KoJèVe  AND the  eARlY  lAcAN
the World changes essentially (and becomes human) through ‘exchange’.
(Alexandre Kojève)2
Prior to the manifesto of the ‘Rome Discourse’, lacan’s work had 
engaged primarily with traditional freudian and post-freudian concepts 
of psychoanalysis, albeit with a clear interest in philosophy, sociology 
and the human sciences.3 Most notable amongst these engagements is 
his work on the mirror stage, a concept ‘plagiarised’ from henri Wallon 
and subsequently reworked into a post-hegelian theory of subjectivity 
that would constitute a point of reference for lacan throughout his 
career. first undertaken in 1936, as part of a collaborative project with 
his philosophical mentor, the hegelian philosopher, Alexandre Kojève, 
the essay goes through a number of changes before settling in the form in 
which we know it in the Écrits, ‘the Mirror stage as formative of the I 
function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic experience’ (Roudinesco 2003: 
28). By the time of its eventual publication in 1949, Kojève’s name had 
disappeared from both the title page and the text. the short essay none 
the less retains strongly discernible traces of hegel. According to one 
2. iRhf, 179n.
3. in addition to the aforementioned Les Complexes familiaux dans la formation de 
l’individu (1938), which deals with the oedipus complex in relation to sociological 
themes on the family, see also, for example, the brief essay on ‘Beyond the “Reality 
Principle” ’, published in the Écrits.
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commentator, it even ‘reads like a commentary on’ the Phenomenology 
of Spirit’s Master–slave dialectic (Williams 2001: 93).
in the subsection of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) entitled 
‘lordship and Bondage’, hegel posits an encounter between two con-
sciousnesses, unknown to one another, each of whom lives in a ‘world 
without alterity’ (Roudinesco 2003: 30), as ‘a simple being for-itself, 
identical to itself [sichselbstgleich] through the exclusion from itself of 
everything other’ (Ps, 113/147 [§187]). Both believe this world to exist 
as an extension of their respective selves, purely as an object of con-
sumption for the satisfaction of their desires. their mutual encounter 
is accordingly unexpected, presenting itself as an obstacle to satisfac-
tion; for the first time, the consciousnesses run up against one another 
as alterities that refuse to submit to the autarkic conditions of their 
perceived existence, resisting incorporation into the megalothymic 
assumption that the object of desire is already contained within the 
identity of the desirer. they enter into a fight until the brink of death, 
at which point one pulls back, accepting servitude in exchange for the 
preservation of life.
the newly confirmed master puts the slave to work on his behalf to 
maintain the impression that the world exists for his own consumption, 
but subsequently becomes resentful. Where the slave gets a sense of 
external validation through recognition of the products of his labour, 
the master gets no freely offered recognition. he is left unsatisfied by 
the ongoing attempts to establish himself as the ontological ground of 
his own existence and succumbs to a sense of alienation that ultimately 
leads him to surrender his dominion and set the slave free. from the 
resulting positions of equality, it finally becomes possible for each to 
acquire the recognition and ontological ground he initially sought. 
Presaging lévi-strauss, hegel argues that the ‘truth’ of the subject is 
found not through unmediated reference to oneself, but through the 
recognition of the other as the ‘truth’ of oneself. the humanist, anti-
lévi-straussian philosopher, claude lefort, has argued that this recip-
rocal, or rather dialectical, exchange of recognition is actually far closer 
to Mauss than to lévi-strauss’s reading of Mauss (lefort 1978: 21–4). 
the language hegel uses to describe the act of letting the other go free 
reinforces the point through its explicit reference to giving, receiving 
and reciprocating:
for first, through the supersession, it receives back its own self [erhält es 
durch das Aufheben sich selbst zurück], because by superseding its other-
ness, it again becomes equal to itself; but secondly, it equally gives the other 
self-consciousness back again to itself [gibt es das andere Selbstbewußtsein 
ihm wieder ebenso zurück], for it saw itself in the other, but supersedes 
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this being of itself in the other and thus lets the other go free. (Ps, 111/146 
[§181])
lefort points to the hegelianism of Mauss to underline the sovereignty 
of the subject, and to decouple Mauss from what he perceives as the 
abstract, idealist Kantianism of lévi-strauss (lefort 1978: 42). lacan’s 
lévi-straussian reworking of hegel generates the opposite conclusion. 
Rather than a sign of the sovereignty of the subject, the gift demon-
strates the sovereignty of the signifier in excess of the subject and is 
above all illustrative of the impotence of the subject. that lefort’s posi-
tion is so far removed from lacan’s is somewhat surprising, given the 
proximity of both to Kojève. Most distinctive about Kojève’s reading 
of the Phenomenology – and something that would seem to place his 
interests very much in line with those of Mauss and lévi-strauss – is 
his insistence that hegel’s undertaking is a work of anthropology (iRh, 
6–7/13–14). in more conventional interpretations, hegel’s account of 
history sees subjects come mutually to recognise one another through 
a dialectical process whose teleology risks the impression that man is 
a passive bystander, swept along by an impersonal, theocratic event 
that has no origin in human agency. Kojève, by contrast, ‘reduces being 
to history, and excludes the dialectic from nature’ (Baugh 2003: 26). 
Placing the emphasis firmly on man’s agency qua desire, a ‘negating 
negativity [négativité négatrice]’ (iRh, 12/12), he insists upon a crucial 
distinction between nature and the subject, which, as Butler notes, ‘is 
created through the experience of desire and is, in this sense, a non-
natural self’ (Butler 1999: 67). Rather than hegel’s ‘Cunning of Reason 
[list der Vernunft]’ (lPh, 89/49), for Kojève it is man’s desire to be 
recognised as desire, as negativity, that propels history forward. the 
capacity for the negation belongs not to the master but to the slave, per-
taining to the labour through which, ‘stimulated by fear of death’, he 
or she transforms nature (iRh, 26/30). in fact, it is labour that enables 
the slave to work through the trauma of near-death, producing objects 
– and history – that fill in the void of mortality. ‘it is this work and only 
this work that frees – i.e., humanizes – man (the slave). on the one 
hand, this work creates a real objective World, which is a non-natural 
World, a cultural, historical, human World’ (iRh, 26/30–1).
in so far as it is labour that humanises, the humanity of the slave 
stands in sharp contrast to the animal behaviour of the master who, 
suppressing the desire for recognition, merely acquiesces in the passiv-
ity of unmediated (natural) being. in contradistinction to lefort, who 
writes of ‘the denaturing cogito of gift exchange’ (lefort 1978: 45), 
Kojève describes this natural being as ‘being-given [être-donné]’, the 
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‘givenness’ of the world prior to any mediation by man. this strictly 
phenomenological, husserlian, use of the language of giving creates 
tensions with Kojève’s claim to be doing anthropology. Where Mauss 
and lévi-strauss work to prevent the discipline from being conflated 
with metaphysical anthropocentrism, Kojève espouses a broadly tra-
ditional and, by implication, anti-structuralist doctrine of subjectivity. 
clearly aware of this, lacan borrows Kojève’s ideas on the constructed-
ness of history and human society, while reasserting the lévi-straussian 
account of the gift as social reality.
Man, according to lacan, is characterised by a ‘specific prematurity of 
birth’ (e, 78/97), a motor vulnerability that sees culture come into being 
to supplement the meagre provisions of nature. in the aforementioned 
article on the mirror-stage, lacan locates the first stage of the entry into 
culture, or in Kojevian terms, into history, with the infant’s encounter 
with its mirror image, precipitating an internal struggle of identity. 
Played out in the register of the imaginary, in relation to the imaginary 
projection of the infant’s psychic unity, this initial struggle precedes 
the passage into the symbolic order of language and recognition. the 
latter comes into play only later, as the infant seeks to resolve a sense of 
alienation from the specular image underlying the ego. the mirror-stage 
thus functions as ‘the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a 
primordial form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic of identifica-
tion with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, 
its function as subject’ (e, 76/94). lacan describes how the infant dis-
covers its reflected image in the form of a continuous Gestalt, or whole. 
the discovery causes the presubjective infans to undergo a transforma-
tive process of identification, acquiring, through abstraction, a sense of 
identity it can retrospectively be seen to have lacked. the experience of 
physical integrity and unity ‘symbolizes the mental permanence of the I’ 
(e, 76/95), giving rise to the formation of the ego.
Despite the appearance of unity, the ego is only ideal, a product of 
the imagination, however; its agency transpires to be a mere fiction. 
the initially ‘jubilant assumption of its specular image’ results from 
the infant’s narcissistic investment of libido in its own image. But the 
investment soon gives way to an internal dialectical struggle, marked by 
a sense of alienation from the psychic identity imposed on the infant by 
the appearance of corporeal unity (e, 76/94). the reason for this strug-
gle is that there is a substantial part of the infant that escapes the ego’s 
organisation of consciousness, and which is furthermore kept at bay by 
the ego’s role as a self-defence mechanism against the excessive stimu-
lations of the outside world. the ego thus becomes the ‘armour of an 
alienating identity’ (e, 78/97), structured around the  méconnaissance, 
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or misrecognition, of the subject with the field of perception-con-
sciousness. the part of itself that it cannot recognise is desire, which 
is repressed as unconscious, only to return, symptomatised in violent 
behaviour and fantasies like that of le corps morcelé, expressing the 
attempt to overturn desire’s imprisonment by the ego.
the failure of the ego to capture the alterity of unconscious desire is 
what pushes the child away from a purely imaginary construction of its 
identity, toward the realm of the symbolic, where the (Kojevian) desire 
to be recognised by others as desire is made possible by the expression 
of desire in language. the direction of imaginary violence toward the 
imaginary ego frees desire from its bondage to a fixed object. its exist-
ence will henceforth be subject to the process of symbolic exchange, 
determined by the movement of the signifier that enables desire, 
through speech, to offer itself to the other and receive in return a rec-
ognition of its offering. According to Richard Boothby, who draws on 
ideas sketched out in Seminar X: Anxiety (1962–3), this transition from 
imaginary to symbolic is structured around the logic of sacrifice, which, 
by initiating symbolic exchange, brings about ‘the capture of the other 
in the network of desire’ (sX, 320). Boothby writes: ‘in lacanian terms, 
the general function of sacrificial practices is to establish the operation 
of the signifier,’ before continuing: ‘what is accomplished by sacrifice 
is less the engagement of any particular exchange than the establish-
ment of the law of exchange itself’ (Boothby 2001: 183, 185). the 
operation of the signifier refers to the process of symbolisation through 
which access to the world becomes mediated by language. At the origin 
of this operation is a renunciation that is also an offering. the infant 
renounces itself as an object of masturbatory pleasure, renounces the 
fantasy of grounding the satisfaction of desire in itself, in order sacri-
ficially to offer up its desire to an other who might thereby reciprocate 
and recognise it.
What is sacrificed is immediate access to the objects of desire. one repeats 
the gesture of giving up in order to rehearse the possibility of regaining in 
a new form [. . .]. sacrifice thus serves to establish the kingdom of significa-
tion in which the objects of desire can circulate in an unending economy of 
substitutions. [sacrifice] functions less simply to offer a gift than to found 
the very being of the gift by establishing the dimension in which the cycle 
of giving and receiving will be enacted. this cycle is consubstantial with 
the operation of the signifier. the promise of the gift is continually called 
up by the shuttle of signification but forever escapes from it. By establish-
ing the scaffold of binary relations upon which the system of the signifier is 
constructed, while at the same time setting in motion the virtual object with 
which discourse is continually haunted, sacrifice serves to constitute the very 
matrix of desire. the essential sacrifice is less do ut des [the term used by 
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Mauss – GM], i give so that you might give, than do ut desidero, i give in 
order that i might desire. (2001: 188–9)
Boothby suggests that this renunciation is what is at stake in the 
infans’s rejection of identification with the mirror image. the imagi-
nary violence inflicted against the imago of the ego is a self-sacrifice, 
where the infant offers itself up for socialisation, submitting to the law 
of the father in exchange for liberation from its alienating entrapment 
by the ego. the gesture of giving up is premised on the possibility of 
recovery through the economy of symbolic exchange. in being returned 
to itself via the other, through the other’s recognition of the expres-
sion of desire in language, the subject hopes to recover the unity of the 
abandoned imago. ironically, as we shall see, the process of symbolisa-
tion is one that renders any such recovery impossible. Borrowing from 
hegel, lacan states: ‘the word is murder of the thing’ (e, 261–2/318). 
Boothby rereads the murder as a sacrifice (2001: 185).
With language constituting the sacrifice of the thing, the mirror 
image marks a decisive moment in the transition between imaginary 
and symbolic. But it should not be seen as the only instance of the 
sacrificial logic through which symbolic order is instantiated. in a 
1917 paper on ‘on transformations of instinct as exemplified in 
Anal erotism’, sigmund freud discusses a similarly sacrificial process 
of renunciation at the anal stage, in the lavatory training of children. 
the infant undergoes socialisation by foregoing the pleasures of unre-
gulated defaecation, offering gifts of excreta to the father in order to 
forestall the imagined threat of castration.
for its faeces are the infant’s first gift [das erste Geschenk], a part of his 
body which he will ‘give up’ [‘opfert’ – also meaning sacrifice] only on per-
suasion by someone he loves, to whom, indeed, he will make a spontaneous 
gift of it as a token of affection. (freud 2001b: 130/406–7)
once again described as a sacrifice (Opfer), the gift testifies to the 
child’s submission to a symbolic law that requires satisfaction to be 
sought beyond the confines of the self. its presentation becomes the 
means through which children not yet fully endowed with the capaci-
ties of speech seek to purchase the love and recognition they so strongly 
desire from the parent. the gift, in other words, becomes an instrument 
for the repayment of symbolic debt.
Representing a phallus, the gift of shit is given in the hope of pre-
venting castration, the loss of parental love. lacan comments on this 
at length in his most sustained analysis of the gift, during his seminar 
of 1956–7, The Object Relation (Le Séminaire, livre IV: La Relation 
d’objet). Much of the discussion revolves around a highly technical 
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rereading of freud’s case study on ‘Dora’ through the lens of lévi-
strauss’s The Elementary Structures of Kinship, the details of which 
are beyond the scope of the present discussion. lacan makes a crucial 
distinction between the symbolic and imaginary functions of the gift, 
between, on one hand, ‘the gift of speech [le don de la parole]’ (siV, 
189) and, on the other, ‘the gift of what one does not have [le don de ce 
qu’on n’a pas]’ (siV, 123). the former refers to the overall structures of 
language through which the subject comes to be in the symbolic order 
as always already castrated, the latter to the attempts of the ego to 
overcome castration through the offering of gifts. Particularly worthy 
of note in this discussion is the attention paid to sacrifice, not just at 
the inception of the symbolic, but as a technique of the imaginary that 
attempts to overturn the deleterious consequences of symbolisation.
‘ the  G ift  of  WhAt  oNe  Does  Not  hAVe ’  AND 
‘the  G ift  of  sPeech’
the ‘Rome Discourse’ of 1953 constitutes lacan’s first, but not his 
most sustained, discussion of the gift. it does, however, offer the most 
pronounced demonstration of lacan’s turn toward structuralism, even 
if the voices of Jakobson and lévi-strauss at times seem drowned out 
by a cacophony of others, including freud, Bichat, the Upanishads, 
heidegger and hegel–Kojève, to name only a few. it is this hegelo-
Kojevian influence that is most immediately apparent in the discourse’s 
discussion of gifts, not least by virtue of lacan’s choice of vocabulary. 
the discussion begins with a description of gifts bound up in a process 
of recognition: ‘the law of man has been the law of language since the 
first words of recognition presided over the first gifts’ (e, 225/272). 
taking its leave from the privilege now accorded by lacan, following 
lévi-strauss, to linguistics, the citation makes it clear that gifts are given 
to supplement the exchange of words and not vice versa. the gift itself 
is a mere placeholder, something he will later describe ‘as being only the 
sign of the gift’ (siV, 182). symbolic, but merely of the symbolic order 
as such, the material offering serves to draw attention to the words 
whose apparently supplementary status belies their structural priority. 
it returns, becomes significant, only when the very symbolic order it 
expresses is called into question. the supplementary gift, given in addi-
tion to, or in the absence of the word, thus pertains to an attempt of 
the imaginary to reinforce the ego against what is perceived as symbolic 
instability. Rather than the object, what is given in the symbolic is ‘the 
gift of speech’ (e, 265/322), a phrase repeated on several occasions over 
the course of lacan’s presentation. if this privileging of the word over 
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the thing constitutes an implicit challenge to Mauss, lacan’s call to the 
analytic community to return to the word and reassert its centrality to 
the therapeutic process reaffirms Mauss’s injunction to reassert the gift 
as an organisational category of contemporary society (G, 69/263).
Just as for Mauss, one gives to elicit a countergift. When one speaks, 
according to lacan, one does so in order to elicit a response. ‘What 
i seek in speech is a response from the other. What constitutes me as 
a subject is my question’ (e, 247/299). the statement must be taken 
within the context of the earlier, hegelo-Kojevian, claim that it is reco-
gnition, rather than obligation, that is sought in this response: ‘man’s 
desire finds its meaning in the other’s desire [. . .], his first object(ive) 
is to be recognized by the other’ (e, 222/268). the point is confirmed 
by the ease with which one of most decisive, yet problematic, formula-
tions of the ‘Rome Discourse’ lends itself to interpretation through the 
Master–slave dialectic. lacan writes that: ‘human language would 
then constitute a kind of communication in which the sender receives 
his own message back from the receiver in an inverted form’ (e, 
246/298). the wording – suggested to lacan by lévi-strauss (Borch-
Jacobsen 1991: 143/174) – recalls the hegelian concept of being-one-
self-through-another, according to which consciousness accedes to the 
full subjectivity of self-consciousness only through the receipt of recog-
nition from another self-consciousness. it would accordingly be easy to 
read lacan as constructing a hegelian argument to the effect that it is 
exclusion from discourse and the right to free speech that serves as the 
cause of alienation.
for lacan, however, the arch-modern temptation to lay bare the 
other subject as ground of one’s own subjectivity is precisely the temp-
tation to be resisted. he diverges from hegel, rejecting the idea of 
grounded subjectivity, and he is at pains to emphasise that the analyst’s 
gift of speech should in no way be used to create or indulge the impres-
sion of any such ground.
in this sense it becomes crucial to return to the distinction between 
the imaginary and symbolic order, and to differentiate the symbolic 
‘don de la parole’ from another formulation of the gift as a technique 
of the imaginary. throughout his career, lacan also employs the gift to 
describe love as ‘giving what one does not have’ (e 580/691; siV, 140; 
sViii, 419). love, he argues, is the imaginary gift of what one does not 
have: namely, the void of subjectivity. to put this in more convention-
ally psychoanalytic language, it is also the gift of the (lacking) phallus, a 
denial of castration, where one offers an imaginary phallus to the other 
in order to receive back the same in return. the gift of speech would 
be precisely the gift of that which creates this void – namely, language, 
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the symbolic law that castrates the subject in the first place. in love, he 
argues, one denies the extrinsic structures of subjectivity by offering 
oneself to the other as a ground, a ‘truth’ that serves as an ontological 
support. one moreover gives and sacrifices to this other, showering 
them with presents one can symbolically and deliberately ill afford, in 
a bid to convince them – and, lacan would say, oneself – of this truth. 
love, in this respect, is the very opposite of psychoanalysis, the latter 
being a process whose conclusion routinely involves propelling the ana-
lysand backwards out of love with an analyst to whom they turn for 
emotional (viz. ontological) support.
on a clinical level, this insistence on effectuating a counter-transfer-
ence explains lacan’s highly unorthodox and controversial refusal to 
adhere to the standard analytic practice of fixed-length sessions. the 
conventional insistence on a ‘purely chronometric halt’, he argues, 
serves only to facilitate the possibility that the analysand capture itself 
in the imaginary objectivation of a subjective agency that articulates 
its own substantial interiority (e, 209/252 [tM]). it thus runs counter 
to the task of psychoanalysis, which is to disabuse the analysand of 
this pretension. this is what lacan hoped to achieve through the 
introduction of seemingly arbitrary end points, intended to confront 
the analysand with the real of a desire that speaks from without, a 
position of external, alienated lack that articulates only this alienation. 
Analysis, in other words, exposes desire as a gift that only gives (love) 
in the narcissistic hope of receiving recognition of itself in return. if 
treatment is expensive, the argument goes, it is in order to counteract 
any impression that the analyst gives to the patient the nothingness 
that would indicate love: ‘he is paid for this nothing [ce rien, on le lui 
paie], preferably well, in order to show that otherwise it would not be 
worth much’ (e, 516/618; see also e, 254/308). the point has been 
expertly developed by forrester, who, writing on the lacanian theory 
of transference, argues that: ‘the signifier of signifiers, the signifier that 
designates the effects of the system, as lacan describes lévi-strauss’s 
zero signifier, is not hau, is not mana, is not the quantum, is not even 
the phallus, but – money’ (forrester 1997: 1959–60). in handing over 
money for treatment, the patient is exposed to the harsh reality of a 
transactional existence that, insisting on payment irrespective of the 
patient’s suffering, obstinately refuses to indulge in fantasies of charity. 
the transferential process works through the very refusal of charity, 
the unreciprocated gift. the offering of the analyst should be one that 
leaves the subject to dwell on the groundless narcissism of any attempt 
at totalising self-narrative, to be achieved by ‘punctuating’ the speech 
of the analysand, exposing it to the moments of resistance it passes over 
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in silence (e, 253–4/307–8). through this dramatic reworking of the 
psychoanalytic process of transference, lacan aims to show that sym-
bolic gift-exchange does not take place between independent, subjective 
agents, but unconsciously.
Underlying this is the lévi-straussian claim that the subject does 
not, as lovers tend to imagine, exist outside of and immune to society, 
but rather only exists by virtue of the place it is interpolated to occupy 
within the symbolic order. it is not – as argued by the American ego-
psychologists against whom the ‘Rome Discourse’ is directed – the 
subject that articulates the unconscious, but the (symbolic) unconscious 
that speaks the subject. ‘i will show that there is no speech without 
a response, even if speech meets only with silence’ (e, 206/247). the 
claim reiterates but also extends the lévi-straussian emphasis on the 
total social fact. lacan argues that, like the exchange described by 
lévi-strauss, at the level of its unconscious structures, dialogic speech 
cannot be broken down into individuated instances of speech and its 
response. structurally, there is no distinction between the two. Just like 
the lévi-straussian gift, which is only a fragmentary expression of an 
underlying, unitary structure of exchange, ‘true speech already contains 
its own response’ (e, 255/310). ‘the gift’, in other words, ‘implies the 
whole cycle of exchange’ (siV, 182).
Reiterating the above, to say that speech is a gift does not mean that 
it rewards its recipients by telling them what they want to hear. Nor 
does it simply mean that the subject does not exist, since the being 
that is at stake here is rather one of self-grounding in-sistence. ‘the 
enunciation (the gift) of speech is what institutes and very literally gives 
being to what is uttered (given to be heard)’ (Borch-Jacobsen 1991: 
142/173). following Kojève’s argument that the truth of human history 
is created as ‘Reality of-which-one-speaks [Réalité-dont-on-parle]’ 
(iRh, 174/451), lacan suggests that the reality of the subject is not 
pre-given, but rather gives itself in the very act of speech, in giving its 
word. its existence becomes a matter of the recognition that is given in 
reciprocation of its own act of giving. the gift is described as a ‘pact’ 
(e, 225/272), signifying the giving of a consensus in which what is ‘sig-
nified’ is existence as such. the signifier is the law of the gift, presiding 
over the fact that what is given is not ‘what one does not have’, but 
precisely all that one is: ‘the whole reality of its [the psychoanalytic 
experience’s] effects lies in the gift of speech [le don de la parole]; for 
it is through this gift that all reality has come to man and through its 
ongoing action that he sustains this reality’ (e, 265/322).
Before moving on to discuss the impact of Bataille upon this theory, 
we might note that what appears to be a relatively straightforward 
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reworking of hegel-Kojève is complicated by the claim that recogni-
tion is actually already presupposed in the act of giving one’s word. 
As forrester and Borch-Jacobsen have both argued at length, speech 
is ‘performative’, in the sense that the subject is enacted in and by its 
utterance, irrespective of whether anyone is listening (Borch-Jacobsen 
1991: 143–8/174–80; forrester 1990: 152–4). to quote again from 
Borch-Jacobsen:
the given word [. . .] presupposes the recognition of the one to whom it is 
addressed. it is not what it is – a word that binds – except on condition of 
being given to another who is not me. in this respect, it does not matter 
whether the other accepts this gift or not, whether he in turn gives his word 
or not; the given word institutes in any case, by the very fact of its enun-
ciation, a relationship that defines me in my relation to an other. (Borch-
Jacobsen 1991: 141/172)
Much as ‘men recognize each other by the gift of speech’ (e, 265/322), 
the truth of the subject is that there is no truth, aside from that per-
formatively enacted through the other, the ‘big other’ of the symbolic 
unconscious. in a reversal of the hegelian position, recognition is not 
a question of other subjects recognising a subjectivity that speaks itself. 
At stake, rather, is recognition by the subject of the other, the symbolic 
order, that speaks it. this brings us back to the distinction between 
the imaginary gift of what one does not have and the symbolic gift of 
speech, implicit in which is the idea that the imaginary gift attempts to 
reconfigure the unconscious other as a knowable entity. the offering of 
the (imaginary) phallus is a sacrificial act that seeks to confer human, 
subjective attributes on an anthropomorphised social reality, foremost 
amongst which is the ability to offer love and recognition. lacan 
remarks of gifts made to the gods that:
sacrifice consisted [le sacrifice, ça consistait] in behaving as if they desired 
like us. [. . .] Which isn’t to say that they will eat what one sacrifices to them, 
nor even that it might be useful to them, what matters is that they desire it. 
(sX, 321)
Manifesting itself as a ‘call’ to the other (siV, 182), the offering of what 
one does not have functions as a narcissistic attempt to buy the love of 
the other. But it has the additional effect of reinscribing, consolidating 
the process of imaginary misrecognition that leads to the experience of 
debt in the first place. As Žižek puts it:
in its most fundamental dimension, sacrifice is a ‘gift of reconciliation’ to 
the other, destined to appease its desire. sacrifice conceals the abyss of the 
other’s desire, more precisely, it conceals the other’s lack, inconsistency, 
‘inexistence,’ that transpires in this desire. Sacrifice is a guarantee that ‘the 
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Other exists’: that there is another who can be appeased by means of the 
sacrifice. (Žižek 2001: 56)
to receive the gift of speech, by contrast, is to recognise that ‘behind 
what [the subject] gives there is all that it lacks, and that the subject 
sacrifices beyond what it has’ (siV, 140). in receiving it, the subject 
comes to accept symbolic debt as an effect of the structure of subjectiv-
ity, the effect not of a superegoic law of the father, but of structures of 
language that generate an excess of meaning, in relation to which the 
subject is lacking. the debt is affirmed as constitutively unpayable.
through his distinction between imaginary and symbolic giving, 
lacan is able to move beyond Mauss’s ‘discovery’ that the gift is always 
tied to the receipt of a debt. the question of debt is transformed into 
a question of how to perceive ourselves in relation to the symbolic 
order: whether we construe the other as a substantialised ground with 
which to exchange gifts, or whether to recognise the tendency to look 
for ontological support as an inbuilt effect of the extrinsic structures 
of language. even if he rejects the idea of charity, one might wonder 
whether, in distinguishing the gift from the obligation to give, lacan 
does not leave an opening for an unconditional giving of the type 
sought by Derrida. Whether Derrida would think he goes far enough is 
another matter.
lAcAN WITH  DeRRiDA?
Despite lacan’s claim that the subject is merely an empty function of 
speech, it might be suggested that this emphasis on the performative 
enactment of the subject in language still collapses back into a thinking 
of language as an ontological ground. one variant of this argument, 
proposed by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, will be studied in 
depth in the next chapter. Most immediately germane to the question 
of the gift is an argument put forward by Derrida. in the deconstruction 
of lacan in The Post-Card, Derrida is driven to wonder whether the 
exchange of recognition in speech works only at the cost of restricting 
language to a ‘metalinguistic’ conveyance of the presence, or ‘truth’, of 
a transcendentally privileged signifier: ‘what the seminar insists upon 
showing, finally, is that there is a single proper itinerary of the letter 
which returns to a determinable place that is always the same and that 
is its own’ (Pc, 436/464–5). the argument amounts to a rejection of 
the total social fact. indeed, it closely recalls the much earlier article, in 
which Derrida broke ranks with structuralism by arguing against lévi-
strauss’s hypothesis of a distinct social reality. in ‘structure, sign and 
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Play in the Discourse of the human sciences’ (1966), Derrida accuses 
lévi-strauss of over-determining the fixity of signifiers’ production of 
meaning, and suggests that he remains implicitly caught up in an ‘ethics 
of presence’, recuperating speech as a metaphysical ground. through 
his excessively rigid distinction between nature and culture, Derrida 
argues, lévi-strauss neglects the extent to which symbolic order is 
subject to and made possible by a ‘play’ of meaning that blurs this dis-
tinction (WD, 369/427).
in a rereading of edgar Allen Poe’s short story, ‘the Purloined letter’ 
(1844), initially conducted as part of Seminar II, but subsequently 
reprinted as the opening essay of the Écrits, lacan compares Poe’s 
detective hero, Dupin, to a psychoanalyst. the analyst’s knowledge 
of symbolic exchange is what leads Dupin to locate the missing letter 
in between the ‘legs’ of a fireplace, a symbolic site to which the letter 
(the phallus) will unconsciously return, undoing any attempt to assert 
agency over it, to wrest it away from the logic of symbolic exchange. 
lacan concludes with the (lévi-straussian) assertion that ‘a letter 
always arrives at its destination,’ offering the literary text as evidence 
that ‘the sender, as i tell you, receives from the receiver his own message 
in an inverted form’ (e, 30/41). the claim appears to emphasise the 
inevitability of castration, the inevitability that the giving (enunciation) 
of the subject by the signifier will be met by a countergift, a surplus 
of signification that ungrounds and decentres the subject, rendering it 
impotent. Derrida takes issue, suggesting that this only holds true by 
virtue of an idealisation of the signifier as a self-identical phallus, an 
ultimately stable referent that belies lacan’s (lévi-straussian) asser-
tion of its intrinsic inadequation: ‘Not that the letter never arrives at its 
destination, but it belongs to the structure of the letter to be capable, 
always, of not arriving’ (Pc, 444/472). By emphasising the artificial 
imposition of unity on the signifier, what Derrida wants to preserve 
is the possibility of a letter not arriving at its destination, of a gift not 
being reciprocated – even if this gift would still be impossible on his 
own terms. Derrida, we recall, argues that the gift, in order to qualify 
as such, be unconditionally aneconomic, which is to say unrecognisable 
and uncontaminated by the negative impact of reciprocity. lacan, for 
Derrida, destroys the gift by capturing it in a self-identical present.
Articles from Barbara Johnson and slavoj Žižek have sought to 
contest this. turning Derrida back against himself, the former accuses 
him of falling victim to too literal an interpretation of the letter’s 
arrival, of the notion of its ‘destination’ in particular. Johnson suggests 
that Derrida presupposes a teleological understanding of destination as 
something preceding its circulation, and in so doing fails to consider the 
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way the gift (the phallus, the letter) performatively enacts the reality of 
the recipient qua recipient (subject) (Johnson 1988: 248). similarly for 
Žižek, in thinking that the repressed can also not return, that the gift 
can not be reciprocated, ‘we entangle ourselves in a naive substantialist 
notion of the unconscious as a positive entity ontologically preceding 
its “returns” ’ (Žižek 2001: 14). the point that Derrida’s critics seek to 
make is that the lacanian social fact is not as totalisable, not so much 
of an all-encompassing ground, as it initially seems. the very fact that 
the reality of the symbolic order is performatively enacted is precisely 
what prevents it from being total, riddling it with holes that must be 
filled in by the imaginary. What Johnson and Žižek perhaps fail to 
signal is the extent to which this only becomes apparent in lacan’s 
later, more Bataillean work, in which he begins to distance himself from 
his lévi-straussian inheritance of Mauss.
GeoRGes  BAtAille  AND the  ‘DoN De  lA  V ie ’
to sacrifice is not to kill but to give, to relinquish [abandonner].
(Georges Bataille)4
Writing in Le Souffleur (The Whisperer), the final instalment of his 
trilogy, Les Lois de l’hospitalité (The Laws of Hospitality), Pierre 
Klossowski, a member of the collège de sociologie, parodies lacan 
through the character of Dr Ygdrasil, an analyst who accuses his patient 
of misunderstanding the economics of the gift: ‘You cling absolutely to 
giving without return! But you can’t live without submitting yourself to 
the universal law of exchange!’ (Klossowski 1965: 302). the recipient 
of the outburst is one théodore lacase, who, with the encouragement of 
his friend, the imperious Guy de savigny, indulges in the curious practice 
of offering his wife up to guests in his household. By giving her away, he 
hopes better to possess her. only by watching her in intimate congress 
with another, he thinks, can he know her intimately; know that part of 
her disclosed only to the other, beyond the confines of her role as wife. 
Upon discovering that his wife has been short-circuiting the laws of 
hospitality, substituting another, a spitting-image, for herself, so that it 
is this other woman who is given away, théodore breaks down, perceiv-
ing his imaginary experience of intimacy never to have taken place. the 
psychiatrist’s response is to tell him to stop being so generous – the uni-
versal law of exchange means that he will always come undone, always 
receive an unanticipated, poisonous countergift by way of return of his 
4. tR, 48–9/310 [tM].
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own gifts. far better, then, simply to submit wholeheartedly to the law, 
to give up on the illusory, impossible pursuit of intimacy and accept a 
life of symbolic circulation, in which he, too, sleeps with whomever he 
pleases. Underlying this response is the lévi-straussian theory of the 
symbolic exchange of women, an account that sees subjective positions 
of husband and wife conferred in accordance with the logic of the sig-
nifier. this lévi-straussian approach is what reveals Ygdrasil to be a 
caricature of lacan. As leslie hill has pointed out, the ethos of radically 
sacrificial giving suggests savigny to be a repetition of Bataille, with 
théodore repeating Klossowski (hill 2001: 165).
the move of treating a simulacral critique of théodore for an actual 
lacanian critique of Klossowski and furthermore Bataille is fraught 
with problems, obviously including the conflation of two quite differ-
ent thinkers, Bataille and Klossowski, to say nothing of the complexi-
ties of deconstructing Klossowski’s simulacra.5 heuristically, however, 
Ygdrasil’s damning indictment arguably finds no more plausible a 
recipient than Bataille, who can not only be seen to eulogise intimacy, 
but also to regard sex and sacrifice as a means to its attainment. this 
potential difference between Bataille and lacan arises in spite of a 
shared Kojevian heritage and persists even after Bataille’s reading of 
lévi-strauss. it would also seem to lend support to the hypothesis of 
lacan’s biographer that Bataille possibly never read the work of his 
supposed protégé (Roudinesco 1997: 136/188; see also Botting and 
Wilson 2001: 82–4). the opposite does not hold true, though one 
might wonder how much of what passes for a critique of Bataille is 
not already implicit in lacan. it may not be immediately apparent, but 
something closely resembling a Bataillean thinking of giving comes 
increasingly to inflect the work of lacan. the latter does not accept 
without qualification the Bataillean idea that, through sacrifice, one 
might restitute an experience of lost intimacy, ‘of immanence between 
man and world, between the object and the subject’ (tR, 44/307). 
More nuanced ideas of both sacrifice and intimacy none the less become 
crucial for the formulation of the third and final register of his ‘pre-
ontology’ of the unconscious, a concept of psychic reality qua ‘real’, 
‘an idea of morbidity, of reste (vestige), of part maudite (doomed or 
accursed part), borrowed without attribution from the heterological 
science of Bataille’ (Roudinesco 1997: 217/289). in place of intimacy, 
5. on the not entirely harmonious relations between Bataille and Klossowski, see 
Kaufman (2001), hill (2001) and James (2006b); James has written extensively on 
the thematic of the gift in Klossowski’s Les Lois de l’hospitalité (James 2000), as has 
Deleuze, in an appendix to Logique du sens (ls, 327–42).
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lacan writes of ‘extimacy [extimité]’ (sVii, 139/167), or external-
intimacy, an intimacy so interior to the subject as to be ‘en toi plus 
que toi’, ‘in you more than yourself’ (sXi, 268–9/299), lying in excess, 
even, of the extrinsic structures of language. We experience extimacy 
not through sacrifice, but through what is increasingly being called 
the ‘sacrifice of sacrifice’, understood as a strategy for finally coming 
to terms with the traumatic absence of an ontological ground (Žižek 
2001: 165–73; Keenan 2005: 105). characteristic of this later, more 
Bataillean, lacan is the rearticulation of the relation between the gift 
and castration, and of the nature of the unconscious that causes castra-
tion. for the early lacan, the gift is understood both as the castrating 
symbolic exchange of speech and as the imaginary offering that seeks 
to reappropriate the castrated phallus. With the gift of the real, the cas-
tration effect of the floating signifier is traced to a hole in the symbolic, 
which comes into being as the unsymbolisable excess of symbolisation.
Bataille’s first engagement with the gift occurs in a short essay of 
1933, ‘the Notion of expenditure’, written before his meeting with 
Alexandre Kojève. Bataille’s later references to the gift, including those 
in the trilogy of The Accursed Share (1948–57)6 and the Theory of 
Religion (written by 1948 but only posthumously published), are deci-
sively inflected by, but also highly critical of Kojève and lévi-strauss. 
the earlier work extends Mauss’s critique of utilitarianism, return-
ing to archaic society to make the point that apparently disutilitar-
ian behaviour can be rewarded and justified at the level of libidinal 
economy. the later works develop this further through an emphasis 
on the Kojevian motifs of death, desire and recognition, which Bataille 
challenges in what also becomes a critique of lévi-strauss. in The 
History of Eroticism, he accuses the latter of oversimplifying the 
opposition between nature and culture, animal and man, to the point 
of arrogating the gift to a sphere of symbolic exchange in which its 
intrinsic relation to the erotic – and to life in general – is foreclosed 
(hes, 47–58/39–48). the criticism in fact repeats the one levelled at 
Mauss by lévi-strauss: namely, the failure to appreciate the full extent, 
or ‘totality’, of the total social fact. the point this time is that, as 
already implied by lévi-strauss’s lengthy analysis of the incest taboo, 
the apparently distinct symbolic social reality cannot but be bound up 
with nature. Bataille draws a distinction between ‘restrictive economy 
[économie restreinte]’ and ‘general economy [économie générale]’ (As, 
25/33), which recalls, yet is far broader than, the one lévi-strauss 
6. consisting of The Accursed Share (1948), The History of Eroticism (1957) and 
Sovereignty, written by around 1957 but unpublished during the author’s lifetime.
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makes between ‘restricted’ and ‘generalised exchange’. the latter uses 
the contrast to distinguish between straightforwardly reciprocal and 
more complex, simultaneously patri- and matrilineal systems of exo-
gamic exchange (lévi-strauss 1969: 178–89/189–98). Despite lévi-
strauss’s declared anti-humanism, the problem for Bataille is that this 
generalised exchange still only refers to disutilitarian forms of exchange 
between humans. What Bataille regards as the true ‘copernican trans-
formation’ (As, 25/33) of general economy overturns this perceived 
bias by focusing on the energic excess of ‘living matter in general’ (As, 
23/31) and even on the sun, whose continual generation of life is the 
archetypal figure of ‘giving without ever receiving’ (As, 28/35).
Bataille’s principal argument is that every living system generates 
an excess whose expenditure, or wastage, is fundamental to the suste-
nance of that system. the gift pertains to the ‘unproductive expenditure 
[dépense improductive]’ of this excess, which is none the less habitually 
suppressed as an ‘accursed share [part maudite]’, a disutilitarian and 
unhygienic profanity thought simultaneously unpalatable and unneces-
sary to human economic concerns. Modernity emerges from the ruth-
less exclusion of unproductive expenditure, allowing consumption only 
where it works directly in the service of production (As, 132–3/126). 
in a repetition of Nietzsche’s analysis of the ascetic priest (GM, 
97–101/390–1 [iii, §15–17]), Bataille argues that beyond the modern 
apotheosis of reason, efficiency and calculation without remainder, 
there lies a fetishisation of hygiene, a fear of contamination, which is 
ultimately to say a fear of death. Reversing the modern (Durkheimian) 
construal of the sacred as that which is free from the profane, Bataille 
affirms profanity – shit, death and menstruation, the orgiastic and 
intemperate, the unscientific – as that which is sacred, belonging to 
the exuberant general economy of ‘the gift of life’ (Asf: 7f, 235). 
sovereignty, he argues, does not reside in and with the ‘clear and dis-
tinct’ reasoning of a metaphysically individuated, essentially immortal 
cartesian subject. on the contrary, it coincides with the spontaneous, 
miraculous moment in which the subject-as-object ‘dissolves into 
NothiNG, because, ceasing to be useful, or subordinate, it becomes 
sovereign in ceasing to be’ (hes, 204/255). Another way of saying this 
is that sovereignty is experientially ‘impossible’, incommensurable with 
the experience of the subject. long before Derrida, it is thus Bataille 
who asserts the experience of the gift to be one of an impossibility that 
dissolves the subject. it is not entirely clear whether the impossibility 
of experiencing it subjectively renders it inaccessible to experience tout 
court, or whether it simply points to the fact that human experience 
is artificially restricted by the conditions it imposes on itself, however. 
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Bataille writes in Sovereignty that to become sovereign is to open up the 
horizons of experience beyond the restricted economy of the human, to 
witness ‘the impossible coming true, in the reign of the instant’ (hes, 
211/261). the citation could be thought to imply the throwing off of 
the supposedly sovereign subject for the sake of acceding to, reappro-
priating, a new form of superior subjectivity. Jean-luc Nancy suspects 
that this is indeed the case and has been particularly critical of the 
centripetalism of Bataille’s language of immanence, apparently indica-
tive of the ongoing pursuit of an ontological ground, the return of the 
subject under another name (ic, 22–5/60–4; ft, 63/87). A quite dif-
ferent reading of Bataille emerges from Maurice Blanchot, who offers 
a more lacanian Bataille, for whom the inner experience of intimacy 
‘says the opposite of what it seems to say’ (Blanchot 1988: 16/33). 
Blanchot emphasises Bataille’s descriptions of experience at the limits 
of experience, ‘the extremities of the possible’, ‘a voyage to the ends of 
the possible of man’ (ie, 156, 7/48, 19), that is strictly neither ‘inner’ 
nor even ‘experienced’ as such. Rather than the becoming possible of 
the impossible, Blanchot argues, sovereignty implies an encounter with 
the limit at which experience becomes impossible, in which the subject 
is exposed, ek-statically, to the absence of ground, the impossibility of 
‘communitarian fusion’ with being (1988: 11/24). At the heart of this 
experience of impossibility is Bataille’s thinking of sacrifice.
sAcRif ice
in place of Kojève’s triumphant affirmation of ‘the end of history’ 
(iRh, 159n/435n), the completion of man’s historical transformation 
of nature through labour, we find in Bataille a lamentation of moder-
nity as the highest point in the history of man’s alienation. Despite his 
declared allegiance to Kojève, Bataille had begun to criticise him as 
early as 1937, inventing the concept of ‘useless negativity [négativité 
sans emploi]’, broadly synonymous with unproductive expenditure, in 
a letter of response to the master’s address to the collège de sociologie 
(‘letter to X., lecturer on hegel . . .’, in hollier 1986: 89–93/170–7). it 
is presumably in this address, the text of which is now lost, that Kojève 
‘effectively reproached the conspirators [conjurés] of the collège, 
but above all Bataille, for wanting to play at being sorcerer’s appren-
tices’, for wanting to use magic tricks to make them believe in magic 
(caillois, cited in hollier 1988: 12, 86/37, 167). Much like Mauss’s 
own reproach of the collégiens’ ‘absolute irrationalism’ (fournier 2006: 
327/710; fournier 1990: 87), the cause of concern is an obsession with 
using violence to gain privileged access to the ‘sacred’ reality of the total 
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social fact. clearly aiming at Kojève’s claim that labour is the means 
through which man becomes human, comes to terms with his mortality, 
Bataille is highly critical of Western civilisation’s inability to cope with 
death. in an argument that repeats, but also radicalises, Mauss’s injunc-
tion to ‘return to archaic society and to elements in it’ (G, 69/263), 
he laments the West’s continual attempt to defer death through the 
obsessive-compulsive production of objects designed to outlive their 
producers. such a trait, he argues, is constitutive of the essentialisation 
of human identity in an abstract notion of the subject. Modernity thus 
represents a far cry from the so-called ‘primitive’, archaic societies of 
the gift-economy. Where the structures of the latter reflect the natural 
order of death at the heart of society, modernity bears witness to a 
‘hatred of expenditure’ and the suppression of death, brought about 
through the valorisation of production purely for its own sake (Ne, 
124/314). Reread both through and against the Kojevian interpretation 
of the Master–slave dialectic, the institution of the potlatch is offered 
as a primary example of this: a ritual in which the mass destruction of 
goods purports to prove participants’ independence from the immortal-
ity of the object. As leslie hill puts it, what Mauss considered no more 
than ‘an extreme form of gift-exchange’ became, for Bataille, ‘a struggle 
to the death between agonistic partners, each of whom was required 
by the rules of the potlatch to outdo the other and in the process undo 
oneself’ (hill 2001: 39). the reference to undoing oneself refers to 
Bataille’s fascination with transgressing and going beyond the rigidity 
of subjective experience.
Bataille focuses on the recognition of honour and prestige that is 
staked on one’s ability to waste, the annihilation of property through 
which one demonstrates that one has no desire to see one’s offering 
reciprocated. Reciprocation is rendered unnecessary by the fact that, in 
the acquisition of power, the squandering of a ‘useless’ excess already 
generates its own reward: ‘Gift-giving has the virtue of a surpassing 
of the subject who gives, but in exchange for the object given, the 
subject appropriates the surpassing’ (As, 69/72). What appears to be a 
profitless venture from the restricted perspective of a purely economic 
measure of wealth appears within the perspective of general economy 
as a loss that is compensated by an augmentation in status. While 
Bataille celebrates the Amerindian potlatch as an instance of dépense 
improductive, he does not, however, see it as an unqualified affirma-
tion of finitude: that is, as fully exemplary of the general economy he 
espouses. in the later work it becomes apparent that in destroying only 
the surplus of a society’s production, only that share that it does not 
require to be exchanged or traded, the potlatch does not go all the way 
MOORE PRINT.indd   60 02/12/2010   10:45
 Speech, Sacrifice and Shit 61
in counteracting the means through which humanity extricates itself 
from the general economy of life and death. it falls short of the anecon-
omy attained by full-blown sacrifice, whose purpose is to destroy that 
quality of objectality, or thinghood, that is characteristic of restricted 
economy. the difference between the two is that ‘in general, sacrifice 
withdraws useful products from profane circulation; in principle the 
gifts of potlatch liberate objects that are useless from the start’ (As, 
76/78; see also Richman 1982: 16–22, for a more extensive commen-
tary). the potlatch is not truly transgressive because it only witnesses 
the destruction of unnecessary, luxury items; it therefore symbolises but 
does fully act out the possibility of liberation from things. subjectivity 
is only symbolically exceeded: that is, exceeded only on account of the 
recognition one receives from those observing the ceremony. in sacri-
fice, by contrast, the sacrificer arrives at a sacred experience of death by 
removing the object-form of subjectivity. ‘the thing – only the thing – is 
what sacrifice means to destroy in the victim’ (tR, 43/307).
through its destruction of the thing, sacrifice amounts to a genuine 
dépassement, or overcoming, of the subject. the subtlety of this distinc-
tion between sacrifice and the potlatch has recently led hill to suggest 
that Bataille is undertaking to ‘sacrifice sacrifice’, positing his own 
concept of sacrifice in contrast to a lesser type that is purely symbolic: 
‘it is as though for this second form of sacrifice to take place what has 
to be sacrificed is the symbolic economy of sacrifice itself’ (hill 2001: 
46). the reward for this sacrifice, or sacrifice of sacrifice, is not just 
acclaim but a sovereignty that is independent of recognition, which 
laughs in the face of the death that recognition seeks to suspend. By 
overturning the separation between nature and object – a separation, 
incidentally, that Kojève insists to be a condition of the human (iRh, 
158–9n/434–5n) – sacrifice transgresses the artificial barrier interposed 
between man and the world, returning life ‘to the intimacy of the 
divine world, of the profound immanence of all that is’ (tR, 44/308). 
A similarly privileged communication of intimacy is said to derive from 
sex, and also from transgressive forms of writing. Writing in general 
is sovereign, sacrificial, when it succeeds in overturning the aspira-
tion to scientificity, usefulness and knowledge. ‘Knowledge is never 
sovereign,’ Bataille writes, on the ground that knowledge is always 
the result of an economic process, hence opposed to the sovereign 
instant:
Knowledge [la connaissance] is never sovereign: to be sovereign, it would 
have to occur in the instant. We know nothing absolutely [Nous ne savons 
rien absolument] of the instant. in short, we know nothing about what ulti-
mately concerns us, what is supremely [souverainement] important to us. 
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[. . .] consciousness of the instant is not truly such, is not sovereign, except 
in unknowing [dans le non-savoir]. (hes, 202–3/253–4)
the ‘sacred sociology’ of the collège de sociologie would be a prime 
example of this non-savoir (see hollier 1988: 11/34). As a result of his 
engagement with Bataille, so too, lacan hoped, would psychoanalysis.
(Re - ) sAcRif ic iNG  sAcRif ice
Bataille’s fascination with sacrifice has been the subject of considerable 
criticism, both from his peers, notably including Walter Benjamin, and 
from more contemporary sources, not least Jean-luc Nancy, whose 
work will be discussed at length in chapters 3 and 4. Described by 
Pierre Klossowski as an ‘assiduous auditor’ of the collège de sociologie 
(in hollier 1986: 389/586), Benjamin expressed grave concerns that 
Bataille’s project of ‘surfascism’, of deploying sacred, sacrificial vio-
lence to turn fascism back against itself, risked indiscernibility from that 
which it wished to sublate (surya 2002: 268/327). Maurice Blanchot, 
by contrast, draws on accounts of the sacrificial activities of Acéphale 
to read Bataillean sacrifice as the rejection of fascistic or politically 
extreme concepts of community (Blanchot 1988: 15–16/30–2). Aside 
from surya’s passing observation that ‘lacan worried [s’était inquiété] 
over the experiences and activities of Acéphale from up close’ (2002: 
534n/306n [tM]), which would seem to suggest little sympathy with 
the Blanchottian interpretation, little is known of the psychoanalyst’s 
reaction to Bataille’s experimentations. Dean has written on the shared 
cultural context of their early work, but she does not put the two men’s 
later work into a reflective dialogue that would shed light on surya’s 
oblique statement (Dean 1986; 1992). there is thus an open question 
as to what extent lacan’s critique of sacrifice should be thought a sym-
pathetic, albeit uncredited, re-elaboration, and how much it functions 
as a critique of Bataille.
Despite resistance from fredric Jameson (Jameson 2006: 370), 
slavoj Žižek has gone further than most in acknowledging lacan’s 
Batailleanism, albeit only suggestively, by pointing out that a number 
of themes treated in The Accursed Share trilogy are taken up in lacan’s 
seventh annual seminar, 1959–60, On the Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
(Žižek 2003: 54–5). following Žižek, we might take Seminar VII as the 
site of a lacanian response to Bataille, paying particular attention to its 
treatment of the Bataillean concepts of thinghood and intimacy. the 
seminar sees lacan submit both to a reversal that simultaneously recalls 
and yet announces a departure from Bataille. confronted by Bataille’s 
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postulation of a general economy of life so intimate as to be foreclosed 
from the alienated, reified existence of modern subjectivity, lacan 
seemingly paradoxically develops it into the idea of an external uncon-
scious, combining (sublating?) the two in a concept of ‘extimacy’: ‘the 
intimate exteriority or “extimacy” that is the thing’ (sVii, 139/167). 
the neologism points to the increasing complexity of the linguistic 
structuralism of the early lacan, signalling a shift towards what one 
might, pace Žižek (1999: 7), call lacan’s poststructuralism.
lacan’s son-in-law and executor, Jacques-Alain Miller, has stated 
that the real epistemological break does not occur until the seminar 
of 1963–4, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, where 
lacan introduces the concept of the drive (pulsion), the primordial 
life of the libido: ‘lacan’s first ten seminars are developed under the 
banner of a freud coloured by lévi-strauss,’ the result of this being 
an ‘unconscious with rules, a social unconscious, which he would find 
in ethnology’ (Miller 2003). But this regulative, universal unconscious 
is subsequently superseded by a singular unconscious, based on the 
impossibility of universality, sharing and appropriation. Although 
lacan continues to refer positively to the work of lévi-strauss through-
out Seminar VII, he follows Bataille in questioning the crudeness of the 
former’s distinction between nature and culture (sVii, 67–8/82–3) and 
his subsequent discussions of the symbolic begin to alter in tone. he 
refers repeatedly, for instance, to the ‘field of the service of goods’ (sVii, 
313–15/350–2), a term that more closely resembles Bataille’s descrip-
tion of the symbolic as a rationalistic, hyperconsciousness of commodi-
fied things than it does lévi-strauss’s unconscious network of signifiers. 
Miller suggests that lacan’s lévi-straussian dictum, ‘the unconscious is 
structured like a language,’ is increasingly outdated, superseded by the 
new language of extimacy, though he denies that the symbolic simply 
ceases to be unconscious. the thing, or Das Ding, he argues, ‘is not the 
negation of the preceding structure,’ but the reformulation of the core 
of the symbolic order as real (2003).
lacan himself describes das Ding as the uncanny remainder of the 
symbolisation process, the thing that lives on after the object of desire 
is murdered, or sacrificed, by the word. As the ‘the absolute other of 
the subject, that one is supposed to find again’ (sVii, 52/65), it is also 
that which is most real, more real than the (performatively enacted, 
fantasmically supported) reality of the symbolic order. the real per-
tains to what desire desires but cannot have – not just recognition, 
but moreover the object of desire, whose sacrifice propels the infant 
to pursue recognition through the symbolic order. like the sym-
bolic before it, the real occupies the site of hau, the ‘spirit of things’ 
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invoked by Mauss to describe the circulation of gifts. lacan calls it ‘the 
beyond-of-the- signified’ (sVii, 54/67), since it does not itself participate 
in symbolic circulation. ‘the real’, he writes, ‘is that which always 
returns to [se retrouve toujours à] the same place’ (sVii, 70/85 [tM]). 
the non-movement results from the failure of symbolisation, but is 
also precisely what makes symbolic exchange possible. By the time of 
Seminar XI, das Ding is rearticulated as objet petit a: ‘before the image 
of a completeness closed upon itself, [. . .] the separated a from which 
[the subject] is hanging’ (sXi, 116/131). the subject is held in a state 
of suspension by an inappropriable object whose appropriation would 
spell completion, the definitive satisfaction of desire. the irreducibility 
of this separation is what serves as the cause of desire (sX, 326).
lacan’s denial of hegel’s dialectical Aufhebung means that desire never 
achieves complete symbolic integration, never translates without remain-
der into the language of symbolic order. the thing is what remains of 
desire after symbolisation, the empty structure of the object deprived of 
content, a real void, the existence of which endures beyond the fantasies 
imposed in the attempt to conceal it, and whose constant return to the 
same place has the effect of ungrounding, exposing the fantasy for what it 
is (sXi, 185/207). in line with Bataille’s account of the gift, this lost object 
is by definition inaccessible to the generalised structures of exchange and 
substitutability introduced by the movement of the signifier.
Miller’s identification of an epistemological break is based on a 
reading of lacan in terms of his ‘return to freud’, a project he takes to be 
abandoned at the start of Seminar XI. in emphasising freud, however, 
there is a sense in which he neglects the continuity of lacan’s negotia-
tion between lévi-strauss and Bataille. Rather than a radical departure, 
the seminar marks a fine-tuning, a consolidation of this negotiation. 
Seminar VII refers only in passing to the unconscious as ‘un champ 
d’un non-savoir’, ‘a field of non-knowledge’ (sVii, 236–7/277 [empha-
sis added]), but the idea decisively returns three years later. lacan opens 
the seminar of 1963–4 with a discussion of the epistemological status of 
psychoanalysis, posing himself the question of ‘whether psychoanalysis 
is a science’, or whether it is rather a form of ‘religion’ (sXi, 7/15). 
the two poles, such as they are posed, articulate precisely the division 
between lévi-strauss and Bataille, between ‘mathematisation’ and sov-
ereign ‘non-knowledge’, the possibility of symbolising, rationalising the 
unconscious, versus the affirmation of its impossibility.
the seminar’s dominant theme of a distinction between desire and 
drive can also, broadly speaking, be mapped on to the one between a 
lévi-straussian symbolic and a Bataillean real that ‘we would be led 
to define as impossible’ (sXi, 167/188). Repeating Bataille’s attempt 
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to communicate the general economy of life in excess of the restricted 
economy of the subject, lacan reworks the real as libidinal drive. the 
excessive remainder of the real is now described as a:
pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, or irrepressibe life, life that has 
need of no organ, simplified indestructible life. [. . .] And it is of this that all 
the forms of the objet a that can be enumerated are the representatives, the 
equivalents. (sXi, 198/221)
A life that exceeds subjectivity, he describes it moreover, in explicitly 
Bataillean terms, as acephalous: ‘what i have metaphorically called 
an acephalous, headless subjectification [subjectivation acéphale], a 
subjectification without subject’ (sXi, 184/206). the insistence on 
metaphor reiterates that what is at stake is not an appropriable form 
of sovereignty. lacan does not so much reject sovereignty as resitu-
ate it beyond the prospect of subjective reappropriation, in a type of 
pleasure – jouissance – that is irreducible to desire (sXi, 183–4/205–6). 
Jouissance, he argues, names the pleasure the drive extracts from the 
constant deferral of satisfaction, the frustration of desire.
Where Bataille tends toward a centripetal language of immanence 
and intimacy, lacan is less ambiguous in opening up what might be 
described as a pre-ontological cut, a rupture that prevents the totalisa-
tion of being in any form of self-identity. Rather than a unified general 
economy, his pre-ontology of the unconscious revolves around an 
opposition between two different economies, an economy of desire on 
one hand and, on the other, the economy of the drive, whose autarkic 
self-enclosure disrupts the return-to-self of desire, rendering its satis-
faction impossible (sXi, 166–7/188). the drive’s ‘aim is nothing other 
than the return into circuit [son but n’est point autre chose que ce 
retour en circuit]’ (sXi, 179/201 [tM]), the attainment of self-identity 
in the form of the jouissance experienced in the short-circuiting of 
desire. in constantly returning to the same place, it achieves for itself the 
very closure of identity it renders impossible in desire. Paradoxically, 
subjective self-identity is shown to be impossible through the rupturing 
of symbolic order by the drive’s constant and autarkic return to the site 
of jouissance. in place of the transcendental subject of modernity, it is 
thus jouissance that furnishes the ‘substance’ of lacanian psychoanaly-
sis (Žižek 1989: 68).
‘UN CADEAU D ’UNE  MERDE ’
if Bataille’s valorisation of an intimacy with being fails to recognise 
the fantasmic support structure that underlies sexual relations, the 
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 impossibility of accessing the real through the other, he thus remains 
caught up in a thinking that preserves the possibility of privileged sub-
jectivity in the very gesture by which he denies it. lacan never states this 
explicitly, but the tenor of his argument unveils in the details. over the 
course of Seminar VII, Bataille is named only once, and in passing – ‘ – 
il s’agit de Georges Bataille – ’ – initially praised but immediately chas-
tened for failing to grasp the radicality of libidinal economics in sade 
(sVii, 201/236). Anticipating Nancy and Derrida rather than Blanchot, 
more revealing still is lacan’s analysis of the potlatch. Potlatch, for 
lacan, ceases to be privileged for its proximity to a lost intimacy and 
becomes instead a witness to its absence:
the potlatch bears witness to man’s retreat from goods, a retreat which 
enabled him to link the maintenance and discipline of his desire, so to speak 
– insofar as this is what concerns him in his destiny – to the open destruction 
of goods, that were both personal and collective property. the problem and 
drama of the economy of the good, its ricochets and rebounds, all turn on 
this point. (sVii, 235/275–6)
far from destroying or offering a privileged experience of the life of the 
drive, or even the hollowed-out transcendental structure of objet petit 
a, sacrifice is reconfigured as a fantasmic means of keeping them at bay, 
a gesture necessitated and moreover made possible by the very impos-
sibility of intimacy. the final pages of Seminar XI make this claim in a 
way that revives the aforementioned criticism of Bataille by Benjamin. 
in a passage that equates ‘the most monstrous and supposedly super-
seded forms of the holocaust’, ‘the drama of Nazism’, with a resurgence 
of sacrifice, lacan too now cautions against the temptation toward 
supposedly sacred violence. equally worthy of note is the allusion to 
hegel-Kojève that directly precedes this caution. far from testifying, 
as hegel suggests, to a sublime moment in the Aufhebung of Geist, 
sacrifice testifies to the failure of the dialectic and the impossibility of 
recognition:
i would hold that no meaning given to history, based on hegelo-Marxist 
premises, is capable of accounting for this resurgence – which only goes to 
show that the offering to obscure gods of an object of sacrifice is something 
to which few subjects can resist succumbing, as if under some monstrous 
spell. [t]here are certainly few who do not succumb to the fascination of 
sacrifice in itself – the sacrifice signifies that, in the object of our desires, we 
try to find the presence for the desire of this other that i call here the dark 
God. (sXi, 275/305–6)
the passage repeats the criticism of the sacrificial gift of what one does 
not have, revealing it to be not so much a form of expenditure in which 
we repeat the general economy of life, but rather the means of giving 
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birth to a fantasmic construction through which we conceal it. Rather 
than ‘succumb to the fascination with sacrifice’, the alternative lacan 
proposes is to sacrifice it, to sacrifice the fantasy through which desire 
sustains the illusion of satisfaction. this sacrifice of sacrifice conforms 
to the ethical imperative of psychoanalysis, an imperative that is once 
again differentiated from the subject’s imagined obligation to repay the 
symbolic debt incurred in the misrecognition of the gift of speech. the 
attempt to repay this debt only ever increases the sense of indebtedness, 
performatively reinscribing the existence of the big other to whom one 
sacrifices. the only solution is to escape the vicious circle, the vicious 
economy of repayment. ‘the only thing of which one can be guilty is 
of having given ground relative to one’s desire’ (sVii, 318/370). the 
claim is similar to but perhaps more radical than the ethical imperative 
implied in the receipt of the gift of speech. in his later work, lacan goes 
on to argue that the symbolic order is itself a fantasy, the ‘fundamental 
phantasy’ of an other that confers recognition and self-identity (sXi, 
273/304).
commenting on the fate of the heroine in sophocles’ Antigone, 
lacan describes how, in accepting exile-until-death as the punishment 
for burying her brother, Antigone is driven to ‘sacrifice her own being 
in order to maintain this essential being’ (sVii, 283/329). Despite 
impending marriage to the king’s son, she knows that only by sacrific-
ing herself can she preserve the possibility of what she knows to be 
impossible: namely, desire. Knowing that the satisfaction of desire, 
the impossible desire for the recovery of objet petit a, is irretrievably 
beyond her, she refuses to compromise, renouncing the prospect of an 
illusory satisfaction out of fidelity to the impossible object. the logic is 
one of forced choice, of ‘Your freedom or your life!’, to recall hegel’s 
life or death encounter (sXi, 212/237). Alenka Zupancˇicˇ summarises it 
elegantly as a situation:
where the only way you can choose A is by choosing its negation, not-A; 
the only way the subject can stay true to the cause is by betraying it, by 
sacrificing it to the very thing that drove her to make this sacrifice. it is this 
paradoxical logic which allows subjectivation to coincide here with the 
‘destitution’ of the subject. While the subject constitutes herself as a subject 
through the act of choosing, the nature of the choice renders her destitute as 
a subject. (Zupancˇicˇ 2000: 216)
this rejection of identification equates with what lacan describes as 
the experience of having ‘traversed the radical phantasy [traversé le 
fantasme radical]’ (sXi, 273/304). through her refusal of the sym-
bolic order of law, Antigone effects the traversal of the fundamental 
fantasy. the cave wherein she dwells until her demise represents the 
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entry into ‘the zone between life and death’ (sVii, 280/326), between 
what, in light of the later work on the drive, we might call a biologi-
cal death that is yet to arrive and a symbolic death that coincides with 
the recognition of the impossibility of its arrival – the impossibility of 
bringing an end to the endless circulation of the libido. it is moreover 
the site of objet petit a as a remainder that lives on after the fantasy’s 
traversal.
When the fantasy dissolves, the object ceases to appear as some-
thing worthy of love, leaving in its wake only an unrecognisable, 
shitty remainder: ‘I give myself to you [. . .], but this gift of my person 
– as they say – Oh mystery! is changed inexplicably into a gift of shit 
[cadeau d’une merde] – a term that is also essential to our experience’ 
(sXi, 268/299). the gift of shit is no longer the attempt of the child, 
at freud’s anal stage, to purchase parental affection through a sacri-
ficial offering; no longer the imaginary gift of love, the gift of what 
one does not have to give, through which we seek to recognise and 
thereby ground the existence of the other. lacan refers elsewhere to his 
‘essential term’ as ‘le fruit anal’ and ‘le a excrémentiel’ (sX, 353, 371), 
reprised by Žižek as the ‘excremental kernel of the Real’, the innermost 
kernel of being, stripped of the fantasmic support that rendered it pal-
atable to subjective experience. As the unconscious surplus of what is 
consciously desired, it is always given in excess of what is consciously 
demanded. its excess lies in confronting the subject with the hitherto 
unknown real of desire, destituting it by depriving it of the possibility 
of the recognition that would satisfy desire. in the place of the subject 
there is only objet petit a as an excessive and ineliminable trace, the 
stain of ‘the “undead”, a strange, immortal, indestructible life that 
persists beyond death’ (Žižek 1999: 294). As lacan writes, discussing 
freud:
i have already said and repeated that oblation is the fantasy of an obsessive. 
of course everybody wants genital union to be a gift – I give myself, you give 
yourself, we give ourselves to one another. Unfortunately, there is no trace 
of a gift in the copulatory, genital act, however successful you might imagine 
it. there is only a gift precisely there where we have always marked it, at 
the level of the anus. At the genital level, something emerges, pricks itself up 
[se dresse], that stops the subject over the realisation of a gaping chasm, a 
central hole, and prevents whatever might function as an object of the gift, 
an object destined to satisfy, from being captured. (sX, 371)
the formulation anticipates and provides an explanation for lacan’s 
later claim, made in Seminar XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of 
Love and Knowledge (1972–3), that ‘there is no sexual relation [il n’y 
a pas de rapport sexuel]’ (sXX, 126/114). there is no sexual relation 
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because there is no ‘real’ gift exchange, no giving and receipt of recogni-
tion that would raise the extimate, excremental object to the dignity of 
a recognised and grounded subject.
to return to the film that opened this book, lacan’s gift of shit is 
illustrated in the dénouement of lars von trier’s Dogville, which illus-
trates the catastrophic consequences of the protagonist’s request for a 
gift. thomas edison, Jr’s request that the people of Dogville have some-
thing ‘to accept. something tangible, like a gift’ initially appears to be 
granted with the arrival of Grace, a beautiful woman who works tire-
lessly to integrate herself and repay a symbolic debt to townsfolk who 
only reluctantly received her. When in due course it becomes apparent 
that they got more than they asked for, they attempt to sacrifice her to 
the perceived forces of law, the gangsters to whom they fearfully look 
for the ontological support of love and recognition. the sacrifice fails, 
multiplying the town’s own feeling of symbolic guilt. it fails, moreover, 
because sacrifice of this sort only ever reinforces the relation between 
law and jouissance, law as the instantiation of the drive’s frustration 
of desire. having survived her attempted sacrifice, Grace becomes the 
embodiment of the real, a persistent stain of life beyond death, return-
ing to the town in the form of a monstrous, violent excess and visiting 
death (the impossibility of recognition) upon its inhabitants. Behind 
the gift of what one does not have, the attempt to give away the het-
erogeneous surplus that never belonged in the first place, we are con-
fronted with a cadeau d’une merde that always returns to the site of its 
attempted and ultimately futile expenditure.
in Seminar XX, lacan proposes the formulation of ‘I ask you to 
refuse what I offer you – because it’s not that [ça – also meaning ‘id’],’ 
because what i offer you will never be the object of your unconscious 
desire – only the thing that stands in for its absence (sXX, 126/114). 
Yet it is not so much a question of refusing receipt as of recognising 
exactly what it is that is given. Rather than trying to sacrifice the drive, 
or confronting it head-on, challenging it to expend itself in some form 
of potlatch that the subject is destined to lose, the only option is know-
ingly to choose to accept the gift of shit, and, by affirming the impos-
sibility of choosing, to become it. in accepting the gift, the tragic hero 
affirms the extimate part of him- or herself in excess of the symbolic 
order and, renouncing the pursuit of subjectivity, becomes identical to, 
repeats, the object. ‘the act [of acceptance, of traversing the fantasy] is 
a repetition’, writes Kay, ‘because it repeats the moment of our entry 
into the symbolic’ (Kay 2003: 111), because it passes us backward 
through the subjectivising process. there is a clear repetition here of the 
transferential process of passing backward through love, receiving the 
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gift of speech that announces one as a pure effect of symbolic exchange. 
But now, however, the symbolic is also seen as underwritten by the 
imaginary, performatively enacted through the sacrifice of the object 
of desire to the big other. the receipt of the gift of the real is there-
fore a repudiation of sacrifice, ‘a repetition of the sacrifice of sacrifice’ 
(Keenan 2005: 113). the repetition is an ungrounding of the gesture by 
which the infant gives the object away in order to recover it in another 
form. the sacrifice of sacrifice pertains to a ‘real’ sacrifice, in which 
what is sacrificed is the imaginary sacrifice that generates faith in the 
efficacy of symbolic exchange. to accept the gift of the real is therefore 
to recognise the first two orders of giving for what they are: a sacrifi-
cial offering through which we seek to bring about the possibility of 
ontological recognition, and the symbolic exchange whose constitutive 
incompleteness repeatedly undermines the prospect of recognition. it is 
also to affirm the intangibility of a gift of the real that takes us further 
than ever from the realms of homo economicus, toward a thinking of 
the gift as an event that undercuts the Western philosophical pretension 
to metaphysical privilege. in receiving it, we encounter the excremental 
kernel of what lacan diagnoses as a modern european obsessional 
fantasy of turning shit into soap, or nothingness into a substantial 
ground of subjectivity (sX, 348).
coNclUs ioN
in the final paragraphs of the ‘Rome Discourse’, lacan briefly turns 
to the hindu Upanishads to articulate three meanings attached to the 
root, ‘Da-’: ‘ “Damyata, master yourselves”, – the sacred text meaning 
that the powers above are governed by the law of speech’; ‘ “Datta, 
give”, – the sacred text meaning that men recognize each other by 
the gift of speech’; ‘ “Dayadhvam, be merciful”, – the sacred text 
meaning that the powers below resound to the invocation of speech’ (e, 
265/322). it would, perhaps, be pushing it to suggest that these three 
meanings – the impossibility of an agency independent of the law of the 
signifier; the recognition of the don de la parole; grace – map directly on 
to a threefold understanding of the gift as imaginary, symbolic and real. 
An initial problem stems from the fact that the first two apparently refer 
to the symbolic, with less immediate relevance to the imaginary and 
real. one might, however, note the blurring of the distinction between 
imaginary and symbolic in the later lacan, where, with the discovery of 
the real, he shifts away from the lévi-straussian structuralism that led 
him to identify the subject as nothing more than an effect of language. 
the delayed but none the less growing influence of Bataille leads him 
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to locate the origin of the subject in the failure of symbolisation, the 
breakdown of symbolic exchange, for which sacrificial offerings and 
the performative gift of speech merely compensate. symbolic and imag-
inary are intertwined in a gesture that simultaneously renounces and 
seeks to recover the object of desire, creates the symbolic and compen-
sates for the castration it bestows at the (missing) core of the subject. 
their effect is moreover to displace and conceal an originary gift of shit, 
a traumatic, poisonous offering that exceeds the symbolic order – and 
which is accordingly unrecognisable as a gift.
it is here, paradoxically, that we might also look for redemption. 
John forrester has suggested that lacan leaves open the space for a 
concept of giving that exceeds relations of exchange, in the form of 
grace. this ‘gift as pure gift, as grace’, he argues, would satisfy the 
unconditionality – one might also add: the unrecognisability – required 
of the gift by Derrida (forrester 1997: 159). the closing remarks of the 
‘Rome Discourse’ thus anticipate the ethical imperative to traverse the 
fantasy, to affirm receipt of the (excremental) gift of the real. in Seminar 
VII, the tragic hero is defined as ‘someone who may be betrayed with 
impunity’, someone who is mercifully unfettered by the disappoint-
ment of desire. in contrast to ‘ordinary man’, whose betrayal ‘has the 
effect of decisively throwing him back into the service of goods’ (sVii, 
320/370 [tM]), the hero is one who accepts the betrayal of desire to be 
inevitable; whose traversal of the ‘fundamental fantasy’ of identifica-
tion leads him or her to see through the interminable exchange of signi-
fiers, of gift and countergift at the level of the symbolic, and recognise 
the impossibility of repaying one’s symbolic debt to the other. the 
ultimate gift therefore takes place only in breakdown of the recognis-
able offerings and gifts of the imaginary and symbolic, in sacrificing the 
sacrificial gesture that inaugurated the symbolic order, in recognising 
oneself as defined by the extimate ‘a excrémentiel’, the gift of shit that 
lives on beyond the attempt of the imaginary to present it as a benign 
gift of love. the hero asserts his fidelity to desire by repeating the 
object, recognising himself not as the generous samaritan, a bestower 
of love providing the ground of the other, but rather as the excremental 
absence of any redemptive offering. Redemption paradoxically lies in 
recognising that everything turns to shit and the obscene pleasure we 
take in it: namely, the jouissance we derive from desire’s frustration. 
the negativity of this image maps on to criticisms of lacan by Derrida, 
but also Deleuze and Guattari, all of whom effectively accuse him of 
reinscribing the gift within an economy of inevitable repayment, in 
an eternal return of the same that fails to capture the heterogeneity – 
hence also the politics – of the event. having opened up the question of 
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Mauss’s legacy, tracing the reception of his ideas through the self-styled 
anti-philosophical endeavours of structuralism, sacred sociology and 
psychoanalysis, we are in a position to see the effect of this on philoso-
phy and a philosophical thinking of the political.
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2. The Eternal Return of the 
Gift: Deleuze (and Derrida) 
contra Lacan
eulogising in the immediate aftermath of his contemporary’s suicide in 
1995, Jacques Derrida describes ‘the flustering, really flustering expe-
rience of a closeness or a nearly total affinity’ evoked by the work of 
Gilles Deleuze (Derrida 2001a: 192/235). Deleuze was, he continues:
the one among all those of my ‘generation’ to whom i have always consid-
ered myself closest. i never felt the slightest ‘objection’ arising in me, not 
even a virtual one, against any of his works, even if i happened to grumble 
a bit about one or another of the propositions found in Anti-Oedipus [. . .] 
or perhaps about the idea that philosophy consists in ‘creating’ concepts. 
(Derrida 2001a: 192–3/236)
for all Derrida’s knowingly Deleuzian language in the above citation, 
the idea of an affinity, or complicity, between the two is belied by the 
merely fleeting references to each other’s work. Despite the intimacy of 
Parisian intellectual circles, there is also only a single recorded exchange 
between the two, a brief discussion on the politics of eternal return in 
Nietzsche, instigated by Pierre Klossowski in 1972 (Klossowski 1973: 
111–16). Although there were other encounters, and even a promise of 
dialogue left unfulfilled by Deleuze’s death (Nancy 2005: 8n), it seems 
safe to say that Derrida was never ‘volé’, stolen, by Deleuze in the way 
that félix Guattari was ‘volé’. ‘i stole félix [J’ai volé Félix] and i hope 
he did the same for me,’ Deleuze intriguingly states of the political 
activist and psychoanalyst with whom he collaborated for over twenty 
years (D, 17/24). the verb voler, to steal, also means to fly and Deleuze 
will repeatedly play on the double meaning. for Derrida, at least, the 
vol appears to be cause for a mild concern, ‘a grumble [un murmure]’. 
commenting on the passage cited above, both stivale and colombat 
have noted the contrasting praise for the single-authored works and 
the somewhat diminished enthusiasm with which he receives Deleuze’s 
major collaborations with Guattari (stivale 2000: 9; colombat 1996: 
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236). A similar criticism has been made by slavoj Žižek, who describes 
the turn toward Guattari as an ‘alibi’, a way for Deleuze to avoid 
coming to terms with the unbearable weight of his own thought (Žižek 
2004: 21). Underlying Žižek’s provocation is a rejection of the anti-
lacanianism, the politics of reverse-castration that Guattari brings with 
him. the reasons for Derrida’s ‘grumbling’ are less clear-cut and have 
at times been obfuscated, rather than clarified, by a small but often 
partisan literature, not least that of Žižek, for whom it is a matter of 
‘fact that Derrida and Deleuze speak different, totally incompatible 
languages, with no shared ground between them’ (2004: 47). Against 
the wilful hyperbole that seeks to reappropriate Deleuze as a lacanian, 
the aim of this second chapter is to take Derrida’s remarks at face value 
– perhaps naïvely, but in the sense that Deleuze himself was avow-
edly naïve, not at all interested, as Derrida notes, in the philosophy 
of ‘objections’, conjecture and refutation. the concept of the gift, in 
particular, will be read as exemplary of this affinity between Derrida 
and Deleuze, but also Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari. interesting 
to note is that Nietzsche and the politics of eternal return emerge as 
fundamental components in the elaboration of this affinity. so too does 
the concept of theft.
like Derrida, Deleuze seeks to differentiate the gift from anything 
resembling an economy of exchange, anything that would subsume it 
under laws of identity and equivalence. he finds the potential to over-
turn these laws and break free from the economic, ‘circular figure’ of 
the time of the subject in Nietzsche’s thinking of eternal return (DR, 
113/120). from its initial reworking in Nietzsche and Philosophy 
(Deleuze 2003: 23/32–3) and subsequent re-elaboration in Difference 
and Repetition (1968), Nietzsche’s thought experiment figures through-
out Deleuze’s work as a superior repetition, the name for a life in excess 
of subjectivity, chronology and castrated desire. Deleuze describes 
‘theft/flight and gift’, ‘vol et don’, as the ‘criteria’ of this repetition (DR, 
1/7). the double meaning of vol as theft and flight affirms the gift as an 
expropriation and moreover a liberation, a theft of identity that frees 
thought from the repressive regimes of economic subjectivity. Much of 
this resonates with lacan, above all with the ethics of repeating a drive 
whose eternal return to the same place expropriates the subject of its 
desire. like Bataille, however, Deleuze and Guattari affirm the imma-
nence that lacan denies, and moreover use it as the basis for a critique 
of the lacanian distinction between desire and libido, the castrated life 
of the human and the acephalic life of the drive. Deleuze offers an onto-
logical (or pre-ontological) reading of the eternal return that radicalises 
the concept of life, identifying it even more explicitly with the imper-
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sonal, aneconomic repetition of a gift that defies exchange, unground-
ing the recipient in the moment of its receipt. ‘in the gift, repetition 
surges forth as the highest power of the unexchangeable’ (ls, 329/334).
this Nietzschean influence is carried over into the reading of the gift 
economy in Anti-Oedipus (1972), where Deleuze and Guattari argue: 
‘the great book of modern ethnology is not so much Mauss’s The 
Gift as Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality. At least, it should 
be’ (AŒ, 207/224). Underlying this claim is a conviction that the total 
social fact of Durkheim, Mauss and lévi-strauss is totalitarian in its 
subordination of difference to identity and disequilibrium to equilib-
rium (AŒ, 202–4/220–1), its reduction of the gift to supposedly tran-
scendental structures of exchange. following Bataille and anticipating 
Derrida, Deleuze articulates the gift as a name for the event of existence 
as such, the eternal return of an excessive giving of life that is effec-
tively diametrically opposed to the gifts characteristic of the archaic 
gift economy. Rather than an a priori synthesis of society, read through 
a Nietzschean thinking of economics as the creation of memory and 
habit, the ritualised exchange of gifts becomes a way of containing 
this excessive event, a contingent technique for the imposition of laws 
(nomoi) of identity that serve to inscribe bodies with a homogeneous 
experience of time and desire. Deleuze and Guattari draw a subtle – 
perhaps too subtle, often ambiguous – distinction between the gift as a 
virtual, unrepresentable event, and the gift as an (overstated) category 
of archaic society; the gift as a future that brings about a forgetting, an 
erasure of the memory of the past, and the gift as a mnemotechnique 
for the formation of subjectivities. As in lacan, where the imaginary 
gift of love, the sacrificial offering, is given to stave off the unpredict-
able, ungrounding excess of the real, so in Deleuze and Guattari, the 
actual, recognisable gift appears as a dilution of the intensity, a con-
straint upon the aneconomy, of the virtual giving of the event, which 
it endeavours to repress through contingent practices of coding. this 
contingency, however, means that the gift can break free; that the 
virtual gift of eternal return can be glimpsed in the breakdown of the 
actual gift economy, in the emergence of lines of flight that escape 
the subsumption of life under economics. through this crucial distinc-
tion between virtual and actual gifts, Deleuze and Guattari lend cre-
dence to Derrida’s later claim that ‘a work as monumental as Marcel 
Mauss’s The Gift speaks of everything but the gift’ (Gt, 24/39).
the argument is shot through with politics and a rethinking of the 
political. By returning to the tension between the virtual and actual con-
ceptions of the gift – between what, following the distinction of What is 
Philosophy?, we might call the gift as concept, teased out from the gift 
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as an economic ‘state of affairs [état des choses]’ (WiP, 154–7/147–9) – 
we see politics come into existence as a response to the impossibility of 
receiving the eternal return of the gift. thought conceptually, as a way 
of coming to terms with the unfolding of life in excess of the human, the 
affirmation of an eternal return to (and of) the gift becomes a strategy 
for reasserting the inherent politicity of philosophy as an alternative to 
a politics that struggles to free itself from the tyranny of the economic. 
the task of philosophy becomes to think the eternal return of the event 
– to attempt to recuperate in thought the excessive, aneconomic giving 
that is held at bay by the economic structures of representation, and to 
seek to translate this back into politics.
l i fe ,  iDeNtitY ,  D iffeReNce
the highest virtue is uncommon and useless, it is shining and mellow in 
lustre: the highest virtue is a bestowing virtue [eine schenkende Tugend ist 
die höchste Tugend]. [. . .] lead, as i do, the flown-away virtue back to earth 
– yes, back to body and life: that may give the earth its meaning, a human 
meaning!
(friedrich Nietzsche)1
As we saw at the end of chapter 1, lacan’s pre-ontology of the real 
poses something of a paradox, in that the source of aneconomy, the 
aneconomic gift of the real, coincides with the economic return-to-
self of the drive, which autarkically sustains itself on the jouissance 
derived from the short-circuiting of desire. the libidinal drive is pure, 
undifferentiated life, an oppressive self-identity from which otherness 
is excluded. it might be preferable to say that aneconomy, in lacan, 
is caused by the disjunction between two economies: on one hand, 
the fantasmatically supported economy of symbolic exchange; on the 
other, the autarkic, auto-jouissant libido, which in always returning to 
the same place prevents the closure of the circuit of desire. the theme 
of lacan’s failure fully to pursue what we are calling aneconomy reso-
nates throughout the work of Gilles Deleuze, most notably in the sole-
authored Difference and Repetition (1968) and Logic of Sense (1969), 
but also in the co-authored Anti-Oedipus (1972). A critique of lacan 
can be drawn from Deleuze’s reworking of Nietzsche’s eternal return 
of the same, which repeats but also extends a similar reworking under-
taken by the psychoanalyst.
Recent work by Alenka Zupancˇicˇ has opened up a dialogue between 
Nietzsche and lacan, drawing particular attention to the considerable 
1. ‘of the Bestowing Virtue’, Z, 100–2/93.
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degree of overlap in their ethical projects (Zupancˇicˇ 2003). for all the 
considerable merits of the ambition, one quite obvious similarity passes 
unnoticed, however. even if only indirectly, as a result of the mediating 
presence of Bataille, Nietzsche’s challenge to dare to assume ‘das grösste 
Schwergewicht’ of living the same life ‘once more and innumerable 
times more’ finds a distinct correlate and is metaphysicalised in the cir-
culations of the lacanian drive (Gs, 273/250 [§341]). As the relentless 
‘return into circuit’ of a libidinal life in excess of the subject, the drive 
is nothing less than a pre-ontological staging of the eternal return. the 
ethical imperative to affirm repetition is repeated in the traversal of the 
fantasy, with the ethical act described as precisely a repetition, an affir-
mation of the impossibility of escaping the short-circuiting of desire by 
jouissance. to traverse the fantasy is to repeat the birth of the symbolic 
order, while recognising the impossibility of receiving substantial rec-
ognition of one’s existence from the other. Rather than clinging to the 
fantasy of substantial subjectivity, it is to recognise the futility of the 
sacrificial offerings that sustain this fantasy, and to become identical to 
the object they seek to conceal.
it was argued in the previous chapter that the real is aneconomic, 
the unrepresentable excess that supervenes on the economy of symbolic 
exchange. the argument is complicated, however, by the problem of 
how to reconcile this aneconomy with the following paradox: to accept 
the gift of the real, the excremental kernel of the subject, is to traverse 
the fantasy and thereby escape the eternally frustrated economy of 
desiring subjectivity. Yet far from giving rise to further aneconomy, the 
receipt of this gift implicates the recipient in a becoming that is merely 
becoming-economic, regrounding the subject as a subject of the drive, 
in the substance of jouissance. Deleuze, by contrast, paves the way for 
an understanding of the aneconomic gift that, while avoiding the para-
doxes of lacan, lends itself to a re-evaluation of the political, affirmed 
as the question and site of difference.
Despite lacan’s positing of an energy that is prior to human subjec-
tivity, by continually aligning the drive with an object, objet petit a, 
lacan reinscribes it within the dichotomous language of subject and 
object that Deleuze takes to be symptomatic of metaphysical tran-
scendence. the criticism is developed into a full-scale critique in Anti-
Oedipus, albeit in a way that has met with considerable resistance from 
both the philosophical and the psychoanalytic communities. Žižek, in 
particular, has sought to defend lacan against the common accusation 
of a transcendent master-signifier by emphasising the immanent emer-
gence of the real from the failure of the symbolic order (Žižek 1999: 
296). Broadly anticipating subsequent criticisms from lacoue-labarthe 
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and Nancy and Derrida, the crux of Deleuze and Guattari’s argument 
is that lacan idealises desire as lack, reducing its inherently excessive 
force to the desire for what is absent, objet a. the real does not refer to 
reality as such, but is reduced to its evacuation, to the fact that reality 
is always fantasmically supported. in its wake, frustrated desire is left 
capable of producing only the fantasies that mask the ontological void 
(AŒ, 27/33). impotent, castrated, it has no bearing on the actual pro-
duction of reality.
Deleuze’s solution to this problem is to reject lacan’s implicit recu-
peration of identity in the form of a negative ground. in an argument 
that, mutatis mutandis, applies as much to Kojève and lévi-strauss 
as to lacan, he rejects the idea of life as an undifferentiated, homo-
geneous nature into which differences are introduced symbolically, 
through language, and at the price of introducing an irreducible gap 
between nature and culture. he also rejects lacan’s threefold distinc-
tion between imaginary, symbolic and real as an anthropocentrism 
that reduces the concept of life to a surplus of the (human) symbolic. 
Underlying the rejection is the sense that lacan fails to break free from 
what Deleuze diagnoses as a persistent failure of Western philosophy 
to treat difference in itself, without ‘subordinating difference to the 
supposedly initial powers of the same and the similar’ (DR, 155/166). 
lacan, in other words, is guilty of privileging identity, the real of the 
drive, while reducing difference to the extrinsically determined differ-
ences between signifiers in the symbolic order.
in place of the lacanian registers, Deleuze invokes an originally 
Bergsonian distinction between ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’, between a virtual 
‘plan(e) of consistency’ and an actual ‘plan(e) of organisation’, as the 
basis of what he unashamedly ‘naively’ calls his metaphysics (Deleuze 
1995: 136/122). the exact nature of the relation between the two has 
been the subject of considerable debate. in one of the most important 
challenges to Deleuze’s philosophy, Deleuze’s most eminent critic, 
Alain Badiou, accuses him of Platonism, by arguing that ‘the virtual is 
the ground of the actual’ (Badiou 2000: 43/65), an ideal and moreo-
ver eternal programme that the actual passively strives to instantiate. 
this argument has been recently reiterated by another Badiousian, 
Peter hallward (2006a), but finds strong contestation in the work of 
Keith Ansell-Pearson. the latter accuses Badiou of reifying the virtual, 
oversimplifying Deleuze’s complex presentation (Ansell-Pearson 2002: 
98–105). he argues alongside Deleuze that the difference between 
actuality and virtuality is essentially perspectival rather than metaphysi-
cal. As ‘two aspects’ of existence (D, 151/185), virtual and actual do 
not exist apart, but are rather implicated in one another, inverse sides 
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of the same surface, separated out only by an (unconscious) tendency 
to subsume experience under general laws of identity and predictabil-
ity – structures of representation that organise the world as a field of 
discrete, substantialised and apparently transcendent entities. Although 
not metaphysically distinct, they are, for all that, irreducible to one 
another. crucially, there is no relation of resemblance between the two. 
the virtual is a ‘transcendental field’ that conditions the possibility of 
actuality, but cannot be re-presented in actuality without sacrificing 
its constitutive singularity; nor can it be construed as a mere nega-
tion of actuality, as if hierarchically inferior, which is to say less real 
than the actuality it conditions. Where actuality refers to a plan(e) of 
representation and identity, virtuality refers to a plan(e) of pure posi-
tive differences, prior to any concept of identity, whose singularity is 
foreclosed by the filtration of experience in consciousness. Deleuze 
develops a methodology that enables an understanding of the condi-
tions of possibility of subjective experience without recourse to the 
anthropologism of a transcendental subjectivity: ‘the transcendental is 
resolutely separated from every idea of consciousness, appearing as an 
experience without either consciousness or subject: a transcendental 
empiricism, in Deleuze’s truly paradoxical formula’ (Agamben 1999: 
225).
the virtual is thus what exceeds the restricted economy of repre-
sentation, an accursed share whose foreclusion is also the condition 
of the possibility of actuality. like lacan, Deleuze rarely gives explicit 
mention to Bataille, but the Bataillean terminology is not incidental 
here. Duns scotus and spinoza are routinely given as the more obvious 
references, but Deleuze arguably follows Bataille in thinking the imma-
nence that lacan rejects. the ‘plan(e) of immanence’ is the name more 
commonly given to the virtual plan(e) of consistence; the actual plan(e) 
of organisation is also called the ‘plan(e) of transcendence’ (tP, 265–
6/325). What appears in actuality as the substantive and ontologically 
distinct lives of self-identical subjects, exists virtually as only ‘une vie’, a 
single life of ‘absolute immanence’: ‘an impersonal and yet singular life 
that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and exter-
nal life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens’ 
(tRM, 387/361). immanence means that all forms of existence give 
expression to ‘a single phylogenetic lineage, a single machinic phylum, 
ideally continuous: the flow of matter-movement, the flow of matter in 
continuous variation’ (tP, 406/506). there is only a single reality, prior 
to hierarchical individuations between different strata of being, prior 
to the introduction of a distinction between materiality and ideality. 
hence the description of virtuality borrowed from Proust: ‘real without 
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being actual, ideal without being abstract’ (DR, 260/269; Proust 1990: 
179). life is not composed of extensively distinct objects, but nor is it an 
undifferentiated mass. the plan(e) of immanence consists in the event 
of (pre-conceptual) differences in intensity: ‘there are only speeds and 
slownesses between unformed elements, and affects between nonsub-
jectified powers’ (tP, 267/327). As a field of difference, ‘une vie’ is not 
to be thought in terms of self-identity, but rather as a life of multiplicity, 
of multiplicities of positively construed, pre-symbolic differences, con-
tinually dissolving and reforming flows of intensities, which precede the 
introduction of the negation that is inherent in representation. these 
singular, or intensive, differences are also the transcendental conditions 
of representation, constituting the expanded field of experience from 
which our own experiences are drawn, without our having to refer 
beyond them to an external, transcendent ground that explains their 
existence. there is no ontological cut here, no metaphysically inscribed 
distinction between virtual and actual; no irreducible tension between 
eros and thanatos, desire and drive. Deleuze rejects lacan’s claim that 
the object of desire is constitutively and ontologically inaccessible to 
the subject in favour of a thesis of univocity, according to which there 
is no incompatibility or incommensurability between different modes 
of being:
the univocity of Being signifies that Being is Voice; that it is said, and that is 
said in the same ‘sense [sens]’ of everything about which it is said. [. . .] one 
and the same Being for the impossible, the possible, and the real [Un seul 
et même être pour l’impossible, le possible et le réel]. (ls, 205–6/210–11)
the thesis is reasserted in Anti-Oedipus, where Deleuze and Guattari 
write explicitly contra lacan: ‘the real is not impossible, within the 
real everything is possible, everything becomes possible’ (AŒ, 29/35). 
Ansell-Pearson suggests that Deleuze’s idea of the experientiability of 
the impossible comes originally from Bergson, rather than Bataille, but 
works to similar effect in extending experience beyond the restricted 
horizons of subjectivity, beyond reference to sets of circumstances 
that already exist in actuality, where ‘the possible only precedes the 
real through an intellectual act that conceals its own illusion’ (Ansell-
Pearson 2002: 79). Deleuze sets about reversing the intellectual acts that 
give rise to the illusion of a world composed of metaphysically, tran-
scendentally distinct entities, by locating the moments where subjective 
experience reveals itself as incomplete. the incompleteness provides an 
opening through which to trace the event that is ‘necessarily given at the 
same time as that to which it gives rise’, though crucially not given in 
consciousness (tP, 268/326–7). it follows from this that on the virtual 
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plan(e) of immanence, even the impossible gift becomes possible, albeit 
in a form that does not yield itself to phenomenal experience. As the 
giving of the plan(e) of immanence, in a time of life that cannot be 
reduced to the transcendent, chronological time of the subject, the gift 
names a virtuality that bears no resemblance to its configuration as a 
discrete, essentially identifiable object in actuality.
DeleUZe ,  Ž iŽeK  AND A  l i fe  of  the  Pol it icAl
in the collaborative works with Guattari, Deleuze moves to explore 
the political implications of the univocity thesis by articulating the 
multiplicity of life as a political ontology, in both senses of the term. 
Beistegui has described Deleuzian ontology as ‘onto-hetero-genesis’: 
‘a discourse on the way in which systems and phenomena of various 
types come into being’, where moreover ‘the “principle” presiding over 
the process of generation is not one of identity and resemblance, but of 
difference and dissimilarity’ (Beistegui 2004: 223). Under the influence 
of Guattari, onto-hetero-genesis is politicised to the point of becoming 
a manifesto: ‘PlURAlisM=MoNisM’ (tP, 20/31), developed from 
the relationality of differences on the plan(e) of immanence. the phi-
losophy of immanence translates into a politics of inclusivity and the 
embracing of difference. the same perhaps cannot be said for lacan, 
whose distinction between life, defined as the self-identical drive of the 
libidinal real, and a desire conceived symbolically as a political sphere 
of exchange, means that the bare force of life is always pre- or proto-
political.
the evidence of this is seen in lacan’s privileging of the heroic excep-
tion, the tragic figures of Antigone and oedipus, who make the forced 
choice of withdrawing from the symbolic sphere of politics. lacan and, 
after him, Žižek emphasise the possibility of using this withdrawal to 
renew the political through a ‘sacrifice of sacrifice’ that recreates the 
symbolic order. there is no conception of any community preceding 
the symbolic. A similar point has been made by Judith Butler, who, 
in Antigone’s Claim, writes of being struck by the traditional nature 
of lacan’s reading of Antigone, ‘not as a political figure, one whose 
speech has political implications, but rather as one who articulates a 
prepolitical opposition to politics, representing kinship as the sphere 
that conditions the possibility of politics without ever entering into it’ 
(Butler 2000: 2).
the problem is exposed in lacan’s attempt to construct an alter-
native basis of community and collective coexistence in light of the 
collapse of the fantasmically supported big other, which he does by 
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reintroducing a residual form of difference back into the undifferenti-
ated economy of the drive. According to Žižek, lacan:
insists that ‘going through the fantasy’ is not strictly equivalent to the shift 
from drive to desire: there is a desire that remains even after we have tra-
versed our fundamental fantasy, a desire not sustained by a fantasy, and 
this desire, of course, is the desire of the analyst [. . .] the desire of someone 
who has undergone ‘subjective destitution’ and accepted the role of the 
excremental abject [. . .]. this unique desire is what, even after i have fully 
assumed ‘the big other’s non-existence’ – that is, the fact that the symbolic 
order is a mere semblance – prevents me from immersing myself in the self-
enclosure of the drive’s circuit and its debilitating satisfaction. the desire 
of the analyst is thus supposed to sustain the analytic community in the 
absence of any phantasmic support; it is supposed to make possible a com-
munal big other that avoids the transferential effect of the ‘subject supposed 
to . . . “know, believe, enjoy” ’. (Žižek 1999: 296)
one cannot help but wonder, in light of this, whether politics is reduced 
to little more than a fantasy, albeit a necessary fantasy, required as 
an antidote to the nihilistic temptation toward acquiescence in libidi-
nal jouissance. As Butler suggests, there is the suspicion of a residual 
hegelianism. Reworked into the displaced identity of a real that is 
supposedly posterior to the politics of symbolic order, the oikos still 
essentially precedes the political. the lacanian real comes to resemble 
the family in hegel’s Principles of the Philosophy of Right, where it is 
both prior to and an antidote to the deleterious effects of a civil society 
defined as ‘Differenz’ (ePR, 220/339 [§182]). We are presented with 
the prospect of withdrawing from (symbolic) politics into the ‘debilitat-
ing satisfaction’ of jouissance, construed as a kind of pre-political, self-
enclosed oikos, as if the decision to withdraw were not itself already 
political.
it is worth noting that Žižek’s more recent work moves away from 
indulging any fantasy of pre-political retreat. Rather than pertaining 
to any particular one of lacan’s pre-ontological registers, it is increas-
ingly apparent that politics is generated by their mutual imbrication, 
by the impossibility of self-enclosure. in his self-declared magnum 
opus, The Parallax View (2006), Žižek appears to distance himself 
from a conception of the real as the self-identical life-beyond-death 
of a metaphysicalised drive. in its place, he proffers the idea of an 
irreducible discrepancy between experience and the underlying fabric 
of reality; the ‘parallax of the Real’ refers to how the ‘lacanian Real 
has no positive substantial consistency, it is just the gap between the 
multitude of perspectives on it’ (Žižek 2006b: 7). this reassertion of 
the primacy of minimal difference, of the irreducible gap between real 
and symbolic, brings Žižek closer to Deleuze and Guattari, but also, 
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he recognises, closer to Derrida, his criticisms of whom – to which 
we shall return in chapter 4 – begin to be mixed with praise (Žižek 
2006b: 11).
Deleuze and Guattari posit politics as irreducible, the brute fact of 
a life that consists in a field of virtual, singular multiplicities, prior to 
any concept of identity. Rather than reduce politics to a fantasy (and 
by implication, we might say, to ideology), they reinvent the political 
as a problem of the actualisation of the virtual and the way virtual sin-
gularities are invested in, which is to say condition, the social. Deleuze 
and Guattari stress that ‘politics precedes being’: ‘avant l’être, il y a la 
politique’ (tP, 203/249). Underlying this claim is a form of virtual rela-
tionality that is pre-subjective and pre-individuated, pertaining to the 
interactions of the flows of life. Deleuze describes this relationality as a 
process of ‘differentiation’, where the lines of becoming that constitute 
the excess of the virtual emerge from the ‘differential relations’ in which 
singularities differentiate themselves intensively from one another (DR, 
274/285). Differentiation translates into a corresponding process of 
differenciation, which refers to the actualisation of virtual becomings 
in representable reality.
the question of translation, of how the activity of the virtual is 
translated into the lived experience of the actual, is the central question 
of Deleuze’s reworking of Nietzsche’s eternal return. in conversation 
with Klossowski, lyotard and Derrida, amongst others, in the 1972 
colloquium on Nietzsche at cérisy-la-salle, Deleuze poses this question 
in terms of whether ‘it is possible to conceive links between singulari-
ties whose criteria would ultimately be the eternal return, implying the 
loss of identities, and yet not returning to any individualism, forming 
on the contrary societies and groups’ (Deleuze, in Klossowski 1973: 
120). Whereas the lacanian traversal of the fantasy introduces us to 
the sameness that exists beyond the symbolic order, and the impossi-
bility of pre-symbolic politics that this implies, the legacy of Nietzsche 
achieves the opposite effect in Deleuze. By affirming the different and 
the multiple against the illusions of transcendent identity, the eternal 
return is what hallward has felicitously described as a ‘principle of 
ontological discrimination’ (hallward 2006a: 206). it is the experience 
of eternal return, configured not as identity, but as the return of differ-
ence and multiplicity that generates a new concept of the political. the 
supposed impossibility of an inclusive politics of life re-emerges as the 
already existing community of the virtual.
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RePet it ioN,  theft ,  G ift
the initial and most concentrated development of Deleuze’s rework-
ing of the eternal return takes place in Difference and Repetition, a 
book that speaks, from the very first page, of inexchangeable excess. 
Deleuze begins by corroborating lacan’s claim that symbolic exchange 
is based on substitution rather than repetition. once again he goes 
much further, however, making it clear that repetition, with its inherent 
singularity, can never be a question of identity and, by implication, the 
eternal return of the same:
Repetition is not generality. [. . .] Generality presents two major orders: the 
qualitative order of resemblances and the quantitative order or equivalences. 
cycles and equalities are their respective symbols. But in any case, generality 
expresses a point of view according to which one term may be exchanged 
or substituted for another. [. . .] Repetition as a conduct and a point of view 
concerns non-exchangeable [inéchangeable] and non-substitutable singu-
larities. (DR, 1/7)
As the citation suggests, repetition pertains to precisely that which cannot 
be exchanged, namely the singular, the uniquely different. it is immedi-
ately following this that, implicating the structuralist thinking of symbolic 
exchange, Deleuze makes the first, albeit fleeting, reference to the gift to 
appear in his major writings: ‘if exchange is the criteria of generality, 
theft/flight and gift [vol et don] are those of repetition. there is therefore 
an economic difference between the two’ (DR, 1/7 [tM]). What he calls 
the ‘economic difference’ between the two orders of exchange and repeti-
tion might more usefully be defined as the difference between economy 
and aneconomy. As repetition and not substitution, he argues, the trace 
of a gift can never be eliminated by the presence of a countergift that 
seeks to reinstate equivalence. Nor, it follows, can the gift be subjected 
to any overarching law of identity and exchange. its irreducible singular-
ity means that it will always be in excess of the particular, resisting the 
attempt to subsume it under universal principles governing its behaviour. 
As a criterion of repetition, giving is thus diametrically opposed to the 
law-governed substitution of terms, the synthetically inseparable gift and 
countergift of lévi-strauss’s symbolic exchange. ‘the true repetition is in 
the gift’ (ls, 328/333–4), because in the reciprocation of gifts the virtual 
offering is never simply annulled by the countergift. on the contrary, the 
countergift exceeds the initial offering, compelling the opening gift to be 
repeated in an interminable cycle that sees the gift acquire ‘the highest 
power of the inexchangeable’ (ls, 329/334).
the claim that ‘vol et don’ are the criteria for repetition is, for all that, 
ambiguous and receives no immediate qualification. on one hand, the 
MOORE PRINT.indd   84 02/12/2010   10:45
 The Eternal Return of the Gift 85
formulation raises the prospect of gift and flight/theft as distinct events, 
brought together under the concept of repetition. on the other, the two 
can be read as complementary, as inverse faces of the same event. in 
what is to date one of only two works that look explicitly at Deleuze’s 
thinking of the gift, constantin Boundas draws on the seminal anthro-
pology of Annette B. Weiner to argue for complementarity and empha-
sise that the gift is indeed bound up with theft (Boundas 2001: 107).2 
Writing in Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-
Giving, on the gift economy of Western samoa, Weiner challenges the 
lévi-straussian idea that identity is a product of the circulation and 
exchange of gifts by suggesting that the giving of gifts is intended to 
reinforce rather than blur the boundaries between public and private 
spheres. Where lévi-strauss follows Mauss in asserting the identity of 
the giver to be embedded in the given object, Weiner points to the exist-
ence of ‘inalienable possessions’, ‘possessions that are imbued with the 
intrinsic and ineffable identities of their owners’ (Weiner 1986: 6), as 
evidence of a distinction between oikos and agora, domestic and politi-
cal economy within archaic society. Gifts, she argues, are never items 
of the highest value, but rather substitutes for items that are withheld 
from circulation, for fear that giving them away would amount to an 
irretrievable loss of the owner’s identity (Weiner 1986: 6).
the thesis is seen by Godelier to present considerable difficulties for 
lacan’s theory of symbolic intersubjectivity, the idea that the subject is 
constituted through circulation, with no substantive existence outside 
this intersubjective symbolic economy (Godelier 1999: 25–7/41–2). 
one might also argue the contrary, however: namely, that Weiner illus-
trates the way the (imaginary) ego clings to the prospect of interiority, 
the loss of which would be experienced as traumatic, inextricable from 
the loss, or theft, of identity. When, in a late interview, Deleuze even-
tually elaborates on the meaning of ‘vol’, he links it to an encounter 
that entails the expropriation of subjectivity. Pace Weiner, the theft 
is affirmed, not just as theft but as flight, an ‘encounter’ that takes the 
subject beyond the restrictive confines of the self. if traumatic, it is 
because it opens experience on to the possibility of multiple different 
becomings:
An encounter is perhaps the same thing as a becoming or nuptuals. [. . .] 
it designates an effect, a zigzag, something that passes or happens between 
2. the second is claire colebrook’s introductory but none the less superlative essay 
on ‘exchange, Gift and theft’ (colebrook 2006), which, despite the name, dwells 
for only the briefest of moments on Deleuze’s thinking of archaic society and says 
nothing about Deleuze’s concept of eternal return.
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two, as though under a difference in potential. [. . .] it is not one term that 
becomes another, but each encountering the other, a single becoming that 
is not common to the two, since they have nothing to do with one another, 
but which has its own direction, a bloc of becoming. [. . .] to encounter is 
to find, to capture, to take flight and steal [voler]. [. . .] taking flight/stealing 
[voler] is the opposite of plagiarising copying, imitating or doing like. (D, 
6–7/13 [tM])
hélène cixous similarly draws on the ambiguity of voler to see in 
expropriation the possibility of affirmation, the potential for a flight 
that escapes from (masculine) economy (cixous 1996: 96/134). Rather 
than a repetition of identity, theft pertains to a repetition of difference 
that cannot be conceived in terms of substitution and exchange. What 
needs to be emphasised, perhaps, is that for Deleuze the theft only 
appears as such from the perspective of the actual plan(e) of conscious-
ness, where life is broken down into appropriable, hence violable, 
identities. it makes no sense from the standpoint of the virtual plan(e) 
of immanence, where life is precisely pre-individuated, hence inappro-
priable. the opposite is true of the gift, which, following Derrida, we 
know to take place only where it cannot be recognised as such, where it 
cannot be recuperated into an economy of subjectivity that would see it 
negated. theft exists as the inverse face of the gift, as what Mauss calls 
the gift of poison, or rather the gift as poison (Mauss 1997: 28–32/234–
7). like poison, which works by transgressing the established thresh-
olds of life, theft also resonates as an expression of the subversiveness 
of a life of excess that resists subsumption under law, constantly finding 
new ways to overturn the established order of identity.
the  l i fe  of  t iMe  AND the  RePet it ioN of 
the  G ift
from Difference and Repetition to Logic of Sense and the late work on 
cinema, Cinema II: The Time-Image (1986), Deleuze’s work is marked 
by a persistent critique of the attempt to conceive time in terms of 
presence. Predominant since Aristotle, if not even earlier, with Zeno, 
and remaining so at least up until Kant, this view regards time as a 
punctilinear series in which past and future exist as mere modalities of 
the present: ‘Past, present, and future are not three dimensions of time; 
only the present fills time, whereas past and future are two dimensions 
relative to the present in time,’ reduced respectively to presents that 
have already passed and those which are yet to pass (ls, 186/190). for 
Deleuze, to conceive time thus is to frame it in terms of human subjec-
tivity, privileging (as did Kant) the idea that time is imposed on being by 
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the subject. his initial argument, outlined in Difference and Repetition, 
proceeds by way of a distinction between three distinct ‘syntheses’ of 
time, one pertaining to each of the present, past and future respectively. 
each synthesis also bears witness to the influence of one of three very 
different philosophers, united, Deleuze argues, by a commitment to 
the thinking of difference in excess of the supposed identity of the 
subject. the synthesis of the present is founded on the anti-inductionist 
empiricism of hume; that of the past on the (Proustian) intuitionism of 
Bergson; that of the future on the eternal return of Nietzsche, dramati-
cally and influentially restaged by the collégien, Pierre Klossowski, as 
an eternal return of difference. each synthesis is said to be ‘passive’, 
which is to say prior to any operation of subjective, human agency. 
the syntheses of the present, habitus, and of the future, the eternal 
return, prove to be particularly important for the analysis of the gift as 
repetition, and the relation of the virtual to the actual gifts of archaic 
society.
the first synthesis of time is habitus, a term Deleuze borrows from 
hume’s description of the imagination as a faculty of habit forma-
tion (hume 1975: 43). hume argues against the possibility of objec-
tively knowing whether relations of nature are bound by necessity, 
or whether they are merely contingent, derived from an experience 
of consistency that ultimately has no metaphysical basis. he suggests 
that our experience of their supposed necessity is psychological, the 
product of the human mind, rather than transcendent in origin. the 
impression of necessity is not simply disclosed in experience but rather 
unconsciously imposed on it, or synthesised, through a psychological 
principal of induction. Deleuze goes further than hume, positing that 
every appearance of transcendence, of logical necessity and essentiality, 
is the product of a similar process. he denies that this process is simply 
psychological, however, since this would still be to imply a privileging 
of the human mind as the site of synthesis. the ‘contraction’ of life 
into general laws and identities is in fact the most primordial form of 
pre-human organisation: ‘every organism [. . .] is a sum of contractions’ 
(DR, 93/99). the human subject is but one instance of a universal 
process of contraction, inherent to the actualisation in consciousness of 
an unconscious life of immanence.
When Deleuze writes that ‘the event [. . .] has no present’ (ls, 73/79), 
it is because presence must be created. it exists only as (an effect of) 
habitus, the synthesis that organises time into a punctilinear experience 
of presents passing through consciousness. this process of organisation 
is said to take place in the withdrawal of difference from repetition: 
‘habit withdraws something new from repetition – namely difference 
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[. . .]. in essence, habit is contraction’ (DR, 95/101 [tM]). By extracting 
difference from repetition, the synthesis of the imagination creates the 
economic order of generality wherein one instance can be exchanged or 
substituted for any other. it falls short of full-blown repetition for the 
same reason.
the time that precedes this time of habit and presence, Deleuze 
argues, is a time of repetitions of difference and a futurity that cannot 
be conceived in terms of consciousness and presence. in Logic of Sense, 
this is described as the ‘non-chronological time’ of Aiôn, the event, 
which stands against the linear, habitual temporality of Chronos (ls, 
74–5/80–2). in the slightly earlier Difference and Repetition, this repeti-
tion of pure difference constitutes the third synthesis of time, the impos-
sible time of the eternal return. ‘the eternal return is the same of the 
different, the one of the multiple, the resemblant of the dissimilar’ (DR, 
154/165). the formulation strongly recalls that of Pierre Klossowski, 
to whom Deleuze devotes a substantial appendix in Logic of Sense 
(ls, 321–40/325–50), and whose influence is also quietly discernible 
throughout Difference and Repetition and Anti-Oedipus. Published 
contemporaneously with the latter, but incorporating earlier material 
to which Deleuze (to whom it is dedicated) had access, Klossowski’s 
seminal Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle (1969) challenges the idea that 
Nietzsche’s thinking of eternal return could consist in a repetition of the 
same, the repetition of this life ‘once more and innumerable times more’ 
(Gs, 273/250). According to Klossowski, the description of the thought 
experiment laid out in §341 of The Gay Science expresses not so much 
the unconscious reality of the eternal return as a ‘simulacrum’ of this 
reality, an attempt to reconfigure the unthinkable in terms that render it 
amenable to representation. the truth of the greatest weight is not the 
persistence of identity, but its very opposite – namely, the opening up 
of experience to a body that, despite being given cohesion and continu-
ous identity by the imagined subject, is anything but continuous and 
coherent: ‘this body dies and is reborn numerous times – deaths and 
rebirths that the self [le moi] claims to survive in its imaginary cohe-
sion’ (Klossowski 2005: 23/55 [tM]). through the death and constant 
rebirth of multiple libidinal intensities, the body becomes the site of an 
unconscious repetition that undermines the subject’s claim to unified, 
self-identical (ergo, essential) agency: ‘the eternal Return suppresses 
enduring identities. Nietzsche urges the adherent of the Vicious circle 
to accept the dissolution of his fortuitous soul, in order to receive 
another, equally fortuitous’ (2005: 55/108).
eternal return thus describes repetition in what Deleuze takes to 
be the fullest sense of the term, repetition ‘this time by excess’ of the 
MOORE PRINT.indd   88 02/12/2010   10:45
 The Eternal Return of the Gift 89
future, where futurity is understood as the advent of the ‘absolutely 
new itself’ (DR, 113/122). in this moment of excess, all categories of 
representation are overturned; all representational content is evacuated 
from the memory of the pure past. the economy of representation in 
which time is stripped of its singularity loses it oikos, rendering time 
itself ‘out of joint [hors de ses gonds]’, anarchic, no longer bound by the 
logic of chronological time, Chronos:
time itself unravels (that is, apparently ceases to be a circle) instead of 
things unfolding within it (following the overly simple circular figure). [. . .] 
it is distributed unequally on both sides of a ‘caesura’, as a result of which 
beginning and end no longer coincide. (DR, 111/119–20)
in contrast to lacan’s death drive, where the subject is destroyed 
through the renunciation of desire in the répétition-en-acte of pure 
identity, by the acceptance of the impossibility of the identity of desire 
and drive (the pure life of the libido), in Deleuze the transcendental 
death of the subject is brought about by the pure difference of thanatos 
(rebaptised Aiôn in Logic of Sense). in this repetition of difference, time 
is no longer subordinate to its contents, a means of chronologically 
ordering or measuring the movement of things within it. it breaks with 
the chronology of sequential presents in a way that fractures the iden-
tity of the contractions and habits of the present. As one such contrac-
tion, the conscious, supposedly transcendent, individuated subject is 
destroyed. the singularities that underlie subjectivity surge up through 
the subject and:
turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to 
pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dis-
persed by the shock of that to which it multiply gives birth: what the self has 
become equal to is the unequal in itself. (DR, 112/121 [tM])
if habitus synthesises the identity of subjectivity, we might say that 
the eternal return articulates the failure of induction, the collapse of 
law-governed patterns (contractions) of experience. in other words, it 
refers to what, commenting on Klossowski, Deleuze calls a ‘disjunctive 
synthesis’, a synthesis of intensities that, for Klossowski, ‘aspire only to 
de-individuate themselves’ (Klossowski 2005: 21/53 [tM]; see also ls, 
339/342).3 this synthesis undoes the synthesis of the subject, signal-
ling the collapse of order and the opening of the world on to the under-
lying ‘chaosmos’ that is concealed by representation. the experience of 
3. the reference to Klossowski in L’Anti-Œdipe is in fact a reprint of a slightly earlier 
essay, ‘la synthèse disjonctive’, which, its authors note, ‘isn’t presented as a com-
mentary on Klossowski, but is all the more indebted to him as a constant reference’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1971: 54).
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pure intensity propels us beyond the illusion of the transcendent subject 
as the privileged ground of being and discloses, in the wake of this 
transcendence, the absence of a ground. there is only a ‘groundlessness 
[sans-fond], a universal ungrounding [effondement], which turns upon 
itself and causes only the yet-to-come to return’ (DR, 114/123). More 
than just a collapse, an ‘effondrement’, Deleuze calls this experience an 
effondement, a reversal of grounding, an ungrounding, in which the 
experience of life on the plan(e) of organisation gives way to an expe-
rience of the world in its virtual immanence, an event of singularities 
taking flight, unbound from the strictures of chronological time.
through this experience of difference in the eternal return, the 
destruction of the subject frees life from its captivity in the thought of 
transcendence and opens on to a privileged experience of the world 
as a plan(e) of immanence, multiple continua of differences defined as 
sensation without subjectivity, experience without consciousness. the 
repetition of difference returns the virtual experience of pure intensity 
and transcendental death, announcing itself ‘in an instant that no doubt 
does not belong to the economy of time, in a time without time, in such 
a way that the forgetting forgets, that it forgets itself’ (Gt, 17/30). 
the citation is from Derrida, but applies seamlessly to Deleuze. the 
aneconomic time of the event is the time of the forgetting of both the 
subject and the representational content of memory: ‘a self-effacement 
that is carried off with what it effaces’ (Gt, 17/30). one critic has 
already noted the similarity of Derrida and Deleuze on this thinking of 
the temporality of the gift (lorraine 2003: 44). Another has sought to 
differentiate them on this point, however, by suggesting that the gift is 
experientiable for Deleuze but not for Derrida (Bearn 2003: 181). Yet 
this claim understates the extent to which for Deleuze, too, the gift does 
not admit of conventional, which is to say, phenomenal experience, not 
to mention the way it proves incompatible with the experience of debt 
that would serve to negate it.
for Deleuze, as for Derrida, in the virtual experience of the eternal 
return as gift, there can be no indebtedness on the part of the recipient 
because, qua self-identical subject, the recipient is destroyed in the very 
moment of reception. there is no longer a distinction between the giver, 
the gift and its recipient. life (time, desire) gives itself as a becoming-
other that implicates the subject in the same becoming-other. to receive 
the gift, it follows, is to give up, or sacrifice, the pretension to grounded 
subjectivity and recognise oneself as an expression of the event of the 
giving of life. this is already to put into effect Derrida’s criterion that 
the gift must ‘efface everything’, ‘leave nothing behind it’ (Gt, 17/30). 
What Deleuze calls the ‘plan(e) of organisation’, of transcendence, is 
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populated by distinct objects and subjects, creating a set of conditions 
under which, following Derrida, the gift will always be annulled. it is 
only where the objects or actions given as gifts are themselves individu-
ated that they become recognisable as such, and are consequently able 
to generate the feeling of indebtedness that reinscribes the gift within 
an economy. equally, it is only where there are individuated subjects 
that the receiver of a gift can feel indebted to the giver, or the giver can 
derive a similar return on his gift by enjoying the narcissistic pleasure 
of having given: ‘there where there is subject and object, the gift would 
be excluded’ (Gt, 24/39). Where once there was a subject, there are 
now only lines of flight, or becoming, each one tracing the aneconomy 
of Aiôn toward a ‘becoming-imperceptible’ in which one no longer 
perceives oneself as individuated, an identifiable giver or receiver of 
gifts. even love is transformed, ‘freed from bondage to the organism 
and to the person’ (Protevi 2003: 189). No longer lacan’s imaginary 
gift of what one does not have (siV, 140), the narcissistic attempt to 
ground oneself by offering in vain to ground another (the other), love, 
for Deleuze and Guattari, names the becoming, the experimentation, 
of excessive desire, freed from the narcissism of the subject of lack and 
rendered creative, aneconomic. the one to whom one gives ‘is just as 
selfless as i’:
one has become imperceptible and clandestine in motionless voyage. 
Nothing can happen, or have happened, any longer. Nobody can do any-
thing for and against me any longer. [. . .] i am now no more than a line. i 
have become capable of loving, not with any abstract universal love, but a 
love i shall choose, and that shall choose me, blindly, my double, just as self-
less as i [qui n’a plus de moi que moi]. one has been saved by and for love, 
by abandoning love and self. (tP, 199/244)
this love without propriety is precisely what characterises the behav-
iour of Roberte in Le Souffleur, the dynamics of which were outlined 
briefly in the previous chapter. in the third and final instalment of 
Klossowski’s Les Lois de l’hospitalité, théodore gives away his wife 
in order to know her all the more intimately, as she exists beyond the 
restricted economy of marriage. to her husband’s despair, however, 
Roberte breaks with the spirit of the laws of hospitality, substituting 
herself for another, a simulacrum, identical to the point of undermin-
ing the idea that there exists an ‘original’ Roberte. While Roberte 
becomes what Deleuze and Guattari call an ‘antiexchangist amorous 
machine’ (AŒ, 203/219), théodore suffers a nervous breakdown, a 
subjective destitution or ‘theft’ of identity, which is redoubled by his 
ensuing inability to differentiate his own self from that of another simu-
lacrum, K. the psychoanalyst, Dr Ygdrasil (lacan), tries to cure him 
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by  recommending that he too submit to a circulation without begin-
ning or end, without a higher goal that attempts to accord it meaning. 
only thus might he disabuse himself of the notion of propriety, of the 
pretension that Roberte was ever his to give away. What Ygdrasil fails 
to realise, however, is that the phalanstery implied by the ‘universal 
law of exchange’ would never yield the gift that théodore desires. 
What is more, Roberte has already given her husband precisely what 
he asked for. the latter simply failed to realise that the gift is theft, 
poison, culminating in an experience of intimacy in excess of identity: 
an experience of immanence without consciousness, of the ultimately 
ungovernable multiplicity that underlies the contractions of difference 
into identity. Roberte rises to meet the challenge of accepting the gift of 
eternal return, actively embracing a life of multiplicity and groundless-
ness. théodore, by contrast, crumbles under the weight of das grösste 
Schwergewicht.
Ž iŽeK  CONTRA GUAttARi
if Deleuze’s earlier, sole-authored, efforts open us on to an experience 
of time as eternal return, it is only really in the collaborative works with 
félix Guattari that this thinking of time is rearticulated as a revolution-
ary politics of desire, a theory of life in which the eternal return directly 
plays out as a becoming that cuts across history. the idea of a discern-
ible difference between two ‘conceptual logics’ in Deleuze has been 
argued forcefully by slavoj Žižek, who uses it as a basis for rejecting 
the ‘Guattarianised’ Deleuze of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Žižek 
differentiates an earlier, more lacanian, position in Difference and 
Repetition and Logic of Sense from what he derisively calls the ‘ideal-
ism’ of Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus (Žižek 2004: 21). in the 
earlier works, the eternal return is confined to a Klossowskian experi-
ence of bodily intensity that cannot be conceived within the restricted 
experiential horizons of presence and the self-consciousness of the 
subject. the corresponding event is ‘sterile’, an intensified experience 
of reality rather than a ‘productive’ process in which reality is actually 
created by the activity of the virtual. the shift from sterility to produc-
tivity coincides with the claim that the eternal return of desire is directly 
implicated in the production of social reality. it moreover coincides 
with the intervention of Guattari and the onset of a sustained critique of 
lacan, in which the lacanian concept of desire as lack is hyperbolically 
dismissed as ahistorical, a formulation that characterises desire only in 
light of its reconfiguration under conditions of capitalism. Žižek also 
aligns it with the politicisation of a hitherto ‘elitist’, apolitical, or – in 
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the words of Alain Badiou – ‘profoundly aristocratic’ Deleuze (Žižek 
2004: 20; Badiou 2000: 12/22).
Žižek’s preference for the apolitical Deleuze is perhaps not surprising, 
given what was suggested above to be lacan’s restrictive conception of 
politics in terms of fantasy. one wonders, however, whether he does 
not short-circuit a politics that is already at work in the earlier Deleuze: 
namely, a politics of the relationality between intensive differences in a 
state of multiplicity, the actual political implications of which Guattari 
merely makes explicit.4 in accusing Deleuze and Guattari of idealism, 
Žižek is rejecting the hypothesis of a ‘desiring-production’ capable of 
directly creating social reality. What his critique fails to appreciate is 
that the desire in question refers not simply to the generative potential-
ity of human desire, but rather to desire as a name for life as such.
like the temporality of the event in Difference and Repetition, accor-
ding to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘desire knows nothing of exchange, it 
knows only theft and gift [vol]’ (AŒ, 203/219 [tM]). Desire, in other 
words, cannot be confined to the (hegelo-Kojevian) desire for recogni-
tion through symbolic exchange, nor to any other configuration on the 
plan(e) of organisation. it desires the theft of identity, the excessiveness 
of a gift whose receipt would undermine rather than complete identity. 
‘Desire lacks nothing; it does not lack its object. it is rather the subject 
that is missing in desire’ (AŒ, 28/34 [tM]). Just as Deleuze inverts Kant 
by asserting that the subject is in time and not vice versa, so Deleuze 
and Guattari affirm that the subject exists within desire, albeit as a cor-
ruption of desire. lacan said something similar through the theory of 
the symbolic order, but his thinking of desire as lack points to a residual 
framing of his work by economism. Deleuze and Guattari read him as 
the last stand of homo economicus, a figure historically defined by lack 
in so far as driven to make choices by the scarcity of resources within 
society. the prevalence of scarcity translates into the pervasiveness of 
lack, which leads in turn to the impossibility of satisfaction.
on the virtual plane of immanence opened up by transcendental 
empiricism, desire is liberated from the bondage to lack in which it 
is imprisoned by subjectivity and becomes manifest as the flow of 
intensive singularities. What desire desires is not simply an actually 
missing object, but rather the possibility of virtually reconnecting with 
its hitherto excessive dimension, where individuated objects give way 
to a multiplicity of intensive flows of becoming: ‘What is desired is the 
intense germinal or germinative flow, where one would look in vain for 
4. on this point, see also Patton (2000: 104); and hallward, who confidently asserts 
that there is no radical break between Logic of Sense and Anti-Oedipus (2006a: 87).
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persons or even functions discernible as father, mother, son, daughter, 
etc.’ (AŒ, 177/191). opened on to its virtuality, desire ceases to be 
the castrated, impotent desire of lacan, capable of producing nothing 
more than the fantasies that fill in for the impossibility of satisfaction. 
through its relation to excess, desire is revealed as inherently produc-
tive, where this production is of reality as such:
if desire produces, it produces the real. if desire is productive, it can be 
productive only in the real world and produce only reality. Desire is the set 
of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows and bodies, and that 
function as units of production. the real is the end product, the result of the 
passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious [Le réel en 
découle, il est le résultat des synthèses passives du désir comme autoproduc-
tion de l’inconscient]. (AŒ, 28/34)
Desiring-production is not expressive. When construed in terms of a 
general economy of life, it does not, as lacan suggests, share a structure 
with language; nor does it express itself through fantasy, except when 
cut off from its productive aspect. it is rather a machinic process of 
creation, with no purpose – no object of satisfaction – other than the 
continual production of new connections with other desiring machines 
(AŒ, 28/34). it is this connectivity that takes desire beyond the oikos, 
beyond, on one hand, the desire for identity and, on the other, beyond 
confinement to the familial (oedipal) unit. By producing connections 
that go beyond this unit, desiring-production breaks down the modern 
(hegelian, freudian) distinction between a private sphere of desire and 
a public sphere of political economy.
economics is classically defined as the distribution of scarce resources, 
the science of ‘human behaviour in disposing of scarce means’ over a 
limited period of time (Robbins 1945: 30). Against this orthodoxy of 
scarcity, for Deleuze and Guattari it is excess and not lack that consti-
tutes the primary problem of the socio-political. the question is not 
whether there is excess, but rather how to contain the excess that is 
virtually always already inherent in desire. By the same measure, the 
principal question of revolution is not how to foment it, but, again, 
how to contain the revolution that is virtually ongoing. the organisa-
tion of scarce resources is but secondary to this, an attempt to forestall 
the excessive arrival of a future of death and instability, a future that 
would break from identity with the present:
Desire is revolutionary in its essence [. . .] and no society can tolerate a 
position of true desire without its structures of exploitation, servitude, and 
hierarchy being compromised. [. . .] it is therefore of vital importance for a 
society to repress desire [. . .]. Desire does not ‘want’ revolution, it is revolu-
tionary in its own right, as though involuntarily, by wanting what it wants 
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[Le désir ne ‘veut’ pas la révolution, il est révolutionnaire par lui-même et 
comme involontairement, en voulant ce qu’il veut]. (AŒ, 126–7/138)
in a formulation whose potential denial of human agency has met with 
resistance from the more humanist of Deleuze’s commentators (notably 
Ansell-Pearson 2004: 37; see also hallward 2006a: 56, 162), Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that ‘the fundamental problem of political philoso-
phy’ is ‘why, after centuries of exploitation, do people still tolerate being 
humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they actually want 
humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves?’ (AŒ, 
31/36). the answer they posit is that the subject is already the result of 
a tendency immanent yet running counter to desire: namely, repression. 
Repression occurs because desire is unable to cope with its own inten-
sity, its constant production of new connections, intensities and becom-
ings: ‘there is no fixed subject unless there is repression’ (AŒ, 28/34). 
one should be wary of reading the subject as the only site of repression, 
however. the tendency toward repression is not just immanent to the 
human, but to all life. Rather than a psychic structure of a pre-given, 
individuated subject, it refers more generally – one might argue too 
generally – to the way differences on the plan(e) of immanence are con-
tracted into the apparently transcendent entities manifest in subjective 
experience. As nothing more than another name for the process of filter-
ing the virtual life of immanence into actual experience, repression is not 
simply a characteristic of the human, but rather pertains to every organi-
sation of life in representable actuality. it is also, as such, one of the key 
concepts in Deleuze and Guattari’s radically non-anthropocentric think-
ing of the political. the generality of the concept offers one reason as to 
why the above-mentioned critics suspect Deleuze and Guattari of going 
too far in trying to decentre politics from human need.
if politics is a question of repression, it is not an active human repres-
sion, but rather a passive operation. it refers, in other words, to the 
impossibility of fully actualising the virtual, of completing the break-
down of organisation that would coincide with the ‘absolute deterri-
torialisation’ of identity. According to Deleuze and Guattari, different 
societies are the result of differences in the way the actualisation of 
virtuality plays out, with different social organisations reflecting varia-
tions in regimes of restricted economy, varying techniques of repressing 
and containing the aneconomic, virtual potentiality of life. Deleuze and 
Guattari describe them in terms of different social bodies, each one the 
reorganisation of an underlying ‘Body without organs [Corps sans 
Organes]’ which, as Delanda notes, is roughly synonymous with the 
plan(e) of immanence, ‘the virtual continuum formed by multiplicities’ 
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(Delanda 2002: 158). the socius functions as the surface on which 
production takes place, hence also bears witness to life’s inability to 
cope with the intensity of excess. this becomes manifest in its inabil-
ity constantly to renew itself, to repeat itself through the creation of 
new connections with other desiring-machines. the fixity of social life 
results from the organisation of the virtual flows of life into apparently 
transcendent, individuated bodies and partial organs, disconnected 
from their immanent conditions. the tension between economy and 
aneconomy, between the institution and breakdown of laws of iden-
tity, is thus the fundamental moment of politics. throughout history, 
politics consists in the attempt to capture the excessive life of the gift in 
repressive regimes of identity.
in saying this, Deleuze and Guattari closely recall not only Bataille’s 
The Accursed Share (1949), but also Nietzsche’s conjectural, unasham-
edly fictional account of the birth of human society in On the Genealogy 
of Morality (1887), which Bataille’s work attempts to historicise. they 
furthermore explicitly elevate the Genealogy above Mauss’s Essai as 
‘the great book of modern ethnology’ (AŒ, 207/224). As part of a 
genealogical strategy to disclose concealed values and animal modes of 
behaviour beneath the supposedly transcendent, a priori institutions of 
modernity, Nietzsche posits a distinction between two ideal types in the 
pre-history of man, which Deleuze, in an earlier work, differentiates as 
the ‘active’ noble and the ‘reactive’ slave (Deleuze 2003: 53/65). the 
behaviour of the former is distinguished by its uncontrollable instinc-
tive spontaneity. the hypothetical noble is said to live without regard 
for the actions of others and is even speculatively endowed with an 
active ‘faculty of forgetting’ (active Vergesslichkeit) that causes suffer-
ing experienced at the hands of others to be forgotten. Able to live and 
face the future without fear of suffering, the noble is thus effectively 
aneconomic, which is to say unconcerned by identity and the prospect 
of losing everything. in the Bataillean terms laid out in the previous 
chapter, nobility roughly translates into the sovereignty of unproduc-
tive expenditure, the ability unconditionally to squander, to discharge 
one’s instincts and energy without expecting something in return. the 
hypothetical slave, by contrast, is pure economy. obsessed with death 
and a suffering that memory leaves it unable to forget, its behaviour 
seeks to minimise potential loss by holding back resources, withhold-
ing from expending energy in the present. Rational and calculating, the 
slave’s incessant mediation of action by thought renders it fundamen-
tally incapable of spontaneity. Whereas the noble is unaware of time, 
the slave lives in bondage to it, always reacts to it, as if threatened by 
it; servitude of this sort ‘is never “through” with anything [wird mit 
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Nichts “fertig”]’ (GM, 39/308 [2§1, tM]). the latter is embodied in 
christianity, which sacrifices life in the present in order to invest in a 
future of beatitude, as if in accordance with some calculus of salvation.
strongly anticipating what Weber, in 1905, would go on to describe 
as the Protestant work ethic (Weber 1992: 53–4/61), Nietzsche for-
mulates the modern experience of time as an economic problem. 
time is reconstructed as homogeneous, present, rendered suitable for 
investment through the foreclusion of destabilising heterogeneity. the 
emergence of this economic disposition towards life coincides with the 
‘breeding of an animal which is able to make promises’ (GM, 38/307 
[2§1]), the breeding of an animal that experiences time as stable, pre-
dictable, on the basis of which it becomes possible to regulate one’s 
experiences within time. this in turn is traced to what Nietzsche regards 
as the fundamental social relationship of pre-modern (pre-christian) 
society: namely, that of debtor to creditor. the former secures a loan 
by agreeing to the creditor’s demand to extract, in the event of non-
repayment, quantities of flesh commensurate with the incurred debt. in 
addition to affording the creditor a degree of compensatory pleasure, 
the inscriptions punish the failure to repay by creating a memory on 
the surface of the debtor’s body. the presence of scars serves ‘to etch 
the duty and obligation of repayment into conscience’ (GM, 44/315 
[2§5]), leaving the debtor unable to escape the memory of debt. far 
from a metaphysical given, Nietzsche thus conjectures that the calcu-
lating, predictably rational figure of homo economicus is the product 
of mnemotechnical forces that have been overlooked by conventional, 
teleologising accounts of history.
Yet this mnemotechnical ‘breeding’ also conditions the subsequent 
(be)coming of the Übermensch, the one who surpasses servitude 
through the ability to say ‘yes’ to the memory of a past that has made 
him or her who he or she is. As the one who survives the thought exper-
iment of eternal return, the Übermensch is also the one who breaks free 
from the economic constraints of identity; who valorises the reckless 
expenditure of a gift so great that it would sunder identity – and who 
indeed affirms the eternal return as such a gift. hence Zarathustra’s 
elevation of a ‘schenkende tugend’, a ‘bestowing virtue’, above all 
others (Z, 100/93).
s iMUlAcRA  of  the  G ift  (DeleUZe  AND 
GUAttARi  CONTRA lYotARD)
Given Nietzsche’s hypothetical location of the noble in a time prior to 
the onset of Western modernity, it is tempting to follow Bataille and 
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equate the noble with archaic society, with the capacity for spontane-
ous expenditure exhibited in the allegedly ahistorical societies of the 
potlatch. there are, however, considerable risks in succumbing to this 
temptation. Jean-françois lyotard has been highly critical of what he 
sees as the fetishisation of the gift economy, the fantasy of ‘ethnology’s 
good savage’ as an untainted, idealised natural communism, prior to the 
deleterious transformations of capitalism. lyotard argues in Libidinal 
Economy (1974) that ‘the whole problematic of the gift, such as [we] 
receive it from Mauss, with or without the additions and diversion of 
Bataille, caillois and lacan, belongs in its entirety to Western imperia-
lism and racism’ (lyotard 1993a: 106/130). offered as an alternative 
to capitalism, the gift economy reveals itself as a fantasy generated by 
capital, whose logic it reinforces by positing itself as an alternative. 
Judith still argues that Derrida’s awareness of ‘reverse ethnocentrism’ 
diminishes his susceptibility to lyotard’s criticism (still 1997: 19–20; 
see also WD, 356/414, cited above, in the introductory chapter). it is 
not always clear whether the same can be said of Deleuze and Guattari, 
or whether they happily romanticise archaic society, purposefully con-
flating the archaic gift with a concept of the gift as the event of eternal 
return. the affirmation, in Logic of Sense, of an ‘economy of the gift 
that is opposed to the mercantile economy of exchange’ (ls, 328/334) 
is one instance of an apparent tendency to make little effort to differ-
entiate the virtual from the actual organisations that repress it, often 
collapsing the two together. the ensuing suspicion is that Deleuze and 
Guattari idealise often decidedly repressive archaic regimes, and has 
led christopher l. Miller to argue that they ‘take some extraordinary 
liberties’ in their use of anthropology (Miller 1993: 19). the problem, 
as Miller sees it, lies in their attempt to deploy anthropological con-
cepts to characterise the event while simultaneously reading them back 
into archaic society, thus transforming the latter into a utopian site 
of resistance against a specifically Western history of the repression 
of desiring-production. Miller offers Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
the nomad as an example of this. in A Thousand Plateaus (1980), they 
extract the idea of nomadology from anthropological discourse in order 
to recreate it as a philosophical ‘concept’, an expression that captures 
the unconstrained desiring-production of eternal return as a nomos 
without oikos, a distribution of energy unbound by the repressive for-
mations of identity, where, to cite Ansell-Pearson, ‘repetition itself [is] 
the only form of “law” beyond morality’ (Ansell-Pearson 1997a: 66). 
Yet, Miller argues, they also characterise the nomadic ‘war machine’ as 
an actually existing anarchic, archaic reality, prior to the social repres-
sion of desire (1993: 25–9).
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in their final collaboration, What Is Philosophy? (1991), Deleuze 
and Guattari differentiate the concept of philosophy from what 
Deleuze perceives to be the wholly distinct and unrelated function of 
the sciences. to this end, they argue that the concerns of science (in 
which they would presumably also include anthropology and the other 
human sciences) lie primarily in the descriptions of ‘states of affairs’, 
the configurations and organisations of actualised, individuated entities 
in conscious experience. only philosophy, by contrast, engages with 
the virtual, creating ‘concepts’ that ‘survey’ the plan(e) of immanence, 
giving expression to the impossible experience of eternal return (WiP, 
32–4/35–7). Defined by its ‘power of repetition’ (WiP, 159/150), the 
task of the philosophical concept is to lend consistency to that which 
exists virtually, beyond the bounds of consistent, comprehensible logic. 
But as a repetition of difference, it also serves to unground the purport-
edly stable logos of anthropology, ‘countereffectuating’ the giving of 
the gift economy (WiP, 155–6/147).
in addition to the complaint that Deleuze and Guattari idealise the 
archaic gift economy, this construal of philosophy as the creation of 
concepts has given rise to a number of other accusations of idealism, 
not least of which the suspicion, already noted by lyotard, that they 
legitimate capitalism. the reasons for this will be discussed at greater 
length in chapter 4, primarily in respect of their understanding of 
the relationality between philosophy and politics. Miller’s criticisms 
vis-à-vis anthropology thus fit into a broader set of concerns about 
Deleuze and Guattari. taken by itself, however, the suggestion that 
they conflate archaic society with a site of unrestricted, aneconomic 
exchange is unconvincing. When Anti-Oedipus is reread through What 
Is Philosophy?, we see that what is at stake is not so much an anthro-
pological description as the staging of how the archaic gift economy 
comes into existence. Deleuze and Guattari’s aim is to extract from 
archaic actuality its habitually concealed relation to the event. their 
iconoclastic, strategically hyperbolic writing style admittedly lends 
itself to confusion on this point by continually and repeatedly switch-
ing between anthropological and conceptual registers, blurring the 
boundaries between philosophy and the human sciences. they none 
the less seem to be aware of the risks of idealisation, stating pointedly 
in Anti-Oedipus that ‘there is no pure nomad,’ no formation of desire 
that is not subject to regimes of organisation (AŒ, 163/174 [tM]). 
Problematically, in terms of what it might imply about the trajectory of 
their later work, this is more apparent in the first volume of Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, whose lengthy consideration of exogamy presents 
archaic society as anything but an anarchy of free desire. the 
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 distinctions that Miller accuses Deleuze and Guattari of obfuscating 
are also manifest in their denial of the ‘especially weak and inadequate’ 
belief that archaic society falls outside history (AŒ, 165/177). this 
belief, they argue, is bound up in a modern (originally Judeo-christian), 
teleological concept of history, which they also reject as a product of 
ideology and racism. Rather than a continuum of progress, Deleuze 
and Guattari define history in terms of rupture and discontinuity, ‘the 
history of contingencies and not the history of necessity’, whose traver-
sal marks the breakdown of the repressive formations through which 
the eternal return is held at bay (AŒ, 154/163). if archaic society is 
thought ahistorical, in this respect, it is not because it bears witness to 
a privileged experience of eternal return, but quite the contrary. the 
apparent ahistoricality stems from the success of archaic techniques in 
staving off the deterritorialising ruptures that would mark the entry of 
eternal return into history. Rather than ahistorical, archaic society is, if 
anything, marked by an excess of history over becoming (which is also 
to say a deficit of philosophy).
Nietzsche’s Genealogy is more important than Mauss’s The Gift not 
because it opens us on to a pre-christian, ahistorical, social reality of 
spontaneity and aneconomy, but rather because Nietzsche’s speculative 
account of mnemotechnicity is already implicitly at work in Mauss’s 
account of the gift economy. Where Mauss and, moreover, lévi-strauss 
posit the synthetic apriority of an overarching total social fact, a tran-
scendent ground of unified social reality, it is only with Nietzsche and 
genealogy, they suggest, that we uncover the origins of apparently pre-
given social structures:
society is not first of all a milieu for exchange where the essential would be 
to circulate and to cause to circulate, but rather a socius of inscription where 
the essential thing is to mark and to be marked. there is circulation only if 
inscription requires or permits it. (AŒ, 156/166)
this privileging of inscription over exchange serves as a basis for con-
testing lévi-strauss’s identification of exchange with the unconscious of 
desire. Deleuze and Guattari actually argue the contrary: namely, that 
exchange functions as a technique for desire’s repression, albeit one 
that is not repressive enough for archaic society. in place of exchange 
as a total social fact, the synthesis of social identity, we find a pre-
exchangist economics of inscription, in relation to which the giving of 
gifts functions as a supplementary strategy for the circulation of debt. 
the archaic economy is described as a mnemotechnical attempt to 
regulate the ‘decoded flux’ of the eternal return, to repress and impose 
constraints upon the revolutionary potential of unconstrained desiring-
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production, which constitutes ‘the nightmare that the primitive social 
machine exorcises with all its forces’ (AŒ, 167/179).
in saying this, Deleuze and Guattari can be read as developing on the 
arguments of lacan, who, as we saw in the previous chapter, describes 
the imaginary gift as a defence mechanism against the ungrounding 
effect of, first, the symbolic gift of speech and, later, the gift of the real. 
Deleuze and Guattari draw an analogous distinction between actual 
and virtual gifts, where the former responds to the excess of the latter in 
the form of a repression. in light of this, it becomes necessary to draw a 
distinction between the gift of eternal return and the gift as an instance 
of mnemotechnical repression. With this distinction in hand, it becomes 
clearer that the archaic gift is what becomes of aneconomic desiring-
production when in so-called primitive society it is always already 
caught up in a process of codification, of subjection to social repression.
Whereas Nietzsche emphasised the creation of memory as a tech-
nique of individuating subjects, binding them to individual debts, 
Deleuze and Guattari use it to posit the archaic body as the collective 
body of the tribe, ‘a collective investment of organs’ that precedes any 
experience of individuated (modern) subjectivity. this is exemplified in 
traditions that appropriate bodies by physically marking and modify-
ing them with signs (including tattooing, scarification, subincision, 
circumcision) that designate their function within the overarching tribal 
collective. the inscribed memory is experienced as a debt, an inability 
to forget the collective body to which one owes one’s existence: ‘Debt 
is the direct result of inscription’ (AŒ, 208/225). ‘the original subject 
of obligation is not the persona,’ as lingis puts it, ‘it is my body, more 
exactly, my productive body parts, which have been incorporated into 
the social code by being marked’ (lingis 1994: 293). More than just 
an aggregate of marked individuals, the archaic social body is rendered 
collective through the mnemotechnical circulation of women as gifts. 
there is thus an explicit link between the circulation of gifts and what 
Deleuze and Guattari call the circular time of habitus (DR, 117/120). 
By focusing on the inscriptive power of the gift economy, Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that the body is not just written on, but moreover 
written into existence, produced by pre-graphic techniques of writing 
as forms of habitus, the contraction of aneconomy into iterable laws of 
identity.
Where the gift of eternal return breaks down the experience of chron-
ological time, the archaic gift, by contrast, participates in the creation 
of this experience. following Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari write of 
‘a memory of alliance and of words, implying an active repression of 
the intense memory of filiation’ (AŒ, 170/182). By memory of alliance, 
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they mean a (psychological) memory, or habitus, brought into existence 
through organisations of kinship and exogamy, techniques that restrict 
the potential for desire to produce new connections. the giving away 
of women for marriage creates a new social memory by imposing a 
code over another, pre-existing memory: namely, that of a genetic flux 
whose immanent potentiality generates a scope for reproduction and 
sexual activity far in excess of what the institutions of archaic society 
are able to absorb. systems of exogamy code the repetition of desiring-
production by imposing a patrilineal system of reciprocity on to the 
otherwise unconstrained possibilities of filiative (sexual) reproduction 
(AŒ, 173/186). the gift economy consists in the repression of differ-
ence, the contraction of virtual aneconomy into economic regimes of 
identity. What is circulated is not just women, but debt, in the form 
of the obligation to reciprocate gifts given, and it is debt, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue, that prevents the gift economy from being configured 
in terms of exchange. Deleuze and Guattari praise Mauss for having 
kept open the question – foreclosed by the structuralism of lévi-strauss 
– of whether debt is prior to exchange, or merely a mode thereof (AŒ, 
205/218–19).
Rereading the pre-lévi-straussian Mauss through Nietzsche enables 
them to go further and show how the excessive, untranslatable remain-
der functions as a decisive moment in the creation of a repressive 
organisation. in his critique of their use of anthropology, Miller takes 
Deleuze and Guattari to task for over-reliance on problematically colo-
nialist anthropological sources, as if to imply that their argument would 
find little sympathy with more contemporary, post-colonial anthropol-
ogy (Miller 1993: 22–4). Yet their establishment of a relation between 
excess and domination suggests quite the contrary. Writing from within 
the discourse of anthropology, Marilyn strathern has argued that the 
possibility of such a relation has been neglected by traditional gift 
anthropology (strathern 1988: 166). Deleuze and Guattari not only 
anticipate this lacuna but moreover propose a solution to it, arguing 
that surplus value is central to the techniques of domination through 
which excessive desiring-production is drawn off and turned back 
against itself, rendered docile. it is always the surplus, they argue, that 
serves to ‘organize selections [prélèvements] from the flows’, effecting 
the breakdown of flows of immanence into transcendent units of iden-
tity (AŒ, 165/177). their argument – like the problematic to which 
it responds – is clearly Marxian in origin; like Marx’s, theirs will also 
culminate in an analysis of surplus capital, profit, as the most advanced 
stage in a history of domination through excess (AŒ, 153/163).
the earliest, most ‘primitive’ form of surplus value, however, is the 
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surplus value of code (AŒ, 164–5/176). Deleuze and Guattari identify 
this with the hau, the ‘esprit des choses’ described by Maori myths as 
the cause of the circulation of gifts throughout the gift economy. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, the attention Mauss pays to the hau leads 
lévi-strauss to accuse him of being seduced by indigenous myths. the 
latter reworks the hau as a ‘floating signifier’, an unconscious expres-
sion of the structures of exchange that govern social reality (iMM, 63/
xlix). the hau is in turn reconfigured by lacan as an expression of the 
lost object of desire, the empty placeholder of the real in the symbolic 
order, which tribal members attempt to recuperate through the sacri-
ficial offering of gifts. for Deleuze and Guattari, the myth of the hau 
codes desire by overseeing the conversion of a virtual, inherently desta-
bilising excess of energy into a manageable, containable surplus (AŒ, 
164–5/176). By imposing the obligation that the reciprocating gift be in 
excess of the one it reciprocates, the hau generates new and more debt 
rather than simply extirpating debt through the establishment of har-
monious equilibrium. it propagates rituals like the potlatch as archaic 
systems of taxation, skimming off surplus goods by offering honour 
in lieu of payment for what might otherwise have facilitated material 
domination. Writing on the broader ‘political posture’ of Deleuze, one 
commentator captures how this prevents the centralisation of influence 
in the hands of a tribal chieftain, whose ‘power is held in check because 
the gifts he receives increase exponentially his obligation to repay them’ 
(Valentin 2006: 195).
far from indicating the existence of transcendental, ergo ahistorical 
and totalising structures of exchange, the regulating myths of archaic 
society consist in contingent and experimental practices (AŒ, 162/173), 
which through the absence of any transcendental privilege can never 
totally succeed in implementing a system that fully captures and codes 
the excess of desire. Mythopoiesis contributes to the stability of archaic 
society, preventing it from succumbing to a comparatively deregulated 
system of exchange. A similar conclusion is found in the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu, whose highly influential analyses of the gift economy overlap 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s on a number of points. Bourdieu also 
insists on the gift economy as a ‘logic of practice’ revolving around a 
concept of habitus that prohibits a simple contrast between object and 
subject, society and the individual agent. like Deleuze and Guattari, he 
is vocally critical of the ‘exchangeism’ of lévi-strauss, who argues that 
the countergift is contained synthetically a priori within the opening 
gift. Reminding us of the reasons for which Deleuze and Guattari turn 
toward Nietzsche, Bourdieu argues that a focus on the apriority of 
structures fundamentally elides the question of the relationship between 
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the experience of agency and social conditioning, of how people’s par-
ticipation in social norms is governed by unconscious (‘unthinkable’) 
processes, which are themselves the outcome of previous practices 
(Bourdieu 1990: 54/90). the attempted reversal of this elision is borne 
out in Bourdieu’s theory of habitus, which he describes as consisting in 
‘principles that generate and organise practices and representations that 
can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends’ (Bourdieu 1990: 53/88). Drawing not from 
hume but from none other than Mauss, who uses the term to account 
for culturally different ‘techniques of the body’ (Mauss 1979: 70–4; 
sA, 368–72), Bourdieu employs the concept to explain how the sedi-
mentation of practices over time serves unconsciously to organise social 
behaviour, embedding actions in habit to the point where adhesion to 
social norms passes off as the result of freely chosen actions.
of particular significance, in this respect, is the importance Bourdieu 
attaches to the role played by institutions of gift-giving in creating the 
impression of subjective agency through manipulations of the experi-
ence of time. he accuses lévi-strauss of neglecting the ‘temporal inter-
val between the gift and the countergift’, the fact that cultures of gift 
exchange almost always insist upon a delay prior to the reciprocation 
of a gift. Viewed as an instance of habitus, the effect of the temporal 
gap is to create an impression of agency, ‘to enable whoever is giving to 
experience their gift as a gift without return [un don sans retour], and 
whoever reciprocates to experience their countergift as gratuitous and 
not determined by the initial gift’ (Bourdieu 1998: 94/179 [tM]). it is 
in this sense of agency that we see the origin of a system of honour, a 
system for channelling the instability of excess, of futurity and temporal 
uncertainty, into a system of returns through which uncertainty and 
unpredictability are contained. By ensuring that the gift is experienced 
as freely given, the habitus creates an incentive to give. But it also thus 
averts the threat of a future that breaks drastically with the established 
order, converting the instability implied by the non-reciprocation of 
gifts into a manageable system of surplus. Bourdieu argues that the 
control implicitly exercised by the habitus is a fundamental prerequisite 
for the harmonious functioning of a community, which falls into dis-
array once members cease to submit to the collective ‘misrecognitions 
[méconnaissances]’ through which this discharge is controlled (1998: 
95–6/181–2). his argument thus presents itself as a productive way of 
interpreting Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that the circulation of gifts 
is never continual, but rather made possible by discontinuity and the 
measured rhythming of time. Anticipating Bourdieu, they argue that 
the repressive, mnemotechnical power of the archaic habitus consists 
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in its ability to introduce ‘breaks [coupures]’ and ‘selections from 
the flux [prélèvements de flux]’ that slow circulation to a stop (AŒ, 
163–7/174–6). it is in this slowing of circulation, the introduction of 
breaks allowing the accretion of honour to the giver, that we see the 
drawing off and encasting of excess, the conversion of potentiality into 
a manageable surplus that ultimately poses little threat to the metast-
ability of the tribe.
the  PRoMise  of  escAPe
Bourdieu’s reading of the gift economy in terms of an unconscious 
habitus has led him to criticise Derrida for overstating the extent to 
which the gift is bound up in ‘the free decision of an isolated individ-
ual’: in other words, for presupposing the giver as a homo economicus 
whose calculations undermine and negate the supposed spontane-
ity and generosity of offering a gift (Bourdieu 1998: 95/181 [tM]). 
the criticism misses the point that, for Derrida, it would not matter 
whether the gift is given freely or under unconscious duress, for the 
simple reason that, subjectively, it is still linked to a feeling of agency, 
and this feeling is enough to reinscribe the gift within an economy that 
negates it. By emphasising that the spontaneity of a gift is a result of 
the habitus, Bourdieu actually reinforces Derrida’s claim that the gift is 
never unconditional when implicated in the economics of subjectivity. 
But the criticism of Derrida exposes Bourdieu to an objection raised by 
Manuel Delanda, who, in his recent and sophisticated elaboration of 
a Deleuzo-Guattarian social ontology, argues that Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus irreducibly differs from that of Deleuze in its failure to leave 
space for human agency, ‘to the extent that all differences between the 
motivations behind social behaviour [. . .] disappear’ (Delanda 2006: 
64). if this is transposed on to Bourdieu’s reading of the gift, it would 
seem that he can only preserve the authenticity of gifts by denying that 
the giver plays any active part in the giving. ironically, the accusation 
precisely mirrors one levelled against Deleuze by hallward, whose 
ultimate rejection of the former stems from the conviction that he 
‘acknowledges only a unilateral relation between virtual and actual’, 
thus denying ‘any notion of change, time or history that is mediated by 
actuality’ (hallward 2006a: 162). the argument hinges on the validity 
of Badiou’s claim that the Deleuzian thinking of virtuality collapses 
back into a ‘Platonism of the virtual’, a regrounding of existence in the 
metaphysics of the event (in Badiou 2000: 47/69). Without wishing 
to dwell too much on a question whose complexity exceeds the remit 
of the present exercise, one could respond provisionally in favour of 
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Deleuze by reprising an idea mentioned at the onset of the chapter. in 
looking for actuality to mediate the virtual, hallward is perhaps guilty 
of a category mistake, treating virtual and actual as metaphysically 
rather than perspectivally distinct. in so doing, he conflates the rejec-
tion of a transcendent, ontologically privileged agency with a rejection 
of agency tout court.
As we shall see in chapter 4, where it will be suggested that Deleuze’s 
thinking of the virtual gives rise to an undue privileging of philosophy 
over politics, this does not mean that Deleuze and Guattari entirely 
escape the criticisms of Badiou and his disciple. But nor does it mean 
that Deleuze and Guattari deny the space for agency. on the contrary, 
their exposition of the relations between virtual and actual is what 
enables them to do this. the rejection of structuralism in favour of an 
analysis of mnemotechnical practices means that there is potential for 
members of a society actively to resist and unground the techniques 
through which eternal return is held at bay. this does not mean that 
agency is pre-given, that it can be taken for granted in its ability to 
override other (non-human) forces. Rather, agency too must actively be 
actualised, created in lines of flight that unground the restricted habit-
uses of identity. in this respect Deleuze and Guattari are in agreement 
with Derrida about the possibility of the impossible, the possibility 
of rewriting the social order. the Deleuzo-Guattarian description of 
habitus as a technique of coding, or writing, is one of the rare instances 
where they refer directly to Derrida, with whom they agree that lan-
guage originates in writing. Describing how the ‘voice’ of the hau, the 
law that compels the circulation of gifts, presupposes the appropria-
tive marking of a tribal body through inscription, they argue: ‘Jacques 
Derrida is correct in saying that every language presupposes a writing 
system from which it originates, if by that he means the existence and 
connection of some sort of graphism – writing in the largest sense of 
the term’ (AŒ, 220–1/240). they go on to qualify this, noting that the 
relationship between writing and voice is historically unstable (indeed, 
the whole of Anti-Oedipus’s monumental third chapter, ‘savages, 
Barbarians, civilized People’, can be read as a historicisation of this 
claim; see in particular AŒ, 220–1/240). the thesis that organisation 
proceeds through the introduction of breaks (coupures) into the ane-
conomic flux of life is still highly Derridean. from his earliest works, 
Derrida argues to similar effect that language works by creating a com-
municable economy of representation, which stands in for the incom-
municable, aneconomic event, without foreclosing it entirely (Derrida 
1988: 8, 20–1/28, 49; Derrida, Nouss and soussana 2001: 89). like 
Deleuze and Guattari, he explicitly identifies eternal return with a repe-
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tition of difference (différance) that prohibits the formation of closed 
systems of identity: ‘on the basis of the unfolding of the same as dif-
férance, we see announced the sameness of differance and repetition in 
the eternal return’ (M, 17/18–19). this concept of différance, however, 
describes how that which is sacrificed in the process of organisation 
retains a virtual potentiality through which it continues to exert influ-
ence over that from which it is foreclosed. language is never stable, 
but works on account of its instability. Rather than a closed system of 
exchange, through which a message is communicated unambiguously 
and in its entirety, communication works by sacrificing this possibility, 
by excluding the singularity of experience in order to express it in terms 
of a comprehensible generality. it is only through this organisation that 
language can attempt to communicate the impossible: namely, the event 
that exceeds organisation. But the organisation is fragile, to a greater or 
lesser degree, which is to say it remains eternally open to the prospect of 
a return of différance, the singularity that was foreclosed in the process 
or organisation (1988: 20–1/49). there is always thus a future in which 
the impossible could conceivably become possible.
Deleuze and Guattari draw on a similar thinking of systemic insta-
bility to demonstrate the possibility of lines of flight, traces of virtual-
ity prefiguring what, in his later work, Derrida will equate with the 
promise, a repetition of difference that breaks free from the economy 
of representation (Gt, 24/39; sM, 48/126). in Anti-Oedipus, the effect 
of these virtual traces is discernible within the regimes of repression, 
which are never closed systems but rather open, unstable and necessar-
ily so: ‘it is in order to function that a social machine must not function 
well’ (AŒ, 166/177).
the trace of the virtual, the gift of eternal return, is not found in 
the mnemotechnical gift, the gifts of women circulating throughout 
archaic society, but rather in the ability of tribal members to defy this 
circulation. Deleuze and Guattari anticipate Derrida’s Given Time by 
arguing that the gift bestowing debt is in fact the antithesis of the gift as 
event; that the virtual gift breaks through only in the breakdown of the 
economy that encasts it. Paradoxically, it is in tribal members’ experi-
ence of the gift as theft (AŒ, 202–3/219), for example, that we bear 
witness to a destabilising excess that escapes capture. Although held 
within a position of metastability by the practice of the countergift, the 
gift economy is none the less constitutively unstable, always open to the 
possibility that someone could successfully avoid being coded, escape 
the obligation to give and counter-give and accrue enough power to 
overturn the collective organisation of power. According to Deleuze 
and Guattari, this is indeed what happens. ‘Primitive societies are 
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defined by mechanisms of prevention-anticipation’ (tP, 435/542), by 
the anticipation and prevention, or warding off (‘conjuration’), of the 
emergence of centres of power. they earn this definition by maintaining 
circulation, by promoting the myths that nothing falls outside or resists 
circulation; that production is permissible only in so far as subject to 
coding, which is to say convertible into a system of surplus manage-
ment that threatens its destruction (through the destruction of goods in 
the potlatch). But archaic society succumbs to despotism through the 
breakdown of circulation, when a tribal member bypasses the duty to 
give away women and obtains an incestuous marriage, which in turn 
creates a privileged, royal bloodline and elevates the despot as the credi-
tor to whom all debts are owed (AŒ, 217/236).
it is in this receipt of his own gift that the self-appointed despot 
appropriates the archaic ‘war machine’, a concept, briefly, that refers to 
the possibility of a destabilising countergift, a gift that would unground 
established relations of power, fracturing the monopoly of apparently 
transcendent institutions and loci of power (tP, 355–60/439–46). the 
birth of the state coincides with the centralisation of power in the hands 
of a despot, who captures the destabilising logic of the gift by declar-
ing himself the source of an infinite, hence ineliminable, debt, ensur-
ing that the gifts he receives never become subject to the obligation to 
reciprocate (AŒ, 215/234). the rise of despotism also coincides with 
an unleashing of production and technology. in a reversal of Bataille’s 
reading of the gift economy as a site of unproductive expenditure, to 
be contrasted favourably with the production without expenditure of 
modernity (As, 131–2/126), Deleuze and Guattari suggest that archaic 
society is characterised by a repressive coding of production:
the primitive machine isn’t ignorant of exchange, commerce and industry; 
it exorcises them, localizes them, cordons them off, encasts them, and main-
tains the merchant and the blacksmith in a subordinate position, so that the 
flows of exchange and the flows of production do not manage to break the 
codes. (AŒ, 168/179–80)
the breakdown of the gift economy paves the way for technological 
lines of flight that, even if fostered and appropriated by the repressive 
institutions of the state, will ultimately become forces of deterritori-
alisation. Decoupled from the system of honour and instrumentalised, 
rendered subordinate to the despot, technology serves all the more 
forcefully to add to and ‘overcode’ the regimes of repression immanent 
to life, the better to contain the virtual potentiality of the event (AŒ, 
214–15/233; tP, 419/522). the question of technology thus emerges 
as another variable in a history of politics that is effectively a history 
of flight from the gift, a history of the attempt to curb and encast the 
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unregulated potentiality of a life in excess and subversive of the social 
order. But the history of politics’ flight from the gift is also a history of 
the return of the repressed, of the creation of lines of flight in which the 
eternal return of difference breaks through and undermines repressive 
social formations of identity. Much as technics may inhibit the exercise 
of agency, it also expands its horizons of possibility, creating new lines 
of flight through which a seemingly impossible agency retains the pros-
pect of actualisation. for all that, technology remains ambiguous, both 
a facilitator and an obstacle to change, both a threat and a supplement 
to the becoming of the human (tP, 410–12/510–13).
in saying this, Deleuze and Guattari provoke comparison with 
another thinker of the gift who, though different in a great many 
ways, raises a number of questions that will need to be addressed. 
like Deleuze and Guattari, Martin heidegger advocates a politics of 
repetition based on a specifically – one might say overly – philosophi-
cal thinking of politics. like Deleuze and Guattari, he writes of the 
ambiguous role of technology in relation to the event and is openly 
sceptical of democracy. if the appearance of similarity falls down on 
heidegger’s Nazism, one is nevertheless compelled to raise the ques-
tion of whether the philosophical thinking of a politics of the gift is not 
inherently contaminated, liable to veer toward aristocratism through its 
attempt to privilege the singular and unthinkable over the general and 
comprehensible.
coNclUs ioN
As we saw in chapter 1, lacan develops the idea of a tension between 
a (real) gift of excess and an imaginary gift that works to repress it. 
Deleuze and Guattari go much further, however. Reconfigured as a 
tension between virtual and actual, the problematic of the gift becomes 
the fundamental, or rather ungrounding, axis of the socio-political and 
its history, which plays out as the perennial struggle to curb the flow of 
virtual revolution into actuality, the attempt to forestall the repetition 
of eternal return. in place of a mere thought experiment, a proposition 
designed to challenge the christian waiting for an afterlife, we find the 
eternal return ontologised, reconfigured as a name for life as such. this 
life, or ‘une vie’, is not self-identical, undifferentiated (as it is in lacan), 
but rather internally differentiating and multiple, giving rise to a tem-
porality that cannot be confined to the mere chronology of passing 
presents, and to a desire that does more than just (anthropomorphi-
cally) lament its lack of self-identity. far more than just the life of an 
individuated organism, ‘une vie’ names the non-chronological time of a 
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future that breaks with the present, a desiring-production that produces 
the continual novelty of becoming, rather than languishing in the stasis 
of identity. But it also, as such, names the time and generosity of a 
virtual giving that bears no resemblance to the anthropological incarna-
tion of the gift. if, as Derrida suggests, Marcel Mauss’s The Gift offers 
an analysis of ‘everything but the gift [tout sauf du don]’ (Gt, 24/39), 
it is because in circulating debt and the obligation to reciprocate, and 
in being given in the expectation of this reciprocation, the archaic gift is 
precisely the opposite of a spontaneous, uncalculated, generous offer-
ing. in describing the ‘tout’ of archaic society, Mauss and lévi-strauss 
misrecognise it as a closed system, a totalisable whole that overlooks 
the ruptures and discontinuities characteristic of the social dynamic. 
they therefore miss the constitutive tension between the event of differ-
ence and the economic practices employed in its constraint.
this tension is also what gives rise to politics, which, though begin-
ning with the differentiation of singularities on the plane of immanence, 
is moreover staged in the attempted actualisation of these singular rela-
tions, the organisation of pre-individuated differences into laws, habits, 
identities or economies, that curtail the intensity of the excessive, 
ungrounding event. Against the accusation that Deleuze and Guattari 
conflate the gift economy with the event, it becomes clear that a politics 
of the gift cannot be constricted to the regimes of archaic society. its 
primary concern is rather to expand the field of the political to account 
for the conditions of possibility of politics: namely, the absence of 
a ground, for which politics compensates through the inscription of 
stabilising regimes of order. Understood as a response to the eternal 
return, to the repetition of difference, what Deleuze and Guattari call 
the micropolitics of becoming consists in taking flight from the gift 
economy, affirming the revolutionary potential of a gift that cannot be 
reduced to economic exchange. the line of flight is also a vol, requiring 
the affirmation of the theft of identity that coincides with the receipt of 
this gift. Deleuze writes in Logic of Sense that ‘willing the event [vouloir 
l’événement]’ is the primary question of ethics (ls, 164/168). that is 
not to say that all ethics and indeed all politics of the gift will be worthy 
of the event; that they would not be swept aside by the advent of the 
event in the eternal return, however. the question becomes one of how 
to recover when this happens, how to reconceive the gift without col-
lapsing back into some form of restricted economy. Walter Benjamin’s 
(and lacan’s) concerns over Bataille, in this respect, have already 
been noted in chapter 1, while those of Miller regarding Deleuze and 
Guattari have been discussed above. from Bataille, to lacan to Deleuze, 
in each of its incarnations, there has been a suggestion that the thinking 
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of the gift can never achieve the aneconomy to which it aspires. there 
is a risk that the attempt to elaborate a politics of the eternal return, 
of the rejection of all grounding figures of essence and identity, is 
inevitably reterritorialised around a surreptitious return of a transcend-
ent, foundational truth that becomes paradoxically totalitarian in its 
affirmation of difference, and which accordingly raises the stakes of its 
relation to the political. Nowhere is this more starkly illustrated than in 
the politics of the gift, the politics of repetition, of the one-time Nazi, 
Martin heidegger. We shall see in the attempts to salvage the gift from 
his legacy that the question of the political – of what the political is and 
also how it relates to fascism – surges up as das grösste Schwergewicht 
of thinking politics in relation to the event.
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3. Repeating the Political: 
Heidegger and Nancy on 
Technics and the Event
the heidegger Affair has complicated matters: a great philosopher actually 
had to be reterritorialized on Nazism. [. . .] it had to be a philosopher, as if 
shame had to enter into philosophy itself.
(Gilles Deleuze and félix Guattari)1
the rise of the human sciences was one of the conditions for a distinctly 
philosophical thinking of a politics of the gift – one of the conditions 
for thinking politics both in its relation to anthropology and in its rela-
tion to an event in excess of the human. But it was not the only one; and 
the nascent field of anthropology was not the only academic discipline 
to engage with the problematic. the brief mentions of husserl and 
Jean-luc Marion in the introductory chapter noted how phenomenol-
ogy too was also and still is immersed in a language of the gift, of what 
es gibt in consciousness, distinct from the anthropological discourse of 
giving (husserl 1960: 24/64). Writing from within this phenomenologi-
cal tradition of ‘givenness’, Martin heidegger was among the first to 
seek to wrest philosophy back from what he perceived as its restrictive 
framing by ‘Anthropology’. he dismisses anthropology’s ‘lacking onto-
logical foundations [fehlende ontologische Fundament]’ as an obstacle 
to the fundamental ontology through which he could conceptualise 
giving as the essential characteristic of the event (Bt, 75/67 [§10, 49]). 
Rather than welcome the emergence of the discipline, recognising it as 
a resource for philosophy, he condemns it as the apogee of a deleterious 
history of Western metaphysics, the culmination of an anthropomor-
phosis of being, in which the metaphysical essence of man is taken for 
granted: ‘the anthropological mode of thinking, which, no longer com-
prehending the essence of subjectivity, prolongs modern metaphysics by 
vitiating it. “Anthropology” as metaphysics is the transition of meta-
1. WiP, 108/104.
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physics into its final configuration: “Weltanschauung”, or worldview’ 
(N, 441/179). in so far as it neglects, or suppresses, the fundamental 
relation of beings (Seiende, the Dasein heidegger substitutes for the 
subject) to the event of being (Sein), the anthropological world view 
is linked to ‘the question concerning technology’, the question – also 
the title of one of heidegger’s most influential essays – of how man’s 
relationship to the event is mediated by the manipulation of the world 
through technics. heidegger understands modern technology as a tech-
nics for the immortalisation of the subject, a way of framing being so 
as to conceal its excess over finite beings. this leads him to diagnose 
a crisis of global technological nihilism, brought on by man’s inability 
to confront the immanence of death. in so far as similarly framed by 
the technological-nihilistic attempt to evacuate death, the crisis is one 
to which politics alone proves dramatically insufficient a response. the 
critique of modern technology accordingly entails a rejection of politics, 
in its traditional (institutional) conception, and causes heidegger to 
seek beyond the technologically enframed institutions of the modern 
state a philosophically purified, which is to say ‘authentic’, essential 
and, crucially, ‘pre-political [vor-politisch]’ way of existing (hhi, 
82/102). to this end, he returns to analyse the relationship between 
being and technics in the Greek polis and argues for the ontological 
superiority of ancient over modern technicity. the latter works by 
subsuming being under the dominion of man, framing it in terms of a 
conscious subjectivity that is constitutively unable to capture the event 
of giving in its withdrawal, the experience of giving in excess of the 
subject. the technè of Ancient Greece, by contrast, refers to a language 
able to disclose the gift’s withdrawal without betraying the event, 
without substituting the being of beings for the impersonal es gibt of 
being and time. heidegger’s commitment to the purity of language 
underlies his faith in the prospect of a philosophy of repetition whose 
political implications would exceed those of any revolution (Beistegui 
2003: 60). through language, he argues, it becomes possible to repeat, 
to reground, a concept of being that has been lost since the onset of 
Platonic (christian) modernity, and with it, to receive the gift – the 
giving of being – that would take us beyond nihilism. A heideggerian 
politics of the gift thus in some respects looks quite similar to that of 
Bataille, lacan and Deleuze and Guattari, who seek to free the gift from 
the anthropological gift economy and to think it in terms of a singular, 
inexchangeable excess that cannot be expressed through the traditional 
concepts of political economy.
heidegger’s concept of the gift, which he significantly conceives in 
terms of presencing in language, is for all that less radical than the 
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impossible, avowedly non-self identical one employed by Derrida and 
Deleuze. the effect of this lesser radicality is discernible and moreover 
decisive in its consequences for his relation to the political, the rhetoric 
of which is worryingly replete with the centripetal themes of essence, 
destiny and homecoming (Heimischwerden). heidegger asserts the need 
to ‘think more Greek than the Greeks themselves’ (hhi, 81/100), in 
returning to the pre-political, ontological meaning of the Greek polis. 
in so doing, however, his argument famously dovetails into an extreme 
political conservatism and a dalliance with Nazism that for many neces-
sitates the refusal to engage with his thought. After heidegger, there 
is accordingly a deep-seated suspicion, if not an outright rejection, of 
the philosophical attempt to think the politics of an event that exceeds 
the modern politics of the subject. compounded by the concerns of 
lyotard, who fears that the problematic of the gift originates in the fet-
ishisation of a pre- or non-capitalistic other (lyotard 1993a: 106/130), 
the project of a politics of the gift – of discerning a relationality to and of 
the event that precedes the individuation of homines economici – risks 
being fundamentally compromised, condemned by its dubious reliance 
on conjectural, speculative history, to collapse back into an ambiguous 
relation to the totalitarian or fascistic. At stake is an allegedly totalising 
philosophical arrogation of the historical and political. We also saw 
this in Miller’s grievance over the relation of philosophy to anthropol-
ogy in Deleuze and Guattari, his suspicion that they romanticise the 
nomad as an anarchic site of aneconomy, prior to the (technological) 
overcoding that coincides with the birth of the state. one is naturally 
led to wonder how or whether this relates to Deleuze’s insistence that 
we ‘must not refuse to take heidegger seriously’ (f, 91/118).
Deleuze rarely engages with heidegger and phenomenology, but it 
is still a constant, albeit implicit influence (see WiP, 46–7/48–9; and 
the largely complimentary footnote on heidegger in Difference and 
Repetition, DR, 77/89–91n). the Deleuzian emphasis on repetition 
and becoming is ostensibly a repetition of Nietzsche. But as a philoso-
phy of repetition, it also stands in a relation of similarity to heidegger, 
and therefore risks contamination by the latter’s injunction to repeat 
the pre-political Greek polis. We see this in the possibility of reapplying 
a critique of heidegger elaborated by Jean-luc Nancy to the Deleuzian 
philosophy of immanence. But there is a crucial difference between 
Deleuze and Guattari and heidegger, which concerns the Deleuze and 
Guattari’s insistence on the intractability of the politics that heidegger 
seeks to circumscribe, notably their claim in Mille plateaux that ‘poli-
tics precedes being’ (tP, 203/249). With additional reference to their 
description of heidegger’s Nazism as the entry of shame into philoso-
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phy, one could and perhaps should argue that this crucial difference 
offers itself as a point of departure for the recovery and rehabilitation 
of a politics of the gift, creating the conditions of possibility for a new 
philosophical thinking of politics beyond the point of its destitution, 
where it encounters the impossibility of repetition, of restituting a 
lost origin, and gives up trying to make present that which precisely 
refuses presence. in other words, rather than getting caught up in and 
contaminated by ‘one of the most compromised thinkers of our recent 
past’ (hallward 2006b: 55), Deleuze and Guattari facilitate an escape 
from the heideggerian legacy through an account of the irreducibility 
of the politics of the gift.
this becomes more apparent by reading Deleuze and Guattari 
through the work of Nancy and his collaborator, Philippe lacoue-
labarthe. As already suggested, a critique of heidegger is only inter-
mittently encountered in Deleuze: for instance, in his passing reference 
to the ‘the deep ambiguity of his technical and political ontology’, in 
Foucault (f, 113/121), and a short but damning parody reading him 
through the absurdist Alfred Jarry (Deleuze 1998: 91–8/115–25). A 
similar approach does, however, inform and find itself reflected in 
lacoue-labarthe and Nancy, whose efforts to politicise the event, 
to politicise the technicity of giving, anticipate and indirectly read 
as a detailed response to both points of heidegger’s ‘deep ambigu-
ity’. Working both collaboratively, through the Centre de recherches 
philosophiques sur le politique (Centre for Philosophical Research into 
the Political), and individually, subsequent to the centre’s dissolution 
in 1984, lacoue-labarthe and Nancy seek to repeat heidegger in full 
knowledge of his shame, precisely in order to uncover and thereby move 
beyond the impasse that sunders his thought. they do this by elaborat-
ing a concept of the political, le politique, that cannot be reduced to the 
technologically enframed politics of institutions. Arguing that politics 
consists in precisely the absence of a ground, they advocate a ‘retrait 
du politique’, a withdrawal of politics from the philosophy that habitu-
ally overdetermines it. lacoue-labarthe and Nancy can also thus be 
seen to qualify Deleuze and Guattari. there is none the less something 
deeply Deleuzian about their return to and differential repetition of the 
heideggerian project of ontology. Despite being known primarily as a 
heideggerian student of Derrida, and despite making almost no explicit 
reference to Deleuze, Nancy in particular, and particularly in his latter 
works, can and will be read as a thinker of the ‘vol et don’ that for 
Deleuze characterises the politicity of the virtual.
With figures like Nancy in mind, the philosopher and historian of 
poststructuralism, Alan D. schrift, has cautioned against trying to 
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read recent french philosophy as a mere response to heidegger, at the 
expense of other influences (schrift 2004: 38). like Deleuze, Nancy is 
formed by the french legacy of Nietzsche and can be seen to return 
to the problematic of how to ontologise the eternal return, how to 
think repetition and circulation in terms of an ontology of the politi-
cal. Nancy follows heidegger in locating repetition in technicity, but 
central to his work is the re-elaboration of an irreducibly political, pre-
linguistic concept of technicity, which enables him to resist heidegger’s 
understanding of language as the site of pre-political, ontological 
privilege. in developing a critique of the dangerously aestheticised, or 
poietic, concept of technè employed by heidegger (lacoue-labarthe 
1990), lacoue-labarthe paves the way for Nancy to articulate the 
gift as praxis, rather than poiesis: the offering of an originary political 
technicity, expressed by what he calls ecotechnics, or the shared finitude 
of corporeal bodies (sW, 101/158; c, 89/77–9). this shared finitude 
gives rise to an ontology of singular plurality that, though subtly dif-
ferent, is strongly reminiscent of the Deleuzo-Guattarian metaphysics 
of virtual, singular multiplicities. it is also inseparable from a concept 
of espacement or ‘spacing’ movement of ungrounding that Nancy 
uses to rearticulate the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the nomad (ef, 
145/187).
far from eliciting complicity with fascism, this renewed thinking 
of the event entails a politics of the gift that is inherently opposed to 
it: a politics based on the ceaseless, ungrounding repetition of singu-
larity, on the flight/theft and gift of hermes rather than the hestial 
Heimischwerden sought by heidegger.
techNoloGY AND the  foReclosURe  of  the 
eVeNt
A brief discussion of Derrida’s critique of lacan, in chapter 1, outlined 
how the former suspects the latter of idealising the phallus, foreclosing 
the play of the signifier by imposing a psychoanalytic interpretation on 
the literary text. the broader gist of Derrida’s complaint is that lacan 
presupposes the phallus as a transcendental structure, such that every-
where the psychoanalyst turns, the phallus is already there, awaiting 
detection (Pc, 413/441). the term he later uses to capture the catch-
all lacanian strategy is encadrer, the act of framing the text within a 
restricted economy of interpretation (Pc, 431/461). Derrida, of course, 
argues that the gift intrinsically exceeds any such confinement; this is 
reflected in his thinking of technology, which he insists must preserve 
the possibility of invention, the production of a novelty that overflows 
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any attempt to frame (encadrer) it within an essence (Derrida 2007: 
30/42). the latter position is more radical than the one laid out by the 
essentialist philosophy of Martin heidegger, from whom Derrida inher-
its the concept of the frame. Unlike Derrida, heidegger remains com-
mitted to a thinking of essence (Wesen), albeit one whose withdrawal 
from experience means essences do not readily lend themselves to rep-
resentation. he opposes a technics of the event to a technics of framing, 
Ge-stell, that forecloses the giving of being. Ge-stell, he argues, ‘means 
the way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern tech-
nology and that is itself nothing technological’ (Qt, 325/24). As the 
non-technological essence of technology, Ge-stell is the means by which 
man attempts to subordinate being to his own mastery, to incorporate 
it within the economy of subjectivity and presence. here, technology 
figures as the extension of this economy, an extension that, like hegel’s 
master, seeks to exercise dominion over a world that will exist purely 
for it in the consciousness of a presence divested of the otherness of the 
event. heidegger writes: ‘thus “technology” does not signify here the 
separate areas of the production and equipment of machines’ (oM, 
74/76). it refers, rather, to the ontico-metaphysical structure that privi-
leges the being of beings (Seienden) over the being of being (Sein) and 
which determines the history of Western metaphysics as the forgetting 
of being. if, in Derrida, every act of foreclosure is an irreducibly violent 
attempt at essentialisation, in heidegger technology is also dangerous: 
‘the destining of revealing [das Geschick der Entbergung] is in itself 
not just any danger, but the danger’:
enframing [das Ge-stell] does not just endanger man in his relationship to 
himself and to everything that is. As a destining, it banishes man into the 
kind of revealing that is an ordering [das Entbergen von der Art Bestellens]. 
Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of 
revealing. (Qt, 331–2/30–1)
enframing serves to impose upon being an ordering, a logos, that 
distorts it, misrepresents it, prevents being from being in the way that 
is ‘proper’, or essential, to it. its ordering takes the form of dragging 
being into the orbit of a privileged subject, for whom it will provide a 
‘Bestand’, a ‘standing-reserve’ of energy and economic resources to be 
deployed in its flight from death. in this respect, there is a clear parallel 
between heidegger’s thinking of technology and the theory of non-con-
sumptive production of Georges Bataille. for Bataille, too, the world of 
manufactured objects, or things, is symptomatic of a retreat from the 
futurity of death. And death is indeed what is at stake here: standing-
reserve is accumulated to minimise the possibility of the withdrawal of 
the subject’s lifeworld; to minimise the risk of a future that violently 
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ruptures the stability of the present. heidegger uses the example of 
the commercial forestry industry, which orders the landscape so as 
to be able to stockpile timber for fuel and production. enframing is a 
mechanism for the reconfiguration of time as an economy, that is, the 
subordination of time – above all, the future – to the present, or pres-
ence. it is an economy where the future is made to return to the place 
of identity, the oikos of subjectivity, through a deployment of technol-
ogy that functions analogously to the lacanian fantasy in its suppres-
sion of difference. technology thus sustains the narcissistic, nihilistic 
fantasy of the ontologically privileged subject, by concealing what, in 
Being and Time (1927), heidegger describes as the ontological reality 
of Geworfenheit, or ‘thrownness’, Dasein’s existence as being-thrown 
into the world (Bt, 224/237 [§38, 179]).
technology conceals the being that is ontologically prior to Dasein 
and whose being is presupposed by the operation of technology upon it. 
this is nothing less than the being of the event, or rather being as event: 
the es gibt of Ereignis. heidegger’s thinking of the relation between the 
event and the gift prefigures the work of Derrida and Deleuze on this 
point, although crucially he does not consider the being of temporality 
in terms of the non-presence to which Derrida and Deleuze would later 
attach so much importance – or at least not to the same extent. Both 
time and Being are given, in heidegger: ‘it gives Being, it gives time [Es 
gibt Zeit, Es gibt Sein’ (tB, 17–18/17), but, and in accordance with his 
phenomenological heritage, the gift is also always related to presence, 
making presence possible, even if giving cannot definitely be located 
in presence: ‘Being proves to be destiny’s gift of presence [Gabe des 
Geschickes von Anwesenheit], the gift granted by the giving of time. 
the gift of presence is the property of Appropriating [Die Gabe von 
Anwesen ist Eigentum des Ereignens]. Being vanishes in Appropriation’ 
(tB, 22/22). Where Deleuze is critical of the thinking of past and future 
as dimensions of the present, heidegger explicitly justifies this move, 
noting that ‘absence, too, manifests itself as presence’ (tB, 17/18). 
even absence gives itself in presence. the past is that which is no 
longer present, the dimension that denies itself presence. the future is 
the present that has yet to become present and as such withholds itself 
from presence. these dimensions of presencing and the denial and 
withholding of presence are thus in excess of Dasein. they belong, or 
are rather appropriated, by a fourth dimension of time, the time of ‘the 
giving that determines all [das alles bestimmende Reichen]’ (tB, 15/16), 
which might equally be called the time of the event, Ereignis. Perhaps 
paradoxically, after Derrida’s disarticulation of the gift from any form 
of appropriation, heidegger describes Ereignis as appropriation that 
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is also giving. As giving, it also withdraws in the very moment of its 
giving.
to giving as sending there belongs keeping back [Zum Geben als Schicken 
das Ansichhalten gehört] – such that the denial of the present and the 
withholding of the present, play within the giving of what has been and 
what will be. [. . .] Keeping back, denial, withholding – shows something 
like a self-withdrawing, something we might call for short: withdrawal 
[ein Sichentziehen, kurz gesagt: den Entzug]. But inasmuch as the modes 
of giving that are determined by withdrawal – sending and extending [das 
Sichen und das Reichen] – lie in Appropriation, withdrawal must belong to 
what is peculiar to the Appropriation. (tB, 22/23)
if the present is that which is presently being-presenced and the past is 
the denial of presence – namely, that which is no longer present – what 
withdraws from being given immediately in presence is the future. 
technology is deployed to overwrite the unpredictability of the future 
that the fact of its being withdrawn from presence makes possible. 
As ‘ordering’ (‘das entbergen von der Art Bestellens’, Qt, 332/31), it 
carries connotations of logos and hence chronology, the organisation 
of time into measurable instances of presence that pass homogeneously 
in succession.
to the extent that it grants the future its own mode of presencing as 
withdrawal, Ereignis, the event, stands over Seienden as the cause of 
their vulnerability, exposing them to the excess of the future over the 
present. that is not to say that Sein does not require Seienden, however. 
the later heidegger does away with the ontological difference between 
being and beings, marked out in Sein und Zeit (Bt, 29–35/12–20 
[§3–4, 9–15]), in favour of a notion of Ereignis in which Sein cannot 
‘be’ in accordance with its ownmost essence without the presence of 
Seienden. Whereas Derrida argues that the gift is necessarily annulled 
by the presence of a recipient, heidegger sides with Mauss in writing of 
reciprocity. the event takes the form of an exchange between the giving 
of time and being and the beings who receive and thereby recognise this 
gift as having been given. this recognition, as we shall see, takes the 
form of naming being in language in a way that captures its essence. 
the event of Ereignis is as such fundamentally economic. it is by virtue 
of completing the circuit of exchange that being becomes being and 
man, whose being is defined in terms of language, becomes man, each 
returning to itself via the mediation of the other:
Man: standing within the approach of presence, but in such a way that he 
receives as a gift the presencing that it gives [Es gibt, als Gabe emfängt] by 
perceiving what appears in letting-presence. if man were not the constant 
receiver of the gift given by the ‘it gives presence’ [der stete Empfänger der 
Gabe aus dem ‘Es gibt Anwesenheit’], if that which is extended in the gift 
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[der Gabe Gereichte] did not reach man, then not only would Being remain 
concealed in the absence of this gift, not only closed off, but man would 
remain excluded from the scope of: it gives Being. Man would not be man. 
(tB, 12/12–13)
the reciprocity of this exchange leads heidegger to describe the event 
of the gift as precisely Fug, meaning jointure, or harmony between the 
event and the beings who will shepherd it in language (iM, 171/169 
[123]). But the term again points to the difference between heidegger 
and Deleuze and Derrida, both of whom borrow from shakespeare in 
describing the gift as time ‘out of joint’, ‘hors de ses gonds’ – a phrase 
that would, as Derrida notes in Specters of Marx, be rendered in 
German as ‘aus der fuge’ (DR, 111–12/119–20; sM, 25/49–50).
this emphasis on harmony means that, in place of the explicit anti-
humanism of Derrida and Deleuze, heidegger’s thinking of Ereignis 
contains within it the prospect of reconciliation between time and 
human subjectivity. in heidegger’s residual humanitas, the sovereignty 
once accorded to the subject is shifted on to being, and Dasein recov-
ers some sense of being by existing to receive, or appropriate, the gift 
of the event. through language there exists the possibility of equilib-
rium, or justice, in so far as Dasein bears witness to the presencing of 
the event, where being and beings give and receive in equal measure. 
the presencing of the gift takes the form of a constant strife between 
these two forces of propriation, between what, in his Introduction to 
Metaphysics, heidegger calls the dikè of being (physis) and the technè 
of beings (iM, 169–71/168–70 [122–3]). As fried has recently argued at 
length, this striving, also called polemos, is at the heart of heidegger’s 
‘pre-political’ thinking of politics (fried 2000: 142–8); it also conveys 
the difficulty inherent in Dasein’s attempt to coexist with the event. 
Ansell-Pearson has criticised the contradiction of a humanism that 
‘turns the human into little more than an “instrument”, a mere organ 
of the time of technology, so that mankind is sacrificed on the altar 
of self-withdrawing being’ (Ansell-Pearson 1997a: 153). the default 
position is not one of passive instrumentality, however, but rather of 
an ultimately futile attempt to wrest away the sovereignty of the event. 
Dasein creates a tension within the harmony, the Fug, of the event by 
attempting, in an inauthentic concealment of its own mortality, to take 
possession and thereby curb the prospective intensity of time.
the  G ift  of  the  POLIS
We saw in chapter 1 how Bataille detects in the archaic societies of 
the potlatch a sense of the sacred that has been missing since the emer-
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gence of non-consumptive production. heidegger, too, locates a purer 
form of experience in an age prior to the advent of metaphysics. Where 
Bataille writes of the lost ‘intimacy of the divine world’ (tR, 44/308), 
the loss in modern man of the ability to achieve sacred communication 
with the general economy of life, heidegger writes roughly contempo-
raneously of the forgetting of the meaning of being that coincides with 
the Platonic advent of modernity. in both thinkers, (non-consumptive) 
production and technology feature as respective techniques for the 
avoidance of death and are held responsible for the institution of an 
age of nihilism. the same nihilism leads heidegger to yearn for ‘non-
political politics [eine unpolitische Politik]’, an intervention that would 
escape the ‘laborious business of preserving and asserting [particular] 
interests’, the ‘quarrelling, selfishness and conflict’ that characterised 
the political scene of the Weimar Republic (safranksi 1998: 230/271). 
Accordingly, just as he insists on non-technological Ge-stell as the 
essence of modern technology, so heidegger looks for an essence of pol-
itics that would be pre- or non-political; that would escape the bureau-
cratism of political practice. his location of this essence in the Greek 
polis receives its first explicit formulation in the 1935 text, Introduction 
to Metaphysics, where heidegger differentiates the polis from its habit-
ual rendering as Staat. ‘Rather, polis is the name for the site [Stätte], the 
here, within which and as which Da-sein is historically. the polis is the 
site of history, the here, in which, out of which and for which history 
happens’ (iM, 162/161 [117]). this account is considerably nuanced by 
the time of the 1942 lecture series on hölderlin’s ‘Der ister’, which is 
more deliberate in designating the polis as pre-political:
the pre-political essence of the polis [das Vor-politische . . . Wesen der 
Polis], the essence that first makes possible everything political in the origi-
nary and in the derivative sense, lies in its being the open site of that fitting 
destining [die offene Stätte zu sein der Schickung] from out of which all 
human relations toward beings – and that always means in the first instance 
the relations of beings as such to humans – are determined. the essence 
of the polis therefore always comes to light in accordance with the ways 
in which beings as such in general enter into unconcealing. (hhi, 82/102 
[tM])
As in Deleuze and Guattari, the original question of the political (or in 
this case, the pre-political) refers to beings’ relationship to the excess of 
the event. heidegger’s privileging of the polis has little or nothing to do 
with its status as the birthplace of democracy. What accounts for the 
privileging of the polis is the ancients’ accommodation of a thinking of 
being in excess of the being of man. in line with the identification of 
politics with the inauthentic sphere of the ‘ontic’, heidegger considers 
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the polis philosophically rather than politically, and this entails that it 
be thought aside from any consideration of the ‘calculative’, quantita-
tive enumerations associated with direct voting.
the importance of the passage cited above resides in the positing 
of a relation between the (non-political) essence of the political and 
the event of giving. the pre-political polis is the site of the presencing 
of the gift and it is this presencing of the gift in time that determines 
the relationality of beings to the event. firstly, it is the place of the 
becoming, or unfurling, of history, Geschichte. (the word is chosen 
to resonate with Geschick, destiny, and thereby imply an affinity, or 
complicity, between the various modes of giving, which reveals itself in 
language.) secondly, and in addition to this, the polis relates to time as 
the place where Dasein is opened on to its thrownness, exposed to the 
imminent facticity of its own death. the cause of this thrownness is 
the withdrawal of the future from giving itself immediately in pres-
ence; the future comes to denote anything that does not offer itself 
to experience in representation. to borrow a Deleuzian formula, this 
withdrawal brings Dasein to realise that time is not internal to Dasein. 
Dasein is rather abandoned to, and in, time.
the polis is thus ontologically significant because it exposes Dasein 
to an event in excess of its dominion, because it precedes the subordina-
tion of the event to the technical domination of the subject. Rather than 
an oikos, a place of comfort and security, it is a name for the site of 
Dasein’s abandonment, of the originary experience of time as the time 
of death, the withdrawal from presence that threatens the economy 
of self-identity. Another way of saying this, provisionally, is that, 
rather than a Heim, the polis is the site of an unheimlich excess that 
exposes Dasein to Dasein’s own homelessness, Unheimischkeit (hhi, 
59–75/73–87).
however, it is crucial to heidegger’s argument that the Greek polis 
is not the site of technological nihilism. Rather than succumb to inau-
thenticity, the challenge, as heidegger sees it, is for Dasein to accept 
the constitutive Unheimischkeit of the polis, and accordingly to affirm 
the mortality to which it is exposed. Another way of saying this is that, 
for heidegger, Unheimischkeit is not simply originary. there is also the 
ontological prospect of a Heimat and a homecoming, Heimischwerden, 
to be revealed and reappropriated in the unconcealment of the essence 
of the polis. in other words, in spite of his critique of privileged sub-
jectivity, heidegger continues to affirm the possibility of recuperating 
the event as an ontological ground. What he rejects is not the idea of 
a ground per se, but the conflation of the ground with the cartesian 
cogito. Being-as-one with the origin is achieved by surrendering the 
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conceit of the sovereign subject in favour of becoming a shepherd to the 
sovereignty of the event.
heidegger does not himself employ the term oikos, but he does con-
sider hestia, which has the same connotations of hearth and home, as 
a site that exists in harmony and is moreover explicitly identified with 
the polis. translating hestia by der Herd, he writes: ‘the hearth is the 
site of being-homely [Der Herd ist die Stätte des Heimisch-seins]’ (hhi, 
105/130); Stätte, of course, is also the word he uses to translate polis. 
it is perhaps significant that hestia, according to Greek mythology, 
is the daughter of chronos, the god Deleuze explicitly identifies with 
the economic structure of time. Doubly significant is the traditional 
opposition of hestia to hermes. the latter god is characterised by 
the traits of flight and theft, the vol that Deleuze explicitly attaches to 
the don of repetition in the event. By positing a ground that is prior to the 
ungrounding, hence arguably aneconomic effect of the polis, heidegger 
reinscribes being within a restricted and ultimately symbolic economy:
hearth is the word for being [. . .]. Being is not something that is actual, but 
that which determines what is actual in its potential for being, and deter-
mines especially the potential for human beings to be; that potentiality for 
being in which the being of humans is fulfilled: being unhomely in becoming 
homely [das Unheimischsein im Heimischwerden]. such is our belonging to 
being itself. What essentially prevails as being is never beings or something 
actual and therefore always appears as a nothingness that can only be said 
in poetizing or thought in thinking [wie das Nichts, das kann nur im Dichten 
gesagt oder im Denken gedacht werden]. (hhi, 120/150 [tM])
Beistegui notes that ‘the polis was also, and possibly more so than 
the domestic home, considered as providing one with a genuine sense 
of place: the homeland, the Heimat’ (Beistegui 2003: 161). indeed, 
more than just another name for the restricted domestic economy, 
hestia is given as a name for being as such. the same claim is reiter-
ated throughout heidegger’s writings, including notably the 1947 text, 
Letter on Humanism (Brief über den Humanismus), where he writes: 
‘the homeland [Heimat] of this historical dwelling is nearness to being’ 
(lh, 242/338). if (pre-Platonic) Ancient Greece is characterised by the 
harmonious coincidence of polis and hestia, the Unheimischkeit and 
Heimatlosigkeit of the technological epoch derive from the forgetting 
and abandonment of the hestia, which is to say, the forgetting of being 
as such: ‘homelessness so understood consists in the abandonment of 
Being by beings. homelessness is the symptom of oblivion of Being. 
Because of it the truth of Being remains unthought’ (lh, 242/339). the 
claim hints at a worrying circularity: if homelessness, as heidegger sug-
gests, is actually only the effect of the forgetting of being, rather than 
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what leads Dasein to seek to forget it, then what caused this forget-
ting? But it also indicates a problematic conception of the relationship 
between philosophy and politics, in which the latter is seen to take 
place only in the absence, or failure, of the former. in its technological 
conception, politics is what lives on as the remainder of the forgetting 
of being, a spectre that must also be forgotten, or exorcised, if man is 
to recover the original experience of the polis as the site of the giving 
of the event. Rather than condemn the hestia as a fantasy, heidegger 
designates it as quite the opposite: namely, the site of being to which 
thinking must return if it is to escape the impasse of global technologi-
cal nihilism.
the  RetURN of  the  G ift  of  sPeech
heidegger argues that the path to the essential reappropriation of 
Heimischwerden is to be found in a return to the thinking of the essence 
of technology. By this he does not simply mean Ge-stell, which is only 
the essence of modern technology. What he seeks to return to is the 
Greek concept of technology, the technè whose forgetting made Ge-stell 
possible. in its original Greek sense, technè captures precisely what is 
excluded from Ge-stell: ‘there was a time when it was not technology 
alone that bore the name technè. once the revealing that brings forth 
truth into the splendor of radiant appearance was also called technè’ 
(Qt, 339/38). the modern technological process of forcibly reorganis-
ing being into standing-reserve stands in stark contrast to the revealing 
as bringing forth and presencing of the type encountered in the Ancient 
polis, namely unconcealing (Unverborgen, aletheia). Whereas Ge-stell 
exists in tension with the event of Ereignis, whose forgetting it continu-
ally re-enacts, technè precedes this forgetting and can therefore depict 
the giving of being and time in presence without committing violence 
against the simultaneous giving and withdrawal of presencing.
this movement of making present, or presencing, heidegger also 
calls poiesis, translated by the German Dichtung, meaning poetry but 
also, more broadly, creative invention. Dichtung names the originary 
essence of the technè that reveals itself in language as the process of 
unconcealing the forgotten essence of being:
the essence of art is poetry [Das Wesen der Kunst ist Dichtung]. the essence 
of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth [die Stiftung der Wahrheit]. We 
understand founding here in a triple sense: founding as bestowing, found-
ing as grounding, and founding as beginning [Stiften als Schenken, Stiften 
als Gründen und Stiften als Anfangen]. [. . .] the setting-into-work of truth 
thrusts up the awesome and at the same time thrusts down the ordinary and 
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what we believe to be such. the truth that discloses itself in the work can 
never be proved or derived from what went before. What went before is 
refuted in its exclusive actuality by the work. What art founds can therefore 
never be compensated and made up for by what is already at hand and avail-
able. founding is an overflow, a bestowal [Die Stiftung ist ein Überfluß, eine 
Schenkung]. (oWA, 199–200/63)
Whereas modern technology is rendered corrupt by its imposition 
of a frame around whatever it seeks to bring to presence (namely, 
the subject), Dichtung is the reinstatement of a technè prior to the 
corruption of its essence by metaphysics; the founding of truth that 
allows presencing to take place unconstrained by the imposition of any 
Gestell. Rather than forcefully reconfiguring the being that withdraws 
from representation as standing-reserve, it allows for the presencing 
of withdrawal and concealment. in other words, Dichtung is able to 
affirm the event of being as the double movement of the gift: the giving 
and withdrawal of presence as the strife that constitutes Ereignis; it 
thus becomes the site of conflict between presencing and withdrawal 
from presence. on account of its opening of beings on to the event, lan-
guage is more than ‘a kind of communication’, a mechanism for ‘verbal 
exchange and agreement’ (oWA, 198/61). it serves ontologically to 
give expression to being beyond beings, the originary polemos between 
physis and technè, earth and world, concealment and the unconceal-
ing of that which withdraws from presence. Poiesis in other words 
repeats the originary technical structure of the event, and is as such to 
be identified with the polis. there is a polis because there is language, 
because language opens the horizons for an encounter with the event. 
Repeating the earlier claim that modern technics is ‘die Gefahr’, ‘the 
danger’, heidegger now affirms hölderlin’s description of language as 
‘das Gefährlichste’, the ‘most dangerous’ of gifts (hhG, 61), the site 
of a repetition that harbours the potential for an encounter with the 
gift, and yet also, at the other extreme, facilitates its denial. if language 
creates the polis, it also makes possible the politics through which we 
lose sight of it.
language is the originary repetition of a gift that does not precede 
but is rather inaugurated as repetition. for heidegger, the concept 
of the gift is as closely linked to repetition as it is for the other post-
Nietzschean thinkers of repetition and the work it does for him prefig-
ures its role in the (post-)structuralisms of lacan, Deleuze and Derrida. 
Despite this, heidegger is one of, if not the only thinker under discus-
sion explicitly to reject Nietzsche’s eternal return. in both his Nietzsche 
lectures (1939) and another set of lectures dating from 1951–2, deliv-
ered and (posthumously) published under the title of What Is Called 
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Thinking (Was heisst Denken?), heidegger dismisses the idea of eternal 
return as ‘eine phantastiche Mystik’, a fantastical mysticism, the ulti-
mate and highest expression of Western technological metaphysics. 
the act of willing backwards, of affirming all that has come to pass 
as a condition of becoming who one is, discloses the highest sense in 
which Dasein has sought to become coextensive with being as such, 
subordinating the time of the event to the identity of an overarching 
subject: ‘the essence of modern technology will come to light as the 
steadily rotating recurrence of the same [Wiederkehr des Gleichen]’ 
(Wct, 109/112 [tM]). Where Nietzsche writes of repeating the same, 
heidegger, anticipating Deleuze et al., is only interested in a repetition 
of difference (even if he ultimately does not go far enough in repeating 
difference, collapsing back into the repetition of essential identity and 
the return of propriety). it is by means of differential repetition – the 
repetition of what falls outside the dominant history of metaphysics 
– that heidegger thinks it possible to reintroduce novelty and thereby 
overturn the technologically exhausted paradigm of modernity. crucial 
to note, in this respect, is that the repetition of the Greek origin requires 
us to go further than the Greeks themselves did, raising to the level of 
consciousness – of language – what was for them merely implicit. like 
the theorisations of repetition that would follow, it is not so much a 
simple repetition of the past as a repetition from the future, a rupture 
that breaks with the chronological order of things: ‘whenever there 
is a beginning – a thrust enters into history; history either begins or 
starts over again’ (oWA, 201/64). Dichtung is the site of an excess, an 
overflowing, singular repetition that displaces the past in the giving, 
the Schenken, of itself. heidegger’s choice of the word Stiften, meaning 
(charitable) donation or bestowal, allows him to incorporate the three 
actions of giving, grounding and beginning in a single operation. the 
gift is not the disclosure of something that has always already been 
given, but rather what gives itself excessively each time anew, a rep-
etition that grounds itself and in so doing clears away what has gone 
before. By repeating the heimlich, or oikéotes, structure of the event in 
a way that conveys the strife between giving and withdrawal, language 
emerges as the site of homecoming. ‘thus language is at once the house 
of Being [Haus des Seins] and the home of human beings’ (lh, 262/561 
[192]).
commenting on this, and in a formulation that closely recalls lacan’s 
‘gift of speech [don de la parole]’, lacoue-labarthe succinctly notes how 
heideggerian being ‘gives itself originarily as the gift of language [don 
de la langue]’ (lacoue-labarthe 1989: 194 [not included in the english 
edition]). this should not, however, be equated with the lacanian 
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thinking of the same expression. Where heidegger’s gift of language 
‘brings Being to beings from out of their Being’ (oWA, 202/63 [tM]), 
for lacan, ‘the word is the murder of the thing’ (e, 261–2/318), which 
sacrifices the real, replacing it with a performatively enacted fantasy of 
reality. Repetition occurs not in the füglich presencing of language, but 
in the nachträglich return of the real. there is thus an implicit critique 
of heidegger in lacan, though it is perhaps not enough to defend lacan 
against criticisms that were also levelled against the former. We saw in 
chapter 2 how the lacanian reworking of eternal return as a return of 
the real to the same place, via the autarkic circulations of the libido, 
leads to the accusation that lacan excludes political, understood as a 
form of relationality, by regrounding the subject in its suspension from 
the self-identity of the drive. A similar problem is inherent in heidegger, 
albeit with more immediately devastating consequences.
NAZIONALSOZIALISMUS  AND the  Pol it ics  of 
RePet it ioN
this prospect of history beginning over, breaking free from its destitu-
tion by metaphysics, has led Beistegui to speak of a ‘politics of repeti-
tion’ in heidegger, and more decisively to pose the question of whether 
‘beyond heidegger’s own political errancy [. . .] genuine repetition might 
not be thought as a political alternative to revolution, whether the very 
temporality of repetition is not such as to have from the start opened 
onto another relation to praxis altogether’ (Beistegui 2003: 60). the 
reference to political errancy is to heidegger’s arguably short-lived but 
immensely controversial Nazism, manifest in his appointment, in April 
1933, to the rectorate of freiburg University. heidegger would hold 
the position of Rektor-Führer for less than a year, resigning in protest 
at hitler in April 1934, but his commitment to the Nazi cause over this 
period is borne out in a number of explicitly pro-hitlerian speeches, 
replete with the Nazi rhetoric of the Volk and Führung. this rhetoric 
would also live on after the resignation. Written in 1935, Introduction 
to Metaphysics, for example, describes the ‘innere Wahrheit und Größe’, 
‘the inner truth and greatness’, of Nazionalsozialismus, ‘(namely the 
encounter between planetary technics and contemporary man)’ (iM, 
213/208 [152]). the citation needs to be qualified: its context makes it 
clear that heidegger is differentiating the inner, ontological potential of 
Nazism from its ‘ontic’ manifestation in an ideology of biological and 
racial superiority of which he is unreservedly dismissive. the passage 
could therefore be read as ‘what was, in the circumstances, a daring 
critique of many aspects of Nazism’ (Young 1997: 2), but for the fact, 
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as Žižek notes, that ‘heidegger never speaks of the “inner greatness” 
of, say, liberal democracy’ (Žižek 1999: 13). elsewhere, the work of 
Alexander Garcia Düttmann on heidegger’s thinking of ‘Germania’ has 
shown how heidegger believed the German Volk to occupy a histori-
cally privileged and unique position for the receipt and repetition (the 
repetition in receipt) of the gift of the Greek sending (Düttmann 2002: 
152–3, 170–2/154, 170–4).
the explicit references to Nazism disappear from heidegger’s work 
toward the end of the 1930s, though it has been argued that the shift is 
more a change in rhetorical register than a genuine renunciation of the 
ideas that led him toward National socialism (Bambach 2003). lacoue-
labarthe is in agreement with Bambach, observing that heidegger’s 
centripetal language of the Heimat and Heimischwerden remains highly 
significant in his later writings, even undergoing a ‘certain accentua-
tion’ (RP, 63). Unlike some commentators, however, lacoue-labarthe 
does not regard Nazism as an inevitable culmination of heidegger’s 
philosophy, contaminating it to the extent that it ‘loses all greatness’ 
(lyotard 1990: 53/90). he does not attempt what one critic calls a 
‘de-Nazification of heidegger’ (Young 1997: 1), nor does his interest 
in heidegger stretch only to diagnosing the philosophical causes of 
Nazism (fried 2000: 137–8). in spite of the furore caused by the so-
called ‘heidegger affair’, lacoue-labarthe – like Derrida, Deleuze and 
Guattari – is interested in what caused heidegger to collapse back from 
radicality into a fundamental economism. he affirms that there are ele-
ments of radicality, or aneconomy, in heidegger’s concept of repetition, 
but laments how their radical potential is compromised by the economy 
of what is to be repeated: namely, essence. the difficulty of this is 
captured succinctly by lacoue-labarthe’s influential essay, ‘finite 
transcendence ends in Politics’ (‘la transcendance finie/t dans la poli-
tique’), which concludes with the assertion that there is ‘a fundamental 
mimetology at work in heidegger’s thought’ (lacoue-labarthe 1989: 
297/170). in other words, heidegger’s personal and conceptual engage-
ment with politics and the political is overdetermined by the question 
of identification and the search for an ontological ground. Another way 
of saying this is that the gift, heidegger’s event of Ereignis, remains 
inscribed within an oikos, torn asunder by its reluctance to bear the risk 
of thinking aneconomically (Beistegui 1998: 145).
RePeAt iNG  RePet it ioN
the prospect that heidegger’s Nazism stems from a residual econo-
mism, an insufficient thinking of the gift as aneconomic, opens us on to 
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the greatest weight of what is at stake in the decentring of the subject of 
politics and the unfurling, in its place, of the event. indeed, if a politics 
of the gift is a politics of eternal return, of coming to terms with the 
ungrounding event of a giving that exceeds our ability to recognise it as 
such, we might ask whether the project of trying to think the political 
aneconomically is not inherently compromised, destined at every level 
to abandon the subject yet ultimately collapse back into another form 
of restricted economy, in which the privileged sovereignty of the subject 
returns under another name. Recalling Deleuze’s analysis of habitus as 
a defence mechanism against the revolutionary power of difference, 
it is as if – and in this respect heidegger recalls hegel, who also saw 
the home as a place of respite from the brutality of the market (ePR, 
222–5/343–5 [§185]) – a reactionary heidegger clings to the oikos as a 
sanctuary from the uncertainty, the ungrounding effect of a technologi-
cal future. Derrida has noted how heidegger slips between the language 
of the ghost, the spectrality that haunts the polis, and the Romantic 
language of Geist, suggesting that the turn toward Nazism occurs in 
the shadow of an inability to escape the centripetal logic of the latter 
(Derrida 1989: 98–9/126–8). the problem, as Jean-françois lyotard 
has noted, is that: ‘the oikos in the Greek tradition [. . .] is not, and i 
insist on this, the place of safety. the oikos is above all the place of 
tragedy. [. . .] tragedy is not possible outside this ecologic or ecotragic 
framework’ (lyotard 1993b: 97). the oikos is tragic because it poses 
as a sanctuary from the greatest weight of an event that it cannot ulti-
mately resist. to realise this, to accept the impossibility of appropriat-
ing identity through and as Heimischwerden, is to overcome tragedy, 
or at least to affirm its inevitability. A politics of the gift is not simply 
prescriptive in this respect. Rather than advocate the actualisation of a 
new order, it discloses the absence of any instantiable, superior reality 
in which identity could be grounded and politics thereby sublated, 
obviated by the advent of a transcendent, foundational truth. in spite 
of his attempts to re-engage with and repeat the age of tragedy, the 
ultimately ungrounding effect of repetition is precisely what heidegger 
failed to see. it is on account of this failure, and owing to his inability 
to repeat the classical tragic gesture of learning from his mistakes, that 
lacoue-labarthe insists heidegger ‘is precisely not tragic’ (RP, 79).
the attempt to learn from heidegger’s mistakes, to reinstate tragedy 
into politics, could well be posed as a mission statement for the 
Centre de recherches philosophiques sur le politique (cRPP), a project 
founded, in 1980, by Philippe lacoue-labarthe and Jean-luc Nancy in 
response to an essay published, in Margins – Of Philosophy (1972), by 
Jacques Derrida. the essay, entitled ‘the ends of Man’ (‘Les Fins de 
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l’homme’), would serve as the point of departure for a 1980 conference 
of the same name, held at cérisy-la-salle. the subject of both essay 
and conference was the need for an end to the ‘anthropologism’ of the 
Western ‘oikonomia’ of philosophy (M, 133–4/161), an economy in 
which, up to and including heidegger, man has been construed tele-
ologically, in terms of the appropriation of a metaphysically determined 
destiny. in light of the culmination of this in Nazism and stalinism, 
Derrida calls not only for a decoupling of the subject from the teleo-
logical, but also for philosophy to awaken itself to the unavoidable fact 
that: ‘every philosophical colloquium necessarily has a political signifi-
cance’ (M, 111/131). set up, in response to this, to explore this ques-
tion of the relationality between politics and (the metaphysics of) the 
subject, the cRPP would also become the site of an attempt to repeat 
the heideggerian repetition of the Greek polis, to surpass the hegemony 
of the oikos by tracing the impasse of thought to its abyssal, impossible 
limit. the repetition, it will be argued, is implicitly Deleuzian, both in 
its rejection of the politics of identity and in its emphasis on repetition 
as a process of ungrounding. Contra Bataille, lévi-strauss and lacan, it 
is also Deleuzian on account of an ‘insistence on the philosophical’, its 
refusal to relinquish the priority of philosophy ‘faced with the almost 
undivided domination of anthropology’ (RP, 109; RJ, 14). Against the 
putative criticism that heidegger’s impasse results from his dismissal of 
the ontic – his dismissal of the anthropological and political sciences – 
and the instrumentality of his reworked humanism, lacoue-labarthe 
and Nancy argue the contrary: namely, that the problems actually stem 
from an excess of anthropology.
According to lacoue-labarthe and Nancy, it has become necessary 
to recognise what they refer to as: ‘a certain completion of the politi-
cal [accomplissement du politique], or to use another lexicon, [. . .] of 
the closure of the political [la clôture du politique]. What we mean by 
this is not unrelated [n’est pas sans rapport] to what heidegger [. . .] 
attempted to think under the question of technology’ (RP, 110; RJ, 
15). the ambiguity of the double negative raises the question of just 
how much proximity this ‘not unrelatedness’ entails: all the more so 
given heidegger’s own reduction of politics to technology. indeed, it 
is tempting to think that heidegger’s claim, made in the 1954 essay, 
‘overcoming Metaphysics’, that ‘the world of completed metaphysics 
can stringently be called “technology” ’ (oM, 74/80), lies at the heart 
of lacoue-labarthe and Nancy’s thinking of the political, and that it is 
in terms of this completion of metaphysics that politics and a supposed 
‘end’ of politics must also initially be thought. When they say that 
politics has become exhausted, what they mean is that being has been 
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enframed by the metaphysics of the modern subject to the point where 
every other possibility of revealing or interacting with the world has 
been foreclosed. Politics has entered into crisis because it is unable to 
think itself beyond ‘what is deployed in the modern age as the qualifi-
cation of the political by the subject (and of the subject by the political)’ 
(RP, 110; RJ, 15). it is entrapped, that is to say, in the paradigm of sub-
jectivity, unable to disarticulate itself from the ever implicit presupposi-
tion of a self-transparent oikos of sovereignty. the result is an impasse:
What completes itself (and does not cease to complete itself) is the great 
‘enlightened’, progressivist discourse of secular or profane eschatology, and 
that is to say the discourse of the re-appropriation of man in his human-
ity, the discourse of the actualisation of the genre of the human. (RP, 111; 
RJ, 16)
this is true even of heidegger, who, they suggest, remains caught up in 
a thinking of the oikos and presence, despite his substitution of Dasein 
for the subject. We find in the ‘closure of the political [clôture du poli-
tique]’ an apocalyptic vision of ideals that have become monstrous 
and totalitarian; history, philosophy, anthropology and politics – each 
one having become another name, a non-identical synonym, for what 
heidegger means by metaphysics, or technology – play themselves 
out in such a way that they can do no more than repeat the gesture 
of their own end, their own ‘completion’. in contrast to the idea of a 
repetition of difference that exceeds subjectivity, we are confronted 
in heidegger by an eternal return stripped of its difference, where the 
present is haunted by a presence that refuses to acknowledge its own 
non-existence; where the future is foreclosed because it remains unable 
to escape – to exorcise – the fantasy of presence, tied in turn to an 
emancipatory politics of subjectivity in which man re-appropriates his 
alienated essence from whatever obstacles or resistances (capital, tech-
nology) stand in his way.
What lacoue-labarthe and Nancy see as having reached a point of 
exhaustion is not ‘the political’, le politique, but ‘politics’, la politique. 
the distinction is absolutely crucial; ‘in speaking of the political [du 
politique] we fully intend not to designate politics [la politique].’ the 
present is diagnosed as a time of ‘the absolute reign or “total” domi-
nation of the political’ (RP, 110; RJ, 15), a time in which the political 
has succumbed to total domination – a domination of the political by 
politics, which is to say the politics of the subject. the totalising philo-
sophical discourse of modernity means that politics has become coex-
tensive with the politics of the subject, to the extent that the political 
(le politique) is forgotten. the la/le politique distinction thus appears 
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to map neatly on to heidegger’s account of the forgetting of being 
through the process of its technological enframing, the domination of 
the ontological by the ontic. following on from heidegger’s project of 
repeating the polis, lacoue-labarthe and Nancy also seek to repeat the 
forgotten site of the event. the title of the cRPP’s second volume, The 
Retreat of the Political (Le Retrait du politique), makes it clear that 
what has ‘retreated’ is also to be ‘re-treated’, which is to say repeated 
(RP, 112; RJ, 18).
several commentators have emphasised this apparent continuity 
of lacoue-labarthe and Nancy with heidegger: for instance, francis 
Guibal, who remarks that ‘Nancy will be, for me, the “lieutenant” of 
heidegger’ (Guibal 2004: 90). Another, simon critchley, has followed 
this line to the point of reading la politique as denoting the empirical 
facticity of political institutions – what heidegger would describe as 
their ‘ontic’ arrangement which, in so far as it fails ontologically to 
interrogate the essence of the political, is not itself ‘worthy of question’, 
in the heideggerian sense of the term (‘fragwürdig’). By extension, 
critchley reads le politique as referring to the heideggerian notion of 
the ‘essence’ of the political, a reworking of the non-political essence 
of the polis, concealed by the totalitarianism of politics, but none the 
less recuperable. there is thus a straightforward translation of the la/
le politique distinction from heidegger’s distinction between the ontic 
aspect, or facticity, of technology and its (non-technological) ontologi-
cal essence as Ge-stell. Just as for heidegger it is the very dominance of 
technology that conditions the forgetting of, and the failure to reflect 
upon, Ge-stell, so the dominance of the facticity of politics leads us to 
neglect the ontological ‘essence’ of the political (critchley 1999a: 201). 
echoing concerns expressed by cRPP member Denis Kambouchner, 
who queries the separability of politics and the political (RJ, 150–6), 
critchley goes on to express deep suspicions about the allegedly 
heideggerian pursuit of an ontological essence of the political, pointing 
to a tension between ontological description and a project (the cRPP) 
that sees itself as a continuation of Derridean deconstruction. he thus 
highlights an important ambiguity, noting that the term ‘essence’ is 
‘apparently employed [by lacoue-labarthe and Nancy] with little 
deconstructive reticence’ (1999a: 201; see also critchley 1993: 74).
the extent to which lacoue-labarthe and Nancy intend their 
notion of the political to carry the metaphysical baggage of the early 
heidegger’s fundamental ontology is none the less open to a radically 
different interpretation. Not only does critchley neglect lacoue-
labarthe and Nancy’s own vocal concerns about the totalisation of 
technology in heidegger, by accusing them of uncritically reinstating 
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the language of a discredited metaphysics, he also underplays what ian 
James has recently emphasised as Nancy’s deliberate strategy of rede-
ploying traditional metaphysical concepts in order to bring about their 
ungrounding (James 2006a: 171). critchley thus neglects the constitu-
tive significance of their retrait of the political: namely, the repetition 
of difference, of singularity, through which they return to heidegger in 
order to move beyond him, to unground him.
the implications of this retrait go far beyond a simple critique of 
heidegger, in that it also enables lacoue-labarthe and Nancy to rectify 
what fynsk has perceived as deconstruction’s ‘ “allusive” treatment 
of the political’ in the earlier works of Derrida, notably in relation to 
Marx and the possibility of a complicity between Marxism and decon-
struction (RP, 96). Despite an acknowledged commitment to Marxism 
on the part of both lacoue-labarthe and Nancy (former members 
of Socialisme et barbarie and the christian socialist Confédération 
française démocratique du travail respectively; RP, 179n3; RJ, 16), they 
argue that Marx too is implicated in the stagnant paradigm of subjec-
tivity: ‘socialism (in the sense of “real or actually existing socialism”) 
is the complete and completing figure of philosophy’s imposition’ (RP, 
110–11; RJ, 16), the last stage in the framing of politics by the subject. 
lacoue-labarthe and Nancy argue that Marx, too, continues to subor-
dinate politics to the (distinctly economic) figure of the subject, with the 
idea of socialist revolution presupposing an essentialised humanity that 
exists to be emancipated.
this indictment of Marx is one that lacoue-labarthe and Nancy 
would subsequently come to regard as hasty, in need of qualifica-
tion, however. Apparently frustrated by members’ descent into an 
‘easily accepted consensus of opinion’ regarding the end of Marxism, 
the cRPP’s co-organisers suspended the centre’s activities after just 
four years, in 1984 (RP, 145). in a letter, ‘Chers amis . . .’, outlining 
the reasons for the suspension, they suggest that this consensus is an 
obstacle to future enquiry into the essence of the political (RP, 146). 
James has also detected a sense of irritation with respect to other par-
ticipants’ reluctance to endorse the broadly heideggerian methodology 
of lacoue-labarthe and Nancy (James 2006a: 167). Accordingly, much 
as their subsequent individual projects are decisively orientated by the 
agenda of the cRPP, their later work reflects an attempt to come to 
terms with some of these criticisms, to elaborate, for example, on their 
relations to heidegger, while simultaneously reasserting a critical dis-
tance from him. coinciding with this period of re-elaboration, Nancy’s 
implicit engagement with Deleuze might be read in terms of the search 
for a way out of this Marxist-heideggerian impasse. over the course of 
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developing an ontology that borrows increasingly from the Deleuzian 
language of singularity, Nancy returns to questions surrounding the 
legacy of Marx, to the post-heideggerian meaning of technology and 
a concept of community that survives the (then anticipated) collapse of 
communism.
While critical of Marx’s ontology, Nancy anticipates the need for 
what Derrida, in Specters of Marx (1993), will call a certain spirit of 
Marxism, a commitment to the goal of overturning alienation, even if 
there is ultimately no essential, ontologically privileged subject to be 
emancipated: ‘it isn’t a question, therefore, of giving up the struggle, but 
of determining in what name [au nom de quoi] we carry it on, in what 
name we desire the continued existence of beings’ (ft, 20/38). the ‘au 
nom de’, ‘in the name of’, repeats the title of the paper and question 
posed to Derrida by lacoue-labarthe at cérisy: namely, ‘in what name’ 
the essence of man might continue to be thought (RP, 63). At stake, in 
other words, is the elaboration of an ontology that, without metaphysi-
cally privileging the human, does not simply abandon it. in response, 
and intended as an alternative to the anthropologism of affording 
ontological privilege to language, Nancy creates the concept of eco-
technicity: ‘from now on, then, ecotechnics is the name of “political 
economy” ’ (BsP, 135/160). this concept of ecotechnicity designates a 
radicalised Marxian account of the world and also contains within it a 
substantial critique of heidegger’s questioning of technology, above all 
of the latter’s construal of technology in terms of poiesis, and the rela-
tion of this essence to politics. According to heidegger, we remember, 
technè is essentially a crafting or production that actualises the essence 
of being in the work of art. Dichtung repeats the Heimat through which 
Dasein, exposed to the excess of being over finitude, finds solace and a 
home beyond the unheimliche Unheimischkeit, or uncanny unhomeli-
ness, of the polis. As a form of repetition, technè is thus still subordinate 
to aletheia, the unveiling of being in its essentiality. for Nancy and, in 
particular, lacoue-labarthe, this configuration of technology as poiesis 
amounts to an aestheticisation of politics. in his 1987 book, Heidegger, 
Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political, the latter argues that it is 
this aestheticisation, with its underlying conception of a return to the 
oikos, that underlies heidegger’s turn to Nazism. in privileging technol-
ogy as an aesthetics, rather than a politics:
this makes an immense difference, in which no less than the essence of 
Nazism – and consequently of the political – plays out. ‘Work [le travail]’ 
has been supplanted by ‘the work [œuvre]’ and in the very same process, it 
seems to me, in the innermost ‘political’ recesses of that discourse, National 
socialism has been supplanted by what i shall call a national-aestheticism. 
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there is a vast difference between the two, a difference in which nothing less 
than the essence of Nazism – and, as a consequence, the essence of politics – 
is in play. (lacoue-labarthe 1990: 53/83)
the weight of lacoue-labarthe’s concern is reiterated by Nancy, 
for whom ‘technics seems to tend to resemble a praxis rather than 
a poiesis’ (sW, 101/158 [tM]). implicit in this subtle distinction is 
the idea that heidegger instrumentalises technics, reducing technè to 
that which works to make presence in the service of being. it thus 
recalls Ansell-Pearson’s criticism, quoted above, that heidegger reduces 
Dasein to a mere cipher, existing for no other reason than technically 
to articulate the event. for Nancy, by contrast, to say that technology 
is a praxis and not a poiesis means to do away with the hierarchy that 
teleologises being and to affirm that technics describes nothing other 
than the way in which existence simply is. Nancy denies that technol-
ogy is an abstract system of expropriation, distinct from and outside 
the subject. it cannot be understood as the means of supplementing or 
completing a deficient subjectivity with a force (technè) that is distinct 
from and transcendent over nature (physis). he thus disputes the dis-
tinction between technè and physis, the supposition that technics does 
something that being cannot:
technology [la technique] doesn’t reform a Nature or a Being in some 
Grand Artifice. Rather, it is the ‘artifice’ (and the ‘art’) of the fact that there 
is no nature. [. . .] so much so, in fact, that it ultimately designates that there 
is neither immanence nor transcendence. And this is why there is no technol-
ogy ‘as such’ [il n’y a pas ‘la’ technique], merely a multiplicity of technolo-
gies [mais une multiplicité de techniques]. (ft: 25/45)
in place of an essentialised, homogeneous concept of technè, there are 
only multiple technics. technical objects are not the instruments of 
nature, but the expression of the very technicity of existence, exposing 
the distinction between technè and physis as a fallacy: ‘the “nexus” 
of technologies is existing itself’ (ft, 24/44). the term écotechnie 
gives expression to a state of pantechnicity in which the oikos is not 
a home or the place of the identity of subjects, but a world of ‘technè 
of bodies’ in which not just tools and crafts, but the very bodies that 
employ them, have their basis in an originary technicity (c, 89/77). 
in place of the symbolic economy of language as the ‘haus des seins’, 
the heideggerian house of being, Nancy turns his attention to the pre-
symbolic forms of (aneconomic) exchange that characterise the inter-
relationality of finite bodies. the ecotechnical interactions of bodies are 
inherently deconstructive, breaking down rather than reinforcing the 
impression of subjective integrity and identity:
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ecotechnics [l’écotechnie] creates the world of bodies in two correlated 
modes: for the projections of linear histories and final ends, it substitutes 
the spacings [espacements] of time, with local differences and numerous 
bifurcations. ecotechnics deconstructs the system of ends, rendering these 
ends non-systematisible, non-organic and even stochastic (except under the 
imposition of the end of political economy or capital, which in fact imposes 
itself today on all ecotechnics, re-linearising time and homogenising ends 
[sauf sous l’imposition de la fin de l’économie politique ou du capital, qui 
s’impose en effet aujourd’hui à toute l’écotechnie, re-linéarisant le temps, 
homogénéisant les fins]). (c, 89/78–9 [tM])
By distinguishing between the originary ecotechnicity of finite bodies 
and the forces of capital that reorganise them as linear and homogene-
ous, Nancy signals both his residual Marxism and that his thinking of 
the body departs from the presupposition of the rigorously individu-
ated, atomised body traditionally ascribed to homo economicus. With 
its emphasis on the individual, the latter is symptomatic of the totalising 
discourse of the subject and the concomitant forgetting of the political. 
Nancy’s turn to ecotechnicity and the technè of bodies thus extends 
the positive aspect of his retreatment, or repetition, of le politique. 
the Deleuzianism of this repetition is conveyed by the reference to the 
non-organic, or non-organ-ised. in suggesting, somewhat elliptically, 
that capital constitutes the upper limit to ecotechnical deconstruction, 
Nancy also reworks another originally Deleuzo-Guattarian thesis, 
to which we shall return in the next chapter. Where Deleuze and 
Guattari’s metaphysics of force allow for a sophisticated reworking of 
capital as a form of life, the Nancian emphasis on finitude disinclines 
him from incorporating capital into his ontology. it would seem to 
be distinct from ecotechnical bodies, able to limit and organise them, 
without being irreducible to them. the result, as at least one commenta-
tor has noted (Wurzer 1997: 98–100), is that capital has something of 
an ambiguous ontological status in Nancy’s work. this persists in his 
more recent and sustained work on capitalism, found in The Creation of 
the World, or Globalization (2002), where Nancy describes ‘a struggle 
between the two infinities, between extortion and exposition’ (cWG, 
53/60). capitalism, he suggests, is a ‘bad infinity’, strictly incompatible 
with the ‘infinite finitude’ of mortal Dasein.
this difference between Nancy and Deleuze and Guattari is reflected 
in Nancy’s reproach of the latter for substituting a metaphysics of force 
for ontology. one wonders whether this ambiguous thinking of capital 
does not feed into Derrida’s concerns that Nancy continues to idealise 
the human by according undue privilege to ontology.
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NANcY,  DeleUZe  AND the  SENS  of  the 
Pol it icAl
there is no longer any polis because there is oikos everywhere [il n’y a plus 
de polis lorsqu’il y a partout de l’oikos]: the housekeeping of the world as a 
single household, with ‘humanity’ for a mother, ‘law’ for a father.
 But it is clearly the case that this big family does not have a father or a 
mother, and that, in the end, it is no more oikos than polis [n’est pour finir 
plus oikos que polis].
(Jean-luc Nancy)2
in their early collaborative period, lacoue-labarthe and Nancy assert 
the need ‘to displace, re-elaborate and replay the concept of “political 
transcendence” ’ (Rt, 193; RP, 130). the assertion is perhaps under-
standable in light of what they perceive as heidegger’s collapsing of 
politics into aesthetics, but would not immediately appear to lend itself 
to a complicity with the anti-essentialism of Deleuze. in the conclu-
sion to an influential essay on Deleuze, the italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben asserts the need to distinguish ‘in modern philosophy – which 
is, in a new sense, a philosophy of life – between a line of immanence 
and a line of transcendence’ (Agamben 1999: 238–9). the line of tran-
scendence moves from Kant to husserl, passing through heidegger 
before culminating in levinas and Derrida. the line of immanence 
begins with spinoza, passing through Nietzsche and heidegger, again, 
on the way to Bataille, Deleuze and foucault. Nancy is not named in 
the diagram, nor in a subsequent essay by smith that, while expounding 
on Agamben’s comments, rightly cautions that ‘immanence and tran-
scendence are both highly overdetermined in the history of philosophy, 
and it is not immediately clear what it would mean to be a philosopher 
of either one’ (smith 2003: 46). Despite following up the reference to 
political transcendence with a corruscating critique of immanence, 
Nancy becomes a perfect illustration of the truth of smith’s observa-
tion. Although highly critical of the ‘closed immanence’ of self-identical 
essences, hutchens has emphasised Nancy’s status as a thinker of ‘open 
immanence’, of being as a shared plurality of differences that cannot be 
conceived in terms of presence (hutchens 2005: 42–52). the invocation 
of transcendence, lacoue-labarthe and Nancy insist, should not be 
conflated with the desire for a metaphysical ground, in the traditional 
sense of transcendence. they write of ‘the exigency of getting away 
from the metaphysical ground of the political, of the transcendent 
and transcendental ground, for example, of the subject’, all the while 
expressing doubts about the possibility of avoiding such a grounding 
2. BsP, 135/160.
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gesture (Rt, 196; RP, 132). to minimise the risk, they invoke the need 
for ‘a transformation of the very idea of transcendence’ (Rt, 193; RP, 
130). the result of this is a reversal in the traditional configuration of 
the relationship between transcendence, essence and ground. in place of 
the heideggerian conception of transcendence as poiesis, we encounter 
transcendence as praxis. the latter pertains to a type of labour that, 
rather than constructing and grounding in the manner of poiesis, works 
by deconstructing and ungrounding the aestheticised myths of the 
subject (and by extension the state) that reign over politics.
in his own sole-authored post-cRPP work on politics, lacoue-
labarthe radicalises the heideggerian distinction between the ontic 
and the ontological by arguing that transcendence ‘ends’ (‘finit’) in 
politics not simply because politics conceals the ontological ground, 
but precisely because it is the imposition of a ground. lacoue-labarthe 
goes on to describe ‘the problem of identification’ – in other words, of 
a being-in-common or a common ontological ground – as ‘the essential 
problem of the political [le problème lui-même du politique]’ (lacoue-
labarthe 1989: 300/172–3). the practice of politics presupposes and is 
made possible by the fictioning or figuration of a ground, a mythology 
that unifies the body politic and conceals the underlying absence of 
pre-given, appropriable meanings or values on which politics could be 
grounded. for Nancy, too, it is this absence of a ground that is tran-
scendent. in fact, he defines it as transcendent simply because it resists 
the figuration of a ground. it is ‘ “transcendence” that no longer has 
any “sacred” meaning, signifying precisely a resistance to immanence’ 
(ic, 35/88). the same claim is reiterated in the later Experience of 
Freedom, where he describes transcendence in terms not of appro-
priable essence, but of ‘being-exposed at, on, and as the limit [. . .] in 
this being-taken-to-the-edge resulting from what has no “essence” that 
is enclosed and reserved in any immanence present to the interior of the 
body [bordure]’ (ef, 29/36). immanence is the name given to politics, 
which is defined by the attempt to figure the privileged narrative of a 
metaphysical origin. in stark contrast to Deleuze, for whom immanence 
is precisely liberation from the tyranny of essence, Nancy aligns it with 
the foreclosure of being in an essentialised ground from which it cannot 
escape.
there is an implicit reference here to the work of emmanuel levinas 
and to the concept of transcendence within the phenomenological tra-
dition of husserl, where the term serves to describe the transcendent 
appearance of objects within consciousness and the transcendence of 
consciousness over the world. levinas aligns immanence with the pros-
pect of an (impossible) and oppressive experience of identity, of being 
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denuded of alterity, collapsed and locked in on itself. this concept of 
identity without subject is of an ‘il y a’ from which there can be no 
escape. the phrase il y a translates the German es gibt, but levinas 
plays on the imprecision of the translation to argue that the experi-
ence of immanence cannot be equated with one of giving or the gift. 
he affirms that ‘there is no generosity in the “there is” [il n’y a pas de 
générosité dans l’il y a’] [. . .] And there is neither joy nor abundance: 
it is a noise that returns after all negation of this noise. Neither being 
nor nothingness. i sometimes employ the expression of the “excluded 
third [tiers exclu]” ’ (levinas 1985: 48/38). levinas thus departs from 
heidegger’s identification of giving with the impersonal event of exis-
tence, a kind of raw givenness that is concealed by the labours of the 
subject. elsewhere, he will also identify the excluded third with politics, 
as if politics were defined by the absence and moreover the negation of 
a generosity that is strictly ethical, or human, in origin (ti, 300/334–5; 
see also caygill 2002: 65). As ‘transcendence’, a ‘breach of totality’, 
it is the exclusively ethical figure of Autrui, the other person, whose 
generosity consists in breaking open the oppressive horror of the self-
identical il y a (ti, 35/24). the most distilled expression of this gift is 
found in the other’s death, ‘something that is wholly other’, which 
is experienced as absolutely ungraspable by consciousness, creating a 
rupture that renders the present non-identical to itself (levinas 1987: 
74/74).
Nancy borrows the levinasian thinking of the transcendence of the 
other over the immanence of pure identity, but significantly corrects 
what (following Deleuze and Guattari) could be regarded as levinas’s 
unsatisfactory assertion of the priority of ethics over politics. he thus 
rejects levinas’s restriction of aneconomic exchange to ethics, the 
‘irreducible relation’ of the ‘face to face’ encounter with the other (ti, 
79/78), in order to rework it as the description of a political community 
that cannot be reduced to the abstract identity of the levinasian tiers. 
like levinas, however, Nancy identifies immanence with a misguided 
fantasy of identity, of the subject as an autarkic ground, which exists 
without need to refer to the other: ‘figure of immanence: the absolutely 
detached for-itself, taken as origin and as certainty’ (ic, 3/16). Broadly 
in line with heidegger, he also equates the philosophy of immanence 
with modernity’s inability to cope with death, which is manifest in its 
attempt to conceptualise existence in terms of discrete, self-identical 
essences. in the age of the exhaustive self-completion of the metaphys-
ics of the subject, immanence becomes another name for what Nancy 
and lacoue-labarthe earlier called the totalitarianism of politics (la 
politique), construed throughout modernity as the discourse of the 
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essence of man. the figuration of man’s immanence-to-self becomes the 
‘general horizon of our time’:
Wherereupon economic ties, technological operations and political fusion 
(into a body or under a leader) necessarily and through themselves represent 
or rather present, expose, and make real [réalisent] this essence. essence 
is made into a work [mise en œuvre]; through them, it becomes a work of 
labour in its own right [devient son propre ouvrage]. this is what we have 
called ‘totalitarianism’, but it might be better named ‘immanentism’, as long 
as we do not restrict the term to designating certain types of societies or 
regimes but rather see in it the general horizon of our time, encompassing 
both democracies and their fragile juridical parapets. (ic, 3/15–16)
the reference to technology in this passage, taken from The Inoperative 
Community (La Communauté désœuvrée, 1986), is to the early 
heideggerian conception thereof, not to the more nuanced thought of 
ecotechnicity, which appears in Nancy’s later writings. immanence – 
no longer just humanism – signals the exhaustion of the metaphysical 
possibilities of man, the limit horizon of modernity. Given Deleuze’s 
reliance on the term, is this to be read as an indictment of Deleuzian 
philosophy as the highest moment in the self-completion of immanence?
in addition to heidegger, the principal recipient of Nancy’s critique 
of immanence in The Inoperative Community is Georges Bataille, 
whom, in contrast to the less centripetal reading of Bataille by 
Blanchot, Nancy suspects of privileging intimacy and an inner experi-
ence of being that borders on the centripetal, totalitarian logic of home-
coming. A slightly later text, The Experience of Freedom (1988), comes 
closer to an explicit indictment of Deleuze by criticising another, more 
explicitly Deleuzian, representative of Agamben’s ‘line of immanence’. 
Nancy parenthetically suggests a continuity between modern concep-
tions of (institutional) politics – ‘the dynamic of powers’ – and Michel 
foucault’s philosophy of forces:
we will at least posit that the political does not primarily consist in the 
composition and dynamic of powers (with which it has been identified in 
the modern age to the point of slipping to a pure mechanics of forces that 
would be alien even to power as such, or to the point of a ‘political technol-
ogy’, according to foucault’s expression), but in the opening of a space. (ef, 
78/104)
the generally acknowledged proximity of Deleuze to foucault means 
that the reference to a pure mechanics of force might be deemed equally 
applicable to Deleuze’s ontology of virtual forces. it is none the less 
thrown into relief by what, elsewhere, Nancy will affirm as his consid-
erable indebtedness to Deleuze.
even if he never refers it explicitly to Deleuze, there is a sense in 
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which Nancy’s critique of immanence repeats the standard criticism 
that Deleuze and Guattari are overly idealistic, that the Deleuzian 
Übermensch, who throws off individuation to become coextensive with 
the Body without Organs, is just another privileged form of the sub-
ject.3 But the criticism seeks to nuance rather than to reject Deleuze and 
does not, consequently, undermine the possibility of reading Nancy as 
an implicit, albeit in crucial respects qualified, Deleuzian. in one of his 
only two short works to date that focus specifically on Deleuze, a paper 
delivered in commemoration of the latter’s death, Nancy writes that 
‘one cannot avoid not sharing with this thought, to a greater or lesser 
degree,’ before going on to note ‘the strange proximity that obliges me in 
spite of everything to take up a fold of his thought’ (Nancy 1998: 115). 
the ‘in spite of everything [malgré tout]’ acknowledges the different 
‘directions’ between Deleuze’s emphasis on immanence and (the early) 
Nancy’s preferred term of transcendence, but also indicates the latter’s 
willingness to negotiate, to attenuate the heuristic distinction made by 
Agamben between transcendence and immanence. Nancy achieves this 
by reworking the concept of finitude within a Deleuzian philosophy 
whose critique of phenomenology means that it contains almost no ref-
erence to death, understood as the limit horizon of subjectivity.
Reflecting the broad difference between philosophies of transcend-
ence and those of immanence, where Nancy differs from Deleuze is 
foremost over the ontological status of negativity: whether it is merely 
a fallacy attributable to the impossibility of representing being’s excess, 
as is asserted in the univocity thesis of transcendental empiricism 
(‘MoNisM=PlURAlisM’), or whether we can speak, like lacan, of 
a (pre-)ontological cut, a rupture within being that renders immanence 
impossible. Alluding to his own emphasis on finitude, Nancy acknowl-
edges that Deleuze and he ‘do not have the same concept of the nega-
tive [pas le même négatif]’ (Nancy 1998: 122) and, in The Inoperative 
Community, he affirms the existence of an ontological déchirure, a tear, 
on the basis of the claim that absolute immanence is logically impos-
sible. Absolute immanence here means being that is autarkic, present-
to-self, essentially ‘without relation [sans rapport]’ (ic, 4/18–19). Yet 
in order to be absolute, Nancy maintains, being would have to be in 
relation to something else, external to itself, against which its own 
interiority to itself could be measured. the necessity of an external 
3. A recent and highly sophisticated version of this criticism of Deleuze and 
Guattari is outlined by Jacques Derrida, in On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy (see 
t, 124–6/141–5). Derrida is also the first to recognise Nancy’s Deleuzianism; his 
remarks on Deleuze and Guattari in this respect are not incidental, but importantly 
inform his critique of Nancy’s ‘absolute realism’.
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measure immediately reinstates being in a relation that contradicts its 
supposed immanence. Paradoxically, ‘the logic of the absolute sets it 
in relation [le met en rapport].’ it is the relationality of existence that 
exposes and ungrounds the absence of relation as impossible: ‘the 
relation (the community) is, if it is, nothing other than what undoes 
[désœuvre], in its very principle – and at its closure or on its limit – the 
autarky of absolute immanence’ (ic, 4/19 [tM]). Relation undoes, or 
ecotechnically deconstructs, the notion of being as immanent to itself, 
a locus of pure identity uncontaminated by alterity and difference. At 
the origin of this relationality is the face-to-face encounter with the 
other (Autrui), whose alterity, fully experienced only in their death, 
creates a rupture on the oppressive self-identity of the il y a, exposing 
us to our own subjective finitude (levinas 1987: 46–8/46–8). Nancy 
borrows his key concept of désœuvrement from Blanchot, who, in The 
Space of Literature (1955), reworks the levinasian thinking of death 
as an impersonal event that cannot be ‘worked’, or aestheticised as a 
constituent of identity. Désœuvrement, for Blanchot, describes the idea 
of being-toward-death as ‘pure beginning’, an inappropriable ‘supera-
bundance’ ‘that can never be realised in a work [qui ne permet jamais 
d’arriver à l’œuvre]’ (Blanchot 1982: 46/48–9). for Nancy, désœuvre-
ment, usually translated as ‘unworking’, or ‘inoperativity’, is charac-
teristic of what precedes and undoes any political attempt to project 
aestheticised narratives of shared identity and teleological destiny 
(ic, 31–2/78–9). As in Deleuze, who also cites Blanchot’s account of 
impersonal death (DR, 138–9/148–9), the activity of unworking the 
synthesis of identity pertains to a multiplicity, or community, of sin-
gularities, whose interrelations resist and countereffectuate any effort 
to subsume them under a totalising logic. As if in acknowledgement 
of a proximity to Deleuze, in his later works, Nancy even deploys the 
term ‘transimmanence’ to describe the coexistence of singularities, thus 
nuancing his earlier critique of immanence (sW, 17–18, 55/33–4, 91). 
Without wishing to dwell too much on this point here, the concept of 
transimmanence is what enables Nancy to think the existence of sens, 
the ungrounded circulation of meaning between bodies. this account 
of sens, given primarily in The Sense of the World (1993), would seem 
to come quite close to the account of sens given by Deleuze in Logic of 
Sense (1969). like Deleuze, Nancy is keen to emphasise the role played 
by the unsymbolisable in the creation of meaning.
in spite of the apparent lexical gulf, Nancy’s transcendent essence of 
the political, once understood in terms of his thinking of a community 
of singularities, arguably comes close to the plan(e) of immanence in 
Deleuze. As a name for the being of relationality that exceeds its own 
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representability, ‘the being-ecstatic of Being itself’ (ic, 6/23), commu-
nity and ecotechnicity connote the virtuality of existence that cannot 
be figured as a unified ground. the Deleuzian framework of virtual 
and actual thus offers itself as a more convincing schema for under-
standing the le/la politique distinction than the heideggerian onto-
ontological binary in which critchley fears that lacoue-labarthe and 
Nancy remain trapped. Nancy none the less perhaps suspects Deleuze 
of not going far enough in his thinking of ungrounding. if, as suggested 
in chapter 1, the lacanian concept of ungrounding veers toward the 
opening up of differences (the symbolic order) on to the pure identity of 
the real, Nancy will side with Deleuze in characterising the sans fond as 
the site of difference and singularity:
it is a groundless ‘ground’ [‘fond’ sans fond], less in the sense that it opens 
up the gaping chasm of an abyss than that it is made up only of the network, 
the interweaving, and the sharing [partage] of singularities: Ungrund rather 
than Abgrund, but no less vertiginous. there is nothing behind singularity [il 
n’y a rien derrière la singularité] – but there is, outside it and in it, the imma-
terial and material space that distributes it and shares it out [qui la partage] 
as singularity, distributes and shares the confines of other singularities, or 
even more exactly distributes and shares the confines of singularity – which 
is to say of alterity – between it and itself. (ic, 27/70)
the language is reminiscent of Deleuze’s description of a virtual plan 
d’immanence populated by flows and distributions of singularities, 
whose interactions give rise to Guattari’s claim that being, or rather 
life, is inherently political: ‘politics precedes being’ (tP, 203/249). the 
claim anticipates lacoue-labarthe and Nancy’s designation of the 
relationality, or partage, of singularities as the essence of the political: 
‘the so-called “question of the relation” remains in our eyes the major 
question; it is perhaps even, as such, the question of the essence of the 
political’ (Rt, 133; RP, 197). elsewhere, in another rare footnote on 
Deleuze, Nancy affirms that his own use of the term singularity coin-
cides considerably with the former’s descriptions of singularity as an 
‘ideal event’, ‘essentially pre-individual, impersonal and a-conceptual’ 
(ef, 190–1n12/78). this impersonal, pre-individual event of multiple, 
coexisting singularities is what Nancy will call community:
community means, consequently, that there is no singular being without 
another singular being [qu’il n’y a pas d’être singulier sans un autre être 
singulier], and that there is only, therefore, what might be called, in a rather 
inappropraite idiom, an originary or ‘ontological’ sociality that in its princi-
ple exceeds the theme of man as a social being (the zoon politikon is second-
ary to this community). (ic, 28/71 [tM])
Prior to the community of individuals, the originary political commu-
nity is a community of singularities, moreover a ‘community of bodies’ 
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(c, 57/73). Nancy argues that singularities do not exist independently, 
autarkically, but only in multiplicities of ecotechnical inter-relation. 
there is community, the political, in the sense that singularities are 
shared, mutually implicated and determining of one another. Another 
way of saying this is that the relations between singularities are con-
stitutive of the singular as such. to cite the title of another of Nancy’s 
books, ‘being singular’ is already ‘being singular plural’. Nancy 
employs the latin expression partes extra partes to connote the absence 
of interiority ascribed to subjectivity (see, for example, ic, 29/73; c, 
29/27). the community of bodies is composed of ‘parts outside parts’, 
not self-contained and complete individuals, but (Deleuzo-Guattarian) 
flows of, for example, blood and air. Above all, community is an event 
that, in excess of individual experience, only exists extrinsically, as 
shared: the event of, or rather as, exposure of/to the finitude of bodies. 
An emphasis on the shared plurality of finitude is central to Nancy’s 
rereading of heidegger, the core of which lies in his assertion that 
Dasein is always Mitsein; it is by virtue of his being-in-common with 
others that man is singular. in Sein und Zeit, Dasein is constituted by 
its ability to die and only accedes to the authenticity of its own essence 
by actively appropriating death as that which is most proper to it. for 
Nancy, however, death is the singularity that cannot be appropriated, 
that renders impossible any form of the immanence-to-self presup-
posed by subjectivity. heidegger writes: ‘by its very essence, death is 
in every case mine [wesensmäßig je der meine], insofar as it “is” at 
all’ (Bt, 284/319 [§47, 240]). Radically reinterpreting heidegger’s 
infamous claim, Nancy denies that the Jemeinigkeit, the ‘mineness’, of 
death resides in its immanence to the subject, as the highest possibility 
of Dasein. the sens of death resides in its extrinsicity, in the fact of its 
being shared, experienced as other to oneself. Rather than the instance 
of identity, Jemeinigkeit becomes the moment of rupture in which 
essence and immanence to being as such are voided, which ‘implies the 
withdrawal of all substance, in which is hollowed out the infinity of the 
relation according to which “mineness” identically means the noniden-
tity of “yourness” and “his/her/its-ness” ’ (ef, 67/92).
intended to convey the non-self-identity of any concept of propri-
ety and self-ownership, the formulation is ambiguous to the point of 
leading Derrida to worry that Nancy remains caught up in a classical 
thinking of the subject. this risk is of ‘saving, at least surreptitiously, 
the “i can” of my own freedom, of the freedom that is mine, of the 
freedom of the i-myself, indeed of the voluntary-conscious-intentional-
deciding-i-myself, the “i can”, let’s just say, of classical freedom’ (R, 
45/70). one could argue along with ian James here that Derrida wil-
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fully ignores the subtlety of Nancy’s deconstructive redeployment of 
the traditional language of ontology (James 2006a: 148). in another 
essay, ‘finite thinking’, written roughly contemporaneously with The 
Experience of Freedom, Nancy returns to the concept of Jemeinigkeit in 
a way that, irrespective of the heideggerianism of his language, through 
its mention of pre-individuated singularities reiterates the suggestion of 
a proximity to Deleuze:
here ‘singularity’ isn’t simply understood as the singularity of an individual 
(not simply as heidegger’s ‘in each case mine [Jemeinigkeit – GM]’, but as 
the singularity of punctuations, of encounters and events that are as much 
individual as they are preindividual or common, at every level of commu-
nity). (ft, 12/23–4)
if Nancy still clings to heideggerian terminology, it is therefore because 
the je of Jemeinigkeit enables him to refer to both the french je, 
meaning ‘i’, and to the German ‘je’, the time of singularity, ‘this time’ 
or ‘this time just this once [cette fois, cette seule fois]’ (ef, 67/91). 
the translation recalls the ‘repetition once and for all [une fois pour 
toutes]’ of Deleuze and the ‘repetition and first time’ that Derrida uses 
to describe the eternal return of différance (DR, 154/165; sM, 10/31; 
M, 17/18–19). it is here that we also find Nancy’s concept of repetition 
as a reworking of Nietzsche’s eternal return. significantly, his rereading 
of Nietzsche differs from that of Deleuze. Rather than articulate the 
eternal return in terms of exposure to the transcendental experience of 
the ‘beyond’ of the death of the subject, Nancy uses it to emphasise the 
irreducible facticity of finitude, the fact that there is no such beyond. 
there is only ‘the repetition of the instant, NOTHING but this repeti-
tion, and as a result, NOTHING (since it is a matter of the repetition 
of what essentially does not return)’ (BsP, 4/21–2). What circulates in 
this eternal return is not just bodily flows, but ultimately the sens from 
which the I emerges. the I is not a continuous, underlying substrate of 
identity, but is rather continually recreated through these circulations, 
only existing in the instant. Contra lacan, the circulation is not of 
language but of bodies. Sens is not symbolic but pre-symbolic. Nancy’s 
insistence on this point has caused at least one prominent lacanian 
to lament the emergence of the ‘metaphysics of finitude’ as ‘our (con-
temporary) great narrative’, ‘a new Master-signifier’ (Zupancˇicˇ 2006: 
190).4 the retort misses the subtlety of Nancy’s critique of lacan 
(lacoue-labarthe and Nancy 1992: 109–13/113–15; Nancy 1979; 
4. the comment, originally given at the conference ‘is there still a Politics of 
truth?’ (Birkbeck college, University of london, 25–26 November 2005), was 
greeted with enthusiastic approval by slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou.
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James 2002: 125–6), and also arguably fails to account for his recent 
return to the concepts of infinity, in the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ infinities of 
ecotechnicity and capitalism (see also sW, 29–33/51–6). None the less, 
it dovetails with the Derridean suspicion that Nancy is overly reliant 
on the concept of finitude. in so far as there is a Nancian real, it is not 
the paradoxically idealised, singular but self-identical life of the libido, 
but what Derrida, commenting on Nancy, describes as the ‘absolute, 
irredentist, and post-deconstructive realism’ of finite bodies (t, 46/60).
Being, in this respect, is precisely coextensive with beings, nothing 
more than a community of shared finitude, or relationality prior to any 
metaphysical essence:
in this relation, ‘man’ is not given – but it is relation alone that can give him 
‘humanity’ [l’‘homme’ n’est pas donné – mais c’est le rapport seul qui peut 
donner son ‘humanité’]. it is freedom that gives relation by withdrawing 
being. it is then freedom that gives humanity, and not the inverse. But the 
gift that freedom gives is perhaps never, insofar as it is a gift of freedom, 
a quality, or property, or essence in the order of ‘humanitas’. even when 
freedom gives its gift under the form of a ‘humanitas’, as it has done in 
modern times, it is in face a transcendence that freedom gives: a gift that, 
as gift, transcends the giving, that does not establish itself as a giving but 
above all gives itself as gift and as a gift of freedom that gives itself in the 
withdrawal of being [c’est en fait une transcendance qu’elle donne: un don 
qui transcende, en tant que don, la donation, qui ne s’établit pas comme une 
donation, mais qui avant tout se donne en tant que don, et que don de la 
liberté qui essentiellement donne et se donne, dans le retrait de l’être]. (ef, 
73/99 [tM])
the passage returns us to the question of the gift in its relation to the 
political. once again, no longer is it the Maussian concept of the impo-
sition of debt and obligation. Nancy writes of the ‘gift of freedom [don 
de la liberté]’ – the gift of freedom both by and of itself, in excess of 
the representation of the human, which it ungrounds. freedom is prior 
to subjectivity, opening up as the space created by the withdrawal of 
the immanence of being. As in heidegger, the gift is inseparable from 
this countermovement of withdrawal, which conditions the giving of 
freedom as relationality. But whereas for heidegger the gift opens on to 
the previously concealed pre-political being of the Heimat, Nancy’s gift 
is political precisely because behind its withdrawal there is NOTHING, 
because it has no substantial, instantiable existence that could be real-
ised through an arrogative intervention of philosophy in the sphere of 
politics. the withdrawal of the gift ‘aban-dons us’, or gives us up, to 
a spatio-temporality in which NOTHING is given for us to receive. in 
the absence of a ground, there are only singularities, exposed and aban-
doned to their shared finitude.
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Where heidegger affirms the goddess hestia, Nancy affirms hermes, 
the god of theft and flight to whom heidegger opposes hestia. We recall 
from chapter 2 that these very characteristics of theft and flight, cap-
tured simultaneously in the french, vol, are ascribed by Deleuze to the 
repetition of the event qua aneconomic gift. Reiterating his rejection of 
the politics of Heimischwerden and the fixed hearth, Nancy borrows the 
concept of the aneconomic nomad from Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille 
plateaux to describe a spatio-temporal ‘spacing [espacement]’ in which 
neither time nor space is pre-given, but is rather created through the 
excessive repetitions, or interactions, of singularities (ef, 145/187). in 
this espacement, meaning, or sens, is created from nothing through the 
repeated ungrounding of (political) narratives, whose attempts to reap-
propriate an ontological ground (for politics) are condemned to failure. 
the je, the i, comes into existence as that which tries to appropriate 
the Je, the chaque fois of singularity, through the act of naming itself 
as a subject. Yet it is repeatedly displaced by exposure to other bodies, 
which expose the impossibility of appropriating one’s own finitude. the 
attempt at appropriation thus occurs in a space without guarantee. it is 
for this reason that Nancy becomes increasingly reluctant, in his works 
published after The Inoperative Community, to adopt the Derridean 
language of the gift wholesale. Where Derrida qualifies the gift with a 
‘s’il y en a’ to account for the double-bind of there being a gift that would 
be negated both by its receipt and its non-receipt (Gt, 7/18), Nancy 
circumscribes the aporia by writing instead of offering and abandoning:
What takes place is neither a coming-into-presence nor a gift. it is rather 
the one or the other, or the one and the other, but as abandoned, given up 
[abandonnées]. the offering is the giving up of the gift and of the present. 
offering is not giving up – it is suspending or giving up the gift in the face 
of a freedom that can take it or leave it. it is a proposition and exposed as 
such [L’offrande est l’abandon du don et du présent. Offrir n’est pas donner 
– c’est suspendre le don en face d’une liberté qui peut le prendre ou le laisser. 
C’est une proposition, et comme telle exposée].
 What is offered is offered up – addressed, destined, abandoned – to the 
eventual to-come of a presentation, but it is left to this coming and does not 
impose or determine it. (ft, 237–8/185–6 [tM])
existence is not ‘given’, in the phenomenological sense, but is rather 
abandoned, awaiting, offering itself up to naming.
WIEDERKEHR DES  GLEICHES
heidegger, we saw, memorably criticises Nietzsche’s affirmation of 
eternal return as the ultimate symptom of global technological nihilism. 
By contrast, in the opening pages of Being Singular Plural, in a passage 
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that decisively reflects the importance Nietzsche acquires through the 
work of Deleuze, Nancy writes that ‘the thinking of the eternal return 
is the inaugural thought of our contemporary history, a thinking we 
must repeat (even if it means calling it something else)’ (BsP, 4/21–2). 
We are condemned, even abandoned, to the repetition of this thought, 
just as politics (la politique) is condemned to repeat the gesture of its 
own demise, the exhausted paradigm of the subject, stalled by capital-
ism in the final phase of its ecotechnical deconstruction. Deleuze and 
Guattari say something quite similar in Anti-Oedipus, where they argue 
that capital constitutes the end point of universal history – beyond 
which philosophy alone (or, at least, only an overtly philosophical, 
which is to say creative, experimental micropolitics) is able to bring 
about the repetition of difference. As Nancy himself labours to point 
out, it is by no means certain that a grounding gesture can be avoided; 
that the repetition of the political can escape the frame of the subject 
it seeks to supersede. there is ‘nothing but this repetition’ (BsP, 4/21), 
nothing but the repetition of eternal return, of Nancy’s repetition of 
heidegger’s repetition of Greece (which, in its notion of Anfang is also 
a reprise of Nietzsche’s thought, ‘even if it means calling it something 
else’). Unsurprisingly, then, it is far from certain that Nancy succeeds 
where heidegger fails. Derrida’s suspicion that Nancy’s work is shot 
through with a residual self-presence of the subject has already been 
noted, alongside James’s defence of Nancy.
A return to Deleuze re-raises the question of whether Derrida has 
a point (even if he will ultimately also accuse Deleuze and Guattari of 
doing something very similar). At the heart of Derrida’s reading lies 
a critique of Nancy’s transformed essentialism which, despite being 
tied to the ungrounding gesture of désœuvrement, continues to speak 
in terms of touching the origin, suggesting in turn the possibility of 
an originary experience of the human body, prior to its mediation by 
representation:
touching is the very experience of ‘origin’ as ‘singular plurality’. the plural 
singular, originarily, is what finds itself given to touch [ce qui se trouve 
donné à toucher]. the origin could be touched, or would have to be, as – 
and like – touching itself as self-touching [le toucher même en tant que se 
toucher]. (t, 115/132–3)
Derrida makes a similar criticism of Deleuze and Guattari in the same 
work (t, 123–6/141–5). Returning to the latter none the less proves 
useful for an understanding of Derrida’s critique of Nancy. We saw in 
chapter 2 how the body is caught up in a history of inscription. Anti-
Oedipus gives a lengthy account of the history of writing the body and 
of the way that bodies are formed through the mnemotechnicities of 
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inscription. in this account, technicity functions not only between finite 
bodies, but is prior to them, playing a constitutive role in determining 
what it is that gets counted as a body. in the archaic societies of the gift 
economy, it is the body of the earth on which the collective identity of 
the community is inscribed through the gift-economic institutions of 
the potlatch and the circulation of women as gifts. human bodies are 
not individuated, but gathered together under the overarching identity 
of the community through a number of inscriptive practices, including 
tattooing and scarification. in Corpus (1992), Nancy writes of ‘incised, 
ingraved, tattooed and scarred, “written bodies” ’ that ‘ultimately this 
is not the modern body [. . .] exscribed in advance of all writing’ (c, 
11/13). the inference is that these practices serve merely as primitive 
forms of the mythopoiesis to which, in The Inoperative Community, 
he attributes the figuration of an ontological ground (ic, 53–4/134–6). 
inscription is understood exclusively in terms of the production of 
signification, serving the purpose of rendering bodies decipherable to 
the community that appropriates them. We see this in his claim that 
inscription – writing – is in no way prior to the body, but rather that 
which runs counter to it, attempting to create interiority there where 
there is only the exteriority of parts.
Determined to disclose the priority of ecotechnical bodies to the 
symbolic order of signification, Nancy rejects any suggestion that the 
body can function as a ‘place of writing’ (c, 85/76). to inscription, he 
opposes the novel concept of ‘exscription’; the two concepts are fur-
thermore declared to be mutually exclusive, the one being the inverse 
side of the other. once the space of bodies is understood as partes extra 
partes:
the body is no longer anything like a surface of inscription – in the sense of 
a site for the recording of signification. [. . .] Without doubt, the body is [the 
fact] that one writes [c’est qu’on écrit] but it is absolutely not where one 
writes, and the body is no more that which one writes [ce qu’on écrit] – but 
always that which writing exscribes [ce que l’écriture excrit]’. (c, 87/76 
[tM])
the body is not that which is written, which is to say itself the product 
of the ‘technè of bodies’, but rather what makes writing possible as the 
spacing of sens.
there is much in this claim that once again reflects the influence 
of Deleuze and Guattari, not least the idea that writing, as a form of 
habitus, works by means of an economy that ultimately conceals the 
aneconomic event of singularity, eliminating the alterity of the com-
munity of multiple singularities. in this sense, Nancy and Deleuze are in 
agreement that the event, the eternal return of difference, constitutes an 
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ungrounding or unworking of inscription. there is nevertheless a ques-
tion of whether, in his understanding of the event purely in terms of fini-
tude and the mutual exposure of finite bodies, Nancy goes far enough; 
of whether he does not ultimately fall short of Deleuze by privileging 
the ecotechnical body as something that is still prior to the various 
habituses of which the human body is always already a product. there 
is a question, in other words, of whether Nancy’s thinking of the body 
as exteriority is not still marked by an interiorisation of bodily praxis 
against the poiesis of writing, and in turn of whether this interiorisation 
would not thereby re-poieticise ecotechnicity as an ontological ground. 
this absolute priority of corporeal Dasein is what Derrida is referring 
to when he writes of Nancy’s ‘absolute realism’, ‘a sort of absolute, 
irredentist, and post-deconstructive realism’, though importantly one 
that supersedes all previous incarnations of realism in the philosophi-
cal tradition (t, 47/60). But it is also the point at which Derrida pro-
vocatively poses the question of whether Nancy succumbs to idealism, 
surreptitiously regrounding (or reterritorialising) the event in a shared 
finitude that continues to presuppose the integrity of the human body. 
the problem, of course, stems from a deliberate strategy on the part 
of Nancy, intended to bring about the supersession of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s politics of abstract mechanical forces; intended, moreover, as 
a response to the alleged Platonism of the Deleuzian virtual, to the idea 
that Deleuze posits a life of immanence that is somehow (metaphysi-
cally) distinct from its actual instantiations. As Derrida points out to 
Nancy, in a dialogue where the latter is only too happy to accept and 
affirm the criticism, in emphasising the relationality of shared finitude 
Nancy risks privileging a distinctly human political (Derrida and Nancy 
2004: 195–8).
coNclUs ioN
the chapter began by posing the question of whether a politics of 
the gift is inherently compromised by a tendency toward an arroga-
tive philosophical overdetermination of the political, a philosophical 
reconstruction that entails the elision of politics, or its sublation in 
philosophy. heidegger attempts to inaugurate a politics of repetition 
through a return to the pre-political origin of the Greek polis. his 
project, however, is limited by both the fixity of his concept of repeti-
tion and, linked to this, a persistent subordination of the polis to an 
oikos, encapsulated in a thinking of Heimischwerden that ultimately 
domesticates the Unheimlichkeit of the gift. the site of this recuperated 
oikos is language, which according to heidegger repeats the ontological 
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structure of the event; it is in language, more precisely in the naming of 
the Heimat of being, that we make present and thereby receive the gift 
in its withdrawal. Beyond the ostensive, ontic, politics of institutions, 
heidegger argues for a politics of the gift that is a (non-)politics of the 
name. in so doing, however, he reduces repetition to mimesis, to the 
disclosure of what is already there. in so far as the Anfang is defined 
by a gesture of grounding, heidegger’s repetition of Nietzsche’s eternal 
return falls foul of the same problems he sees Nietzsche as commit-
ting, framed by an inability to escape the technological nihilism of the 
modernity he set out to criticise. Nancy, by contrast, locates a more 
originary technicity in the ecotechnical sharing of bodies. Rather than 
a hypostatised excess of being over beings, seemingly endowed with its 
own historical agency, he strips it of any vestiges of destiny, teleology 
and the sacred, reworking the event as nothing other than the com-
munity of finitude, of inappropriable partes extra partes. it is in respect 
of this, moreover, that the event is inherently political. in place of an 
aestheticised being beyond beings, existence comes simply to name the 
relationality between singular bodies; the eternal return describes the 
shifting configurations of partes extra partes, generating sens through 
the movement of vol and don, the expropriation of identity that results 
from the offering of existence. Yet there remain doubts about whether 
Nancy goes far enough in his decentring of the subject; whether his 
attempts to desacralize existence do not merely shift the sacred from 
language to the body in a way that continues to privilege the human. 
We shall see in the next chapter how the ensuing charge of idealism is 
reflected in a tendency amongst commentators to see Nancy’s politics 
as idealistic, ill-equipped to engage substantially with the task of receiv-
ing the gift of eternal return. Much as lacoue-labarthe and Nancy, in 
particular, make considerable progress in redeeming a politics of the 
gift tainted by heidegger, there is still more to be done if they are fully 
to escape the heideggerian tendency toward overdetermination. for 
reasons that Nancy has begun to appreciate, the same will hold true for 
Deleuze and Guattari.
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4. ‘Pour en finir avec . . .’: 
Democracy and Sacrifice
‘the “and” conjoins but never innocently or romantically. so much 
at stake’ (Ansell-Pearson 1997b: 1). At stake, precisely, is nothing less 
than the future of philosophy and politics, an allegedly impossible 
future no longer bound by the strictures of a period, no longer subject 
to the categories and binary oppositions of modernity. in the introduc-
tory essay on ‘Rhizome’ in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari 
assert the need to ‘establish a logic of the and’ in order to ‘overthrow 
ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings’ 
(tP, 25/36–7). the deployment of the rhizomatic ‘and . . . and . . . and’ 
serves to desubstantialise the hegemonic, arboreal logic of the verb, 
emphasising the theft, the withdrawal of substance that coincides 
with the giving of the event. it thus also frees us to trace constellations 
between the supposedly incommensurable: to seek in democracy, for 
example, a lens on to the fate of sacrifice.
expressed through the elegantly desubstantialising ‘ “without” 
without privation or negativity or lack’ of Blanchot and Derrida (lo, 
87/140), the so-called postmodern age of high capitalism might loosely 
be defined as a period without period, a time without time, whose nos-
talgia for the present coincides with its being beyond the end of history 
and the ‘metanarratives’ of modernity (Jameson 1991: 19–21; lyotard 
1986: xxiv/7). there is also therefore an ambiguity of the end, an inter-
minable repetition of the end (Nancy 1986: 15), inseparable from what 
Badiou has called ‘the end of the end of history [which] is cut from the 
same cloth as this end’ (Badiou 1999: 31/11; Badiou 2008b: 9–10/64). 
the latter is also encapsulated in a thinking of phantasm, spectrality 
and a neg(oti)ation of ghosts that live on beyond their apparent demise. 
After Specters of Marx and the spectres of Mauss whose haunting pre-
dominates this work, we now turn to the spectres of hegel-Kojève, who 
diagnosed the end of history, and whose ghosts live on in the appar-
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ent failure of this diagnosis. Given the relation of Kojève to Bataille 
and lacan – given, moreover, the disjuncture between the idealism of 
modern philosophy and the experience of the twentieth century – the 
whole project of a politics of the gift might be seen to follow from this 
failure. following hegel – and to the chagrin of Bataille, who turned to 
Mauss to argue the contrary – Kojève predicted that ‘the end of human 
time or history’ would entail the end of philosophy and the contraction 
of politics into bureaucracy (iRh, 159/435n). Both live on, but in what 
sense and to what extent? the modern subject, the one who, according 
to Nietzsche, ‘is never “through” with anything’ (GM, 39/308 [2§1; 
tM]), has supposedly been replaced by an Übermensch all too happy 
to announce that he or she is through with everything, fully able to let 
go of history and affirm the transitory being of the human. But this too, 
is symptomatic, Nancy suggests (BsP, 4/21–2, which nuances the earlier 
Forgetting of Philosophy [Oubli de la philosophie], 1986: 24). With 
the eternal return perhaps nothing other than a prolonged and inescap-
able meditation on the age of an end without end, without Aufhebung, 
can philosophy and politics amount to anything more than disquisi-
tions on their own end, fundamentally unable to establish whether or 
not they have actually died? in a similar reworking of Kojève through 
Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari invoke the end of history to describe 
the life of capital as the upper limit of the eternal return, the point at 
which becoming succumbs to a historical impasse that is reinforced 
rather than teased open by democracy. Rather than sublated in the 
movement of a dialectic, institutions once thought essential, purported 
to bear a privileged relation to the event, now appear desubstantialised, 
exposed to and by an ungrounding they prove powerless to withstand. 
Democracy, in the words of heidegger, but echoed by those of Deleuze 
and Guattari and, on occasion, Nancy, becomes simply ‘incompat-
ible’ (nicht zugeordnet) with the new forms of life – capital, technics 
– that threaten to surpass the human (heidegger 1993b: 104–5/206). 
likewise sacrifice, which has supposedly disappeared, thrown into 
‘sacrificial crisis or crisis of differences’ by the collapse of the binary 
sacred-profane it was once charged with safeguarding (Girard 1977: 
49/81 [tM]). Philosophy lives on regardless; one could be forgiven 
for thinking that, in its evocation of the event, it absorbs the role once 
accorded to sacrifice.
the task of the present chapter is to challenge the givenness of this 
diagnosis, to question whether – recalling the Derridean logic of spec-
trality – something can so simply be abandoned unto death without 
thereby reanimating it in the very act of abandonment. Drawing on the 
words of Miguel de Beistegui, who notes that sacrifice ‘was never as 
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alive as when at the announced threshold of its demise, never as flour-
ishing as when at its end’ (Beistegui 1997: 159), it will be argued that 
the same can be said of democracy, and moreover that the two need to 
be thought together, reasserted in the context of a politics of the gift 
that is irreducibly framed by capitalism. it is, in other words, possible 
to think democracy aneconomically, as a singularity that exceeds the 
framing of politics by representation. Rather than the site of the com-
pletion of metaphysics, the reappropriation of essence through which 
privileged homines economici would arrive at their destiny, democracy 
need not be thought intrinsically incompatible with the ungrounding 
event of the gift. to see this, however, it is first necessary to transform 
the way it is conceived in relation to a concept of sacrifice that has been 
thought similarly restrictively in terms of appropriation.
this is not to deny that both concepts are deeply problematic, not to 
overlook how, for a certain strand of (post-)hegelianism, democracy 
has reductively been thought a sufficient condition of politics; how, for 
anti-hegelians, it testifies to much that is wrong with modernity, neces-
sitating the equally problematic demand for a sacrificial reconnection 
with the sacred immanence of being. the problem, it will be argued, 
stems from philosophical overdeterminations of both democracy and 
sacrifice, but moreover from a philosophical overdetermination of 
politics. found in Kojève and fukuyama, but arguably also Deleuze 
and Nancy, this overdetermination renders their apparently opposed 
positions complicit in the propagation of a paradigmatically idealising 
hegelo-heideggerianism. We see this in the thinking of both democracy 
and sacrifice too restrictively in terms of mimesis: that is, as instances 
of the negative, restricted repetition of identity that a politics of the gift 
seeks to abandon. Deleuze and Guattari regard democracy as the ‘abou-
tissement’, the culmination or outcome, of the hegelian state and the 
heideggerian Heimat, a reterritorialisation that exists to furnish iden-
tity, to make habitable the deterritorialised oikos of capitalism (WiP, 
98/94). Although he recently and emphatically clarified his earlier criti-
cisms of democracy, Nancy has been similarly critical of a state that 
embodies sacrifice, of representative democracy that, as ‘a kind of last 
sacrifice’ (sW, 90/142), overlaps with lacan’s sacrificial gift of what 
one does not have. Based on readings of hegel, heidegger and Bataille, 
Nancy reads sacrifice as inseparable from the attempt to ‘transappro-
priate’ an ontological ground. Recalling his concept of the political as 
désœuvrement, unworking, there is thus a constitutively chiasmic rela-
tionship between sacrifice and politics, in which a politics of sacrifice 
must always amount to a sacrifice of the political. the disclosure of the 
ecotechnical event raises the question of whether being is not always 
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already sacrificed in being offered: ‘shouldn’t the age of technology be 
understood as the age of the end of sacrifice?’ (ft, 72/98).
By way of a return to Derrida, but with interventions from Badiou, 
it will be argued that the politics of the gift articulated by Nancy 
and Deleuze risks continuing philosophically to arrogate the politi-
cal, because they have failed sufficiently to deconstruct their hegelo-
heideggerian past; because, through these rejections of democracy and 
sacrifice, they go simultaneously too far and not far enough in seeking 
superficially to distance themselves from their respective oedipal 
fathers, and in so doing collapse back into the logic they seek to escape. 
Writing on hegel, in Glas (1974), Derrida suggests ‘the gift can only 
be a sacrifice, that is the axiom of speculative reason’ (Derrida 1986: 
243a/270a). in slightly different ways, both Deleuze and Nancy cor-
roborate this reading, but only at the cost of unnecessarily disavowing a 
more political concept of sacrifice. the effect of this is to risk collapsing 
the gift back into a hegelian logic of theodicy that fails to differentiate 
between sacrifice and the gift; that overlooks the translation of virtual 
into actual, the fatal but moreover sacrificial strategies that govern the 
impossibility of the gift’s receipt in actuality. We miss the possibility 
of reading sacrifice as unhinged from mimesis, an affirmation of the 
excess of the gift and therefore of the impossibility of its appropria-
tion. Understood in these terms, the relation of sacrifice to the sacred 
is not simply one of the performative enactment and perpetuation of 
a fantasy, but rather a creative destruction that is vital to the political 
process, and which is moreover embodied in the ungrounded decision-
making of democracy.
At the heart of the Deleuzo-Guattarian and perhaps also – in spite of 
itself – the Nancian position is the claim that politics is effectively over; 
that revolution, were it possible, would be philosophical or aesthetic 
rather than political. it is here that, in spite of the critique of democ-
racy, we find the paradoxical problem of theodicy, which manifests 
itself in the injunction to submit – to sacrifice oneself – to eternal return, 
to adjust ourselves to an experience of ‘a life’ of the event in excess of 
the subject. implicit in this position is the idea that grace, the gift, is 
already there, but for our inability to recognise it (or rather recognise 
the impossibility of recognising it). We know from previous chapters 
that the gift and a politics thereof coincide with neither the archaic gift 
economy, nor with the type of pre-political, ontological regime envis-
aged by heidegger. could it therefore be that an experience of the gift 
already pervades the capitalist society described by Mauss as precisely 
lacking in the logic of the gift? such an ‘idealised’ position is attrib-
uted to Deleuze by Badiou, for whom the politics of difference serves 
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to legitimate capitalism. for Deleuze, Badiou argues, ‘ “All” ’ is grace 
[‘Tout’ est grâce]’, but ‘to say that all is grace means precisely that we 
are never ever accorded any grace’ (Badiou 2000: 97/142–3). to say 
that ‘All’ is grace is either to privilege sacrifice as a sublime movement 
of (re-)appropriation, or to do away with it by declaring that every-
thing is already given, that there is no need for a sacrificial offering as a 
condition of the gift’s receipt. Politics of the gift becomes synonymous 
with the sacrifice of politics to a philosophy that, in asserting the pos-
sibility (albeit virtual) of having everything, serves only to legitimate the 
prevailing order. Badiou’s rejoinder that grace is still possible – that we 
need not reconcile ourselves to the idea that it has already been given 
– points to a refusal to see democracy and sacrifice as irrecoverably 
enframed by capital, and thereby to his insistence that they continue to 
play a role in the realisation of eternal return. Badiou thus opens up a 
space between Deleuze and the Derridean thinking of the gift, revealing 
his unexpected proximity to a deconstructive position of which he is 
habitually deemed only critical.
in the elaboration of this point, the second half of the chapter returns 
to the later political writings of Derrida to elicit a politics of sacrifice 
that functions as a necessary counterpart to his politics of the gift. 
through reference to a range of Derrida’s late texts, it will be argued 
that Derrida, too, conceives politics in terms of sacrifice, above all in 
terms of a sacrificial decision – a decision about what is to be named 
in the giving of the gift, about what is to be recognised in a receipt 
that serves to destroy, or more precisely to sacrifice, the gift it receives. 
Nancy states that sacrifice is impossible because existence is already 
sacrificed in being offered. Derrida’s more complex claim is that it is 
precisely this offering that condemns us to sacrifice. there is politics – 
sacrifice – because we are abandoned, because the withdrawal of the 
gift from experience compels us to make decisions about what exactly is 
to be received, or named as being given; compels us to offer hospitality 
toward an other whose alterity will be violated, sacrificed, by this very 
act of hospitality. the experience of sacrifice is thus not one of imma-
nence to being, but of the limit of experience, the interface between 
virtual and actual, the event and the subject it ungrounds. to decide is 
accordingly to confront the impossible. it is to experience the absence 
of ground, but immediately to respond to this ungrounding through the 
performative fictioning of new grounds. it is to reciprocate the gift of 
the event with the sacrificial offering of ‘the gift of what one does not 
have’ – and, ultimately, to do so knowing that one does not have it.
Derrida goes on to argue that the decision thus also sustains and 
resacralizes the gift, and that it has the same effect on democracy, 
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understood as a democracy-to-come (démocratie-à-venir) that would 
be another name for the gift. Democracy thus conceals a promise that, 
unlike Deleuze, Derrida refuses to dismiss as irreparably contaminated 
by the imperfection of its actual instantiations; which is moreover 
sacred in spite of its legitimation of capitalism. the promise of democ-
racy – like the promise of the gift – exceeds its framing by capital, 
exceeds the possibility of capture in any habitus. its excess furthermore 
gives rise to a sacred horizon without sacrifice, a horizon in which the 
gift could be received without negation, which would be the condition 
of the (im)possibility of politics: a condition that causes politics to exist 
through the failure, the impossibility, of receiving the gift. But it is pre-
cisely not, for this reason, a sacrifice in which sacrifice is sublated, auf-
gehoben, in a final figure of receipt of recognition. sacrifice takes place 
precisely in order that it not take place, for the possibility of sacrificing 
sacrifice (GD, 66, 70–1/96, 101; Keenan 2005: 135–59), but also in so 
far as it is condemned to failure, in so far as this final act of sacrifice 
could never actually occur.
however much framed by capital, it is here that we come closest to 
an experience of eternal return, to an aporetic experience of the gift as 
ungrounding. the eternal return, in other words, is condemned to do 
just that: to return eternally with neither beginning nor end, without 
prospect of completion.
DeMocRAcY iN  the  AGe  of  the  eVeNt
A decisive question for me today is how can a political system accommo-
date itself [zugeordnet werden] to the technological age, and which system 
would that be? i have no answer to this question. i am not convinced that 
it is democracy.
(Martin heidegger)
We are perhaps living the end of the political. for, if it is true that politics 
is a field opened through the existence of revolution, and if the question of 
revolution can no longer be posed in these terms, then politics risks disap-
pearing.
(Michel foucault)1
We saw in the last chapter how lacoue-labarthe and Nancy rediscover 
the political as a question that precedes all forms of identity and all 
determinations of politics as the ‘dynamic of powers’ (ef, 78/104), 
the brokering of power in the institutions of state (not to mention the 
interaction of abstract forces in philosophies of immanence). there is 
1. heidegger 1993b: 104/206; foucault 1994: 267.
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politics because there is freedom, because existence is not ‘given’, in the 
phenomenological sense, to and in sovereign agents, but rather offers 
itself in an abandonment from which we must subsequently attempt to 
appropriate and name the subject. the attempt always ultimately fails, 
in so far as the subject shifts, is displaced, deconstructed, in the circula-
tions of sens. Nancy offers the name of ecotechnicity to that which lives 
on after deconstruction; indeed, it is ecotechnicity that deconstructs. 
Yet there remain questions over whether Nancy goes far enough in his 
reworking of Nietzsche’s eternal return; whether the eternal return of 
sens does not continue to presuppose a metaphysical integrity of the 
corporeal subject.
in the Nancian – and Deleuzian – politics of the gift, the political 
occurs in excess of subjectivity, in a rupturing of subjectivity char-
acterised by repetition without schematism. in the Bataillean termi-
nology adopted by Nancy, this is, strictly speaking, the repetition of 
NOTHING (rien), where NothiNG refers to the withdrawal of being, 
the absence of metaphysical foundation, that resides in the destitution 
of immanence. the offering of the political is the repetition of nothing-
ness, the finitude of singularity through which finite singular beings are 
thrown into relation with one another. the scene of the political is the 
non-self identical void of being created by the withdrawal of the gift. 
the result is the constant circulation, or repetition, of parts outside 
parts, of singularities differing from one another in the sharing of fini-
tude. Nancy’s condemnation of heidegger’s Nazism has not stopped 
him from repeating the former’s doubts that this virtual sharing could 
be incorporable into actual institutions of democracy. Were we to 
achieve ‘a liberation of the political itself [une libération du politique 
lui-même]’ from the exhausted paradigm of politics, there would be a 
risk, though by no means certain, that ‘it may no longer even be pos-
sible, in the future, to think in terms of “democracy” ’ (ef, 79/105; 
compare sW, 90/144). the ambivalence of the statement is clarified in 
a much later essay, where Nancy proposes ‘ “communism” as the truth 
of democracy: for nothing is more common than the common dust to 
which we are all destined’ (tD, 30/55). communism should be under-
stood here as a community of shared finitude, a sharing (partage) of 
the incalculable and unshareable (impartageable) that ‘exceeds politics 
[excède la politique]’ and cannot be thought in terms of politics, ‘ – not 
democratic politics, at any rate’ (tD, 17/33–4). At the same time, he 
argues, democracy remains an essential precondition of our ability to 
access the offering of existence. Although in practice infinitely suscep-
tible to ochlocratic homogenisation and ‘the domination of calculations 
of general equivalence [. . .] (which goes by the name “capitalism”)’ 
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(tD, 32/59), democracy is ‘first of all a metaphysics and only then a 
politics’ (34/62), an uncontaminable principle of openness to change 
prior to being a kind of institutional organisation. Were democracy to 
be superseded, its supersession would have to be philosophical rather 
than institutional, because its truth lies in its irreducibility to any insti-
tutional set-up.
the position marked out by Deleuze and Guattari is similarly sym-
pathetic to Marxism in principle, again holding back from advocating 
the viability of revolution, while not fully endorsing democracy either. 
they maintain that the democratic state is inherently majoritarian, as 
much in the service of capitalism as heidegger thought it in the service 
of modern technics: ‘if there is no universal democratic state, despite 
German philosophy’s dream of foundation, it is because the market is 
the only thing that is universal in capitalism’ (tP, 106/101–2). in spite 
of heidegger, in spite of the tainting of the gift by Nazism, this position 
of scepticism toward democracy, marked by a reluctance to confer on 
it any kind of privileged relation to the event, is one that many of the 
thinkers discussed over the course of the present work have in common. 
in an essay on the aftermath of 9/11, (the openly communist) slavoj 
Žižek captures the dissident poststructuralist mood by eloquently dis-
missing a liberal democratic centre whose ‘main function is to guaran-
tee that nothing will ever really happen in politics: liberal democracy is 
the party of the non-event’ (Žižek 2002: 151). he has since reiterated 
this point, declaring that ‘democracy is not a sacred word.’2
At the other end of the political spectrum, the neoconservative, neo-
Kojevian, francis fukuyama employs an effective but philosophically 
crude psychological model, based on Plato’s theory of thymos (spirit), to 
argue that democracy alone ‘solved’ or has the potential to solve man’s 
desire for recognition (fukuyama 1992: 333). the claim risks overstat-
ing the extent of our sovereignty, reinforcing the conceit that the event 
can be subjugated to the human, leaving us ill-prepared for the prospect 
of a future over which there could be no control. is this not what is 
at stake in heidegger’s posthumously published lamentation, ‘only a 
God can save Us’ (1976)? the import of the title is that the technologi-
cally exhausted institutions of politics need to be supplemented with 
some kind of understanding of the event. Badiou reads heidegger as 
nostalgic for the sacred, for the resacralization of a world saturated 
by technological profanity (Badiou 1999: 51/58). the return of the 
gods, of some form of messianic ground, would thus be a precondition 
2. opening remarks at the conference, ‘is there still a Politics of truth?’ (Birkbeck 
college, University of london, 25–26 November 2005).
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of the possibility of perfectible government, a necessary supplement 
to the democracy he infamously suspects of being unable to accom-
modate itself to the technological age (heidegger 1993b: 104–5/206). 
heidegger’s comments, in this respect, bear comparison to those of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who wrote memorably in The Social Contract 
(1762) that ‘Were there a people of gods, their government would be 
democratic. so perfect a government is not for men’ (Rousseau 1993: 
240/97). Reading Rousseau through the Nancian emphasis on finitude 
and what he has elsewhere called the withdrawal of god(s) (Nancy 
2001: 7), the allusion to democracy’s end coincides with a renunciation 
of the grand narrative of sovereignty. the implication is that democracy 
should be left to those who can meet its demands or, like the gods, live 
on as a fantasy of the disenfranchised, offered as a consolation for those 
excessively fearful of its absence. Contra Rousseau, the gods need not 
lay exclusive claim to it to be the (impossible) supplement that makes 
it possible; whose withdrawal, moreover, condemns us to a repetition 
that constantly and necessarily courts the risk of collapsing back into 
the tyranny it seeks to escape.
Read crudely, Nancy’s speculation on the end of democracy would 
articulate the incompatibility of his concept of community with any 
form of modern democratic politics. one critic to ascribe this position 
to Nancy is Richard Wolin, who, in a recent highly charged attack, 
accuses Nancy of following Bataille and heidegger in elaborating an 
aesthetic concept of community. According to Wolin, ‘this community 
would be subtended not by the values of social transparency but by the 
anti-conventional mores of transgression’ (Wolin 2004: 164). Wolin is 
right to recognise Nancy’s willingness to take on the shibboleths, the 
‘sacred transcendences’ of Western culture, but none the less absolutely 
wrong in his diagnosis, which fails to consider Nancy’s own critique of 
the aestheticised politics of violence. Above all, as we shall see, Wolin 
fails to appreciate Nancy’s critique of sacrifice, which, by explicitly 
condemning the attempt to uncover an ontological ground through 
sacrifice, effectively rules out the prospect of violently instantiating a 
community that is by definition always already there.
A more serious criticism comes from within a climate that is more 
broadly receptive to deconstruction. Where Wolin attacks Nancy for 
according an excessively privileged role to violence in politics, another 
critic takes him to task for understating it, for refusing to abandon 
a fantasy of political purity. Nancy fraser has argued that lacoue-
labarthe and Nancy’s concept of the political, le politique, implic-
itly still borders on a totalitarian philosophical overdetermination, 
which excludes the material reality of politics. in fraser’s view, just as 
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heidegger’s notion of the polis could not readily accommodate existing 
political institutions, so lacoue-labarthe and Nancy loftily and even 
puritanically cling to the hope of ‘a philosophical interrogation of the 
political which somehow ends up producing profound, new, politically 
relevant insights without dirtying any hands in political struggle’ (fraser 
1984: 149). like heidegger, lacoue-labarthe and Nancy’s insistence 
on ‘purity’ (fraser’s term) sees them ‘maintain the rigorous exclusion 
of politics, and especially of empirical and normative considerations’, 
from the political. this means that they ironically elide precisely what it 
means to be political: namely, immersion in the daily grind of empirical 
reality and the contestation of incommensurable values (fraser 1984: 
149). her complaint is echoed by a later article from simon critchley, 
who reiterates his earlier suspicions of the cRPP founder-members’ 
excessive heideggerianism. for critchley, the attempted isolation of an 
essence of the political from the empirical state of institutional politics 
amounts to ‘an exclusion of politics itself, if by the latter one under-
stands an empirical and contingent field of antagonism, conflict and 
struggle, the space of doxa’ (critchley 1993: 84). for both critics, the 
result is an impasse; lacoue-labarthe and Nancy’s critique is unable 
to effect any kind of intervention or translation into the operations of 
politics and political institutions, condemning their philosophical work 
to impotence and, worse, ideology. Despite their explicit aims to the 
contrary, the political is reduced to a spectre, an idealised phantasm 
that passes through without ever quite making contact with political 
praxis.
some ten years later, Derrida will say much more on the politics of 
spectrality, and will do so moreover in the context of an engagement 
with Marxism. Writing in 1984, however, fraser views the cRPP as 
exemplary of Derrida’s failure vis-à-vis Marx, highlighting the lacuna 
to which he later responds. According to fraser, lacoue-labarthe and 
Nancy’s
programme for rethinking the political from the standpoint of deconstruc-
tion [. . .] is a programme which, in its purity and rigor, is far more faithful 
to the spirit of Derrida’s work than the latter’s own comparatively simplistic 
leftist remarks at cérisy. But it also – indeed, therefore – reveals all the more 
starkly the limitations of Derrideanism as an outlook seeking to confront the 
political. (1984: 142)
the remarks in question refer to comments made by Derrida during 
the aforementioned conference on ‘the ends of Man’, at cérisy-la-
salle, in 1980, where he justified his oft-criticised lack of engagement 
with Marxism by stating that he did not want his rejection of Marx’s 
ontology to undermine the potential of Marxism as a force for  political 
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change (1984: 133). fraser believes Derrida to be guilty of shirking 
confrontations, of using ontological undecidability as an excuse to sit 
on the fence and avoid an engagement with radical politics. if so, then 
lacoue-labarthe and Nancy rearticulate this tacit avoidance – or retrait 
– as the very meaning of politics. she calls on them to join the struggles 
that define contemporary politics: for instance, the feminist fight at the 
front between polis and oikos, waged in order to repoliticise the family 
by casting off the immunity of the private from the gaze of the public 
sphere. such an engagement, however, is already implicit in their posi-
tion, which does not so much avoid struggle as avoid subordinating it 
to a grounding figure of subjectivity. Derrida is more explicit on this 
point, drawing on ‘at least one of the spirits of Marx or Marxism’ to 
produce a ten-point manifesto for political action. At the heart of this 
manifesto, he advocates the creation of a ‘new international’ to fight, 
amongst other things, against the global arms trade, third-world debt, 
interethnic conflict and the protectionism of first-world governments 
(sM, 81–3/134–8). Again, however, Derrida stops short of advocating 
full-scale revolution. like the gift, for which it is effectively another 
name, the new international is defined by the impossibility of its iden-
tification, as a futural promise whose existence is virtual, inconceivable 
in terms of the ‘ontic’ categories of politics:
it is an untimely [intempestif] link, without status, without title, and without 
name, barely public even if it is not clandestine, ‘out of joint’, without 
coordination, without party, without country, without national commu-
nity (international before, across, and beyond any national determina-
tion), without co-citizenship, without common belonging to a class. (sM, 
85/141–2)
clearly eager to avert the (predictable) accusation that he promotes a 
hollow, stripped-down Marxism, Derrida appears deliberately to avoid 
the typically deconstructive formulation terry eagleton derisively calls 
‘Marxism without Marxism’ (eagleton 1999: 86). this has not stopped 
Žižek, amongst others, from hastily judging him to be complicit in the 
liberal democratic avoidance of the real, a ‘politics without politics’ 
that refuses revolution while clinging to a consolatory ‘promise’ of 
its virtual conceivability (Žižek 2003: 140–1; see also Ahmad 1999: 
104–8).
A similar brand of arevolutionary Marxism pervades the work 
of Deleuze and Guattari, who find themselves faced with the same 
predicament of wanting to criticise democracy without advocating 
a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. even more so than Nancy, 
Deleuze has received vehement criticism for his ‘profoundly aristo-
cratic’ privileging of the philosophical over the political (Badiou 2000: 
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12/22), ‘his haughtiness, and his condescendence toward democracies 
and politics’ (Mengue 2006: 183). the alleged haughtiness is borne out 
most vociferously in What Is Philosophy? (1991), where Deleuze and 
Guattari portray democracy as inherently inimical to the eternal return 
of the gift. ‘Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature 
that which always eludes the majority’ (WiP, 108/104). conceived as 
a principle of representation, democracy is inherently majoritarian, 
constitutively predisposed toward the ochlocratic imposition of laws 
of identity on the aneconomic repetition of difference. in what might 
seem to suggest an affirmation of unconstrained capitalism, they argue 
that democracy constitutes a reterritorialisation of the identities that 
capital breaks down, by concealing the extent of the damage it inflicts: 
‘the immense relative deterritorialization of world capitalism needs to 
be reterritorialized on the modern nation-state, which finds an outcome 
in democracy’ (WiP, 98/94). commenting on these passages in What Is 
Philosophy?, Mengue notes with consternation that ‘whenever Deleuze 
mentions democracy, it is always accompanied by a reductive quali-
fier – “democratic imperialism”, “colonising democracy”, and so on’ 
(2006: 181).
the basic problem, Mengue thinks, is that Deleuze and Guattari 
conflate the philosophically ‘totalising’ critique of identity with politi-
cal totalitarianism. Much as lacoue-labarthe and Nancy allegedly do, 
they thus repeat heidegger’s mistake of philosophically overdetermin-
ing politics. the suspicion of this has led Alain Badiou to question 
‘how it is that, for Deleuze, politics is not an autonomous form of 
thought, a singular cut in chaos, one that differs from art, science and 
philosophy? this point alone attests to our divergence, and everything 
follows from it’ (Badiou 2006: 69 [tM]). Mengue reiterates this point, 
lamenting that Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between art (the 
creation of ‘percepts’ of the event), science (the description of actuali-
ties) and philosophy (the creation of concepts) ‘seems to pass over that 
which constitutes the specificity of the political’ (Mengue 2003: 159). 
central to his argument is an insistence on the irreducibility of poli-
tics to philosophy, the incompatibility of politics (the ‘macropolitics’ 
of statehood) with what Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘micropolitics’ 
of experimentation, becoming and the inherent excess of the event. 
speaking in defence of the ‘micropolitical’ events of May ’68, they 
write: ‘those who understood things in macropolitical terms understood 
nothing of the event because something unaccountable was escaping’ 
(tP, 216/264). Yet politics, Mengue insists, is not about the deter-
ritorialisation of identity, but rather the accommodation of different 
identities and opinions; not the affirmation of instability and futurity, 
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but rather the contrary attempt to create stability and consensus in the 
present:
the concern of the political is that of a stable and common world. And this 
world is to be positively constructed from bits of everything, for it will not 
be done spontaneously and by itself, on account of the plurality of opin-
ions and interests, necessarily divergent and in conflict, that they represent. 
(Mengue 2003: 134–5)
this view need not entail the reassertion of an essentialised grounding 
subject. in an argument that serves as a counterpart to Mengue, Badiou 
condemns poststructuralist philosophies of difference as the highest 
moment, the final figure, in the history of homo economicus, whose 
affirmation of difference conceals a desire not to be subjected to univer-
sal, prescriptive laws (Badiou 2001: 24/42). Yet prescription, he insists, 
is precisely what politics should consist in: not simply the attempt to 
elicit the complex truths of an event that precludes essential subjectiv-
ity, but moreover the active creation of new subjects from out of the 
ungrounding exposure to the event. Politics is not about the affirmation 
of a difference that cannot be universalised, but rather the universalisa-
tion, the rendering consistent, of a singularity. ‘i call politics that which 
establishes the consistency of the event in the regime of intervention,’ 
that which propagates the singularity of the event by working to trans-
late it into the public sphere of the political (Badiou 1985: 77). ‘this 
propagation is never a repetition. it is a subject-effect [un effet de sujet], 
a consistency,’ which can be achieved only at the cost of sacrificing 
other singularities, other possibilities of existing that avail themselves 
in the multiplicity of actuality (1985: 77). Politics is precisely not about 
the actualisation, the privileging, of every singularity, but rather about 
the selection of which singularities should be privileged as the organi-
sational bases of new forms of political consciousness. By configuring 
institutionalised politics as the majoritarian site of identity, to be aban-
doned in favour of an affirmation of virtual differences, Deleuze and 
Guattari commit the mistake of overlooking the ‘space of doxa’ as a 
space of actual differences. they thus miss the sense in which politics 
is defined by the making of decisions in relation to these differences, 
which is to say in the absence of an ontologically grounded consensus. 
in other words, Deleuze and Guattari’s privileging of a philosophy of 
virtual difference over a politics of actual difference risks another evac-
uation of politics – of what one could call the constitutively sacrificial 
dimension of the political.
Badiou does not thematise sacrifice, but his polemical critique of 
Deleuze is replete with its rhetoric: ‘i maintain that the forms of the 
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multiple are [. . .] always actual, that the virtual does not exist; i sacrifice 
the one’ (Badiou 2000: 46/69 [emphasis added]). in order to arrive at 
an ontology suitable for the legitimate treatment of politics, he argues, 
it is necessary to ‘sacrifice the Whole [le Tout], sacrifice life, sacrifice 
the great cosmic animal whose surface Deleuze enchants’ (Badiou 1998: 
71/72 [tM]). By ‘the Whole [le Tout]’, here, Badiou is referring to the 
singular life of absolute immanence, to the idealised conferral of grace 
on everything (‘la grâce du Tout’) he takes to result from the Platonism 
of Deleuze’s univocity thesis. Deployed in the context of ontology, 
it is hard not to be struck by the theological and political quality of 
Badiou’s language. the theological inflection comes in spite of his tren-
chant critique of the sacred, a (rare) affirmation of capital as ‘the end of 
the sacred figures of the bond [. . .] the general dissolvant of sacralizing 
representations, which postulate the existence of intrinsic and essential 
relations’ (Badiou 1999: 56/36). We shall see later that, by understating 
the role of sacrifice in making sacred, Badiou sacralizes precisely what 
he wants to sacrifice. his intention, however, is to deploy religious 
language to deliberately political and philosophical effect. he does 
this elsewhere, too: for example, when designating ‘the event as super-
numerary givenness [donation surnuméraire] and incalculable grace’ 
(Badiou 2003: 65/69 [emphasis added]). in accordance with his claim 
that it is the actual and not the virtual that is multiple, that actuality 
is accordingly susceptible to many different names, Badiou wants to 
make the point that ontology – and, by implication, the designation 
of the sacred – is ultimately a question of political choice, the outcome 
of a decision about what is to be counted as existing. Alex callinicos 
notes that there is an ambiguous line between ‘politicizing ontology’, of 
which ‘Badiou can legitimately be accused’ in his earlier writings, and 
the ‘ontologizing politics’ of his more recent work (callinicos 2006: 
107–8). Badiou would hardly dispute this. indeed, as the language of 
sacrifice suggests, he affirms that his reading of Deleuze’s ‘Platonism of 
the virtual’ is politically motivated, driven less by the accuracy of its 
textual exegesis than by a desire to elicit by means of caricature a poten-
tially deleterious tendency inherent to Deleuze’s project.3 Rather than 
seeking ‘to do justice’ to Deleuze’s text, his reading is avowedly ‘pre-
scriptive’ (hallward 2005: 172–6), designed to draw attention to the 
prospect that Deleuze is more concerned with the event than with the 
politics of actual differences, more preoccupied with becoming other 
than with deploying this becoming to transformative political effect. 
3. on the serious and numerous problems with Badiou’s reading of Derrida, see 
Ansell-Pearson 2002: 103–5; Beistegui 2004: 371n.50; Kacem 2004: 101–16.
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his point is not merely political, however. By emphasising the undecid-
ability of ontology, he also returns us to the constitutive impossibility 
of capturing a gift that withdraws from experience. Badiou argues that 
by identifying the gift with a singular life of immanence, a single event 
(as opposed to multiple events), Deleuze implicitly posits a virtual 
theodicy that forecloses the site of and hence the potential for political 
change: ‘ “All” is grace. for what is, is nothing other than the grace of 
the All’ for Deleuze (Badiou 2000: 97/142). Deleuze’s affirmation of 
the eternal return of difference, of the breakdown of identity, becomes 
indistinguishable from a theodical position that ‘in the final instance, 
always gives reason to what is there [donne en dernier ressort toujours 
raison à ce qu’il y a]’ (2000: 97/142 [tM]). Rather than call on politics 
to eliminate suffering, in other words, Deleuze effectively legitimates it, 
by stoically affirming that redemption lies in the transformative thought 
of becoming-other. hallward summarises the complaint in the asser-
tion that ‘Deleuze’s work is essentially indifferent to the politics of this 
world’ (hallward 2006a: 162), because he sees philosophy rather than 
politics as the means to redeem suffering; because he sees in thought’s 
access to the (sacred) immanence of the event the prospect of leaving 
behind the world of actuality. Viewed from the privileged philosophi-
cal standpoint of the virtual plane of immanence, actuality becomes 
theodic.
the indictment resonates with criticisms of the cRPP by fraser, 
whose grievance that lacoue-labarthe and Nancy fail to understand 
the dirtiness and contamination of politics might also be reformulated 
in terms of their elision of the sacrificial dimension of the political, the 
aspect of politics that requires some values to be sacrificed for the sake 
of preserving others, or which calls for the sacrifice of oneself for a 
particular cause – out of what Badiou would call ‘fidelity’ to an event 
(Badiou 2001: 41–3/62; Badiou 1985: 77). Bearing in mind Nancy’s 
rejection of the ‘sacred’ concepts of community and transcendence (ic, 
35/86–8), a contestation of this type takes us to the core of a project that 
is explicit in asserting an antinomy, a chiasmus, between politics and 
sacrifice. More surprisingly, in light of fraser’s willingness to reduce 
these concerns to symptoms of derridisme, it will eventually return us 
to the critical readings of Nancy proffered by Derrida, who insists that 
politics cannot be extricated from a constitutive risk of totalitarianism.
heGel ,  NANcY AND the  eND(s )  of  sAcRif ice
one might even say that the gods retreated because one no longer gives a 
present to their presence: no more sacrifice, no more oblation [on ne fait 
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plus de présent à leur présence: plus de sacrifice, plus d’oblation], except by 
way of custom or imitation. one has other things to do: write, for example, 
calculate, do business, legislate. Deprived of presents, presence has retreated 
[Privée de présents, la présence se retire].
(Jean-luc Nancy)4
in anthropology and sociology, modern accounts of sacrifice tend to 
begin with Mauss and hubert (1898), for whom ‘the procedure consists 
in establishing a means of communication between the sacred and 
profane worlds through the mediation of a victim, a thing destroyed in 
the course of the ceremony’ (hubert and Mauss 1981: 97/302 [tM]; 
criticised by Nancy, ft, 61/81). it is hegel, however, who casts the 
longer shadow over the philosophical history of sacrifice. his idea that 
sacrifice repeats the sacred, bringing it into the world but also rendering 
it coextensive with the event, is challenged by Bataille, who accuses him 
of submitting to a restricted economy of dialectical Aufhebung in which 
the meaning of sacrifice is forgotten. As seen in chapter 1, Bataille 
develops a concept of sacrifice as the privileged experience of the event 
in excess of any dialectic. Pace Nancy, Blanchot has denied that this 
entails the receipt of a ‘communitarian fusion’ with being. Rather than 
an experience of interiority, Bataille charts the breakdown, the limit, 
of experience. his gift is ‘a gift of “pure” loss that cannot make sure 
of ever being received by the other’ (Blanchot 1988: 12/25), the expe-
rience of the absence of any ontologically guaranteed receipt of one’s 
gift. Against Blanchot, Nancy suggests that Bataille continues to think 
in terms of a hegelian logic of immanence (ic, 22–4/60–4; ft, 63/87).
throughout his work, hegel identifies dialectical Aufhebung with 
the movement of sacrifice, the surrender of the particular for the sake 
of its sublation in the universal. Rather than a movement of loss, it is 
ultimately one of accession or reappropriation, wherein the experience 
of loss is aufgehoben, superseded through the opening of identity on to 
its underlying unity with the other: ‘But that sacrifice [die Ausopferung] 
made by the unessential extreme was at the same time not a one-sided 
action, but contained within itself the action of the other’ (Ps, 137–
8/176 [§230]). the dialectical Aufhebung thus describes the reward of 
sacrifice, the position to which one accedes in discovering the move-
ment of the event underlying one’s own actions. When the dialectic of 
history comes to an end in the modern (Napoleonic) state, it does so in 
a moment that discloses sacrifice as the highest moment of the sublime. 
hegel is critical of sacrifice in its primitive religious context but, as 
Nancy notes, he seems only too happy to ‘reclaim for the state the full 
4. Nancy 2001: 7.
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value of warlike sacrifice’ (ft, 60/79 [tM]). As the final Aufhebung 
of Geist, or spirit, the state is defined by sacrifice, which is expressed 
in the duty that citizens cede their individual lives for the preservation 
of its sublime totality: ‘sacrifice for the individuality of the state is the 
substantial relation of everyone and therefore a universal duty’ (ePR, 
363/494 [§325]). the actualisation of the Geist at the end of history 
reveals itself as the sublime truth of sacrifice, which becomes a name 
for the event, to be thought coextensive with the gift of Geist. ‘the gift 
can only be a sacrifice, that is the axiom of speculative reason’ (Derrida 
1986: 243a/270a).
this sacrificial sublation also marks the sublation of both philosophy 
and politics. Anticipating the heideggerian idea of the Heimat, hegel 
describes the state as a system of universal intimacy, which resolves the 
historical tension between the intimate, familial sphere of the oikos and 
the universal but brutal sphere of the market (ePR, 225/343–5 [§187]). 
With its universal recognition and consideration of basic rights, the 
political structure of the state ensures man’s return from alienation in 
the other, bringing about the unity of subjective identity with objective 
(legal) recognition by others. Although not a democracy, it does not 
need to be. the state’s existence as a self-identical, universal intimacy 
means that individuals are automatically incorporated through a system 
that expresses and privileges the rational, theodical sovereignty of the 
unfurled Geist (ePR, 238–9/359–60 [§207]). in Kojève’s anthropologi-
sation of hegel, this amounts to the end of man’s ‘struggle for recog-
nition’, coinciding initially with what he describes as the ‘communist’ 
classless society of the United states (later revised to designate the ‘post-
historical’ civilisation of Japan; iRh, 161n/436–7n). hegel and Kojève 
identify the end of history not just with the end of substantial political 
change, but also with the end of philosophy. this is because, as hegel 
states in the preface to Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1821), the 
task of philosophy is purely retrospective: ‘As the thought of the world, 
it appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative 
process and attained its completed state’ (ePR, 23/28). Philosophy, in 
other words, serves only to bear witness to the historical, dialectical, 
movement of the Geist, to accord recognition to the theodicy of reason, 
the self-identity of the world with the human consciousness embodied 
in the state. Kojève predicts the disappearance of philosophy and, with 
no more great decisions to be made, the dissolution of politics into 
bureaucratic administration:
the end of human time or history – that is, the definitive annihilation of 
Man properly so-called or of the free and historical individual – means quite 
simply the cessation of Action in the strong sense of the term. Practically, 
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this means: the disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions. And also 
the disappearance of Philosophy; for since Man himself no longer changes 
essentially, there is no longer any reason to change the (true) principles that 
are at the basis of his understanding of the World and of himself. (iRh, 
159n/435n [tM])
history, philosophy and politics thus become something we pass 
through between archaic, primitively religious sacrificial rituals and the 
sublation of sacrifice at the end of history.
the hegelo-Kojevian position is thus broadly, even fundamentally, 
opposed to the one adopted by Deleuze and Guattari, whose philo-
sophical and political stance(s), like those of so many of their postmod-
ern and poststructuralist contemporaries, specifically seek to reverse 
the hegelian thinking of history. Jean-françois lyotard in particular 
has expressed ‘incredulity toward meta-narratives’, the great histori-
cal narratives of modernity that govern the hegelian system (lyotard 
1986: xxiv/7). in a similar vein, Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx 
incorporates a scornful critique of Kojève and, in particular, ‘the ideal-
ist logic of fukuyama’ (sM, 86/142). in a revealing move that should 
perhaps have raised the suspicions of both lyotard and Derrida (who 
is already suspicious of lyotard’s version of the argument; Derrida 
1999b: 228–9/36–7), Deleuze and Guattari reaffirm the hegelian thesis 
of universal history, albeit with significant qualifications. Principal 
amongst these is that history, which comes to an end with capitalism, 
does not proceed dialectically and does not culminate in an Aufhebung. 
Rather, it appears as universal only retrospectively, once capitalism has 
disclosed itself as the upper limit of the eternal return that plays out in 
the (counter)historical repetition of difference:
the answer – as we have seen – is that capitalism is indeed the limit of all 
societies, insofar as it brings about the decoding of the flows that the other 
social formations coded and overcoded. But it is the relative limit of every 
society; it effects relative breaks, because it substitutes for the codes an 
extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a 
bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is deterritorialized [. . .]. 
schizophrenia, on the contrary, is indeed the absolute limit that causes the 
flows to travel in a free state on a desocialized body without organs. (AŒ, 
267/292)
Recalling from chapter 2 the first synthesis of time, or life, in Deleuze, 
the above citation reveals capital to constitute the minimum possible 
degree of habitus, a minimal degree of organisation, which shows itself 
continually able to adapt, to contract differences into identity without 
requiring fundamental changes to its organisational axiomatic.
capital is defined by a subjectivity that is distinct from, irreducible 
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to, the subjectivity of humans, but it is not yet the life of immanence 
(tP, 452–3/565). Deleuze and Guattari hold back from identifying 
capitalism with a simulacral experience of the gift, an experience, that 
is to say, in which the gift is encountered in its ungrounding with-
drawal from presence. Under capitalism, every deterritorialisation of 
life is accompanied by a corresponding reterritorialisation of identity. 
‘it axiomatizes with one hand what it decodes with the other’ (AŒ, 
267/292). every exposure to the event triggers a repression culminat-
ing in the contraction of singularities into a law-governed habitus. the 
reorganisation of identity is ultimately executed by capital itself: for 
example, in its forced erosion of traditional (i.e. inefficient) working 
practices, its demand that labour migrate to follow the relocations of 
capital investment, attenuating the bases of some national and regional 
identifications while simultaneously intensifying other expressions 
of the same. in contrast to the eternal return of difference in the life 
of the event, the eternal return of capital is the eternal return of the 
same, the return to and of the profit in whose name lines of flight are 
repeatedly reterritorialised by the market. however far deterritorialisa-
tion progresses, it will never escape the logic of capital. the general 
economy of difference always collapses back into a reterritorialised, 
restricted economy of identity.
the Deleuzo-Guattarian end of history is thus evolutionary rather 
than ontological or explicitly theodical, the result of contingency rather 
than destiny. capitalism constitutes the end of history not by virtue of 
some teleologically ordained destiny, but rather because it constitutes 
the minimum possible degree of organisation. there is, as such, no 
Aufhebung, no sublation of historical contradictions in a higher truth. 
Nor does capitalism bring about the end of philosophy. on the con-
trary, where Kojève writes of ‘the disappearance of Philosophy’ (iRh, 
159n/435n), Deleuze and Guattari describe how philosophy is precisely 
that which lives on after the advent of capital, a revolution in thought 
being the sole prospect of revolution after what may or may not con-
stitute an end of politics. Where the hegelian concept is retrospective, 
formalising that which is already given in experience, the Deleuzian 
concept appropriates the inappropriable futurity of an event that with-
draws from experience. in other words, it traces the utopian horizon of 
(im)possibility to which politics, in its strict macro-, institutional, sense 
has no access:
Philosophy takes the relative deterritorialization of capital to the absolute; it 
makes it pass over the plane of immanence as movement of the infinite and 
suppresses it as internal limit, turns it back against itself so as to summon 
forth a new earth, a new people. But in this way it arrives at the nonpropo-
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sitional form of the concept in which communication, exchange, consensus 
and opinion vanish entirely (WiP, 99/95)
on account of its thinking of eternal return, its ability to escape the 
habitus of capital, philosophy lives on after the end of history, but 
politics, perhaps, does not, or at least can do so only by changing, 
becoming other. Rather than wither away, it becomes impotent, in 
need of supplementation if it is to conceive possibilities of becoming 
beyond the reterritorialising countertendencies of capitalism. By virtue 
of the inherent ochlocracy of democracy, ‘this people and earth will not 
be found in our democracies’ (WiP, 108/104), but rather in a philoso-
phical ‘experimentation’ that Deleuze elsewhere identifies with politics: 
‘Politics is an active experimentation, since we do not know in advance 
which way a line [of flight] is going to turn’ (D, 137/165–6; see also 
WiP, 111/106).
could this injunction to experiment be construed in terms of a sac-
rificial sublimation (of the political), the attainment of an immanence 
or a communion with the event in which the (political) assertion of 
identity is obviated? Deleuze and Guattari obviously do not want to 
repeat the hegelian identification of sacrifice with the state. When, in 
A Thousand Plateaus, they write of ‘an entire politics of becoming-
animal, as well as a politics of sorcery’ based on the agencement, or 
assemblage, of minority groups and the oppressed (tP, 247/302), 
they do so in deliberate opposition not just to the hegelian logic of 
statehood and sacrifice, but also and more explicitly to the freudian 
thinking of sacrifice. Writing in 1914, in Totem and Taboo, the latter 
locates sacrifice in the ‘duty to repeat the crime of parricide again and 
again in the sacrifice of the totem animal’ (freud 2001a: 145/175), the 
sacrificial killing of an animal that substitutes for the primal father, or 
God. As in hegel, freudian sacrifice is identified with mimesis, rather 
than creativity. the repetition of the foundational moment of society 
and politics, it recalls the murder of a primal father whose monopoly 
over women led his sons to rebel and divide power in accordance with 
a social contract. Deleuze and Guattari employ the old french adjective 
‘anomal’ (anomalous), designating ‘the unequal, the coarse, the rough, 
the cutting edge of deterritorialization’ to contrast such mimesis with 
the anomic, aneconomic repetition of difference in the micropolitics of 
becoming (tP, 243–4/298), the implication being that sacrifice presup-
poses a negative understanding of difference; that it is therefore incom-
patible with an affirmation of positive difference in the event. Unlike 
Bataille, Deleuze and Guattari do not formulate a new concept of sac-
rifice. in other respects, however, their work suggests a clear continuity 
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with what lacan and Nancy take to be the Bataillean thinking thereof. 
commenting on the treatment of sacrifice in the history of philosophy, 
Deleuze writes of a ‘spirit of sacrifice’ that ‘will enable us to rediscover 
everything in the moment of sacrifice [. . .] even before the sacrifice is 
enacted’ (ci, 116/164). At the risk of being disingenuous, hallward 
takes the passage to express Deleuze’s own position rather than a 
Deleuzian reading of the history of philosophy, and uses it to accuse 
Deleuze of perpetrating a negative theodical recovery of the ‘whole of 
creation’ (hallward 2006a: 138). Deleuze, in other words, would thus 
be suggesting the act of sacrifice to bring about absolute immanence to 
and of the gift, the sublation of the gift in sacrifice.
the move is not entirely illegitimate. in a rare attempt to address the 
Deleuzian treatment of the sacred, the anthropological-cum-literary 
theorist, René Girard, makes a near-identical claim apropos of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s privileging of delirium as an experience of absolute 
immanence, which paradoxically amounts, he argues, to a sublime 
‘nullification of differences’ (Girard 1978: 96). like Badiou, Girard 
argues that the philosophy of difference ‘does not constitute a real 
rupture with the past’ but is rather its final figure, unable to escape it 
on account of an inability to recognise the constitutive role of sacrifice 
in social organisation. this role is to maintain a necessary distinction 
between profane and sacred, ‘between impure violence and purify-
ing violence’ (Girard 1977: 49/80–1), the effect of which is to ‘quell 
violence within the community and to prevent conflicts from erupting’ 
(1977: 14/30). Anti-Oedipus becomes symptomatic of what elsewhere 
Girard describes as a ‘sacrificial crisis’, a collapse in the binary opposi-
tions of sacred and profane around which society is structured (1977: 
49/80–1). like Bataille, Deleuze and Guattari seek to transgress every 
transcendent binary, to achieve an impossible experience that exceeds 
these binaries, but they therefore remain fundamentally framed by a 
sublative logic of immanence. their polemic amounts to ‘an effort to 
monopolise whatever remains of the sacred, to appropriate the sacri-
ficial virtue that seems to belong to the other’ (Girard 1978: 116). in 
suggesting as much, Girard anticipates what, as we saw in chapter 3, 
Nancy implies to be the excessive Batailleanism of Deleuze. he also 
thus anticipates Nancy’s reading of the concept of sacrifice as deleteri-
ously and irreducibly bound up with the totalitarianism of immanence. 
Nancy, however, affirms the end of sacrifice, whereas Girard laments it.
in ‘the Unsacrificeable’ (‘L’Insacrifiable’), published in 1991, Nancy 
sets out to explain what he describes as ‘the singular absence in us and 
for us of sacrifice’ (ft, 51/66 [tM]). the absence, he suggests, must 
be traced via a rupture that causes the modern sense of sacrifice to 
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differ fundamentally from its archaic predecessor. it is on account of 
this rupture that we can no longer find, nor even understand, archaic 
sacrificial practices. the motif of the latter none the less persists and is 
repeated at the heart of the former:
the truth of sacrifice is brought to light in terms of its mimesis: ‘ancient’ 
sacrifice is an external and, by itself, futile figure of this truth in which the 
subject sacrifices itself in spirit, to spirit [où le sujet se sacrifie lui-même en 
esprit, à l’esprit]. through spirit, it is to truth itself that sacrifice is offered 
up, in truth and as truth that it is accomplished [Et par l’esprit, c’est à la 
vérité elle-même que le vrai sacrifice est offert]. (ft, 58/76–7)
Nancy argues that modern (self-)sacrifice is a sacrifice of the subject 
undertaken for the very purpose of acceding to, or ‘transappropriating’ 
one’s own subjectivity: ‘sacrifical transappropriation is the appropria-
tion of the subject who penetrates into negativity, who keeps itself there, 
enduring its own dismemberment, and who returns sovereign’ (ft, 
73/99 [tM]). it thus pertains to ‘the fascination with an ecstasy turned 
toward an absolute other or toward an absolute outside, into which 
the subject is emptied better to be restored’ (ft, 75/103). in sacrificing, 
the subject seeks to achieve some experience of participation (methexis) 
with, or immanence to, a transcendent ontological ground. sacrifice, in 
other words, is the attempt to substantiate the event in the subject, by 
declaring the excess of the event to be something that can actually be 
brought into the world. We see this in heidegger, who, though critical 
of hegelian ‘ontotheology’, on account of its failure ‘to confront the true 
meaning of loss, to face the full meaning of sacrifice without redemption’ 
(schmidt 1999: 100), adopts a markedly similar stance vis-à-vis sacrifice.
heidegger refers eliptically, in ‘the origin of the Work of Art’ 
(1936), to ‘das wesentliche opfer’, essential sacrifice, as ‘one essen-
tial way in which truth establishes itself in the beings it has opened 
up, deploys itself [and] is grounded’ (oWA, 186–7/49 [50]). in the 
postscript to the second edition of What is Metaphysics? (1943), he 
qualifies this claim, citing beings’ willingness to die for the sake of 
the event, in order to fulfil the destiny of a historical Volk reconciled 
with its Heimat. this amounts to a ‘thanking’ of being:
in sacrifice there occurs the concealed thanks that alone pays homage to 
the grace [Im Opfer ereignet sich der verborgene Dank, der einzig die Huld 
würdigt] that being has bestowed upon the human essence in thinking, so 
that human beings may, in their relation to being, assume the guardianship 
of being. (PWM, 236/310 [105])
sacrifice thus offers the possibility of an authentic relationship with 
being, one that is moreover denied to the subject by global technologi-
cal nihilism. in what can be read as asserting the incompatibility of this 
MOORE PRINT.indd   173 02/12/2010   10:45
174 Politics of the Gift
bestowal of thanks with the nihilistic, technical structure of democracy, 
the same passage asserts that such sacrifice cannot be fulfilled ‘through 
working and achievement with respect to beings’ (PWM, 236/310 
[106]). Politics is merely ontic, but sacrifice is ontological. ostensibly, 
the position is directly opposed to the one found in Deleuze and Nancy.
the underlying premise of transappropriation means that, for Nancy, 
‘sacrifice as self-sacrifice, universal sacrifice, the truth and sublation of 
sacrifice, is the very institution of the absolute economy of absolute 
subjectivity’ (ft, 62/83). sacrifice could never instantiate political 
community because sacrificial transappropriation presupposes the tra-
ditionally ‘sacred’ possibility of achieving communion with being, the 
existence of a substantial ontological ground to which and for the sake 
of which sacrifices would be made. the Nancian critique of sacrifice 
thus overlaps with his critique of immanence; following Girard, one 
could also see in it the potential for a critique of Deleuze, the sugges-
tion that Deleuze, too, seeks to transappropriate sovereignty in becom-
ing coextensive with the body without organs. Nancy, incidentally, 
has rejected this reading, using the occasion to reassert his affinity to 
Deleuze as an anti-sacrificial thinker: ‘how could one sacrifice a subject 
that one does not think to exist?’5 the remark leaves little space for 
the possibility that this sacrificial logic persists in spite of Deleuze’s 
intentions.
Despite implying that Bataille, too, is guilty of transappropriation 
(ft, 67/87), the Bataillean equation of sovereignty with ‘NothiNG’ 
remains central to Nancy’s critique of nostalgia for an ontological 
ground. the absence of ground exposes that there is ‘NOTHING’ to 
be transappropriated; sacrifice is destined to fail because sovereignty 
is not something that resides elsewhere, but is rather nowhere and 
nothing. Underlying the equation is a position broadly in line with the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian analysis of the experience of high capitalism. A key 
element of Nancy’s critique of sacrifice derives from the way sacrifice 
is bound up with the history of capitalism and technology, his percep-
tion that the world has entered a phase of ecotechnical decomposition. 
if ecotechnicity exposes the end of the age of sacrifice, it is because 
technology no longer testifies to the sovereignty of the subject, but 
has rather become the originary technicity of bodies that ungrounds 
it: ‘in a sense, then, ecotechnics is also pure technè, the pure technè 
of nonsovereignty’ (BsP, 135/160). Moreover, it is what exposes the 
space once occupied by the subject as the empty space of spacing in 
‘a world where sovereignty is NOTHING’ (BsP, 140/165). Writing 
5. in conversation with the author, 6 May 2005, london.
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in an essay on ‘War, Right, Sovereignty – Technè’, appended to Being 
Singular Plural (1996), Nancy suggests that the post-cold War climate 
of conflict in Bosnia, Kuwait and the former UssR is governed not by a 
logic of the United states’ hegemonic, unipolar sovereignty, but rather 
by the very absence of sovereignty: ‘War – with ecotechnics – lets us 
see the henceforth empty space of sovereign Meaning’ (BsP, 137/162 
[tM]). Beneath the veneer of reterritorialising ethno-nationalisms, 
human rights violations and competition for scarce resources, war 
has become the ultimate expression of, or rather the attempt to stave 
off, the NOTHING of ecotechnicity, the ungrounding exposure to the 
event. the use of force serves only as a futile sacrificial gesture that, in 
attempting performatively to re-enact the hierarchy of symbolic order, 
protests and seeks to mask the retreat of sovereignty.
As Nancy argues in a slightly earlier work, The Sense of the World 
(1993), the same can be said of ‘ “democracy” ’, which ‘would thus not 
go beyond a kind of last sacrifice, the sacrifice of the truth or of the 
cause itself, though without ceasing to adhere to sacrificial logic [une 
sorte de dernier sacrifice, celui de la vérité ou de la Cause elle-même, 
ne cessant donc pas d’adhérer à la logique sacrificielle]’ (sW, 90/141–2 
[tM]). the image is reinforced by the recent Truth of Democracy 
(2008), where he states that ‘democracy has not yet clearly freed its 
“conceptions” from the presupposition of a subject that is master 
of its representations, volitions and decisions’ (tD, 11/25). in other 
words, the practice of democracy sustains the fantasy of sovereign 
subjectivity. like war, democracy lives on as an insubstantial remain-
der, the desubstantialised spectre of a sacrifice without cause, whose 
effective impotence exposes its lack of ontological privilege. Nancy’s 
sole-authored works do not explicitly and thematically reprise the 
opposition between le and la politique, thus raising the prospect that 
he departs from the supposed ‘heideggerianism’ of the collaborative 
period. But he does make a corresponding distinction between ‘sac-
rificial politics [la politique sacrificielle]’, or ‘politics in truth, which 
is to say of the “theologico-political” ’ (sW, 89/141 [tM]), and an 
underlying ontology of ‘the political [le politique]’ as ‘the site of the in-
common as such’ in which sacrifice simply has no place (sW, 88/139). 
By repeatedly identifying sacrifice with the fictioning of an ontological 
ground, Nancy reduces it to a relic of metaphysics, denuded of positive 
potential. the ontology of finitude means that there is ‘rien de sacrifi-
able’, nothing sacrificeable, nothing whose sacrifice would open us on 
to a transcendent ground. ‘if we have to say that existence is sacrificed, 
it is sacrificed by no one and to nothing. “existence is offered” means 
the finitude of existence’ (ft, 74/101). if sacrifice is to continue to exist, 
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it can do so only in the bloodless context of ecotechnical  abandonment, 
where henceforth it will not be active, governed by subjects, but rather 
passive, with sacrifice – offering – becoming another name for the 
event. Despite stating that ‘nothing is more dissimilar’ (ft, 74/101 
[tM]), Nancy uses the two terms, sacrifice and offering, as if almost 
interchangeable. in treating them as such, he reiterates that the target 
of his critique is the hegelian ontotheology that conflates sacrifice with 
the gift, rendering the event inherently sublime. one wonders, however, 
whether in saying this, ironically, Nancy’s inversion does not effectively 
repeat the hegelian identification.
What if the site of politics were the one opened up between being’s 
being offered – the brute facticity of being abandoned to decision – 
and sacrifice qua impossible decision, the choice between possibilities 
that, in so far as ungrounded, are undecidable? in positing that there 
is ultimately ‘nothing sacrificeable’ (ft, 67/90) Nancy arguably fails 
to appreciate both the way that sacrifice is condemned to live on, in 
spite of its impossibility, and the prospect that it is indeed this very 
impossibility that sustains and politicises it. the fervour of his refusal 
to grant any relationality of politics to sacrifice becomes conspicuous, 
even political, as if his stated desire to abandon sacrifice leads him to 
miss that it is precisely here that the essence of the political (‘s’il y en 
a’) would lie. this can perhaps only be seen, however, once sacrifice 
is denuded of ontological privilege, recognised as a (tacit) affirmation 
of ungrounding, rather than an attempt to recuperate lost sovereignty. 
if we have forgotten what it means to be political, it is on account of 
the forgetting of a sacrifice that, in the words of Beistegui, ‘was never 
as alive as when at the announced threshold of its demise, never as 
flourishing as when at its end’ (Beistegui 1997: 159). Nancy himself 
has recently shown a considerable willingness to renegotiate his stance, 
conceding that the conflation of sacrifice with a logic of Aufhebung 
does not adequately account for the role of sacrifice in the ‘making and 
naming of the sacred’.6 The Truth of Democracy similarly elaborates 
a more nuanced account of politics as the site of deciding how to trans-
late incalculable, suprapolitical, infinite – one might say aneconomic 
– values once thought ‘divine, sacred or inspired’ into an institutional 
framework that works only in terms of equivalence (tD, 18, 24/35, 
46). the ‘ “spirit” ’ of democracy signals, in this context, the possibil-
ity of avoiding sacrifice, of conceding ways in which differences can be 
accommodated without necessitating the sacrifice of their singularity. 
As ‘a kind of last sacrifice’, democracy becomes a way of preserving the 
6. Again, in conversation with the author.
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truth or causes it seeks to incarnate – precisely by sacrificing them. this 
paradoxical formulation brings us back to Derrida.
DeRRiDA ,  DeMocRAcY AND sAcRif ice
i am responsible to the other as other, i answer to him and i answer for what 
i do before him. But of course, what binds me thus in my singularity to the 
absolute singularity of the other, immediately propels me into the space of 
risk of absolute sacrifice. [. . .] i cannot respond to the call, the request, the 
obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, 
other others [sans lui sacrifier l’autre autre, les autres autres]. Paradox, 
scandal, and aporia are thus none other than sacrifice.
(Jacques Derrida)
What we need is this apparent oxymoron: a Nietzschean democracy.
(Jean-luc Nancy)7
Returning more recently to the question of the political, simon critchley 
has argued that politics ‘articulates an interstitial distance’ between the 
site of power and those subjected to it. he names the specific interstice 
between the state and the self-determination of the people as the site of 
political struggle in which there opens up the possibility of what he calls 
‘true democracy’ (critchley 2007: 92). We need not buy into the loaded 
terminology of the state to affirm the idea – also found in the ‘zone 
between two deaths’ of lacan (sVii, 280/326) – that politics is an inter-
stitial occurrence, which cannot be reduced to a mere affirmation of the 
event. Nancy, too, has lately evinced a similar position, rearticulating 
his earlier ideas of désœuvrement as ‘the truth of democracy’. this 
truth, he suggests, is that democracy ‘is not in the first instance a form 
of politics [n’est-elle pas d’abord une forme politique]’ (tD, 32/59). 
As what he calls ‘in principle an exceeding [dépassement principiel] of 
the political order’ (tD, 29/53), it rather falls between philosophy and 
politics. A broadly similar stance is discernible in Deleuze and Guattari, 
who, rather than being indifferent to democracy, as Mengue suggests, 
regard it as the precondition for an engagement with the event. Much as 
they elaborate a concept of ‘micropolitics’, a politics of becoming and 
experimentation that risks ultimately indistinguishability from the cre-
ation of concepts, this is intended to supplement rather than to replace 
the conventional, institutional, politics of the state: ‘everything is politi-
cal, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropo-
litics’ (tP, 213/260). Understood as both micro and macro, we begin to 
appreciate that politics occurs in the margins of institutions, not in their 
7. GD, 68/97–8; tD, 22/43.
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absence. Badiou’s fear is that, despite Deleuze and Guattari’s sustained 
critique of capital, they endorse it, by implying that concerted deter-
ritorialisation will inevitably remain framed by the market imperative 
of the eternal return of the same: namely, profit. Badiou, however, is 
unwilling to cede to what amounts to a stripping from democracy of 
the capacity to open itself up to the new. Although he stands apart from 
the tradition of french Nietzscheanism, from the predominant pursuit 
of ontologising the eternal return in the repetition of difference, he 
concedes the possibility of using the return to describe an interminable 
process of philosophical evaluation. Nietzsche’s thought experiment 
becomes a way of acting out fidelity to the event of democracy:
the task of philosophy is to expose a politics to assessment. [. . .] Politics can 
be defined sequentially as that which attempts to establish [créer] the impos-
sibility of non-egalitarian statements relative to a situation, and as what can 
be exposed through philosophy, and by means of the word ‘democracy’, to 
what i would call some kind of eternity. let us say that it is by means of the 
word ‘democracy’ thus conceived, and through philosophy and philosophy 
alone, that a politics can be evaluated according to the criteria of eternal 
return. (Badiou 2005a: 94/107–8)
it is only in reference to philosophy, in other words, that we are in a 
position to evaluate the democraticity of a political system independ-
ently of the circumstances of its existence. for all Badiou’s general criti-
cism of the so-called philosophies of difference (Badiou 2001: 24/42), 
he finds a considerable degree of agreement with Derrida on this point. 
the latter also provides the possibility of thinking democracy as sacri-
fice, while crucially distancing himself from the suggestion that sacrifice 
is inherently inauthentic, a technique for the transappropriation of a 
privileged experience of sovereignty.
for Derrida, sacrifice is far more than just a technique for the dis-
avowal of the event. As a strategy through which we engage with the 
possibility of the event’s arrival, it also repeats the possibility of eternal 
return that Deleuze and Guattari deem to be politically impossible. 
Derrida agrees that there is a tension between the event of the gift and 
democracy, but differs from the latter by locating sacrifice at the heart 
of this tension, as that which not only forecloses, compromises, democ-
racy’s claims to democraticity, but also brings about its perfectibility 
and promise. treated deconstructively, sacrifice ceases to be about 
a privileged relation of immanence to a ground and becomes a way 
of communicating the absence of a ground. in so doing, it preserves 
the possibility of a sacrifice of sacrifice in which democracy would be 
redeemed against its hitherto compromised status.
in a by now familiar strategy, Derrida differentiates between the 
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economic practice of democracy and its aneconomic promise. election 
is economic because it is all about the selection and conferral of an 
identity and the laws that govern this identity through the exclusion 
of other identities. if voting is about exercising the right to privilege 
and subsequently submit to particular identities (those of the victori-
ous parties or candidates), then it is, to reprise the criticism levelled at 
heidegger, a technique for submitting the polis to an oikos. the means 
of this submission is calculation, pertaining not just to the calculation 
of winning majorities, but to the demographic and geographic ques-
tions of who can vote:
the question of democracy is [. . .] the question of calculation, of numerical 
calculation, of equality according to number. [. . .] how does one count? 
What should count as a unit of calculation? What is a voice or a vote? What 
is an indivisible and countable voice or vote? so many difficult questions – 
difficult and more open than ever. A question of nomos and thus of nemein, 
of distribution or of sharing [de la distribution ou du partage]. (R, 29/53)
in its practice, democracy thus constitutes itself as a set of laws premised 
upon a further set of laws or calculations determining to whom or what 
these laws apply. But calculation alone cannot provide a ground for the 
constitutively undecidable decisions about how democracy should be 
structured, how the participating polis should be delimited, and so on. 
By way of example, Derrida observes that:
one will never actually be able to ‘prove’ [. . .] that there is more democracy 
in a straight majority vote as opposed to proportional voting; both forms of 
voting are democratic, and yet both also protect their democratic character 
through exclusion, through expulsion or dismissal [renvoi]. (R, 36/60)
even where proportionality and representativity are sacrificed for the 
sake of more efficient government, this efficiency, too, could be the 
choice of the electorate.
the use of the word ‘sacrifice’ might seem somewhat casual here, but 
it is not incidental. Back in the seventeenth century, thomas hobbes 
defined the social contract as the agreement by which ‘I Authorise 
and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this 
Assembly of men’ (hobbes 1996: 120). in an essay, ‘Declarations of 
independence’, published initially in Otobiographies (1984), Derrida 
uses the term ‘fabulous retroactivity’ to describe the performativity, the 
circularity involved in this legitimation process, which must presuppose 
its own authority in the very act of legitimating itself (Derrida 2002: 
50/22). the logic is precisely that of the sacrifice we find in lacan and 
Žižek, the sacrificial gift of love, ‘le don de ce qu’on n’a pas’ that works 
by performatively enacting the ground it presupposes, giving to the 
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other in order that there be another to whom one might give. in voting, 
we surrender a sovereignty that was never ours to give away, in order to 
instantiate the big other of representative government. With its capac-
ity to change increasingly exposed as a fantasy, democracy becomes a 
perfect expression of the fantasmically constructed big other, a sover-
eignty that does not exist, which is strictly speaking NOTHING, but to 
which we none the less continually sacrifice for the sake of concealing 
the event. it is thus the site of what Žižek calls ‘politics without politics’ 
(Žižek 2003: 96), an insubstantial spectre that sanitises the real, by 
concealing its eternal return.
Derrida recognises the Žižekian point but is not so pessimistic in his 
reading of democracy, not so willing to see it reduced to a fantasy that 
masks the traumatic real of capital. Nor is he seemingly prepared to 
draw a hard and fast distinction between the inauthentic repetition of 
identity and the repetition of difference in the event, the sacrifice that 
instantiates a ground and the one that, in traversing the fantasy, seeks 
to sacrifice sacrifice. however, like lacan-Žižek, Derrida also differ-
entiates between two types of sacrifice: namely. the economic sacrifice 
that recuperates a ground and the aneconomic sacrifice of sacrifice that 
affirms the futility of the former:
absolute sacrifice that is not the sacrifice of irresponsibility on the altar of 
responsibility, but the sacrifice of the most imperative duty (that which 
binds me to the other as a singularity in general) in favour of another abso-
lutely imperative duty binding me to the wholly other [le sacrifice du devoir 
plus impératif   au bénéfice d’un autre devoir absolument impératif qui nous 
lie au tout autre]. (GD, 71/101)
the second, aneconomic, sacrifice refers to a sacrifice that does not 
seek, in Nancian terms, to transappropriate an ontological ground. 
Apropos of Derrida’s reading of Bataille, we would do well to remem-
ber, however, that the very absence of a ground means that the ‘sacrifice 
of (economical) sacrifice inevitably turns into the sacrifice of (aneco-
nomical) sacrifice’, collapsing back from general to restricted economy 
(Keenan 2005: 137; WD, 348–50/404–8).
it is by accepting the relation of sacrifice to the impossibility of 
(trans)appropriation that Derrida is able to articulate democracy as an 
inherently sacrificial practice or, more precisely, a sacrificial practice 
constituted by its relation to the promise of a politics without sacrifice. 
Derrida defines sacrifice broadly as ‘a noncriminal putting to death [une 
mise à mort non criminelle]’, a form of giving death that, on account 
of its relation to the sacred, falls short of the legal concept of murder 
(Derrida 1992b: 278/293). More revealingly, in his most sustained 
engagement with the concept, in The Gift of Death (1999), he specifies 
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that ‘sacrifice supposes the putting to death of the unique in terms of its 
being unique, irreplaceable and most precious. it also therefore refers 
to the impossibility of substitution, the unsubstitutable’ (GD, 58/85). 
the demand to sacrifice can only be met by the sacrifice of that which 
it is impossible to sacrifice; by that whose loss would be singularly irre-
placeable. if, traditionally, this demand is met through the sacrifice of 
God – through the killing of the primal father, in the freudian terms of 
Totem and Taboo – henceforth it is fulfilled through the (reluctant but 
inevitable) sacrifice of the virtual, of the singularity that exceeds life’s 
actual manifestations. What is sacrificed is not just the actual, but the 
virtuality that is foreclosed from actuality by the decision that names 
what we recognise as existing. Undecidability means that the act of 
making decisions is inherently sacrificial, necessarily entailing the loss 
of the singular and inexchangeable. crucially, Derrida does not want 
to say that this sacrifice is definitive. on the contrary: if it were, then it 
would not be impossible. the logic of différance, which he understands 
explicitly in terms of ‘repetition in the eternal return’ (M, 17/18–19), 
means that whatever is killed refuses death, returning to haunt the site 
of the decision that condemned it. sacrifice is thus intimately linked to 
eternal return, to ‘das grösste schwergewicht’ of the impossible, unde-
cidable. it is impossible because it calls for the surrendering of some-
thing so precious that the incomprehensibility of its loss would destroy 
the one making the sacrifice; hence Derrida’s example of God com-
manding Abraham to sacrifice isaac (GD, 58–80/94–114). But more-
over it is impossible because it is condemned to failure. that which is 
sacrificed cannot be put to death and accordingly lives on in the form 
of the spectre, a virtual trace of the à venir.
As he writes in the later text, ‘faith and Knowledge’ (1996), it is 
this spectral life – once the life of God, now the life of the event – that 
would have to be sacrificed for sacrifice to take place as a definitive 
consignment to death, for the gift of death to be irreversible. Rather 
than conceiving sacrifice as the material sacrifice of something living, or 
tangible, Derrida argues that ‘true sacrifice ought to sacrifice not only 
“natural” life, called “animal” or “biological”, but also that which is 
worth more than so-called natural life’ (fK, 51/78). the life at stake in 
sacrifice, that is to say, is irreducible to the individuated life of a par-
ticular sacrificial offering. Reread through Derrida, Badiou’s injunction 
to ‘sacrifice life’ acquires a significance not intended by its author. for 
Badiou there is only actuality, and the promising of anything beyond 
this amounts to negative theology (Badiou 1998: 71/72). Derrida’s 
point, though, is that sacrifice only makes sense when conceived in 
terms of a life that exceeds the actual life of the individual, when in 
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 sacrificing one gives death to virtual possibilities whose actualisation 
will henceforth be precluded. in so far as sacrifice communicates with 
the event, it communicates by sacrificing a life that refuses individua-
tion – the life of capital, but beyond this, the virtual life of an other that 
has yet to be embodied in an actual existence. this excessive form of life 
is ‘dead [. . .] and yet more than living, the spectral fantasy of the dead 
as the principal of life and of sur-vival’ (fK, 50/78). outlined more 
fully in the early essay, ‘living on’ (‘Survivre’, 1979), and resurrected 
in Specters of Marx, the concept of survivance names an aneconomic 
force of life in excess of the mortal, economic life of individuated organ-
isms and organ-ised subjects: ‘beyond any present life, life as my life, 
[. . .] beyond therefore the living present in general’ (sM, xx/16–17; lo, 
88–9/152–3). like the other ontologised reformulations of Nietzsche’s 
eternal return discussed over the course of this work, the spectral is 
governed by the differantial structure of repetition: ‘Repetition and first 
time: this is perhaps the question of the event as the question of the 
ghost’ (sM, 10/31). that which is sacrificed escapes the mimetic logic 
that causes Nancy to preclude sacrifice from the political. By contrast, 
the Derridean deconstruction of sacrifice not only is compatible with, 
but also even extends, the project of a politics of repetition. in his later 
writings, Derrida explicitly identifies democracy with a name for the life 
of the event, a non-identical synonym for the gift. Anticipating what 
critchley calls the ‘interstitial distance’, the internal spacing of differ-
ence constitutive of true democracy (critchley 2007: 117), the novelty 
of Derrida’s contribution consists in identifying democracy, like the gift 
before it, with a temporal différance that causes it to exceed its own 
presence. captured in the otherwise banal notion of a ‘gap between fact 
and ideal essence’ (sM, 64/110), it is this différance that opens democ-
racy on to the aneconomic time of the gift, the à-venir:
for democracy remains to be known; this is its essence insofar as it remains: 
not only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and 
future, but, belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in 
each of its future times, to come: even when there is democracy, it never 
exists, is never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept. 
(Pf, 306/339)
Where heidegger conceives democracy as inadequate to the ontological 
reappropriation of the subject (Dasein), the Derridean understanding 
of democracy as promise means that it is not democracy, but rather 
the subject that is inadequate to the democratic imperative of justice. 
By emphasising its exteriority to chronological time, Derrida evokes 
an impossible politics of spectrality, in which the space of doxa is 
expanded to consider the indivisible remainder, the ghosts that live on 
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after their sacrifice. tracing the horizons of a politics without sacrifice, 
a politics without politics, without the necessity of imposing decision 
on the incalculable and undecidable, this promised democracy already 
exists virtually beyond the horizons of the subject. the impossibility of 
instantiating this horizon means that we are condemned to be political, 
to sacrifice. Yet sacrifice takes place in order that it not take place, as a 
putative sacrifice of sacrifice.
the excessive nature of democracy, overflowing its own concept as 
a multiplicity of often mutually exclusive permutations, means that 
democracy is constituted by an ineliminable trace of sacrifice. What 
is sacrificed is not just the votes that are consciously and calculably 
marginalised in the preference of one ballot structure over another; 
nor simply the criminals, immigrants and other disenfranchised who 
are excluded by the demo- or geographic delimitation of a polis. these 
marginalised groups identified by Derrida coincide with what, in the 
book of the same name, Giorgio Agamben identifies as homo sacer, 
the subcategory of life without intrinsic value whose exclusion from 
the polis Agamben takes to constitute the originary structure of the 
political (Agamben 1998: 74). Agamben argues that the exclusion of 
homo sacer is not itself sacrificial, however, but rather the condition of 
the possibility of sacrifice. the central tenet of Agamben’s thesis is that 
politics consists in the naming of the sacred, a naming that excludes the 
sacred from membership of the polis, condemning or rather abandon-
ing it to an oikos on the margins of the political (Wall 2005: 41). the 
recipient of the name is homo sacer, a life that can be ‘killed but not 
sacrificed’, put to death without falling victim to homicide, but not as 
part of a sacrificial ritual. Politics begins with an act of sovereignty, 
the decision that determines what counts as homo sacer and excludes 
said homines sacri from protection by the laws that govern over the 
polis. the violence of this decision makes homo sacer sacred, but in 
exempting him from the dignity of the law simultaneously renders him 
unworthy of sacrifice, unworthy of inclusion in subsequent decisions 
affecting the polis. Recalling Girard, in a much earlier work, Language 
and Death: The Place of Negativity (1982), Agamben implies that 
sacrifice comes into existence only later, as a ritual that repeats the vio-
lence enacted by the sovereign decision: ‘it is this sacred violence that 
sacrifice presupposes in order to repeat it and regulate it within its own 
structure’ (Agamben 1991: 105–6). After Derrida, could we not rather 
say that rituals of sacrifice merely retrospectively seek to ground, to 
legitimate, the decision that is inherently ungrounded, by submitting it 
to a stabilising logic of mimesis that conceals the precariousness of its 
self-justification? should we not also say that what defines homo sacer 
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is less unworthiness of sacrifice than the fact of always already having 
been sacrificed?
Agamben reverses the heideggerian position outlined above. Where 
the latter would argue that sacrifice is pre-political, essential, the former 
argues that it presupposes the foundation of the polis. the subtlety of 
the distinction has led at least one commentator to doubt its useful-
ness. According to Andrew Norris, ‘Agamben complicates his account 
unnecessarily when he concludes that the killing of bare life does not 
constitute a sacrifice’ (Norris 2005: 25). in saying this, Norris opens up 
a space for a more Derridean account, in which the decision is always 
sacrificial – and never sovereign. Derrida has also been critical of 
Agamben, casting doubts on the legitimacy of the deconstructive move 
by which he differentiates between bios and zoé, the life that can be 
qualified as political and the ‘bare life’ that is excluded from the polis 
(R, 24/46). in other words, Derrida is concerned that Agamben’s taxon-
omy of life may still be too restrictive adequately to grasp the complex-
ity of sacrifice. in excess of what Agamben, following foucault, calls 
biopolitics – in excess, even, of what one might call zoepolitics, which, 
however inclusive, still implies a material, organismal conception of life 
(see, for example, Braidotti 2006: 129–38) – there is moreover a politics 
of the spectre, of the life that never achieves actualisation. Prior to the 
designation of life that can be killed but not sacrificed, there is a sacri-
fice that does not kill, one which moreover cannot kill, in our ‘actual’ 
understanding of the term, on account of there being a virtual life that 
refuses to die, and continually returns in the guise of the spectre.
Democracy does not require that the life of the individual be expend-
able, but it is founded on the sacrifice of the supra-biological sur-vie. 
it also thus encapsulates a sacrificial logic of ‘auto-immune suicide’, in 
which at its limit it must sacrifice itself in order to survive. likewise 
community, which, in what implies a critique of Nancy not dissimilar 
to that of fraser, Derrida suggests is also created through sacrifice: ‘no 
community that would not cultivate its own auto-immunity, a principle 
of sacrificial self-destruction ruining the principle of self-protection 
(that of maintaining its self-integrity intact), and this in view of some 
sort of invisible or spectral sur-vival’ (fK, 51/79). the decisional sac-
rifice is the very condition of possibility of democracy, community, yet 
it is the failure of this sacrifice that sustains them. the eternal return of 
the spectre, both as threat and as messianic promise, is what:
keeps the auto-immune community alive, which is to say, open to something 
other and more than itself: the other, the future, death, freedom, the coming 
or the love of the other, the space and time of a spectralizing messianicity 
beyond all messianism. (fK, 51/79)
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in this eternal return, life and death are traversed by the life-beyond-
death that is in excess of both. the community is not distinct from the 
spectre that animates it, but rather continually escapes death through 
the repeated sacrifice of that which refuses to die.
this does not mean that we could or should do away with sacrifice, 
since it is through sacrifice that we preserve the sanctity of its promise; 
through sacrifice, moreover, that we assume the responsibility – that we 
reveal our ability to respond – to the impossible arrival of the other and 
acknowledge the impossibility of our not sacrificing it. Derrida equates 
the affirmation of impossible sacrifice with the eternal return, but also 
thereby to politics as such, to the decision that seeks precariously to 
name, to appropriate, the event. in light of this, Nancy’s dismissal of 
sacrifice as an aesthetic phenomenon simply repeats the illegitimate 
move of essentialising the political, of treating the political as something 
separable from and uncontaminable by the totalitarian, aestheticising 
pursuit of an ontological ground. Derrida’s argument is that politics 
not only is unable to defend itself against contamination, but that it is 
about and defined by this contamination, whose inevitability and irre-
ducibility must paradoxically be affirmed if the promise of escaping it 
is to be preserved. the space of undecidability in which the decision is 
made cannot be foreclosed in the way that the outlawing of totalitar-
ian systems would require: ‘nothing could make us more irresponsible; 
nothing could be more totalitarian’ (Derrida 1999a: 117/201).
Rather than legitimate totalitarianism, what this means, for Derrida, 
is that democracy cannot allow itself to be idealised, aestheticised as a 
fixed and determinate, inflexible structure, whose principal decisions 
are effectively presupposed as cast in stone. like the gift, democracy 
exists not as an essence but as a promise, and one that moreover risks 
destruction if overidentified with a specific set of beliefs or institutional 
practices; it is necessarily ambiguous and, at its limit, unrecognisable. 
We find an illustration of this in Manderlay, the second instalment of 
lars von trier’s America trilogy, a film in which the unbearable weight 
of democracy causes a group of emancipated slaves to engineer their re-
enslavement; where democracy becomes another name for slavery. the 
sequel to Dogville discloses the dangers of hypostatising the various 
names of the promise yielded by the eternal return. We saw this already 
in Dogville, when, in the very moment of becoming-gift, in being 
raped, sacrificed and stripped of humanity by townsfolk purporting to 
welcome her, Grace is reterritorialised, explicitly identifying herself as a 
sovereign angel of death, charged with enforcing the morality of those 
she goes on to kill. A similar scenario plays itself out in Manderlay, 
where, identifying her gift all too readily with a democracy that quickly 
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descends into ochlocratic chaos, Grace once again succumbs to the fatal 
idealism of conferring a fixed and recognisable identity on the promise. 
Unable to accept the collapse of the routines of slavery that their receipt 
of democracy entails, the slaves that Grace emancipates vote to refuse 
her gift in favour of a reinstatement of totalitarian order. As in the first 
film, Grace is made the sacrificial victim, her dream put to death by 
her (unwanted) election to the position of tyrannical mistress. And yet 
she cannot but acknowledge the democracy paradoxically underlying 
the return to tyranny. Unable to reconcile two conflicting concepts of 
democracy in a single body, Grace’s integrity gives way and she once 
again takes flight.
Despite arguing that democracy is not reducible to a readily identifi-
able set of criteria, Derrida does not think it inherently arbitrary, which 
is to say unqualifiable, unrelated to ethics. on the contrary: ‘it is neces-
sary to deduce a politics and a law [droit] from ethics. this deduction 
is necessary in order to determine the “better” or “less bad”, with all 
the requisite quotation marks this calls for: democracy is “better” than 
tyranny’ (Derrida 1999a: 115/198). Derrida thus continues to think the 
political in relation to the ‘ethical’ figure of the other, above all in terms 
of responsibility to and for the other. the formulation draws conster-
nation from Žižek and also ernesto laclau, both of whom suspect a 
literal regrounding of politics in the levinasian Autrui, hence a refusal, 
on Derrida’s part, to accept the impossibility of ontologically privileg-
ing democracy over any other form of government (laclau 1996: 77–8; 
Butler, laclau and Žižek 2000: 229). it is crucial to note that Derrida’s 
other is not simply the other person, however. Nor is his understand-
ing of responsibility reducible to the ‘classical’ idea of individualisable, 
calculable, appropriable causes. this economic conceptualisation of 
responsibility is ‘an obscene presumption’ (Derrida and Nancy 2004: 
177):
When it comes, when it happens, there must be impotence, vulnerability. 
it must be that whoever or whatever, man or animal, to whom it happens, 
has no control over it, even performatively. And thus, in this here place, it 
must be that no-one (no would-be ‘i’-saying subject, no ipseity) can assume 
responsibility, in the classic sense of the term, for what happens [il faut que 
personne (aucun soi-disant sujet disant ‘je’, aucune ipséité) ne puisse assumer 
la responsabilité, au sens classique du terme, de ce qui arrive]. (2004: 178)
Reconstrued as aneconomic, responsibility refers to the ability to 
respond to the other, to ‘countersign such and such an affirmation’ of 
the other (Pf, 231/258 [tM]), to adjust one’s experiential horizons to 
conceive, for example, of a democracy that would not foreclose the 
alterity of the other. Specters of Marx speaks of a ‘principle of some 
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responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins 
the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or 
already dead’ (sM, xix/16). the other is thus not human, but spectral. 
elsewhere, it is also potentially bestial (Derrida 2004: 470–1) and even 
technological: ‘if there is a to-come, it will happen indissociably with a 
transformation of the world by, through or within technology’ (Derrida 
2001b: 78).
Rather than reinscribe the sovereignty of the subject by asserting 
it as the cause of the event, responsibility requires an affirmation of 
ungrounding, the ability to recognise the undecidability that originates 
the decision. Pace laclau and Žižek, this is not a (heideggerian) await-
ing for the return of a ground, for a gift or a democracy that, one day, 
we could recognise as such. on the contrary, it is to affirm the possibil-
ity of exposure to the absence of a ground, a gift so heterogeneous as to 
overwhelm and overturn the subject in the moment of its receipt. it is 
also, as such, to affirm that the decision, too – the sacrificial technique 
through which we mediate between actual and virtual, through which 
we respond to the virtual life of the event – is heterogeneous in origin.
if democracy holds out the promise of such an affirmation in practice 
as well as ideally, it is because the principle of election allows for its 
continual reinvention, the perpetual renegotiation of the polis through 
sacrifice. electoral decisions are precisely those to which, Derrida 
insists, democracy cannot be reduced, the vote being only a very rudi-
mentary way of enumerating the polis. Yet it preserves the promise of 
expansion, the possibility of extending the franchise in principle, even if 
this would still fall short of the demand to sacrifice sacrifice, completely 
to do away with the need to count, to make decisions about what does 
and does not count as partaking in the life of the polis. Politics is ulti-
mately a question of the decision, but, on account of the undecidability 
of the event to which it responds, this decision does not resemble the cal-
culus of opportunity cost traditionally ascribed to homo economicus, a 
predetermined choice between actualities, named candidates and ballot 
structures, for example. Derrida repeatedly describes it as ‘the decision 
of the other in me’, a decision in excess of the habitus of the subject. 
in a move that recalls Deleuze’s description of the passive syntheses 
of time and/as desiring-production (see chapter 2), it is furthermore 
declared to be passive: ‘the passive decision, decision of the event, is 
always in me, structurally, another decision, a rending decision as the 
decision of the other’ (Pf, 68/87 [tM]). exercised without guarantee, it 
has no criterion of success other than its ability to respond to the other, 
to create subjectivities that respond to the shock of the new. its task is 
to adapt the oikos to the polis and not vice versa. the type of  democracy 
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that would (cor)respond to this politics of alterity is therefore very dif-
ferent from the one instantiated in Western parliamentary systems of 
representation. As suggested in the above-mentioned concept of the 
new international, its polis would be unrecognisable, even. in place of 
a politics of space and territory, ‘the political must be deterritorialized,’ 
thought ‘beyond the ‘borders’ of the political’ (Derrida and stiegler 
2002: 65/76), become above all a politics of time and eternal return.
to return, momentarily, to the earlier assertion of a complicity 
between Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida’s invocation of a 
bestial, technical life would seem to endorse the aforementioned idea 
of a life of capital. like the former, Derrida argues that capital should 
not be conflated with the event, which it continues to presuppose, 
‘inscribed and exceeded by a promise of gift beyond exchange’ (sM, 
160/254). following Deleuze and Guattari, one might therefore ques-
tion the extent to which our ability to respond to the event is governed 
by capital and the extent to which the sacralization of democracy is 
itself the result of sacrificial decisions made by capital. Derrida affirms 
the undecidability of this question, while also preserving the possibility 
of a decision that would not be determined by capital. if sovereignty 
implies control and the capacity to appropriate responsibility, he 
argues, the decision takes place beyond sovereignty, at the point where 
the subject – be it capital or the human – unravels in the intensity of 
life stripped of its subjectivity, the greatest weight of the eternal return 
of the event. Beyond the grip of conscious appropriation and control, 
the moment of decision is one of what Derrida, following Kierkegaard, 
calls madness:
‘the instant of the decision is madness’, Kierkegaard says elsewhere. [. . .] 
like the gift and the ‘gift of death’, it remains irreducible to presence or to 
presentation, it demands a temporality of the instant without ever constitut-
ing a present. it belongs to an atemporal temporality, to a duration that 
cannot be grasped. (GD, 65/94)
the decision and hence politics, he continues, takes place in the exposure 
to the event, to (and in) the time beyond presence, the non-chronolog-
ical ‘atemporal temporality’ of the gift. the delirium of undecidability, 
of différance, becomes the moment of exposure to the gift, where one 
touches on and simultaneously pulls back from the experience of the 
gift as gift of death, the destitution of the supposedly sovereign subject. 
And yet it is a moment that, strictly, does not take place. the unground-
ing instant of exposure is instantly met with a decision that recuperates 
the subject. it is at this moment that the aneconomic gift-without-debt 
is reinscribed and negated in an economy of debt, the anxiety of respon-
sibility that comes from the sacrifice of the alterity of the event. Nancy 
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is in agreement: ‘We say all the time nowadays that responsibility is the 
freeing from all guilt. on the contrary, guilt is perhaps the beyond of 
all measurable responsibility’ (Derrida and Nancy 2004: 183). if the 
subject comes into being as the site of an anxiety, guilt and correspond-
ing sense of responsibility, it is as a result of this sacrificial foreclo-
sure of the event. insofar as the subject is a ‘principle of calculability’ 
(Derrida 1992b: 272/287), the first calculus pertains to an economy of 
guilt and its attempted expiation. this explains the ambiguity of how 
Derrida can say both that the gift is negated by the obligation to recip-
rocate and that we are none the less obliged to respond to it. it is only 
as subjects for whom the gift is sacrificed in its moment of receipt that 
the trace of this receipt echoes as a call to responsibility, an obligation 
to reciprocate the giving of the event. sacrifice is not prior to the other, 
a means of its performative enactment, but rather the response to its 
originary, ungrounding excess.
Keenan has noted that Derrida uses the concepts of suppression 
and repression in his work on sacrifice, particularly in regard to the 
logic of the gift. he cites Derrida’s reference to both a ‘double sup-
pression [refoulement]’ and a ‘double “suppression of the object [of 
the gift]” ’ (Keenan 2005: 156; GD, 112/153). the first suppression 
is of the gift’s unconditionality, which is suppressed by the libidinal 
economy that seeks to derive pleasure in giving. following this, ‘one 
must proceed to another suppression: that of keeping in the gift only 
the giving’ (GD, 12/153). the latter refers to the gift’s withdrawal in 
the very act of giving, which is to say its destitution of the subject that 
would stand to recognise and thereby negate the gift. Reading Derrida 
through Deleuze suggests also a third repression, in which the subject 
emerges as a reaction to the gift’s unbearable intensity, as a means of 
escaping the aneconomy of the event. Not only does the gift necessitate 
the ungrounding of the subject, it also effects the repression of which 
the subject is born, and which must be ungrounded. in its effectuation 
of the subject, the secret of a giving whose exposure would entail its 
destruction is thus preserved, but for the trace of repression or forget-
ting.
far from instantiating theodicy, the gift will always be reterrito-
rialised as a subject, the name imposed on a multiplicity. in arriving 
from the other, the decision names not simply the assumption of causal 
responsibility, but more significantly the ability to respond to the event 
through the creation of new subjectivities, new laws of identity that 
would enable it to sustain an encounter with the event. to do this is to 
become aware of the sacrifice that is at stake in the making of a deci-
sion, but also to become aware of the precariousness, the constitutive 
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undecidability, of the decisions that have already been made. We can, 
of course, doubt that there could ever be a pure decision, a decision 
without habitus – without the outcome being effectively predetermined, 
for example, by the minimal habitus of capital. (if there were, it would 
presumably operate on an unadulterated plane of immanence, in rela-
tion to which there would ironically be no need for the sacrificial deci-
sion.) By extension, we might also doubt whether, in creating a new 
subjectivity, we could ever successfully throw off the old one.
the point, for Derrida, is less that our decisions are contaminated, 
which is inevitable, and more that they must therefore remain in con-
stant circulation, never allowed to settle, lest they hypostatise and 
become poisonous, more poisonous than they already are. Unlike 
the Maori hau, the ‘esprit des choses’, or spirit of things given, that 
becomes poisonous if stalled on its circuitous journey home, the deci-
sion becomes poisonous when made in view of a homecoming, when 
the name of the gift is thought definitive. however unsurpassable capital 
may seem, its insuperability cannot be taken for granted, as if rooted 
definitively in ontology. Democracy is not irreducibly condemned to be 
framed by capital. the withdrawal of the gift from experience means 
that the decisions about what the polis, the community of the life of the 
political, consists in, must also be subject to the repetitions of eternal 
return. the eternal return of the decision is also an eternal return to the 
decision. the gift and its sacrifice must continue to communicate with 
one another, to exchange, aneconomically, in a ‘commerce without 
commerce of ghosts’ (sM, xviii/15).
coNclUs ioN
Understood as a politics of the eternal return, of the ungrounding 
repetition of difference, the politics of the gift has, or rather have, 
seemingly always existed in a relation of tension to both sacrifice and 
democracy. Rejecting the theodicy of hegel-Kojève’s end of history, 
Bataille originally articulates sacrifice as the key figure in a politics of 
general economy that exceeds the restricted (political) economy of capi-
talism. the gesture engenders resistance both within and without the 
continental tradition, on account of the violence of his dismissal of the 
institutions of modernity. that heidegger argues much the same has 
the effect of meaning that those who follow in their wake – primarily 
Derrida, Deleuze and Nancy – have been thought similarly contami-
nated, complicit in what at least one eminent critic has called a ‘critique 
of reason that shows reckless disregard for its own foundations’ in the 
project of modernity (habermas 1987: 337/391). in spite of repeated 
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complaints about the constitutive inability of representative democracy 
to accommodate the singularity of an event that refuses representation, 
these need not translate into an active call for institutional overthrow.
if anything, Nancy has sought to distance himself too much from the 
Batailleanism of this politics, marked out in terms of his refusal of the 
concept of sacrifice. tainted on one hand by hegelian connotations of 
theodicy and on the other by the aestheticised politics of fascism, the 
concept of sacrifice, he argues, is incompatible with the eternal return 
of an inappropriable gift, the ecotechnical offering through which we 
are abandoned to politics. Nancy identifies sacrifice as the site of totali-
tarian drift, but in circumscribing the sacrificial leaves himself open to 
the accusation of idealism, of extricating the political from any sense 
of its relation to a field of political practice he regards as inherently 
compromised.
through readings of Badiou and Derrida, we begin to see that sacri-
fice is made a scapegoat, whose abandonment only brings us closer to 
the prospect that there is no essence of the political, no isolable meaning 
of politics, beyond that of the decision through which we receive the 
gift, submitting it to an economy, a law of identity, in the process. 
the decision is itself sacrificial, at the root of sacrifice, pertaining to the 
way the excess of the event is represented, translated into a naming of 
the sacred. As the performative process of naming the sacred, sacri-
fice becomes entangled in the fictioning of an ontological ground, yet 
cannot be reduced to this fictioning; cannot be reduced to the transap-
propriation of essence, the subsumption of the event under immanence. 
to sacrifice, or rather to recognise in sacrifice the possibility of breaking 
with mimesis, is above all to acknowledge a gift that exceeds experi-
ence, to attempt to receive this gift by naming it in an act of reciproca-
tion that is condemned to fall short of the offering to which it responds. 
it is equally, implicitly, to acknowledge the impossibility of naming, 
to acknowledge the inadequacy of the counter-offering. Understood in 
terms of the politics of decision, sacrifice is not a name for the event, an 
inherently sublime gesture of transappropriation, but rather the price – 
we might even say the (an)economy – of our abandonment.
Rather than recklessly breaking with modernity, Derrida’s reasser-
tion of the irreducibility of sacrifice serves to reaffirm the modern herit-
age, by opening up a space for the reinvigoration, the resacralisation of 
democracy. far from recklessly diminishing its significance, thinking 
democracy through sacrifice as something fragile and ungroundable 
that must repeatedly be resacrificed, rethought, offers the means of 
preserving its integrity, of emphasising its promise. in this respect, it is 
vital that it not be essentialised as something whose mere instantiation 
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is enough to ward off and differentiate it from totalitarianism. Were 
there a distinction between totalitarianism and democracy, it would lie 
in the promise of the latter, in its willingness to become subject to rene-
gotiation, to reinvent itself through exposure to the eternal return of the 
new, the different. in practice, democracy’s openness to the future is a 
question of contingency rather than essence, of its willingness to leave 
undetermined the question of what it is that is to be sacrificed. the 
question of the end of history and of the end of this end becomes one 
of how much we are willing to take for granted, to see as having been 
essentially resolved by the passing of time. for Derrida – as for Bataille, 
perhaps, in his original response to Kojève – theodicy, too, must be 
renegotiated, suspended, its concept submitted to trial by eternal return.
it is no longer simply the case that politics takes place by default, 
only in the absence or failure of a philosophical thinking of the event. 
on the contrary, it is also politics that gives rise to philosophy. the sac-
rificial decisions in which politics consists give rise to the spectral excess 
of an event that philosophy is charged with thinking.
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Conclusion: Variations on a 
Theme from Nietzsche
Perhaps we should see the first attempt at this uprooting of Anthropology – 
to which, no doubt, contemporary thought is dedicated – in the Nietzschean 
experience. [. . .] Nietzsche marks the threshold beyond which contemporary 
philosophy can begin thinking again. [. . .] if the discovery of the Return is 
indeed the end of the philosophy, then the end of man, for its part, is the 
return to the beginning of philosophy.
(Michel foucault)1
several attempts have been made to discern an underlying thread or 
unifying thematic of twentieth-century french philosophy. Apparently 
oblivious to the critique of homo economicus that recent philosophies 
of the event have entailed, Gary Gutting has located this thread in 
an overarching ‘concern with individual freedom as a concrete lived 
reality’ (Gutting 2001: 380), in relation to which ‘poststructuralism 
is an interlude rather than a decisive turning point in the history of 
french philosophy’ (2001: 389). todd May rightly describes the con-
vergence of thinkers around the problematic of difference, particularly 
in a critique of foundationalism, viewed as a privileging of identity that 
is not only false but also ‘insidious’ and ‘totalitarian’ (May 1997: 4). 
Moved by the deaths of Deleuze and Derrida amongst others, not to 
mention the then serious illness of Nancy, Badiou writes nostalgically 
of an ‘exceptional [. . .] french philosophical moment’, seeing himself 
as ‘perhaps its last representative’ (Badiou 2005b). stretching broadly 
from sartre to Deleuze, this moment is characterised by interrogations 
of the human subject and the legacy of nineteenth-century German 
philosophy, as well as science, psychoanalysis and a desire to ‘situate 
philosophy directly within the political arena without taking a detour 
via political philosophy’ (2005b [tM]). Mauss is included in this 
1. ot, 342/353.
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 panorama, named amongst the prophets of what, according to Badiou, 
is only ‘mistakenly termed structuralism’, who were increasingly scepti-
cal of modern philosophy’s insistence on the transparency of human 
experience, and amongst the first to decouple experience from ‘a decen-
tred real that is neither grasped nor localized’ (Badiou 2008b: 213n.42, 
48/173n.1, 76; hallward 2003: 401n.11). But to capture the full signifi-
cance of the politics of the gift, which brings together the problematics 
of difference, politics, the emergence of new academic disciplines and 
the legacy of German phenomenology, one must go further, recognis-
ing the anthropologist’s role in fomenting a crisis in philosophy and a 
corresponding reconfiguration of the boundaries between philosophy, 
anthropology and politics.
While acknowledging the multiplicity of origins, the start of the 
moment philosophique français should be moved back, pace Badiou, 
from sartre to Bataille, if not Mauss himself, and defined in relation 
to Bataille’s response to Kojève. By calling for the ‘anthropologisation’ 
of the abstract logic of hegel’s philosophy of Geist, Kojève occupies 
a decisive yet ambiguous moment in french philosophy’s negotia-
tion with the anthropological. the call is less a clinging to the fading 
epistémè of philosophy-as-Anthropology than an attempt to break free 
from it by replacing hegel’s abstract account of reason with a descrip-
tion of man’s being-in-the-world. And yet, rather than open philosophy 
on to a beyond of Anthropology, rather than anticipate foucault’s 
‘death of man’ in the ungrounding of the modern subject, Kojève identi-
fied anthropologisation with the end of history, through the obviation 
of both philosophy and politics. A new paradigm emerges around the 
gift, defined by the rejection of this Anthropo-hegelianism and the 
exposure of the limitations of dialectical exchange. Philosophy would 
henceforth have to open itself up to a shifting intellectual landscape 
with which it had hitherto resisted dialogue. As Kaufman observes, 
with a ‘precedent set by the college of sociology’, there follows a deter-
ritorialisation of philosophy, which is taken beyond the formal institu-
tions of academia and toward a new form of intellectual exchange in 
‘a delirium that signals the ecstatic breakdown of identity’ (Kaufman 
2001: 7). taken up by Bataille, Klossowski and lacan, amongst others, 
Maussian anthropology becomes an other of the type whose spectres, 
Derrida argues, ‘threaten the interiority of the home’, by haunting the 
institutional oikos of philosophy through their compulsion of hospital-
ity (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2007: 53/51).
in terms of the legacy to which this gives rise, the effect is roughly 
discernible in two tendencies, which contrast with Agamben’s distinc-
tion between trajectories of immanence and transcendence in french 
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philosophy (Agamben 1999: 238–9). one might consider a pattern 
based on thinkers’ hospitality toward anthropology and the newly 
emergent human sciences; on the extent to which they affirm an 
encounter with the (anthropological) other as a condition of reconcep-
tualising the relationship between philosophy and anthropology. the 
alternative tendency is to see the human sciences as a legacy of philo-
sophically sclerotic Anthropology and conceive politics from within 
a more narrowly, exclusively, philosophical discourse. A first group 
comprising Mauss, lévi-strauss, Bataille, Klossowski and lacan is 
characterised by an ostensibly ‘anti-philosophical’ treatment of philoso-
phy, by a willingness to move beyond the conventionally philosophical, 
into anthropology, heterology and psychoanalysis. Another group, 
comprising heidegger and Nancy, perhaps also Jean-luc Marion, dis-
tance themselves from philosophy-as-Anthropology, from the modern 
philosophy of privileged subjectivity, while continuing to insist on the 
priority of philosophical (phenomenological, ontological) discourse. 
the two tendencies need not be mutually exclusive, however. Alain 
Badiou has argued that ‘philosophy should always think as closely as 
possible to antiphilosophy’ (Badiou and hallward 1998: 124), and 
Deleuze and Derrida exemplify this claim. Both deem phenomenology 
and ontology insufficient for an understanding of politics, which both 
precedes and exceeds the horizons of subjectivity. Rather than give up 
on philosophy, they conceive it as necessarily defined by the encounter 
with an other that cannot be subsumed under the logical categories of 
transcendental consciousness; the field of philosophy is even precisely 
that which survives this encounter.
Nancy has recently evoked the ‘parallel differences’ of ‘the two Ds’ 
who are ultimately incommensurable (‘sans partage’), ‘for whom ‘there 
is no common measure.’ the relationship between Deleuze and Derrida 
is defined by ‘the impossibility of furnishing a common rule for two 
systems of writing [régimes de phrases], two language games. But’, he 
continues, ‘philosophy itself presents itself to us as the regime of the 
non-given rule’ (2005: 10), as a kind of (aneconomic) exchange that 
never quite takes place, because it escapes any totalising identification; 
because it operates, not through fixed terms, but through unstable 
concepts that cannot be translated into one another without remain-
der. similar comparisons might be applied to the relations, consisting 
in often deliberate misreadings of one another and near-imperceptible 
variations on the same concepts, between any of the thinkers discussed 
over the course of the present work, in a way that complicates the 
(arguably reductive, essentialist) attempt to articulate poststructuralism 
– and poststructuralist politics in particular – as coalescing around a 
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paradigm of the gift. Regarding the two Ds, Nancy prefers to speak of a 
‘sharing’ or parallelism of thought, or of a community, albeit one para-
doxically defined by the ‘absence of community’. A community without 
community, as Derrida would say, recalling Blanchot recalling Bataille, 
for whom ‘the community of which i speak is one that will exist virtu-
ally from the fact of the existence of Nietzsche’ (Blanchot 1988: 22/41; 
Pf, 47/56–7n). A community of the eternal return that comes into exist-
ence only through the impossibility of thinking the ways in which this 
return plays out across thought and history.
the virtual community, or what foucault has called the epistémè, 
of eternal return, is also a community – a polis – of the gift, in which 
the differences of its constituents coexist without being subordinate to 
any totalising figure of a ground. Much as Bataille, Klossowski, lacan, 
Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida and Nancy share in the thinking of a 
gift that withdraws from subjectivity, it is also this withdrawal that 
keeps them apart, entailing an eternal return to the impossibility of 
naming what it is that is given in the event. We see this already in the 
multiple repetitions that play out in Mauss’s legacy. Bataille repeats 
Mauss by turning to Nietzsche, invoking a general economy of life and 
death to take Mauss beyond the restricted lévi-straussian thinking 
of exchange purely in terms of culture. lacan’s account of a real that 
returns eternally to the same place further nuances the relation between 
the symbolic order of nature and its interruption by life (the undead 
life-beyond-death of the libido), and thus anticipates the Derridean 
thinking of spectrality. Derrida also follows Bataille in castigating lévi-
strauss for his omission of Nietzsche. so too do Deleuze and Guattari, 
whose return to Nietzsche enables them to emancipate spectres of 
Mauss from their framing by the total social fact of structuralism. the 
problems of heidegger stem from his attempt to surpass Nietzsche, to 
replace Nietzsche’s ‘metaphysics’ with ontology, because in so doing 
he aestheticises the eternal return, restricting repetition to poiesis. But 
this is overturned by another return to Nietzsche, reincarnated in the 
constant, ungrounding circulations of Nancy’s ecotechnical bodies. if 
Deleuze and Derrida are parallel, Nancy suggests, it is as repetitions of 
Nietzsche, repetitions of ‘difference itself, the sameness of difference’, 
where ‘ “eternal return” = not a flight out of time, but continuously 
discontinuous time, cutting short its completion, all results and all reso-
lution’ (2005: 11).
Poststructuralism’s community of the gift never gives itself as a 
homogeneous present, never resolves the differences that can be traced 
to its origins in anthropology, phenomenology and a certain crisis in 
philosophy. the community created through the receipt of Nietzsche’s 
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legacy is also the (anti-)philosophical community of Mauss’s héritiers, 
though it cannot be confined to either designation. Le moment philos-
ophique français offers itself up to numerous names (‘poststructural-
ism’ included), but the very process of naming it entails the sacrifice of 
its multiplicity, the collapse of its aneconomy into an economy of repre-
sentation. Derrida avoids ontologisation for just this reason, qualifying 
the gift with a ‘s’il y en a’ that avoids committing it to some kind of 
presence. one might none the less point to a post-Maussian consensus 
over a gift that cannot be conflated with a thing or even with a present, 
which is resistant to any kind of identity-politics: a gift that would come 
from the future to disrupt the present, whose politics would pertain to 
a singular excess that escapes institutional organisation. Mauss rejected 
the paradigm of homo economicus, the utility-maximising individual 
driven to work by a combination of lack, the scarcity of resources and 
the desire to actualise his or her essence in labour. Derrida, lacan, 
Deleuze and Nancy, amongst others, extend this critique by showing 
the excess of the gift to precede and unground any concept of essence, 
revealing politics and economics as responses to the absence of foun-
dational, metaphysical structures. they furthermore argue that politics 
must come to affirm ungrounding, to do away with the desire for a 
founding gesture, rather than seek to conceal the effects of our aban-
donment. to this extent, the revolution the gift inaugurates is less insti-
tutional than philosophical. its principal endeavour is less to foment 
revolution than to account for its failure, by reformulating politics as 
something prior to, and which does not simply supervene on, ontology; 
something that moreover renders ontology –the logos of being present – 
impossible. in this sense, a politics of the gift is both more and less than 
revolutionary: more, in that it breaks free from the circle, the economy 
of a founding figure of truth that would see revolution return to its 
point of origin; and simultaneously less, in that it discloses the impos-
sibility of beginning again, of refounding the political on the primordial 
truth of an essential subject or ground.
Understood in these terms, there is politics because there can be no 
revolution. the site of the political is that of the gap between eternal 
return and its completion, of the minimal difference that ungrounds 
the law of the oikos, preventing the closure of the circuit of identity. 
this impossibility is what condemns politics to sacrifice, but equally 
forces philosophy to think the gift that is sacrificed in the moment of 
its receipt. the respective sites of philosophy and politics are perhaps 
the same after all, kept apart only perspectivally, by the minimal dif-
ference between virtual and actual, aneconomy and economy, the gift 
and its sacrifice. Whether by denying it or actively affirming it, politics 
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deals with the eternal return that philosophy would have us envis-
age. likewise, philosophy takes up the task of thinking ‘das grösste 
schwergewicht’, the greatest weight, of the impossible futures to which 
politics attempts to respond. the one does not simply take place by 
default, through the failure of the other, but rather exists as its inverse 
face.
in decentring the political, in shifting the site of politics from the 
subject to the event, there is a risk that we will lose sight of the politics 
of scarcity and human need. thinkers of a gift that cannot be conflated 
with recognition, hence with charity, have faced the inevitable accusa-
tion of privileging an aristocratic affirmation of the deficiency of human 
experience, a nihilistic preference for that which exceeds it, rather than 
an active engagement with the politics of this world. the privileging of 
the singularity and difference of the event means that the politics of the 
anthropos – of basic human equality and the potential forms of political 
subjectivity – is neglected. A newer generation of french philosophers 
are beginning to build a consensus over this point, criticising the excess 
of poststructuralism for making politics contingent on a philosophical 
thinking of difference that cannot be translated into practice. Badiou’s 
concerns that Deleuze aristocratically recuperates suffering through a 
beatific, theodic thinking of the event are mirrored by Jacques Rancière, 
who has recently redrawn attention to the overtly theocratic language 
of Derrida’s work on politics. According to Rancière, Derrida’s ‘politi-
cal concepts are theological concepts that have hardly been secular-
ized’, and which, in the absence of any notion of the political subject, 
effectively just shift sovereignty away from God and on to the event 
(gift, democracy-to-come . . .) (Rancière 2009: 279). What with his 
language of sacrifice and key concept of grace, the same criticism might 
be levelled at Badiou. But rather than work toward a politics freed 
from the restricted economy of Anthropology, a politics that begins 
with the abandonment of the subject, Rancière has joined with Badiou 
in emphasising that politics has a distinct logic of its own, which is that 
of the creation of political subjectivity (Rancière 2001, 2004: 225–6). 
A similar focus is attributable to Bernard stiegler, the philosopher of 
technology and desire, for whom ‘politics is above all the motivation 
and organisation of a process of psychic and collective individuation’: 
that is, the creation of individual and collective subjectivities, through 
the construction of symbolic exchange (stiegler 2004: 36). suspicious 
of the poststructuralist tendency to idealise and romanticise the event, 
stiegler has sought to elaborate a politics that reinforces the symbolic 
order of subjectivity against its erosion by capitalist marketing tech-
nologies, which – recalling what Žižek describes as the eternal return of 
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the ‘real of capital’ – he argues short-circuit the sublimation of libidi-
nal drives into desiring subjectivity. testifying to the anthropologist’s 
enduring influence, he turns to Mauss’s gift economy to develop the 
bases of an aneconomic ‘economy of contribution’ (stiegler 2004: 35; 
stiegler 2005: 55, 66).
the work of this new generation is by no means a regression to 
Anthropology, but a continuation of the movement away from the 
uncritical acceptance of the metaphysics of the subject. By shifting 
emphasis away from a philosophisation of the event and back on to 
the potential for political action, they remain faithful to the project of 
bringing an end to the philosophical overdetermination of the political. 
the shift also points to a renewal of revolutionary impetus and a reluc-
tance to see Marxism reduced to what is perceived as the hollowed-out, 
impotent spectres of Derrida, or the idealism of Deleuze and Guattari. 
An appreciation of these new directions need not, however, entail fully 
conceding to the claims of antihumanism and insufficient radicality 
directed against Deleuze, Derrida et al. one might argue that to disclose 
the absence of ontological privilege is already to disclose the fragility, 
the contingency of the human, and thereby to reassert the need for its 
renewal, by reconceiving its relation to a capitalism that cannot be sur-
passed. this is by no means simply to become an apologist for capital-
ism . . .
*  *  *
on one of his final visits to the english-speaking world, during 
August 1999, local journalists in sydney pressed Jacques Derrida to 
become involved in the debates surrounding the ‘stolen generation’ 
of Aborigines, the fate of the once predominant indigenous tribes 
of Australia. the request, to which the philosopher responded only 
hesitatingly, brought him head-to-head with the legacy of one of the 
cultures of the archaic gift economy from which the modern anthropo-
logical problematic of the gift originates. Asked whether the Australian 
government should offer an apology for its part in the historical per-
secution of the island’s autochthonous peoples, for the politics that 
saw Aborigine and mixed-race children removed from their parents 
and effectively bastardised, orphaned, resettled away from the influ-
ences of native culture, Derrida gives the following comment (in 
english):
if you insist, i will say yes, the government should apologise on behalf of the 
Australian people . . . it is not a matter of forgiveness, we cannot ask forgive-
ness from a people who are dead or not here, but we know that an apology 
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is also a promise for the future, a promise to change the situation. (Derrida 
2001b: 47)
if an apology is desirable, it is not because it stands as the condition of 
possibility of forgiveness, Derrida argues. he rejects the presupposition 
that forgiveness should be offered only as an expiative countergift, in 
response to a previous offering. Nor is it desirable as an assumption 
of fault, an admission of guilt, since this too would be to commit to 
distinctly economic concepts of repayable debt and individualisable 
responsibility. Nor, by implication, does it entail becoming complicit 
in the maintenance and perpetuation of a certain order, since on the 
contrary, an apology creates a rupture with the past. conceived aneco-
nomically, to apologise is rather to assume the responsibility of opening 
oneself to a future not governed by the awaiting of a messiah, the return 
of a ground or destiny. it is thus to recognise that there is no big other, 
no sublimely redemptive gift or Messiah, no pure inheritance from 
which to derive a definitive response to the political; no higher agency 
that could supersede political struggle. this is less to legitimate what is 
than to offer hospitality to its illegitimacy, to affirm that, abandoned to 
politics, we are all orphans, bastards, shot through with 194an indis-
cernible, undecidable alterity whose precise delimitations can never be 
given.
Understood as the event of existence in all its multiplicity and 
unpredictability, the gift keeps on giving in excess of our ability to 
recognise it. to receive it we must sacrifice the subject in a paradoxi-
cal gesture that will also inevitably sacrifice the event, the gift itself, by 
resubmitting it to representation and, in so doing, reinscribing it in an 
economy of subjectivity. the gift accordingly remains impossible, with 
this impossibility serving as the condition of possibility of, the cause 
of our abandonment to, the political. Rather than Bismarck’s famous 
art of the possible (die Kunst des Möglichen), politics occurs as the site 
and praxis of the impossible, to which we are eternally called upon to 
return, compelled to respond without simply giving up. We cannot be, 
and yet are condemned to be, subjects, subject to tension between the 
economic and the aneconomic. the politics of the gift, of the à-venir in 
which what is at stake dissolves and is reborn, otherwise, opens up in 
the space of this double bind.
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